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Summary 
 
In terms of the Constitution every person has the right to freedom and security of the 
person. This includes the right to be free from all forms of violence from either public 
or private sources. The state is charged with the duty to protect the individual from 
such harm. While the Constitution refers to the protection of victims of crime in broad 
and general terms without indicating how these rights should be protected, it makes 
meticulous and detailed provision for the rights of arrested, detained and accused 
persons. This leads to the popular belief that the Constitution protects the criminal 
and not the victim, engendering public dissatisfaction with the status quo, which is 
amplified by the fact that South Africa’s current legal dispensation for victims of crime 
does not embody the requirements of ubuntu and African customary law, which the 
Constitution declares to be binding on South African courts. This study analyses the 
means that exist in South African law for the victim of crime to obtain redress for 
criminal acts and proposes effective avenues through which victims can obtain 
redress, should the existing machinery prove to be inadequate. The term restitution is 
used to indicate recompense obtained from the perpetrator, while the term 
compensation refers to recompense obtained from the state. A comparative study is 
conducted to ascertain how the legal position of victims of crime in South Africa 
compares with that of victims of crime in Great Britain, India and New Zealand, 
respectively.  
 
South Africa does not have a state-funded victim compensation scheme such as 
those which exist in most developed countries. The respective proposals of the South 
African Law Commission for a victim compensation scheme and revised legislation to 
deal with offender/victim restitution are considered critically, inter alia, in the light of 
the findings of the comparative study.  
 
Proposals are made regarding changes to the South African legal system to bring it 
in line with international developments regarding restitution and compensation to 
victims of crime, attention being given to the meaning, significance and 
implementation of the doctrine of restorative justice when dealing with the aftermath 
of criminal injury.  
 
In addition to a complete revision of South African legislation dealing with 
offender/victim restitution, this study recommends the consolidation of the Road 
 iv
Accident Fund and the Compensation Fund operating in terms of the Compensation 
for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act. These two bodies should be 
amalgamated to create a unified Compensation Scheme to compensate victims of 
crime, as well as victims of traffic and industrial injuries. General qualifying criteria for 
claimants would be drafted, with specific criteria applying in cases of traffic, industrial 
and crime related injuries, respectively. 
 
 
Victims of crime – injury – restitution – compensation – restorative justice – victim 
compensation scheme 
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Chapter 1 
 
Nature, extent and structure of the study 
 
1 1 Statement of problem 
 
“Victimisation constitutes a violation of human rights.”1  
 
In terms of the Constitution2 every person has the right to freedom and security of the 
person. This includes the right to be free from all forms of violence from either public 
or private sources. The reference to private sources makes it clear that this right of 
the individual is protected not only against interference by the state, but also against 
violation by other individuals; what Devenish refers to as “explicit horizontal 
application.”3 Devenish further cites assault as an example of the harm against which 
the individual is protected and includes not only physical harm but also psychological 
harm under the aegis of the protection afforded. The fact that there is no direct 
reference to freedom from violence in the interim Constitution4 emphasises the 
importance which the legislators attached to this provision when drafting the final 
version of the Constitution.5 The duty is placed on the state to protect the individual 
from such harm. Only the state has the power to use force against individuals.6 This 
power is limited by two principles, namely that:7 
 
? The use of force should be sufficient to justify its use;  and  
? The least degree of force be used to bring about the necessary results. 
 
The Bill of Rights8 safeguards the right to bodily/physical and psychological integrity 
and grants the individual the right to inter alia security and control over his or her 
body. 
  
                                            
1  White Paper on Safety and Security (Providing adequate service to victims) 
September 1998 SII par 3. 
2  S 12(1)(c) of the Bill of Rights, Ch 2 of the Constitution of the RSA 108 of 1996. 
3  Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 114. 
4  Constitution of the RSA Act 200 of 1993. Referred to as the interim Constitution. 
5  De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook (1998) 199. 
6  This refers to the premeditated application of coercion, excluding isolated situations 
where one individual may legally apply force against another, e g in cases of self 
defence, or in terms of the rule volenti non fit iniuria. 
7  De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook 201. 
8  S 12(2). 
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The Bill of Rights states: “No person may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application…”9 This is not limited to immovable property10 and 
includes personal rights like pensions, unemployment security and medical benefits; 
not just tangibles.11 Children (persons under the age of 18) have the right to 
protection from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation.12 The Bill of Rights is to 
be construed so as to promote “an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.”13 
 
Thus the highest law of the land enshrines the safety and dignity of each person and 
the safety of his or her property as fundamental rights. Giving effect to this protection 
is one of the duties of the state. 
 
It is, however, notable that the provisions cited above do not give any specific 
indication of the means by which violations of person and property are to be 
redressed in favour of the victim. The Constitution14 places the obligation on the 
organs of state, through legislative and other measures, to ensure the impartiality, 
independence, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts. Do the courts 
possess sufficient means to be effective in redressing the harm done to victims of 
crime and can this task be left to the courts alone? This question will be addressed in 
this research. The fact that reference is made to the effectiveness of the courts 
means that provision must be made to ensure this functioning, which further means 
that structures must be created to bring about this effectiveness, if they do not exist. 
The vastly varying nature of these structures, both extant and potential, will be 
explored in this research. 
 
While the Constitution refers to the protection of victims of crime in broad and general 
terms without indicating how these rights should be protected, it makes meticulous 
and detailed provision for the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons,15 
protecting no fewer than twenty-nine rights of the suspected offender. This leads to 
the popular belief that the Constitution protects the criminal and not the victim: 
 
                                            
9  S 25(1). 
10  S 25(4)(b). 
11  Devenish A Commentary on the SA Bill of Rights 351. 
12  S 28(d). 
13  S 39. 
14  S 165(4). 
15  S 35. 
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It has become a refrain among many who lack an appreciation of the virtues 
of our constitutional state that the Bill of Rights ‘is there to help criminals, not 
the victims of crime.’ It is a refrain that, regrettably, has been taken up even 
by senior justice and police officials and their political heads.16 
 
And 
 
In the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution, the rights of offenders 
are clearly stipulated while victims are not even once singled out as a group 
of people having any rights.17 
 
The victim of crime may well “lack an appreciation of the virtues of our constitutional 
state” when faced with the devastation of apparently unredressed criminal acts. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act18 contains numerous provisions safeguarding the rights 
of suspected offenders. It is beyond the scope of this work to enumerate these 
provisions as this research deals with the protection of the rights of the victim of 
crime and not those of the alleged perpetrator. Section 28 of the Act serves as an 
example of the protection of the suspected perpetrator: It authorises a court sitting in 
a criminal hearing to make an order for damages against a police official who enters 
premises or conducts a search or seizure without the necessary search warrant. 
While the person unfairly accused of a crime is also a victim and deserving of 
protection, this does not explain why this particular victim should receive so much 
explicit legislative protection while the “ordinary” victim of crime receives so little 
recognition. Some might argue that it precisely this phenomenon, namely that the 
suspected perpetrator is cast in the role of victim, while the “real” victim is forgotten, 
that lies at the root of the problem. However, it does give rise to the issue of whether 
the victim ought to be compensated when he or she is also involved in a criminal act 
at the time of injury, for example the burglar who is assaulted by an accomplice when 
dividing the spoils. This matter will be dealt with in the course of the discussion of 
state funded victim compensation schemes, both those existing in other jurisdictions 
and in the scheme proposed for South Africa.  
 
                                            
16  Editorial “A salutary precedent” Business Day 20 August 2001. See also van As H J 
"Legal Aid in Mexico: Visions of SA's future?" (2004) 15 Stellenbosch Law Review 
137. Legal Aid Board Annual Report 2003/4 20 states that 88% of all new cases dealt 
with by justice centres during the relevant period were criminal cases and 12% civil. 
17  Moolman C J “Victim rights in Anglo-American and continental European countries:  
What can SA learn?” 1997 (10) SA Journal of Criminal Justice 273. 
18  51 of 1977. 
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South Africa has an extremely high rate of crimes aimed at the individual.19 This 
notwithstanding the fact that crime statistics released by the Department of Safety 
and Security show a reduction in seventeen of the South Africa’s most serious crime 
categories for 2004/2005. Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, is quoted 
as saying: "The future to me looks very rosy in terms of the fight against crime and 
criminality in South Africa."20 Statistics show that while instances of certain crimes 
might be declining, those of a violent crime like rape are rising. It is clear that violent 
crime in South Africa remains a serious problem. 
 
The official figures do not reflect the entire picture, as many crimes are unreported. 
Two of the main reasons for the non-reporting of crimes are, firstly, that members of 
less privileged communities have little expectation of assistance from the authorities 
and, secondly, that the victim – particularly in the case of rape – is subjected to a 
humiliating invasion of privacy. Violent crime constitutes one of the greatest sources 
of productivity loss in South Africa and places a heavy burden on the health care 
system. It is thus in the public interest that the plight of the victim of crime be 
addressed effectively by the legal system. Violence perpetrated against an individual 
constitutes an attack on the fibre of society itself.21 
 
Aside from humanitarian considerations, the growth of the South African economy is 
being stunted by the high cost of crime:22 
 
Unless crime is confronted and addressed vigorously and without 
compromise, there is little hope of developing SA to its full potential. 
 
The status of South Africa as a participant in the international community is 
jeopardised by its image of being a society where the consequences of crime are not 
adequately addressed. Articles in the press support this:23 
                                            
19  S A Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A compensation scheme for victims of 
crime in SA) Project 82 Discussion paper 97 (2001) Ch 2. 
20  Murder statistics declined by 5,6%, attempted murder by 1,8% and serious assault by 
4,5%. Robbery with aggravating circumstances was 5,5% lower and burglary at 
residential and non-residential premises dropped by 8,1% and 13,6% respectively. 
However, rape increased by 4% and indecent assault by 8%. Drug-related crimes 
increased by 33,5%.  
 “Nqakula paints rosy picture of crime levels” 22 September 2005 Independent Online. 
 (September 2005) 
 http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=qw1127307960209B265 
21  See previous 2 footnotes. 
22  Bouwer T quoted in “Crime could impede SA’s growth” Business Day 25 March 2002. 
23  Jenvey N “High costs of crime are turning investors of SA” Business Day 19 February 
2002. 
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(Deloitte and Touche forensic services manager Rupert Haw) said at a recent 
conference on crime in the workplace that expenses related to criminal 
activity including the cost of theft, fraud, corruption, insurance, recovery and 
crime prevention were all factors militating against investment. 
 
When members of society feel that the state is not sufficiently protecting them from 
the consequences of crime, one of the results is the occurrence of vigilantism and the 
loss of respect for the authority of the state. The growth of the People Against 
Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) movement in the Western Cape is a prime 
example of this phenomenon.24 This in turn leads to the further erosion of regard for 
the forces of law and order.25 
 
1 2 Aims of this research 
 
The general aim of this research is to: 
 
? Analyse the means that exist in South African law for the victim of crime to 
obtain redress for the criminal violation of his or her rights enshrined in the 
Constitution; and  
? Propose effective means through which victims can obtain redress should the 
existing means prove to be inadequate.  
 
Internationally, the burgeoning concept of restorative justice26 is inextricably linked 
with the issue of victims’ rights. Restorative justice programmes have the common 
characteristic of underscoring the role of victims of crime in the criminal justice 
process. Not only are victims’ rights emphasised, but victims also have an input in 
deciding the sentence of the offender. This work will concentrate on those 
programmes which seek to redress by pecuniary means the harm done to the victim. 
                                            
24  Article on web page of Department of Religious Studies, University of Cape Town. 
 (June 2002) http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/religion/pagad.htm. Though the influence of 
PAGAD has diminished, its evolution still serves as a warning to the state: Gottschalk 
K Vigilantism v the State: A case study of the rise and fall of Pagad, 1996 – 2000 
(February 2005) Occasional Paper 99 Institute for Security Studies. 
(August 2005) http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/papers/99/Paper99.htm 
25  Merten M “Gangsterism goes on trial in Cape” Mail and Guardian 8 June 2001.  
(June 2002) http://www.mg.co.za 
26  Concerning restorative justice, see Ch 2 Par 2 3 (infra). 
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The United Nations defines a restorative justice programme as one that uses 
restorative processes. A restorative process is described as follows:27 
 
(A)ny process in which the victim and the offender, and, where appropriate, 
any other individuals or community members affected by a crime participate 
together actively in the resolution of matters arising from the crime, generally 
with the help of a facilitator. Restorative processes may include mediation, 
conciliation, conferencing and sentencing circles. 
 
Restorative justice includes the concept of restitution,28 as evidenced by the following 
definition of restorative outcome: 
 
(A)n agreement reached as the result of a restorative process. Restorative 
outcomes include responses and programmes such as reparation, restitution 
and community service, aimed at meeting the individual and collective needs 
and responsibilities of the parties and achieving the reintegration of the victim 
and the offender.29 
 
While restorative justice represents a new direction in criminal justice, its objectives 
are not necessarily different from those of traditional criminal justice systems. Both 
regimes favour the prevention of re-offending by the perpetrator. Restorative justice 
aims to achieve this by re-integrating the offender into society, while traditional 
criminal justice relies on deterrence to achieve this objective.30 
 
This research conducts a comparative study to ascertain how the legal position of 
victims of crime in South Africa compares with that of victims of crime in Great Britain 
(more specifically, England and Wales)31, India and New Zealand respectively. The 
reason for a comparative study is to be found in the fact that South Africa does not 
have a state-funded victim compensation scheme such as those which exist in many 
other countries. The value of a comparison of domestic and foreign law for the 
constructive development of a country’s legal system is universally acknowledged.32 
Specific advantages of the comparative study of foreign legal systems are:33 
 
                                            
27  United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice 
Programmes in Criminal Matters 2000 
 International Centre for Justice and Reconciliation (April 2002) 
http://www.restorativejustice.org/rj3/Undocuments/UNDecBasicPrinciplesofRJ.html 
28  See par 1 3 1 (infra) for a definition of restitution. 
29  See previous footnote. 
30  Easton S & Piper C Sentencing and Punishment – The Quest for Justice (2005) 158. 
31  See Ch 2 Par 2 2 3 (infra). 
32  Venter F et al Regsnavorsing: Metode en Publikasie (1990) 206 et seq. 
33  See previous footnote. 
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? It gives the researcher better insight into reforms required in his or her own 
legal system. The fact that South African law requires reform, is fundamental 
to the research undertaken in this work. 
? It prepares the way for social changes that have occurred elsewhere. The fact 
that many countries have victim compensation schemes while South Africa 
has none, is indicative of the fact that a general consciousness of this need 
will soon arise in South Africa, if it has not in fact already arisen.34 
? It fosters insight into foreign legal systems, thus assisting in outlining policy 
considerations in evolving domestic law. 
? It encourages insight into legal methodology by showing the social function of 
the law and its role in society. It has been shown in this chapter that there is a 
growing social awareness of the plight of victims of crime. 
? It assists in finding a satisfactory solution to an existing problem; its value 
extends beyond a simple quest for knowledge. 
 
The International Crime Victim Compensation Program Directory35 lists twenty-nine 
countries which have state-funded victim compensation schemes. The reasons for 
the choice of Great Britain, India and New Zealand for a comparative study are inter 
alia the following: 
 
? The other three countries, together with South Africa, form part of the 
Commonwealth. 
? Great Britain and New Zealand have well-developed compensation systems 
for victims of crime,36 while India is much less developed in this respect. 
? All four countries share English as an official language.37 
? India, New Zealand and South Africa all experienced British influence in their 
development into modern states. 
                                            
34  Consider the work of the SALC in this regard as set out in par 1 4 (infra) and Ch 5 
(infra). 
35  (1998 – 1999) 
(June 2002) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/intdir/intdir.htm 
The International Crime Victim Compensation Program Directory is compiled by the 
United States’ Department of Justice’s Office for Victims of Crime. 
36  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
 Standards Paper read at an ERA Seminar, Protecting Victims of Crime in the 
European Union 5 – 6 November 2001. 
37  See Venter F et al Regsnavorsing 227 – 228 regarding the problems encountered in 
legal comparison when various languages are involved. 
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? A balance will be achieved by comparing South African with an “Old World” 
country (Great Britain) and other “New World” countries (India and New 
Zealand). 
? Both India and South Africa are developing countries with acute levels of 
crime. New Zealand, while sharing their colonial past, does not have an equal 
crime problem.38  
? While both Great Britain and New Zealand have highly developed victim 
compensation schemes, there is an important and fundamental difference 
between Britain’s Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme and New 
Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme. While the former deals 
exclusively with victims of violent crime, the latter deals on the same footing 
with all victims of accidental injury (not necessarily injury inflicted by criminal 
acts).39 
? Great Britain and New Zealand were the first countries in the world to institute 
victim compensation schemes.40 
 
Although sources of foreign law are limited in South Africa, this is not seen as a 
problem: 
 
Die insig dat die vergelykingsbewerking grootliks vry van waardeoordele 
verloop bring mee dat daar geen sisteemnoodwendige beperkings op die 
aantal elemente wat by die vergelyking betrek word rus nie. Dit stel die 
navorser in staat om die elemente vir sy ondersoek te kies bloot met 
inagneming van praktiese oorwegings, soos die beskikbaarheid van tyd, geld, 
bronne, taalvaardigheid en die oogmerk wat hy met sy navorsing wil bereik.41 
 
When presenting the data collected during comparative investigations, the 
researcher is confronted by two options: The information can be arranged either by 
reference to the legal systems separately or by taking a particular element and 
                                            
38  Chockalingam K University of Madras India Evaluation of the Implementation of the 
Victims Assistance Fund in Tamil Nadu University of Madras India. 
(June 2002) http://www.aqpv.ca/diffusion/abstracts/abc_a/chockalingam_nk.html 
See also Barclay G & Tavares C International Comparison Of Criminal Justice 
Systems 2001 Home Office UK 2003. 
39  See Ch 5 (infra). Hutchison D B Accident Compensation: New Zealand shows the 
way Inaugural lecture delivered on 15 August 1984 at the University of Cape Town. 
40  See Ch 2 par 2 2 (infra). 
41  Venter F et al Regsnavorsing 209. The fact that the process of comparison takes 
place mainly without value judgments, has the result that there are no system 
essential limitations on the number of elements that are incorporated in the 
comparison. This enables the researcher to select the elements of his research 
considering simply practical considerations, such as the availability of time, money, 
sources, linguistic skill and the aim which he wishes to achieve with his research. 
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comparing the manner in which it is approached in each legal system.42 In this 
research a combined approach is followed as specific aspects of victim redress are 
dealt with in different chapters, but within those chapters separate paragraphs are 
dedicated to the relevant aspect of victim redress in each country separately.43 This 
modus operandi then permits a comparison of like aspects at the end of each 
chapter. 
 
Attention is given to the problem of augmenting the legal means at the disposal of 
victims of crime in South Africa as it will be shown that their rights do not receive 
protection equal to that found in some other systems of law. 
 
The proposals of the South African Law Reform Commission for a victim 
compensation scheme44 are considered critically in the light of the findings of the 
comparative study.  
 
Having critically considered the data collected, proposals are made regarding 
changes to the South African legal system to bring it in line current international 
developments. 
 
1 3 Research methodology and assumptions 
 
1 3 1 Research methodology 
 
If one were to visualise a continuum of research methods with quantitative research 
(which is explanatory in nature employing the disinterested voice of the scientist) at 
one end and qualitative research (which has a reconstructive and formative nature 
employing a more participant, passionate voice) at the opposite end of the 
continuum, a positivist paradigm approach would be at the quantitative end of the 
continuum, while the critical theory paradigm would be near the qualitative end. In 
this research the positivist paradigm is adhered to chiefly in so far as a dispassionate 
exposition of the current legal situation will be made, but there will also be elements 
of the critical theory paradigm in so far as a degree of critique and suggestions for 
the transformation of the current situation will be present.45  
                                            
42  Venter F et al Regsnavorsing 238. 
43  As set out in par 1 4 (infra). 
44  See n 19 (supra). 
45  Denzin N K & Lincoln Y S (ed) The landscape of qualitative research – Theories 
and Issues (1998). 
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In broad terms the following modus operandi will be followed to achieve the stated 
aims of this research: 
 
? A literature study of published and unpublished studies and texts relevant to 
the subject area will be undertaken. 
? The delictual rights of and existing legal enactments relating to victims of 
crime, as well as the efficacy of these measures, will be analysed. 
? Relevant bills and court cases will be analysed in order to assess how 
relevant legal prescriptions are applied in practice. 
? A comparative study will be undertaken in order to compare the position of 
victims of crime in Great Britain, India, New Zealand and South Africa. In 
keeping with established practice46 this will consist of the: 
o Investigation of relevant phenomena of the foreign legal systems on 
their own; 
o Analysis of relevant phenomena of the foreign legal systems against 
the background of their unique legal and social milieus; and 
o Consideration of both corresponding and differing aspects of the 
foreign legal systems and the South African legal system in order to 
reach a synthesis which will achieve the purposes of utilising the 
comparative method.47 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, the term restitution will be used to indicate recompense 
obtained from the perpetrator, while the term compensation will refer to recompense 
obtained from the state. This is in line with accepted practice:48 
 
Compensation… relates to the procedures established by the State that aim 
to compensate victims from a state fund, while restitution relates to legal 
remedies available to the victim to claim restitution from the offender by 
means of a court order, either in civil suit or a criminal action. 
 
                                            
46  Venter F et al Regsnavorsing 219. 
47  “Man muss die zu vergleichenden Elementen kennen, um sie zu verstehen und man 
muss sie verstehen, um sie vergleichen zu können.” One has to know the to be 
compared elements to understand them and one has to understand them in order to 
compare them. Constantinesco L Rechtsvergleichung II – Die Rechtsvergleichende 
Methode (1972) 137 – 138. 
48  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A compensation scheme for victims of 
crime in SA) Project 82 Discussion paper 97 (2001) Definitions vii. 
Restitution can take the form of punishment (e g imposition of a fine), in which case 
the state is seen as the benefactor rather than the victim: Sheldon R G & Brown W B 
Criminal justice in America – a critical view (2003) 241. 
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However, it must be conceded that the South African legislature does not generally 
adhere to this terminological distinction.49 
 
Restorative justice includes both the concepts restitution and compensation:50 
 
Thus, the process of restorative justice seeks to redefine crime, interpreting it 
not so much as breaking the law, or offending against the State, but as an 
injury or wrong done to another person. It encourages the victim and the 
offender to be directly involved in resolving conflict and thereby becoming 
central to the criminal justice process with the State and legal professionals 
becoming facilitators, supporting a criminal justice system which aims at 
offender accountability, full participation of both the victim and the offender 
and making good or putting right the wrong.  
As part of this process, restorative justice demands consideration of 
approaches such as that of offering compensation, where appropriate, to the 
victims and empowering victims in their search for recognition through direct 
participation in the criminal justice system. 
 
While the arrangement of the subject matter of this research will be based on the 
distinction between restitution and compensation,51 the distinction is not in all cases 
absolute. An example is the Indian Motor Vehicle Act52 which creates a system of 
statutory insurance. On the one hand it may be argued that this should be seen as a 
form of restitution, as the function of compulsory insurance is to effect restitution to 
the victim for which the offender would normally be liable; on the other hand it may 
be argued that the Act should fall under compensation as the state has taken a role 
in ensuring recompense to the victim. This and other analogous instances will be 
dealt with under the aegis of compensation. Restitution will be restricted to instances 
where the offender is held personally liable. 
 
                                            
49  An example is to be found in s 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which 
refers to “compensation” which an offender can be ordered to pay to the victim of a 
crime. See Ch 4 par 4 2 1 2 (infra). 
50  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) Project 82 
Report (2000) 5 – 6 (2 7 – 2 8). 
Website of the University of the Witwatersrand 
(April 2003) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/report/project82.pdf 
51  See par 1 4 (infra) regarding the subject matter of individual chapters.  
52  59 of 1988.  
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1 3 2 Assumptions 
 
It is assumed that the incidence of crime in South Africa exceeds boundaries 
acceptable to the majority of its population.53 
 
It is, furthermore, assumed that victims of crime in South Africa are granted 
insufficient recompense for the violation of their rights:54 
 
South Africa is far behind the rest of the world in respect of victim support in 
general and victim compensation in particular. From the information available 
to the Commission it appears that the introduction of a central compensation 
scheme for victims of crime in South Africa has become a matter of urgency. 
The right of a victim to recover damages by way of civil action is of little 
comfort to a victim having regard to the financial position of most criminals, 
their ability to compensate victims and the unprecedented crime wave that is 
sweeping our country. 
 
 
1 4 Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis comprises of six chapters: 
 
? Chapter 1 sets out the statement of the problem,55 the aims of the research,56 
the methodology57 applied, and an outline of the research. 
? Chapter 2 considers the influence of history on the treatment of victims of 
crime in the four countries targeted, as well as the concept of restorative 
justice and the influence thereof.  
? Chapter 3 focuses on delictual claims victims of crime have against offenders. 
Regarding each country, three avenues will be explored:   
o Common law of delict;  
o Punitive damages; and  
o Delictual liability of the state. 
                                            
53  Naudé P (Head of NMMU Business School’s Ethics Unit) “Counting the high Cost of 
Crime in South Africa today” Business Herald 17 July 2006 13. 
54  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation for 
victims of crime and victim empowerment) Issue paper 7 Ch 4 41. Simpson G Crime 
and Violence: The need for victim support in SA In Camerer L & Nel J (eds) Putting 
Victims on the Agenda proceedings of a national workshop on victim empowerment 
and support Institute for Security Studies monograph series No 7 (1996). 
55  Par 1 1 (supra). 
56 Par 1 2 (supra). 
57  Par 1 3 (supra). 
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? Chapter 4 analyses and compares relevant primary legislation, secondary 
legislation and state-initiated programmes dealing with restitution for victims 
of crime in each of the four countries. Consideration will be given to the draft 
bill proposed by the South African Law Reform Commission58 dealing with 
reparation (as opposed to state-funded compensation). 
? Chapter 5 analyses and compares state-funded compensation for victims of 
crime in the four countries. Consideration will also be given to the 
recommendations of the South African Law Reform Commission59 regarding 
a state-funded victim compensation scheme. 
? Chapter 6 evaluates the current legal dispensation in South Africa and 
recommends changes for its improvement. 
                                            
58  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) Report. 
(June 2002) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/report/project82.pdf 
59  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A compensation scheme for victims of 
crime in SA) Discussion paper 97 (2001). 
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Chapter 2 
 
Historical influences and restorative justice 
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the influence of history on the treatment of victims of crime and 
the growth of restorative justice. As former colonies, South Africa, India and New 
Zealand reflect the influence of England’s approach to victims of crime. Despite 
sharing this commonality, however, each country’s system is also the result of its 
own pre-colonial history and current circumstances. All four countries have widely 
differing indigenous belief and value systems which of necessity contribute to forming 
their legal dispensations. This is particularly relevant as the treatment of victims of 
crime is an emotive, ethical issue in South Africa. The period since the 1970s has 
seen a renewed interest in the rights of victims of crime; the main manifestation of 
this has been the advent of restorative justice which reinstates the victim as a central 
figure in the criminal justice process.1 The meaning attached to restorative justice 
and its influence on criminal justice systems will be canvassed below.   
 
2 2 History 
 
2 2 1  General 
 
Ancient legal systems were based on a concept akin to the biblical concept of an eye 
for an eye; in other words, vengeance or retribution, which includes the concept of 
restitution.2 The progression of restitution can be divided into six discernable 
historical stages:3 
 
? Private (individual) vengeance – the concept of lex talionis; 
                                            
1  Goodey J “An Overview of Key Themes” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating 
a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice (2000) 13 21. 
2  Retribution includes the concept of recompense which has the meaning of 
compensation, or – in the parlance of this research – restitution. Retribution also 
refers to the punishment of the individual according to what he or she deserves. As 
will be shown below, as time passed, punishment became the realm of the state 
(criminal law), while ensuring restitution fell to the individual (civil law). See Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged) (1966). See 
also Ch 1 Par 1 3 1 (supra). 
3  Galaway B & Hudson J “Restitution as a Victim Service” (1980) Evaluating and 
Change – Special Issue; Harding J (1982) Victims and Offenders; van den Haag E 
“The ‘lex talionis’ before and after Criminal Law” (1992) 1/1 Criminal Justice Ethics 2.  
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? Collective vengeance – vengeance effected by the victim’s group on the 
perpetrator’s group; 
? Negotiation between the perpetrator and the victim and the effecting of 
restitution by the perpetrator – a form of mediation; 
? Payment of a predetermined quantum of restitution by the perpetrator;  
? Intervention by rulers claiming their percentage; and 
? Disappearance of restitution from criminal law. 
 
However, there is also an element of state-funded compensation in various ancient 
enactments. For example, in what is considered the oldest recorded criminal code, 
the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi of the eighteenth century BC, mention was made 
not only of restitution, but also of instances where the state (community) would be 
liable to compensate the victim of a crime where the perpetrator was unable to do so. 
An example of restitution (or what in modern terms may be seen as a compensatory 
fine) was to be found in Law 4 of the Code which translates as: 
 
If it satisfies the elders to impose a fine of grain or money, he shall receive the fine 
that the action produces. 
 
Law 23 of the Code embodied a basic form of compensation: 
 
If the robber is not caught, then shall he who was robbed claim under oath 
the amount of his loss, then shall the community… on whose ground and 
territory and in whose domain it was, compensate him for the goods stolen.4 
(Emphasis added) 
 
And 
 
If it was a life that was lost, the city and governor shall pay one mina of silver 
to his heirs.5 
 
While this did not equate to a victim compensation scheme, the underlying idea was 
present.  
 
Roman Law in the Lex duodecim tabularum of circa 450 BC relied heavily on the 
principle of restitution. The Lex duodecim tabularum determined that the thief had to 
                                            
4  Both translations by King L W “Exploring Ancient World Cultures – Readings from 
the Ancient Near East” (April 2002) 
http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/hammurabi.htm 
5  Edelhertz H “Restitutive Justice: A general survey and analysis” January 1975 
 Battelle Law and Justice Centre. 
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pay the victim double the value of the goods stolen.6 This was a combination of 
punishment and restitution used as a form of punishment. The Lex duodecim 
tabularum distinguished between crimes against individuals and crimes against the 
state. Table VIII dealt generally with the violation of individual interests, such as 
defamation, casting evil spells, assault, theft, arson, bearing false witness and – 
surprisingly – a ban on holding meetings by night in the city,7 while Table IX dealt 
with treason and murder.8  
 
The Germanic invasions of Europe caused primitive Germanic law to overwhelm 
Roman law. Under Germanic law restitution was prominent, with the social status of 
the victim playing a prominent role in the determination of quantum. The perpetrator 
who could not effect restitution would be banished from society and forego the 
protection afforded by being a member of the group. England also followed this 
system.9 
 
The Treaty of Verdun of 843 typified the feudal age and the end of the age of the 
victim. The concept of fines payable to the state was embraced by feudal overlords. 
Feudal philosophy held that a crime was a violation of the King’s peace, thus 
underplaying the loss suffered by the victim of the crime. During the Germanic 
invasions of Europe the concept of a commission or fine payable to the state was 
endorsed. Feudalism brought about the dispersal of larger kingdoms, creating small 
communities each with its own law crafted to suit the feudal lord’s wishes.10 
 
During the period of the Inquisition – which extended from 1231 when Pope Gregory 
IX established the Inquisition to prosecute heretics, up to the decree of 1834 which 
terminated the Spanish Inquisition – an inquisitorial system was followed which 
placed little emphasis on restitution, compensation or the position of the victim in 
general.11 The emphasis was on punishing the heretic who had denied an article of 
faith of the Roman Catholic Church and was thus an enemy of the community.  
                                            
6  Herrington L H “Dollars and Sense: The value of victim restitution” (1986) 48 
Corrections Today. 
7  One would expect to find this under Table IX as it does not deal with the violation of 
an individual’s rights per se, but rather the interests of the community.  
8  Translations of the entire text by Warrington E H “Remains of Old Latin III, circa 450 
B C” (April 2002) http://members.aol.com/pilgrimjon/private/LEX/12tables.html 
9  Cilliers C H ‘n Penologiese studie rakende die vergoeding aan slagoffers van 
 misdaad (1984) D Litt et Phil thesis University of SA. 
10  Korn R R & McCorkle L Criminology and Penology (1959). 
11  History of the Inquisition (April 2002) 
http://es.rice.edu/ES/humsoc/Galileo/student_work/Trial96/loftis/overview.html 
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Interest in the woes of the victim was revived in the nineteenth century as a direct 
consequence of the writings of Jeremy Bentham12 with his philosophy of 
Utilitarianism which held that that the function of the law was to promote “the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number” and that morality could be derived from 
“enlightened self-interest” which implied that a person who always pursued his or her 
own maximum satisfaction in the long run always acted in a morally correct way.13 
During the nineteenth century various international congresses – held to consider the 
treatment of criminals – emphasised the interests of the victim.14 Thus the position of 
victims of crime in the criminal justice process was a concern long before the advent 
of restorative justice. During 1895 the International Prison Congress in Paris noted 
concerns that a vacuum still existed regarding restitution to victims of crime pointing 
out that legislation in various countries prejudiced the victim of crime in favour of the 
perpetrator. The following resolution was accepted at the termination of the 
Congress:15 
 
The congress believes that there is a reason to take into serious 
consideration the propositions which have been submitted to it with regard to 
allowing the injured party a portion of the earnings realised by the work of the 
prisoner in the course of his detention, or with regard to constituting a special 
fund derived from fines from which aid should be granted to the victims of 
penal offences... 
 
State-funded victim compensation and social security grew from the concept of 
workers’ compensation, which was pioneered in nineteenth century England. The 
Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897 granted a worker (or the worker’s 
dependants) a right to claim damages for an accident arising out of and in the course 
of employment. Prior to the passing of this Act, tortious claims of injured employees 
were usually thwarted by the doctrines of16 common employment,17 contributory 
negligence18 and volenti non fit iniuria.19 The Act prohibited employers from 
                                            
12  1748 – 1832. 
13  Biographies: Jeremy Bentham 
(April 2002) http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Bentham.htm 
14  The most important congresses were in Stockholm (1878), Rome (1885), St 
Petersburg (1890), Christiana (1891), Paris (1895) and Brussels (1890). Van den 
Berg C E ‘n Penologiese studie rakende restitusie as ‘n bevel aan die slagoffer van 
misdaad Ch 3. 
15  Cilliers C H ‘n Penologiese studie rakende die vergoeding aan slagoffers van 
misdaad 32. 
16  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law 6 ed (1999) 273. 
17  In terms of which a claim based on the negligence of a co-worker was denied the 
 injured party. 
18  In terms of which the employee’s own negligence was a complete defence to a claim. 
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contracting out of its provisions, but had limited application and provided meagre 
benefits. The common law20 continued as an alternative, permitting a worker to sue 
for damages rather than accept compensation under the Act. Employers usually took 
out insurance to cover this liability. Legislation creating and enforcing a system of 
compulsory insurance was passed.21 The original Act did not provide for full 
compensation, on the principle that employer and employee should share the burden 
equally. Over time this principle was eroded as benefits increased.22 In 1930 the 
Road Traffic Act introduced compulsory third party insurance for traffic injuries.23  
 
Society became still more sensitised to the plight of the victim as a result of events 
such as two World Wars and the Holocaust. In 1951 Margery Fry’s book Arms of the 
Law had a decisive influence advocating direct restitution from the perpetrator to the 
victim. In the late 1950s Fry refined her thesis and campaigned for the institution of 
state funded schemes to compensate victims of crime.24 This movement culminated 
in the introduction during the latter half of the twentieth century of victim 
compensation schemes in the form in which they exist in various states today. The 
first modern victim compensation schemes were introduced in Great Britain and New 
Zealand in the 1960s, New Zealand’s being the first,25 commencing operation on 1 
January 1964.26 Compensation schemes vary vastly in their scope. Some countries, 
for example Israel, offer compensation only in cases of political crimes or terrorism, 
while other countries, for example Great Britain, offer benefits to cover virtually all 
crimes in which the victim has suffered some personal injury.27 The degree of 
compensation offered is generally quantified by the economic wealth of the particular 
country and the public awareness of its populace. 
                                                                                                                             
19  Which denied the employee of a claim where injuries arose from a known risk 
situation. 
20  Reinforced by the Employers' Liability Act of 1880. 
21  See Ch 5 Par 5 3 1 (infra). 
22  By 1940 the employee could be compensated by so much as seven-eighths of the 
 loss of earnings. Social Insurance and Allied Services Report by Sir William 
 Beveridge (Cmnd 6404 1942) Par 99 217 – 217. 
23  See Ch 5 Par 5 3 1 (infra). 
24  Sumner C “The Victim of Violence and the Criminal Justice System” Australian 
Government Website (June 2003) http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/aust-violence-
1/Sumner.pdf; Edelhertz H & Geis G Public Compensation to Victims of Crime (1974) 
10. 
25  Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963; Balkin R P & Davis J L R Law of Torts  
(1991) 404. 
26  The history summarised in the preceding paragraphs is analysed in detail in van den 
Berg C E ‘n Penologiese studie rakende restitusie as ‘n bevel aan die slagoffer van 
misdaad Ch 3. Although the work quoted deals primarily with restitution, as its title 
indicates, mention is also made of compensation. 
27  The International Crime Victim Compensation Programme Resource Directory  
(July 2002) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/intdir/intro.htm 
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Similarly to Great Britain, South Africa and India developed compensation schemes 
for victims of industrial and traffic injuries28 (but – unlike Britain – no comprehensive 
compensation schemes for victims of crime). However, New Zealand perceived that 
compensation for industrial, traffic and criminally caused injuries are all aspects of 
the same phenomenon, namely state-funded compensation for victims of misfortune. 
Consequently in New Zealand all three are now compensated by one authority, the 
Accident Compensation Corporation.29 
 
The late twentieth century also witnessed the emergence of restorative justice as an 
ideology which places the victim at the centre of the criminal justice process.30  
 
2 2 2 South Africa 
 
Having been colonised successively by Holland and England, South Africa’s legal 
system is largely a legacy of its colonial past. In common with both colonising 
systems, African indigenous law universally emphasises restitution.31 The criminal 
and delictual aspects of a crime are dealt with simultaneously, and punishment is 
accompanied by an award of damages to the victim. The lack of adequate provision 
for restitution in the current legal system is viewed as a shortcoming.32 The 
Constitutional Court has expressed the opinion that there is a general erosion of the 
hitherto rigidly held distinction maintained by academics between public and private 
                                            
28  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 and 5 4 (infra).   
29  See Ch 5 Par 5 5 (infra). 
30  See Par 2 3 (infra). While restorative justice is generally seen to represent a 
resurgence of the principles of ancient law, for example the Lex duodecim 
tabularum’s edict (see above in this paragraph) that the thief had to pay the victim 
double the value of the goods stolen (Wikipedia ((June 2006)) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restorative_justice#History), some writers see it as a new 
concept viewing claims to its historical roots with scepticism (Sylvester D G “Myth in 
Restorative Justice” (2003) 1 Utah Law Review 471). 
31  Consider the makgotla procedure discussed in Schärf W & Nina D The other Law – 
Non-state Ordering in South Africa (2001) Ch 7. 
32  Mina R F Compensation of the victim as an aspect of criminal law in SA with 
reference to expectations inherent in indigenous law systems (1989). Although the 
word “compensation” is used in the title of the dissertation, what is referred to is in 
fact restitution in the meaning ascribed to that term in this work. See Ch 1 Par 1 3 
(supra); Oko Elechi O Human Rights and the African Indigenous Justice System 
Paper for presentation at the 18th International Conference of the International 
Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, August 8 – 12, 2004, Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada 23. 
(March 2005) http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2004/Elechi.pdf 
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law33 – a view that seems to be in accord with that of indigenous African law and the 
Roman law of the Lex duodecim tabularum.34 In indigenous African law the 
kraalhead can be held liable for the theft of cattle, in addition to the liability of the 
perpetrator.35 There is, thus, a precedent for the idea of the liability of the community 
head vis-à-vis the victim of crime. Indigenous (customary) law enjoys constitutional 
recognition36 and is not merely an interesting historical phenomenon: Section 39(3) 
of the Constitution37 states:  
 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or 
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent 
with the Bill. 
 
Section 211(3) of Chapter 1238 reads: 
 
(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, 
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals 
with customary law. 
 
Reflecting governmental concern regarding the plight of victims of crime, the South 
African Law Reform Commission39 has generated two documents: 
                                            
33  “It is both undesirable and unnecessary, for purposes of this case, to attempt to do 
 that which has seemingly eluded scholars in the past and given rise to wide 
 differences of opinion among them, namely, the drawing of a clear and permanent 
 line between the domains of private law and public law and the utility of such efforts. 
 Much of this interesting debate is concerned with an analysis of power relations in 
 society; the shift which has taken place in the demarcations between ‘private law’ and 
 ‘public law’; how functions traditionally associated with the state are increasingly 
 exercised by institutions with tenuous or no links with the state; how remedies such 
 as judicial review are being applied in an ever widening field and how legal principles 
 previously associated with private legal relations are being applied to state 
 institutions. Suffice it to say that it could be dangerous to attach consequences to or 
 infer solutions from concepts such as ‘public law’ and ‘private law’ when the validity of 
 such concepts and the distinctions which they imply are being seriously questioned.” 
 (Emphasis added) Ackermann J in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 
 BCLR 851 (CC) 881 [57]. 
34  See previous paragraph. 
35  Sitole v Kumalo 1938 NAC (N & T) 257; Tusini v Ngubane 1948 NAC (N & T) 17. 
36  See also Devenish G E A Commentary on the SA Bill of Rights 11; In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of SA, 1996 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) 
194 where the Constitutional court held: “(T)he fact that they (traditional leaders) are 
declared to be subject to the New Text merely underlines the point that in a 
constitutional state, no-one exercises power or authority outside of the constitution.” 
37  Forming part of the Bill of Rights. 
38  Ch 12 of the Constitution acknowledges the role of traditional leaders. 
39  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation for 
Victims of Crime and Victim Empowerment) Issue paper 7 Ch 1 1. 
(April 2002) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/issue/ip7.html 
For a full discussion see Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 7 and Ch 5 Par 5 2 2 (infra). 
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? Issue Paper: Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation for Victims of 
Crime and Victim Empowerment)40; and 
? Discussion Paper: Sentencing (A Compensation Scheme for Victims of Crime 
in South Africa).41 
 
To date the recommendations in these documents have not found their way into 
legislation. 
 
2 2 3 Great Britain 
 
Terminologically,42 the use of the term “Great Britain” in the context of this work is 
inaccurate. What will be discussed herein is English law, the law in force in England 
and Wales. Having said this, however, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme43 
provides benefits for Scotland as well.44 England is the largest constituent country of 
the United Kingdom and has more than 83% of the total United Kingdom population. 
It occupies most of the southern two-thirds of the island of Great Britain. England and 
Wales share the same legal system and are considered a single jurisdiction or state 
for purposes of the law. The other countries of the United Kingdom, namely Scotland 
and Northern Ireland45 are also separate jurisdictions or states (except under public 
international law), each having its own legal system. "Great Britain" means England, 
                                            
40  Issue paper 7. “In order to secure community participation at an early stage, the 
Commission has decided to introduce, in appropriate circumstances, the publication 
of an issue paper as the first step in the consultative process. The purpose of such a 
paper is to announce a particular investigation (already included in the Commission's 
programme), to elucidate the problems that have given rise to the investigation, to 
point to possible options available for solving those problems and to initiate and 
stimulate debate on identified issues.” Website of the SA Law Reform Commission 
(April 2002) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/function.html 
41  Discussion Paper 97. “After considering the comment received on an issue paper and 
further research conducted under the direction and guidance of the project leader or, 
if applicable, the project committee, the researcher responsible for the investigation 
prepares a draft discussion paper which usually contains the following: 
A definition of the problems requiring solutions;  
The existing state of the law in relation to the problems;  
A comparative legal study; 
Possible preliminary solutions to rectify the problems identified; 
A summary of the preliminary proposals; 
A proposed draft Bill in which the proposals are embodied.” 
Website of the SA Law Reform Commission 
(April 2002) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/function.html 
42  See generally Wikipedia (July 2006) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_law 
43  See Ch 5 Par 5 3 2 (infra). 
44  Website of CICA: (July 2006) http://www.cica-criminal-injuries-compensation.co.uk/ 
45  Plus dependencies such as the Isle of Man and the Bailiwicks of Jersey and 
Guernsey. 
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Wales and Scotland46 and "United Kingdom" means Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland.47  
 
Before the Norman Conquest of 1066 the early Anglo-Saxons used blood feuds to 
avenge wrongs. This collective guilt effected retribution, not only restitution.48 
Customary rules developed to impart a semblance of order to the whole process. By 
the time of Alfred the Great49 it was possible to demand money in lieu of the blood 
feud50 and thus restitution was placed on a legal footing: Anglo-Saxon law formulated 
a tariff for personal injuries.51 Because the law provided no means of enforcement, 
lawlessness ensued. More serious offences were considered botless, that is 
punishable by mutilation or death, because a monetary fine was considered 
inadequate. The Articles of Eyre52 of 1194 established the concept of Pleas of the 
Crown53 which were considered to be personal affronts to the king, resulting in a 
revenue-generating fine becoming payable to the king. Initially acts against the king 
and acts against the individual were seen as being based on the same principle, the 
violation of individual rights. As the concept of statehood developed, the idea arose 
that the state had its own rights which were worthy of protection and that it was no 
longer simply a question of the king’s personal rights. Initially the victim of a wrongful 
act could institute action only if there was a specific writ coinciding with the facts. Up 
to the fourteenth century personal actions were usually based on some variant of the 
writ of trespass, for example trespass to the person, land or goods. After the 
fourteenth century new writs were acknowledged,54 but the writ system disappeared 
under the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852. Plaintiffs could thereafter set out the 
facts upon which their claims were based and the court could then decide whether 
they deserved a remedy, without claimants having to shoehorn their claims into some 
                                            
46  Plus its adjacent territorial waters and the islands of Orkney and Shetland, the 
Hebrides, and Rockall (by virtue of the Island of Rockall Act 1972). 
47  Plus their adjacent territorial waters. It does not include the Isle of Man; nor the 
Channel Islands whose independent status was discussed in Rover International Ltd 
v Canon Film Sales Ltd (1987) 1 WLR 1597 and Chloride Industrial Batteries Ltd v F 
& W Freight Ltd (1989) 1 WLR 823. 
48  Lawyerviews.com 2000 Legal History: Massachusetts Lawyer Views 1. 
(September 2003) http://www.lawyerviews.com/lawsite/history.html 
49  871 – 899. 
50  Randolph O “Your Legal Rights Under Ælfred, King of Wessex” (1996)  
(September 2003) http://www.octavia.net/text/alfredlaw.htm 
51  The Laws of Alfred the Great state: 
(I)f a great toe be struck off, let twenty shillings be paid to him as bot… if 
the little toe be struck off, let five shillings be paid to him. 
52  Art 20. 
53  Knight B “History of the Medieval English Coroner System” 1 3. 
(September 2003) www.britannia.com/history/arts/coroner1.html 
54  Such as libel and nuisance. 
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pre-existing set of norms, known as torts.55 Thus a rigid distinction between crime 
and tort arose. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries various Acts were 
passed to address the needs of the victim:56 
 
Year  Act  Pertinent aspects  Source 
of 
payment
 
1826  Criminal Law 
Act 
(repealed in 
terms of the 
Criminal 
Justice Act 
1988)  
 Section 28 of this Act authorized courts to 
order the bailiff to pay an amount of money 
which could be considered reasonable and 
sufficient to compensate the victim of a 
crime. 
Section 30 provided that the bailiff would 
have to pay compensation to the widow of a 
man killed while attempting to apprehend an 
offender. The courts had a free discretion in 
stipulating the amount to be paid. 
 State 
(Bailiff) 
 
  
1870  Forfeiture Act  This Act authorised the courts to recover an 
amount of money from the offender to effect 
restitution to the victim of the crime 
committed. The amount recoverable was 
limited to certain amounts. 
 Offender
 
 
1886  Real Act  Money was drawn from the police budget to 
compensate victims of unlawful unrest. 
 State  
(Police 
budget) 
 
1914  Criminal 
Justice Act 
 Victims of property-related crimes were to be 
compensated from the police budget. 
 State 
(Police 
budget) 
 
1948  Criminal 
Justice Act 
 Magistrates’ courts were authorised to grant 
orders of restitution up to a maximum of 
£100. 
 Offender
 
These – largely co-existing – Acts contained elements of both compensation (insofar 
as it was sometimes the state that compensated the victim) and restitution (in cases 
where the offender made restitution to the victim),57 but fell short of what could be 
termed a unified system of either restitution or compensation. 
 
The major recourse options currently at the disposal of victims of injury can be 
illustrated as follows: 
                                            
55  Curzon L B English Legal History (1968) 223 et seq. 
56  Under the influence of Jeremy Bentham’s works. See Par 2 2 1 (supra). 
57  Van den Berg C A ‘n Penologiese studie rakende die vergoeding aan slagoffers van 
misdaad 114 – 115. 
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Road Traffic 
Act 
1988 
 Employers’ 
Liability 
(Compulsory 
Insurance) Act 
1969 
  
Criminal Injuries 
Compensation 
Board 
  
 
Tort 
 
 
 
Statutory 
insurance 
 Statutory 
insurance 
 State-funded 
compensation 
 Restitution 
by offender 
 
 
While statutory insurance can be seen as a form of restitution – it effects restitution 
for which the offender would normally be liable – it is also a form of compensation as 
the state has taken a role in ensuring recompense to the victim.58 
 
 
2 2 4 India 
 
The legal history of India reflects four distinct – but sometimes overlapping – periods:59 
 
Hindu 
1500BC 
Muslim 
700AD 
   British 
           1600-1950 
         
Independence 
                    1950 
 
 
                                            
58  See Ch 1 Par 1 3 1 (supra). 
59  Kulshreshtha V D Landmarks in Indian Legal and Constitutional History 5 ed (1981) 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all information in this paragraph is derived from this 
work. As Hindu and Muslim law still have (limited) application in India, these periods 
are left open ended. The diagram is not drawn to scale. 
Injury 
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2 2 4 1  Hindu period (from c 1500 BC) 
 
The Hindu period was dominated by rigid enforcement of the caste system.60 The 
king was considered the source of justice and there was a complex structure of 
courts. In the ancient Hindu period punishment for crime was intended to reform the 
offender’s character, providing satisfaction to the victim, retaliation for the offence, 
deterrence from further offending and spiritual redemption of the offender. Fines and 
other forms of punishment were encountered and sometimes courts were 
empowered to grant restitution to victims in addition to the punishment meted out.61 
In certain cases the whole village was held liable for theft. The king or his local 
representative – being responsible for the maintenance of law and order – could be 
held liable to pay for the missing property. For committing murder the offender was 
sentenced to deliver cattle to the king, the number rising in keeping with the caste of 
the deceased. The king gave the cows to the relatives of the deceased and kept a 
bull as a fine. 
 
While ancient Western legal systems do not distinguish strictly between criminal law 
and the law of delict,62 this is not the case in ancient Hindu law63 where the king 
could take cognisance of crimes,64 mero motu ordering restitution and punishment. 
 
2 2 4 2  Muslim period (from c 700 AD) 
 
From the eighth century Muslim Afghans and Turks conquered the Hindu kingdoms. 
During the Muslim period every criminal court had a public prosecutor or Mohtasib 
and applied Islamic law or Sharia, based on the Quran. Muslim (Mohammedan) 
criminal law is thus based on religion, according to which it is the duty of the ruler to 
punish criminals on behalf of the deity. Offences against individuals were also 
                                            
60  The Brahmins were the uppermost class and produced Hindu priests and scholars. 
The Kshatriyas were the nobles and warriors. The Vaisyas were the merchants and 
traders, and the Sudras, the workers. Membership of a caste was determined by 
birth. 
61  The restitution/penalty for theft would be between 8 and 64 times the value of he 
stolen object depending on the caste of the offender, the higher castes being 
penalised more severely than the lower. 
62  Maine H Ancient Law 3 ed (1866) 370. Kulshreshtha V D Landmarks in Indian Legal 
and Constitutional History 14. See also Par 2 2 1 (supra). 
63  Priya Nath Sen Tagore Law Lectures on Hindu Jurisprudence (1918) Lecture XII 264 
– 266. See Kulshreshtha V D Landmarks in Indian Legal and Constitutional History 
15. 
64  Called chalas, padas and aparadhas. For crimes like theft, assault, adultery, rape and 
manslaughter the Smriti text prescribes both corporeal punishment and restitution. 
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punishable. As the laws of the Quran were found to be inadequate to serve the 
needs of a large and developing community, rules based on religious precepts – 
known as Sunna – were passed. Three forms of punishment were imposed: 
 
? Hadd provided for a fixed punishment in cases like theft, robbery and 
defamation.65 No benefit was granted to the victim.  
? Tazir was a form of punishment for cases like minor theft, assault and 
counterfeiting coins.66 Courts were free to invent new forms of punishment 
as these were uncodified crimes. 
? Qisas, a blood fine, was applied in cases of homicide and serious injury. 
The state intervened only when an aggrieved party requested this. The 
latter would have a private claim for restitution which could be waived. 
The aggrieved person or family could effect physical retaliation. As the 
law developed, only the blood money could be claimed as a restitutionary 
fine. These crimes are also called restitution crimes.67 
 
Mohammedan criminal law was not highly developed. In some respects it was vague, 
and in others, highly technical. Its classification of crimes was unsatisfactory and 
there was no clear distinction between civil and criminal law; usually action against 
the offender was left in the hands of the victim, or his or her family. The concept of a 
crime being an act against the interests of the state, as opposed to merely the 
individual, was not recognised.68 
 
2 2 4 3  British period (1600 – 1950) 
 
On 31 December 1600 Queen Elizabeth I granted a Charter to the English East India 
Company authorising it to trade with India and Africa. The Charter also authorised 
the Company to legislate for its employees.69 In 1618 representatives of the 
                                            
65  These were regarded as the most serious crimes because they were identified in the 
Quran. 
66  They were seen as the least serious crimes: Kulshreshtha V D Landmarks in Indian 
Legal and Constitutional History 34. 
67  Al-Alfi A Punishment in Islamic Criminal law in Bassiuoni M C The Islamic Criminal 
Justice System (1982) 227 – 236; Al-Thakeb, Fahed & Scott J E “Islamic Law: An 
Examination of its Revitalisation” (1981) 21/1 British Journal of Criminology 58 – 69; 
Ali B “Islamic Law and Crime: The Case of Saudi Arabia” (1985) 9/2 International 
Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 45 – 57; Badr Gamal Mouri 
“Islamic Law: Its Relation to other Legal Systems” (1976) 26 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 187 – 198. 
68  Kulshreshtha V D Landmarks in Indian Legal and Constitutional History 266 – 267. 
69  This authority was renewed in different forms by successive English monarchs. The 
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Company negotiated a treaty with the Mughal emperor granting self-government to 
the English in India. Gradually the influence of the Company spread and it became a 
political force, ultimately yielding its power to the English Crown in the mid-nineteenth 
century.70 In 1860 the Indian Penal Code71 codified the criminal law. It was based on 
English criminal law, without any influence from indigenous law.72 Although it has 
undergone many amendments, this Code – together with the Code of Criminal 
Procedure73 and certain sections of the Indian Evidence Act74 – forms the essence of 
India’s criminal law.75 This legislation has been interpreted and developed by a 
substantial body of case law and commentaries.76 
 
2 2 4 4  Independence (1950 onwards) 
 
In terms of its Constitution,77 India was declared a Sovereign Democratic Republic78 
on 26 January 1950. The Constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights79 to 
citizens and also lays down certain Directive Principles of state policy. The 
Constitution80 preserves all law in force before its commencement. This includes 
English common and customary law, Hindu law81 and Mohammedan (Muslim) law.82 
                                                                                                                             
 first English settlement was at the most important centre of trade and commerce, 
 Surat, on the western coast.  
70  In 1858 the Government of India Act finally transferred the governing of India from the 
East India Company to the English Crown. 
71  45 of 1860. The Penal Code consists of 511 sections. 
72  Stephan J F A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol III (1883) Ch XXXIII  
“Indian Criminal Law” 300. 
73  1973 (2 of 1974). See Ch 4 Par 4 2 3 (infra). 
74  1 of 1872. 
75  Raghavan R K World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems 1. 
http//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjind.txt 
76  Kulshreshtha V D Landmarks in Indian Legal and Constitutional History 281 – 282. 
77  1950. 
78  Amended to “Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic” by s 2 of the 
Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976. 
79  Part III. 
80  Art 372. 
81  Bhattacharjee A M Hindu Law and the Constitution 2 ed (1994) 86. Hindu law is 
applied to Hindus in India in matters of inheritance and religious usages and 
institutions. In terms of specific legislation (Hindu Marriage Act 1955; Hindu 
Succession Act 1956; Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956; Hindu Minority 
and Guardianship Act 1956) Hindu law is also applied in the following fields: 
Adoption, maintenance, marriage, succession, minority, guardianship, family 
relations, wills, gifts and partition. 
82  Purohit N The Principles of Mohammedan Law 2 ed (1998) 63 – 64.  
Mohammedan law is applied to Mohammedans in their personal matters by the 
Indian courts in terms of the following legislation: 
Bombay Regulation IV 1827; Punjab Laws Act 1872; Madras Civil Courts Act 1873; 
Central Provinces Laws Act 1875; Oudh Laws Act 1876; Ajmer Law Regulation III 
1877; Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act 1887; Laws Act 1905; Government of 
India Act 1915; Government of India Act 1935; N W Province Muslim Personal Law 
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Aspects of Hindu and Muslim life are governed by Hindu and Muslim law. However, 
Indian criminal law and procedure, law of contract and torts and other general legal 
rules are applicable to all citizens.83 The Constitution of India limits the law-making 
power of the union and state governments. The criminal justice system is based on 
the English system.84 
 
In India the prevalence of life threatening events (often criminal) is significant.85 The 
following editorial illustrates the frustration which this engenders:86 
 
The Surajkund tragedy which claimed three lives on Sunday like most 
disasters in India was simply waiting to happen. Those responsible… will, of 
course, be tried for gross negligence. However, the larger issue which we as 
responsible citizens need to address is our collective lack of concern for 
safety in whatever we do. 
 
The high crime rate is also a large-scale problem in India.87 These factors have led to 
the following consequences:88 
 
Governments have relied on ex gratia discretionary payments to meet the 
demands of victim-creating situations. Administrative schemes, for instance, 
for victims of militancy are executive-administered…  
 
Statutory insurance, which makes insurance compulsory, generally requires a 
user of a victim-causing process or product to insure against injury or death 
being caused to a third person. 
 
In Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v Union of India,89 the Supreme Court 
asked the National Commission for Women to draft a proposal for a Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board. To date, this request has not been fulfilled.90 
                                                                                                                             
(Shariat) Application Act XXVI of 1937; Cutchi Memons Act X of 1938; West Punjab 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act IX of 1948; Madras Muslim Personal 
Law (Shariat) Application Amendment Act XVIII of 1949. 
83  Kesari U P D Modern Hindu Law 2 ed (1998) 7 – 10. 
84  Raghavan R K World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems 2. The most senior court 
in a state is the High Court and the Supreme Court is the highest court in the country, 
having both original and appellate jurisdiction. 
85  Events like the Bhopal Gas disaster mentioned in Ch 3 Par 3 2 4 (infra) are 
examples. 
86  Editorial The Tribune 13 February 2001 Chandigarh, India. 
(July 2002) http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20010213/edit.htm 
87  National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB).  
(October 2002) http://www.ncrbindia.org/ 
88  Ramanathan U Compensation and Insurance in Parasuraman S & Unnikrishnan P V 
(eds) India Disasters Report: Towards a Policy Initiative (2000) 1. 
89  1995 SCC 14. 
90  Ramanathan U “Human Rights in India: A Mapping” (2001) 19  
 Website of the International Environmental Law Research Centre (IELRC) 
 (May 2003) http://www.ielrc.org 
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India was a member of the Economic and Social Council when the Basic Principles 
on the Use of Restorative Justice91 was passed. There is also evidence of reference 
to restorative justice as a significant force in India’s criminal justice philosophy.92 
 
2 2 5 New Zealand 
 
The reception of English law was effected in 1840.93 During the second half of the 
nineteenth century most remnants of indigenous law were erased. For some time the 
British Parliament legislated for New Zealand, but from 1865 New Zealand received 
limited legislative powers of its own.94 Traditionally New Zealand looked to England 
for legislative and judicial precedent. English judgments are still cited, but where 
legislation is concerned, New Zealand has adopted an international outlook with an 
American bias.95 New Zealand’s criminal law was codified by the Criminal Code 
Act.96 Currently crimes of a more serious nature are governed by the Crimes Act,97 
while the Summary Offences Act98 legislates over a variety of lesser offences.  
 
2 3 Victims of crime and restorative justice 
 
2 3 1  Fundamental concepts of restorative justice 
 
Though this thesis is not primarily a study of restorative justice, no consideration of 
the legal position of victims of crime can take place without reference thereto – thus 
                                            
91  Full title: Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal 
Matters (United Nations) 2000 
 International Centre for Justice and Reconciliation (April 2002) 
http://www.restorativejustice.org/rj3/Undocuments/UNDecBasicPrinciplesofRJ.html 
92  See for example Chockalingam K Position of Victim Support Schemes in India in 
Tatsuya O (ed) Victims and Criminal Justice: Asian Perspective (2003) Keio 
University Tokoyo Hogaku-Kenkyu-Kai 63 – 82 where the author shows that the 
victim support movement in India advocates a restorative justice policy to address 
crime, granting comprehensive services that serve both the needs of victims and 
offenders. He also argues that the state is responsible for making reparation to crime 
victims as a matter of social justice, since the state is responsible for protecting its 
citizens. 
93  On 14 January 1840 the Treaty of Waitangi was signed between the Crown and 
 various indigenous Maori chiefs. See Young Warren World Factbook of Criminal 
 Justice Systems (November 2002) http//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjnew.txt 
94  Pratt J Punishment in a Perfect Society (1992). 
95  “An Introduction to New Zealand Law & Legal Information” (2002) Greville M 
 (August 2002) http://www.llrx.com/features/newzealand.htm#Contents 
96  1893. 
97  1961. 
98  1981. 
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what follows is a concise consideration of the meaning and significance of restorative 
justice, bearing in mind that there are many divergent interpretations thereof. 
Circumstances – including the political agenda of governments – influence the 
meanings attached thereto.99  
 
The conventional definition of crime is cited as contributing to the negation of the 
rights of victims: Traditional criminal law defines crimes as acts which are injurious to 
the interests of the state and which are punishable by the state.100 The victim is not 
mentioned and this exclusion can be seen as a cause of victim injustice.101 Thus 
there is a trend to define crimes as acts in conflict with, or detrimental to, the normal 
life and survival of individuals.102 Restorative justice promotes the view that crime is a 
violation of relationships rather than a simple breaking of the law and that the 
appropriate response should go beyond punishment and encompass putting right the 
wrong caused to victims and society.103 Zehr, a prominent writer on restorative 
justice, used the following vocabulary in an early article on the subject: Restitution, 
atonement, community, victim, accountability, victim involvement in outcome, re-
integrative shaming, repairing damage and problem solving.104 Restorative justice 
aspires to helping the victim recover from the crime’s effects, promoting offender 
appreciation of the impact of the crime (on the victim and the community), facilitating 
the making of reparation by the offender to the victim and, generally, repairing the 
damage caused to the community.105 In the South African context, the concept of 
ubuntu – which underpins the Constitution – is synonymous with humaneness, social 
justice and fairness, the rehabilitation of offenders and the maintenance of law and 
order, and represents the opposite of victimisation, grievous crimes and cruel and 
inhuman treatment.106 In S v Makwanyane Langa J stated that ubuntu “… recognises 
a person’s status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value 
and acceptance from the members of the community such person happens to be part 
                                            
99  Hoyle C & Young R “Restorative Justice: Assessing the Prospects and Pitfalls” in 
McConville M & Wilson G (eds) The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (2002) 
525 534 – 535. 
100  Snyman C R Criminal Law 2 ed (1989) 305. 
101  Sank D & Caplan D I (eds) To be a Victim: Encounters with Crime and Injustice 
(1991) 121. 
102  Van der Walt P J Cronje G Smit BF van der Westhuizen J Criminology (1977) 31. 
103  See, for example, one of the initial works on restorative justice, Zehr H Changing 
Lenses (1990). 
104  Zehr H “Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice” (1985) Vol 4 New Perspectives in 
Crime and Justice. 
105  Bowen H & Boyack J New Zealand Restorative Justice Practice Manual (2000) 
Restorative Justice Trust, Auckland. 
106  S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) [130] – [131] [223] – [227] [237] [307] – 
[313] [516]. 
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of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a corresponding duty to 
give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that 
community. More importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it 
lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all.”107 
There is thus a marked similarity between the values of restorative justice and ubuntu 
as both emphasise the harmonisation of damaged relationships within the community 
in a way which is fair to all parties – “fair” not necessarily being synonymous with 
“lenient.” 
 
While the relationship between victim and offender is paramount in the restorative 
justice equation, the community is also represented as a collective third party to 
prevent restorative justice from turning into a reformulation of the civil law of 
delict/tort and mixture thereof with criminal law. The community fulfils the role of 
enforcer and co-victim.108 Prior to the emergence of restorative justice (in the late 
twentieth century) the prevailing philosophy behind sentencing legislation in countries 
such as England and the United States of America required that offenders receive 
their “just deserts” – thus retribution, with culpability serving as a mitigating or 
aggravating circumstance (depending on the circumstances), determined 
sentence.109 The rise of the pro-victim movement resulted in legislation which 
granted victims rights to state-funded compensation, enhanced rights to restitution 
and an input in sentencing. It can thus be said that there has been a movement away 
from individualising the offender to individualising the victim – what can be referred to 
as the Participatory Model of criminal justice.110 However, while the granting of 
procedural rights giving victims the right to give input in the sentencing process may 
be indicative of a restorative justice approach; this is not necessarily the case, as this 
input can just as well form part of a conventional punitive system. A criminal justice 
system must be assessed as a whole to determine whether it has adopted the 
                                            
107  Supra [224]. 
108  Walgrave L “Extending the Victim Perspective towards a systematic Restorative 
Justice Alternative” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective 
in Criminal Justice (2000) 253; 264 – 265; see generally Barnett R & Hagel J 
Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution and the Legal Process (1977). 
109  Erez E “Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice through Victim Impact 
Statements” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in 
Criminal Justice (2000) 165. 
110  Sebba L “The Individualisation of the Victim: From Positivism to Postmodernism” in 
Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice 
(2000) 55 63. 
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principles of restorative justice.111 The transition from the victim movement to 
restorative justice came about when the focus shifted purely from the rights of victims 
in conflict with offenders to the broader goal of improving the whole social, personal 
and juridical position of those victimised, chiefly through constructive interaction 
between victim and offender.112 
 
According to Zehr,113 the pillars of restorative justice are, firstly, the harms and needs 
of victims (and also communities), secondly, the obligations of offenders (and also 
communities) to put matters right and, thirdly, the engagement of stakeholders 
(victims, offenders and communities). “Put right” refers to addressing harms (to 
victims as well as communities) and addressing causes at personal, interpersonal, 
environmental and societal levels.114 
 
According to van Ness and Strong,115 the values of restorative justice are: 
? Encounter: Creation of opportunities for victims, offenders and community 
members to meet for discussion of the crime and its effects;  
? Amends:  Expectation that offenders will take steps to repair the harm 
caused; 
? Reintegration:  Seeking to restore victims and offenders as responsible 
members of the community;  
? Inclusion:  Provision of opportunities for parties with a stake in a specific 
crime to participate in its resolution. 
 
Programmes identified with restorative justice are classified as follows:116 
? Victim offender mediation: This refers to meetings where trained mediators 
assist victims and offenders to resolve the conflict by conceiving an approach 
that they deem appropriate in remedying the wrong caused by the crime. 
                                            
111  Ashworth A “Victims’ Rights, Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure” in Crawford 
A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice (2000) 185 
192. 
112  Walgrave L “Extending the Victim Perspective towards a systematic Restorative 
Justice Alternative” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective 
in Criminal Justice (2000) 253. 
113  Zehr H The Little Book of Restorative Justice (2002) 23. 
114  Zehr H The Little Book of Restorative Justice (2002) 34. 
115  Van Ness D W & Strong K H Restoring Justice (2002) 69 – 125. 
116  Restorative Justice Online (June 2006) http://www.restorativejustice.org/ and the 
sources quoted there. 
 33
? Conferencing: This refers to victim-offender mediation programmes that 
include families, community support groups, police, social welfare officials 
and attorneys. 
? Circles: This refers to conferencing between victims and offenders, but 
including the community in the decision making process. The community may 
be represented by criminal justice staff members or anyone in the community 
concerned about the crime. All participants are given a voice. 
? Victim assistance: Victim assistance programmes support victims in 
recovering from crime and proceeding through the criminal justice system. 
While some programmes lobby for victims' rights (particularly the rights of 
victims to have a primary role in the administration of criminal justice), others 
address the harm suffered by individual victims. 
? Ex-offender assistance: These programmes reintegrate offenders into the 
community, educating them in constructive conflict-resolution skills that 
replace anti-social behaviour and foster accountability. 
? Restitution: Restitution can take the form of both monetary payments and in-
kind services rendered to the victim, thus repairing the financial (and perhaps 
relational) consequences of crime; restitution also has the potential/goal of 
turning the offender into a productive person. 
? Community service: While restitution repairs the harm to the individual, 
community service repairs the harm to the community, the secondary victim. 
 
While state funded victim compensation is not listed as a separate programme in 
terms of this classification, it is commonly referred to in the context of restorative 
justice. The growing interest in compensation signifies a transformation of the 
philosophy of criminal justice, where the primary concern of society in response to 
crime lies in addressing the needs of the victim as opposed to the traditional concern 
with punishing the offender.117 
 
2 3 2  Evaluation of restorative justice 
 
Batley118 raises – and refutes – certain criticisms that are voiced against restorative 
justice: 
                                            
117  Wright M "Why should victims of crime be compensated?" in In Support for Crime 
Victims in a Comparative Perspective, ed Fattah E & Peters T (1998) 83 – 94. 
118  Batley M “Restorative Justice” in Victimology in South Africa (2005) van Schaik, 
Pretoria 117 – 130. Mike Batley is chairperson of Restorative Justice Initiative South 
Africa and co-founder and executive director of the Restorative Justice Centre. 
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? Restorative justice ignores the need for punishment and offers the offender a 
soft option: Restorative justice does not preclude the utilisation of punitive 
measures and can, in fact, be combined with them in a constructive way.119 
? Restorative justice applications have lacked the creativity and sophistication 
to address the issues it claims to address: Facing the victims of their crimes 
can be very difficult for offenders and forces accountability on them; 
punishment can be and is combined with restorative justice sentences. If 
practical applications have proved to lack creativity, this is a shortcoming in 
practice and not principle. 
? Many victims are not prepared to participate in restorative justice processes 
and prefer retribution to restitution: Victims are never forced to participate 
against their will; retribution and restitution are not mutually exclusive and can 
be combined in a single sentencing response to the offence. 
? The level of anger in South Africa is so high that the populace demands crime 
to be dealt with summarily and is not ready for restorative justice 
programmes: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission120 has shown that 
victims are often prepared to participate in restorative processes and extend 
forgiveness to perpetrators. In S v Makwanyane and Another121 Chaskalson P 
said: 
 
The righteous anger of family and friends of the murder victim, 
reinforced by the public abhorrence of vile crimes, is easily translated 
into a call for vengeance… We have long outgrown the literal 
application of the biblical injunction of “an eye for an eye, and a tooth 
for a tooth”. Punishment must to some extent be commensurate with 
the offence, but there is no requirement that it be equivalent or 
identical to it. The State does not put out the eyes of a person who 
has blinded another in a vicious assault, nor does it punish a rapist, 
by castrating him and submitting him to the utmost humiliation in 
gaol. 
 
 
? Restorative justice is inappropriate in the case of serious crimes, such as 
rape, minimising the seriousness of the crime: Restorative justice gives 
victims the opportunity to feel that they have been heard and that perpetrators 
are confronted with the real consequences of their actions; besides, 
restorative justice does not preclude robust punitive measures being taken 
                                            
119  Naudé C M B “Changing Punishment and Restorative Justice” (2001) 42(3) Canadian 
Journal of Criminology 256. 
120  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 1 4 (infra). 
121  1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) 717 [129]. 
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against offenders. In the words of Archbishop Tutu, “Forgiveness does not 
mean condoning what has been done. It means taking what has happened 
seriously and not minimising it…”122 Tutu has expressly cited the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission as an example of the operation of restorative 
justice.123 In New Zealand restorative justice procedures are used for serious 
and persistent offenders, though mainly in the youth justice system.124 In 
North America Umbreit has used victim-offender mediation in cases of 
homicide and sexual assault, even holding a mediation session between the 
family of a murder victim and the killer, shortly before his execution.125 
 
In order to address the perceived shortcomings of restorative justice, Herman126 
proposes a parallel justice system that combines the strengths of both restorative 
justice and the traditional retributive approach to criminal justice.127 Walgrave and 
Aertsen also state that restorative justice should be an integral part of the criminal 
justice system.128 Herman’s parallel system advocates two separate paths of justice, 
namely one for victims and one for offenders. Whereas society has traditionally 
devoted its energies to prosecuting offenders, this approach suggests a parallel set 
of victim-oriented responses. The response of the South African criminal justice 
system will determine whether a successful integration takes place that harnesses 
the strengths of both approaches, or whether restorative justice remains an awkward, 
added-on aspect of criminal justice.129 It is submitted that this will depend to a great 
extent on the attitude of those involved actively in the criminal justice system.   
 
                                            
122  Tutu D No Future without Forgiveness (1999) 218 – 219. 
123  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 1 4 (infra). He states this in his Foreword to Consedine J C 
Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime (1997). 
124  Pollard C “Victims and the Criminal Justice System: A New Vision” 2000 Crim L R 5. 
125  Umbreit M S Bradshaw W & Coates R B “Victims of severe Violence meet the 
Offender: Restorative Justice through Dialogue” (1999) 6 International Review of 
Victimology 321. As Hoyle and Young point out, a sentence of death itself can hardly 
be seen as a restorative process, but that was not the issue here: Hoyle C & Young R 
“Restorative Justice: Assessing the Prospects and Pitfalls” in McConville M & Wilson 
G (eds) The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (2002) 525 534. 
126  Herman S in Zehr H & Toews B Critical Issues in Restorative Justice (2004) Criminal 
Justice Press, Monsey, NY 75. See also Easton S & Piper C Sentencing and 
Punishment – The Quest for Justice 2005 158. 
127  In S v Makwanyane and Another (supra) 717 [129] Chaskalson P stated: “Retribution 
is one of the objects of punishment, but it carries less weight than deterrence.” 
128  Walgrave L & Aertsen “Reintegrative Shaming and Restorative Justice: 
Interchangeable, Complementary or Different?” (1997) 4 European Journal on 
Criminal Justice Policy and Research 67. 
129  Burchell J & Milton J Principles of Criminal Law (3 ed) (2005) 7 – 9. 
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Burchell130 points out that the success of informal reconciliation requires, firstly, the 
willingness of the parties before the tribunal to become involved in the catharsis of 
reconciliation, and secondly, their commitment to ascertaining the unembellished 
truth; in the absence of these preconditions the process of healing will fail. Hoyle and 
Young aver that the participation of both victim and offender is often not really 
willingly given as victims participate motivated by feelings of civic duty and offenders 
do so with an expectation of reduced punishment.131 Making an unpopular decision 
must then be delegated to an independent and qualified tribunal holding the 
necessary authority. Though there is dissent as to whether the state ought to enforce 
the restorative outcome,132 it is submitted that Marshall is correct when he says that 
restorative justice “is complementary to criminal justice, not antithetical to it.”133 
Besides, it is difficult to see how the criminal justice system would deal with so-called 
“victimless crimes,” were the entire criminal justice process to be left exclusively to 
interaction between victim and offender. The success of restorative justice thus 
depends – likewise as in the case of retributive justice – on the exercise of state 
authority, and care must be brought to bear as this exercise of power is largely 
unfettered by normal due process safeguards and the protection afforded by human 
rights norms.134 Divorcing restorative justice from the criminal justice system would 
create an area of practice where the accused loses the protection of due process 
with its procedural safeguards; trampling the accused’s rights cannot tie in with the 
lofty ideals of restorative justice.135 As Hoyle and Young put it:136  
 
One obvious role of the state – in any functional system – is to provide due-
process checks and balances on both the process and outcome of the 
administration of justice.” 
 
                                            
130  See previous footnote. 
131  Hoyle C & Young R “Restorative Justice: Assessing the Prospects and Pitfalls” in 
McConville M & Wilson G (eds) The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (2002) 
525 527. 
132  See source quoted in previous footnote at 527 – 530. 
133  Marshall T “Seeking the whole Justice” ISTD Conference Repairing the Damage: 
Restorative Justice in Action 20 March 1977 10 quoted in Hoyle C & Young R 
“Restorative Justice: Assessing the Prospects and Pitfalls” in McConville M & Wilson 
G (eds) The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (2002) 525 528. 
134  Ashworth A “Some Doubts about Restorative Justice” (1993) 4 Criminal Law Forum 
277; von Hirsch A & Ashworth A Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and 
Policy 2 ed (1998).  
135  Braithwaite J “Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts” in 
Tony M (ed) Crime and Justice: A Review of Research (1999) University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 101. 
136  Hoyle C & Young R “Restorative Justice: Assessing the Prospects and Pitfalls” in 
McConville M & Wilson G (eds) The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (2002) 
525 542. 
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Another caveat is that civil law has over many centuries evolved a highly refined 
system of restitution as victims of wrongdoing need prove their claims only on a 
balance of probabilities. Civil procedure is also better suited to determining 
quantum.137 Also, in the realm of civil law restitution, quantum is based purely on the 
aggrieved party’s loss. Some writers on restorative justice express fears of 
disproportionate reparation agreements being out of reasonable proportion with the 
wrongdoing; the plaintiff at civil law need not fear a claim being reduced in proportion 
to the degree of culpability of the defendant.138  
 
In the short term restorative justice has proved to be expensive in the range and level 
of resources necessary for success. However, experience in Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, parts of the United States of America and other countries has shown that 
proper investment can secure significant long-term and widespread savings to the 
community in the reduction of crime – including the reduction of court sittings and the 
closure of penal institutions.139 
 
The following statement of Hoyle and Young summarises the current situation:140 
 
Across the world restorative justice is evolving in different jurisdictions, in 
some cases quite rapidly, with different types of advocates driving its 
progress. It appears that it is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. 
What this will mean in practice, however, is still to be determined. It will 
almost certainly develop in diverse ways in a variety of settings, dependent 
on the perceived problems of each jurisdiction and the methods for dealing 
with those problems that statutory and voluntary bodies have traditionally 
used. The danger has to be that, in the rush to introduce restorative 
interventions into different systems, programmes will be developed which are 
poorly thought out and badly implemented. There will be a proliferation of 
schemes calling themselves restorative justice, many of which will be 
anything but restorative in their aims and practices… Restorative justice 
should be given the chance to be tried and tested on its own merits rather 
than being marketed as a complete alternative to established criminal justice. 
 
A clue to the suitability of restorative justice to a country with South Africa’s 
heterogeneous population profile can be found in the words of a senior judge of the 
                                            
137  See Ch 3 Par 3 2 2 (infra). 
138  Ashworth A “Victims’ Rights, Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure” in Crawford 
A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice (2000) 185. 
139  Auld (2001) Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales The Stationery 
Office, London Par 66. See also Ch 4 Par 4 3 2 1 (infra). 
140  Hoyle C & Young R “Restorative Justice: Assessing the Prospects and Pitfalls” in 
McConville M & Wilson G (eds) The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (2002) 
Oxford 525 547 – 548. 
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British Court of Appeal, where he says of restorative justice:141 “Interestingly, a 
number of these examples can be found in areas where indigenous people have 
suffered as a result of the imposition of western legal systems without common 
reference points.”  
 
The sources quoted above reveal the most significant objection to restorative justice 
in principle as being the lack of procedural safeguards protecting the accused, 
particularly where the victim has an input in determining sentence. The issue of 
pecuniary redress (which forms the basis of this thesis) does not attract this 
controversy and is invariably accepted as an undisputed right of the victim. In fact, 
criminal justice rules could have the effect of reducing the offender’s liability as 
private law judges a person’s liability on the basis of the loss inflicted and factors 
such as affordability do not limit quantum.142 As pointed out above,143 
blameworthiness can limit the offender’s liability in the criminal justice system. Schärf 
discusses extra-judicial community courts in South Africa, stating “…the two systems 
are fairly compatible as long as the community courts stay within the boundaries of 
what western justice calls dispute resolution, where the parties agree to the decision-
making person/body and agree to honour the agreed outcome.”144 It is where 
community courts deal with criminal matters that they can fall foul of constitutional 
due-process protection. What the author goes on to suggest as the best solution is 
that community courts not be incorporated in the criminal justice system, but that the 
state should endeavour to tutor these tribunals regarding constitutional constraints. 
The state should hold a watching brief and allow them to deal with both civil and 
criminal matters which fall within the boundaries of problem solving. The author does 
not state exactly at what point criminal cases ought to be reserved for the criminal 
justice system, passing beyond simple problem solving.145 It is suggested that the 
dividing line should be based on the question of whether the disruption of the public 
                                            
141  Auld (2001) Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales The Stationery 
Office, London Par 60. See also Ch 4 Par 4 3 2 1 (infra). 
142  In terms of S 130(11) of the British Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act the 
court considers the means of the accused when determining the amount payable and 
should not impose an order in excess thereof: R v Stanley (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 
446; R v Kirk [2001] EWCA Crim 2122. See Ch 4 Par 4 2 2 5 (infra). “The litigant who 
sues on delict sues to recover the loss which he has sustained because of the 
wrongful conduct of another, in other words that the amount by which his patrimony 
has been diminished by such conduct should be restored to him.” Trotman v Edwick 
1951 1 SA 443 (A) at 449 B – C. No mention is made anywhere of limiting the amount 
due to affordability by the defendant. 
143  See footnote 138 (supra). 
144  Schärf W “Policy Options and Community Justice” in Schärf W & Nina D The Other 
Law: Non-state Ordering in South Africa (2001) 58 – 59. 
145  Source in previous footnote: 66 – 70. 
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interest can be dealt with adequately between the parties, or whether larger public 
issues are involved which demand state intervention.   
 
With the lessons learnt from the pioneering work done by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and the heritage of ubuntu, combined with 
the experience gleaned in community courts, there is the prospect that a positive 
local contribution can be made to the international practice of restorative justice. 
 
2 3 3  Recognition of restorative justice in South Africa 
 
Before considering the recognition accorded to restorative justice by the South 
African government, it is worth noting that restorative justice is already flourishing in 
the – uniquely South African – informal justice system of community courts referred 
to in the previous paragraph. Perceived advantages of community courts are the 
absence of court fees and legal costs, the existence of victim-friendly processes and 
the focus on compensation coupled with a respect for established customary values. 
In addition to community courts sanctioned by local communities, there is the reality 
of vigilante groups dispensing summary, mob-style justice in urban townships. Both 
forums deal with criminal matters, sometimes dealing with the most serious of 
offences if the population does not trust the efficacy of the police. In community 
courts, justice dispensed takes the form of restitution, service to the aggrieved party, 
reimbursing lost income and medical costs, or the rendering of service to the 
community. In rural areas, Matgotlas and Chief’s Courts dispense justice in a way 
similar to community courts. Restitution is seen to harmonise damaged relationships 
more effectively than the imposition of punishment, which is perceived as 
perpetuating permanent rifts between parties who have to live in close proximity with 
one another. Sometime members of the police and other functionaries in the criminal 
justice system146 assist, acknowledging – albeit unofficially – that these forums are 
more effective in addressing problems occasioned by offending than the conventional 
criminal justice system.147 Magistrates in rural areas try to reconcile the customary 
dispensation with the formal requirements of the legal system. 148 
                                            
146  Van Niekerk J “At the Coalface: The Childline Experience” in Richter L Daws A 
Higson-Smith C Sexual Abuse of young Children in Southern Africa (2004) Child, 
Youth and Family Development Research Programme, Human Sciences Research 
Council, Cape Town 264. 
147  Schärf W “Policy Options and Community Justice” in Schärf W & Nina D The Other 
Law: Non-state Ordering in South Africa (2001) 39. 
148  Ndima D The Law of Commoners and Kings – Narratives of a rural Transkei 
Magistrate (2004) 112. 
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Turning to the government’s stance, South Africa, as a member of the international 
community, has professed its commitment to restorative justice. When the Economic 
and Social Council called for comment on the preliminary draft Basic Principles on 
the Use of Restorative Justice,149 South Africa was one of thirty-seven countries 
commenting.150 In 2002 the Group of Experts on Restorative Justice151 of the United 
Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice152 formulated 
recommendations153 concerning restorative justice. On 18 April 2002 the 
                                            
149  Full title: Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal 
Matters (United Nations) 2000 
 International Centre for Justice and Reconciliation (April 2002) 
http://www.restorativejustice.org/rj3/Undocuments/UNDecBasicPrinciplesofRJ.html 
150  International Centre for Justice and Reconciliation April 2002)  
http://www.restorativejustice.org/rj3/UNBasicPrinciples/countriesthatresponded.htm 
SA pointed out, inter alia, that traditional retributive criminal justice systems do not 
provide the best outcomes in resolving conflicts among victims, offenders and 
members of the community. Victims, who suffer most from crime, remain 
unsupported, without receiving effective remedies. Restorative justice measures can 
lead to satisfaction for the victim and prevent future offending and can produce viable 
alternatives to short terms of imprisonment and fines. Reference was made to the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (See Ch 5 Par 5 2 1(infra)), the draft bill (as it 
then was) on juvenile justice (See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 5 (infra)) and a pilot project (1996 – 
1997) on family group conferences for child offenders as examples of SA’s 
implementation of the aims of restorative justice. Reference was also made to the 
work of the SA Law Reform Commission (See Ch 5 Par 5 2 2 (infra)) encouraging the 
incorporation of restorative justice principles into SA law. Support was expressed for 
the idea of developing an international instrument on restorative justice. SA 
recommended amendment of the wording in order to place the onus on courts to 
encourage parties to resort to restorative justice measures; the state should also 
provide programmes to engender social responsibility in young offenders and to 
prevent recidivism. The final wording does not directly include SA’s suggestions, but 
reflects the spirit thereof; however, specific reference is made to the fact that the 
victim must not be coerced into taking part in restorative justice procedures against 
his or her will. Arguably, the latter suggestion is canvassed in the provision that 
constant research must be conducted to match restorative justice procedures to 
changing circumstances. See generally: United Nations Economic and Social Council 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 2002 Restorative Justice: 
Report of the Secretary-General E/CN.15/2002/5 
(July 2003) http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/commissions/11comm/5e.pdf 
151  Jabu Sishuba of South Africa being one of the seventeen experts. 
152  United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice 2002 Document E/CN.15/2002/5/Add.1 
 (July 2003) http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/commissions/11comm/5add1e.pdf 
153  The main recommendations were: 
Research must be conducted and disseminated amongst all Member States and 
other interested parties; 
The Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal 
Matters should be reviewed periodically to take account of developments; 
Member States should exchange useful information with one another; 
Member States should provide technical and financial assistance to developing 
countries in the implementation of restorative justice policies; 
The widest possible dissemination should be given to the Basic Principles on the 
Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters. 
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Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice154 recommended to the 
Economic and Social Council the adoption155 of a draft resolution which encourages 
member states to establish guidelines and standards for restorative justice, with 
legislative authority where necessary. South Africa is a member of the Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.156 
 
There is ample evidence of the recognition of restorative justice in domestic South 
African criminal justice policy: 
 
? Section 155 of the White Paper for Social Welfare157 requires that welfare 
programmes for offenders, victims of crime and their families “must aim at 
restorative justice by taking into account the victims’ perspectives and by 
involving the community in justice processes, thus promoting reintegration 
and social cohesion.” 
? In terms of the Probation Services Act158 the Minister of National Health and 
Welfare may establish programmes dealing with, inter alia, the assessment, 
care, treatment, support, referral for and provision of mediation in respect of 
victims of crime,159 the compensating of victims of crime160 and restorative 
justice as part of appropriate sentencing and diversion options.161 Restorative 
justice is defined as “the promotion of reconciliation, restitution and 
responsibility through the involvement of a child, and the child’s parents, 
family members, victims and the communities concerned.”162 
                                            
154  Eleventh Session – Vienna 16 – 25 April 2002. 
United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Report on the 
eleventh session (16 – 25 April 2002) 
(April 2003) http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/commissions/11comm/14e.pdf 
All documents relevant to the eleventh session are available at: (July 2003) 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_commission_session_11.html?print=yes 
155  The resolution was adopted on 24 July 2002 (Resolution 12 of 2002) at the 37th 
 plenary meeting of the Economic and Social Council. 
United Nations Economic and Social Council 2002 Document E/2002/INF/2/Add.2 
(July 2003)  
http://www.ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/528/42/PDF/N0252842.pdf?OpenElement 
156  Press release 25 April 2002 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
(March 2003) http://www.undcp.org/odccp/press_release_2002-04-25_2.html 
157  Notice 1108 of 1997. Ministry for Welfare and Population Development (June 2006) 
 http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/white_papers/social971.html?rebookmark=1 
158  116 of 1991. See Ch 5 Par 5 2 1 1 (infra). 
159  S 3(d). 
160  S 3(h). 
161  S 3(l). 
162  S 1. 
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? One of the goals enumerated in the preamble to the Child Justice Bill163 is “to 
entrench the notion of restorative justice in respect of children.” Section 
2(b)(iii) states an object of the Bill to be “supporting reconciliation by means of 
a restorative justice response,” while Section 1 defines restorative justice as 
“the promotion of reconciliation, restitution and responsibility through the 
involvement of a child, the child’s parent, the child's family members, victims 
and communities.” 
? In the Foreword to the Victims’ Charter164 – drawn up in terms of the 
government initiated Victim Empowerment Programme – the Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Development states that the document complies 
with the spirit of the South African Constitution165 and adheres to the tenets of 
restorative justice.  
? The South African Law Reform Commission’s Report166 on sentencing in 
criminal cases states that “(a)n ideal system should…allow victim participation 
and restorative initiatives…  
? Discussion Paper 97 of the South African Law Reform Commission deals with 
the implementation of a state-funded victim compensation scheme in South 
Africa.167 It calls for the implementation of such a system relying, inter alia, on 
the fact that restorative justice emphasises victim empowerment in the 
criminal justice process. 
 
Perhaps the most profound and successful manifestation of the principles of 
restorative justice in South Africa is to be found in the deliberations of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission168 of which Tutu said:169 
 
Having looked the beast of the past in the eye, having asked and received 
forgiveness and having made amends, let us shut the door on the past – not 
in order to forget it but in order not to allow it to imprison us.” 
                                            
163  B49 of 2002. See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 5 (infra). 
164  See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 6 (infra). 
165  SA Government Website (December 2004) 
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/policy/vc/2004vc.pdf 
166  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) Project 82 
Report (2000) 5 – 6 (2 7 – 2 8). 
Website of the University of the Witwatersrand 
(April 2003) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/report/project82.pdf 
 See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 7 (infra). See also Neser J “Restorative Justice – A New 
 Dimension of Sentencing in SA Courts” (2001) 14 SA Journal of Criminal Justice 46 
 51. 
167  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 2 (infra). 
168  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 1 4 (infra). 
169  Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report Chairperson's Foreword Vol 1 Ch 
1 Par 91. 
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2 4 Comparison 
 
Despite the common influence of English law, the four countries differ vastly in their 
historical development. This is the result of disparate ethnic170 influences. Restitution 
is a common denominator long preceding the influence of English law (in the case of 
the three ex-colonies); it is justifiable to state that victim-driven restitution was the 
precursor of criminal law systems controlled by the state. All systems have isolated 
examples of the state being held liable to compensate victims of crimes committed by 
individuals not acting as organs of state. The precedent set by state-funded 
compensation schemes for those injured in industrial and traffic accidents led to the 
idea of general, state-funded compensation schemes for victims of crime. Today the 
two more affluent states, Great Britain and New Zealand, both have compensation 
schemes for victims of crime; South Africa and India do not. However, Great Britain 
and New Zealand differ fundamentally in that the latter has a unified scheme 
compensating victims of all injuries, while Great Britain has retained separate 
schemes for victims of work-related injuries, traffic injuries and crimes, respectively. 
All four states, however, share a commonality in recognising the desirability of 
compensating victims of criminal injury, and all four states compensate victims of 
traffic and industrial injuries; it is where victims of crime are concerned that the 
distinction persists. Setting aside the extra-juristic question of affordability, 
consideration will have to be given to the suitability of separate schemes – following 
the British precedent – or a unified scheme – following the New Zealand precedent – 
to South African conditions.171  
 
Restorative justice is inseparably interwoven with the subject of victims of crime. 
While restorative justice receives recognition in all four countries, it is applied much 
more rigorously in the two developed countries; this conclusion is evidenced, inter 
alia, by the existence of state-funded victim compensation in Great Britain and New 
Zealand. However, the concept of restorative justice covers a very broad spectrum 
which extends beyond redress for the victim; in certain restorative justice 
programmes the victim’s input is also, to a lesser or greater extent, considered when 
punishment is meted out. In other words, the victim plays an active role as opposed 
                                            
170  “An ethnic group is a human population whose members identify with each other, 
usually on the basis of a presumed common genealogy or ancestry. Ethnic groups 
are also usually united by common cultural, behavioural, linguistic, or religious 
practices. In this sense, an ethnic group is also a cultural community.” 
 Wikipedia (July 2006) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic 
171  See Ch 6 Par 6 2 4 (infra). 
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to a merely passive role. This tendency bears a resemblance to the historical roots of 
the matter where the enforcement of justice against wrongdoers was put squarely in 
the hands of the victim and his or her group. The assumption by the victim of an 
active role in the criminal justice system results in restorative justice being criticised 
on the basis that the accused’s due-process rights can be diluted, for example, 
where restorative programmes influence sentencing. While this problem is 
acknowledged and will have to be addressed in due course by all civil/fundamental 
rights based legal systems, the fact that the this thesis concentrates on redress for 
victims of crime – as opposed to the involvement of the victim as a participator in 
deciding the punishment to be meted out to the offender – means that the due-
process question does not play a major role in the current area of focus.  
 
In South Africa the phenomenon of community courts serves as a working example 
of restorative justice principles in operation. The country stands before the challenge 
of demarcating the spheres of influence of community courts and the formal criminal 
justice system in a way that is conducive to the constitutional administration of 
justice, respecting the role and interests of the victim and the due-process rights of 
the accused.   
 
In the following chapter, the rights of victims against perpetrators and the state will be 
investigated and compared in order to evaluate the rights of redress extended to 
victims in terms of the law of delict/tort and constitutional law in the four jurisdictions. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Delictual rights of victims of crime  
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
Having considered historical trends in the treatment of victims of crime and the 
doctrine of restorative justice in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the 
delictual claims victims have against offenders. Three avenues are explored: 
 
? Common law of delict/tort; 
? Punitive damages; and 
? Delictual/tortious liability of the state. 
 
3 2 Common law of delict 
 
3 2 1  Introduction 
 
While all four countries researched have a common law foundation to their respective 
legal systems, South Africa’s common law is based on Roman Dutch law, while the 
other three countries all base their common law on the English system. This leads to 
certain differences in the ambit of claims under the respective jurisdictions.  
 
While all four countries acknowledge the common law delictual/tortious right of the 
victim to sue the offender, New Zealand’s legal system has virtually nullified this right 
as the victim has only a claim against the Accident Compensation Scheme.1 
 
3 2 2 South Africa 
 
A person who has suffered a violation of his or her subjective rights has the right to 
claim redress from the wrongdoer providing the latter is identifiable and the former 
can prove that some harm has unlawfully been inflicted on him or her.2 This violation 
                                            
1  The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 deprives the 
person who has suffered a personal injury due to an accident – which includes a 
criminal act – of a tortious claim against the wrongdoer in respect of the injuries 
suffered. See Par 3 2 5 (infra). 
2  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg 3; Visser P J & Potgieter J M Law of 
Damages 6. 
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of rights can lead to a claim in terms of the actio legis Aquiliae for damnum iniuria 
datum (patrimonial losses) and/or a claim in terms of the actio iniuriarum for iniuria 
(violations of the personality).3 
 
The victim must prove that the harm was inflicted unlawfully. The benchmarks for 
unlawfulness are not the same in criminal law and private law: In criminal law public 
interest is the guiding dynamic, while private law protects individual interests. The 
fact that a criminal penalty is prescribed for the commission of a certain act does not 
preclude the delictual liability of the perpetrator.4 The criminal penalty does not take 
the place of the delictual award (or vice versa) because both have different 
objectives: The former to penalise, the latter to effect redress. Whatever the position 
is apropos the importance of the distinction between public and private law, there are 
instances where legislation authorises a criminal court to make restitutionary orders 
in criminal cases.5  
 
When the accused effects restitution, “society should not come under the impression 
that a rich man can use his relative wealth to obtain for himself a lesser sentence of 
imprisonment than that which a poorer man would receive in the same 
circumstances.” 6 Restitution should not replace punishment and the differing 
objectives of the two concepts should be borne in mind by courts.7 
 
The situation regarding damage caused by an illegal act resulting from the breach of 
a statutory duty was set out as follows in Patz v Greene & Co8 by Solomon J: 
 
Every one has the right, in my opinion, to protect himself by appeal to a court 
of law against loss caused to him by the doing of an act by another, which is 
expressly prohibited by law. Where the act is expressly prohibited in the 
interests of a particular person, the Court will presume that he is damnified, 
                                            
3  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg 5 – 6. 
4  Unless this is clearly indicated in the relevant legislation - Da Silva v Coutinho 1971 3 
123 (A) 135 – 136. 
5  These instances are discussed below in Ch 4.  
6  S v Sehlako 1999 1 SACR 67 (W) 71e. See discussion of this case in “Recent cases” 
(1999) 12 SA Journal of Criminal Justice 279, where a plea is made for the courts not 
to ignore the value of imposing a suspended sentence conditional on restitution. See 
Ch 4 Par 4 2 1 (infra). 
7  While restitution aims to effect reparation to the victim, the guidelines for the 
imposition of punishment were formulated as follows in S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537 (A) 
540G: “What has to be considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the offender 
and the interests of society.” No mention is made of the victim. 
8  1907 TS 427 433. 
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but where the prohibition is in the public interest, then any member of the 
public who can prove that he has sustained damage is entitled to his remedy. 
 
Despite the last sentence, courts do not generally grant civil remedies in the case of 
statutes enacted in the public interest or general welfare, and not for the protection of 
individual interests.9 Whether the breach of a statutory duty gives rise to a cause of 
action depends on the intention of the legislature;10 the fact that a duty carries a 
criminal sanction does not indicate any intention to exclude a civil remedy.11 
 
The victim seeking redress by way of the common law faces three – often 
insurmountable – problems, namely: 
 
? The financial inability of most offenders to effect redress (especially if 
sentenced to serve a period of imprisonment); 
? The high cost and uncertainty of litigation coupled with problems in the 
South African legal aid system;12 
? Secondary victimisation and traumatisation of the victim, especially in 
rape cases; and 
? South African courts are conservative and tend to make lower awards 
than are expected.13 
 
Even if the accused has been found guilty in a criminal court, a civil court cannot 
accept the record and conviction of the criminal court as proof of the facts. The 
finding of the criminal court is merely an opinion and the case against the perpetrator 
                                            
9  Hall and Another v Edward Snell & Co Ltd 1940 NPD 314; Woolfson and Others v 
Simpson Bros & Co Ltd 1940 NPD 314. See also Boucher v Cape Divisional Council 
1941 CPD 291; Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 (2) SA 1 A 31. 
10  Hall and Another v Edward Snell & Co Ltd (supra); Woolfson and Others v Simpson 
Bros & Co Ltd (supra). 
11  Da Silva v Coutinho 1971 (3) SA 123 A 134 135 – 136. See also Salisbury Bottling 
Co (Pvt) Ltd v Central African Bottling Co (Pvt) Ltd 1958 (1) SA 750 FC; Ellis v 
Vickerman 1971 3 SA 123 (A) 134. 
12  See generally van As H J Regsverteenwoordiging as element van 
Regstoeganklikheid (1999). 
 13  There might be a turning of the tide, however. G Q v Yedwa 1996 (2) SA  437 Tk GD 
stated that awards for personal injury arising out of an assault, had been very small 
and often insignificant and should be increased substantially. RAF v Marunga 2003 
(5) SA 164 SCA 170 E – G approved recent willingness to award a higher quantum of 
damages in personal injury cases. See Jordi P “Compensation for Victims of Crime in 
a Civil Context” Paper delivered at Criminal Justice Conference of Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation February 2005. 
 (July 2006) http://www.csvr.org.za/confpaps/jordi.htm 
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must be proved de novo.14 On the other hand, a court hearing a civil suit has the full 
civil procedure system with its network of pleadings15 at its disposal to make an 
accurate assessment of liability and quantum. In a criminal case, a distinct line is 
drawn between the proceedings up to judgment – when the guilt of the accused is 
determined – and the sentencing stage when a suitable penalty is determined and 
the extent of the harm inflicted on the victim becomes relevant. This procedural 
distinction is not drawn in a civil case where quantum is relevant from the outset: A 
plaintiff suing for damages must provide sufficient information to “enable the 
defendant reasonably to assess the quantum.”16 Furthermore, civil procedure allows 
a defendant to institute a counterclaim (claim in reconvention)17 and the 
Apportionment of Damages Act18 provides for a weighing up of the respective 
degrees of fault of the parties in assessing quantum. Where the amount of the loss is 
not capable of swift assessment in a criminal matter, the courts have stated that the 
criminal trial must not be transformed into a quasi-civil case.19 
 
3 2 3 Great Britain 
 
Like Roman law, English law of torts follows a casuistic approach.20 The victim can 
thus sue the violator only if the latter’s actions comply with a certain set of 
predetermined criteria. The applicable principles are summarised by the European 
Court of Human Rights as follows:21  
                                            
14  Van Dokkum N “Compensation for victims of sexual crimes” (1997) 10 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice  283. See also du Toit v Grobler 1947 3 SA 213 
(SWA); Yusaf v Bailey 1964 4 SA 117 (W); Davids J “Judgments as Evidence” 1968 
SA Law Journal 74. 
15  For example, the Summons, the Request for Further Particulars (in the Magistrates’ 
Court), the Plea and the Replication. 
16  Rule 18(10) of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of Proceedings in the Several 
Provincial and Local Divisions of the Supreme Court of SA passed in terms of s 
43(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 promulgated in Government Notice No 
R48 of 12 January 1965 (the High Court Rules). See also Erasmus H J Superior 
Court Practice (formerly Nathan, Barnett & Brink) (2002) B1-133 – B1-134; Daniels H 
Beck’s Theory and Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions (2002) 64 et seq; Rondalia 
Versekeringskorporasie van Suid-Afrika v Pretorius 1967 2 SA 649 (A); National 
Union of SA Students v Meyer 1973 1 SA 363 (T). 
17  See High Court Rules Rule 24. 
18  34 of 1956. 
19  R v Kurayi 1959 2 SA 62 (R); R v Mazonko 1962 2 SA 366 (R). 
20  Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 13. The law consists of a number of 
separate torts each governed by its own, unique rules. 
21  DP and another v United Kingdom, (App no 38719/97) [2003] 1 FLR 50, [2002] 3 
FCR 385 [93] – [94]. At [97] the court says that this numerus clausus of torts can be 
extended by the courts “incrementally and by analogy with decided categories.” 
However, this development is restricted by the fact that the decision finding that a 
duty of care exists in a particular instance is seen as a binding precedent. As 
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In England and Wales, there is no single tort which imposes liability to pay 
compensation for civil wrongs. Instead there are a series of separate torts, for 
example, trespass, conversion, conspiracy, negligence and defamation. 
  
Although much has been written regarding the difficulty of defining torts in general 
terms, the following statement is representative:22 
 
Tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by law; this 
duty is towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action 
for unliquidated damages. 
 
The emphasis is on a breach of the law, not on a violation of the subjective rights of 
another person.23 Torts are traditionally grouped under the headings Intentional 
invasion of personal and proprietary interests;24 Interests in economic relations, 
business and trading interests;25 Interests in intellectual property;26 Negligent 
interference with personal, proprietary and economic interests;27 Further protection of 
personal and property interests;28 Reputation;29 and Due process.30 Depending on 
the nature of the conduct, the resulting tortious claim of the victim can fall under any 
one (or more) of the abovementioned forms of tort. Changing circumstances and the 
development of new technology necessitate the expansion of existing remedies, a 
task undertaken by Parliament and the Courts.  
                                                                                                                             
opposed to this, SA law follows a system based on general principles (a generalised 
system), though the English law of tort has been absorbed in some areas. A 
generalised system facilitates the protection of new interests as and when they arise. 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Deliktereg 5. Van der Merwe N J and Olivier P J J Die 
Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1989) 18 – 20; Van der Walt J C and 
Midgley J R Delict: Principles and Cases (1997) 18. 
22  Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 3. See also Murphy J Street on Torts 
(2003) 3. 
23  Compare this with the following definition of a delict in SA law: “Die uitdrukking 
onregmatige daad dui onder meer aan dat een persoon skade of nadeel aan ‘n ander 
moes veroorsaak het…” The expression delict indicates inter alia that one person 
must have caused damage or harm to another person. (Emphasis added) Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser Deliktereg 29. 
24  Historically the most important form of tort, consisting of interference with goods, and 
trespass in its various forms. 
25  For example deceit, passing off, interference with contractual relations, conspiracy 
and intimidation. 
26  Besides copyright and patent, new fields are breach of confidence, for example 
breach of patient confidentiality and disclosing trade secrets. 
27  A fast developing field of law, for example where the protecting of economic interests 
is concerned. 
28  For example, the strict liability for injuries caused by defective and dangerous goods 
introduced into British law at the behest of the European Community. 
29  For example, libel and slander. 
30  For example, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. A developing form is 
abuse of administrative process. 
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Originally, the evidence and conviction in a criminal case could not be used as 
evidence in the civil case arising from the same facts. The tort had to be proved 
without reference to the criminal case, but the Civil Evidence Act31 changed the 
situation in favour of the victim by stating that proof of a conviction in a criminal case 
is admissible in a civil case as evidence that the person committed the offence.32 The 
offender “is taken to have committed that offence unless the contrary is proved,”33 
thus creating a prima facie presumption in favour of the victim. Where a statutory 
provision has both criminal and tortious consequences, a defence to the criminal 
charge will not necessarily constitute a defence in a civil case, as differing degrees of 
proof are required.34 However, a victim of crime is subject to the normal rules 
regarding contributory negligence in cases where an offender is sued for damages.35  
 
The Courts have had to consider whether a statute that imposes a criminal sanction 
automatically creates a right to claim damages in tort. In Lonrho Ltd v Shell 
Petroleum Co Ltd36 Shell Petroleum and others had constructed an oil refinery in 
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) while Lonrho had built a supply pipeline. In 
November 1965, the government of Southern Rhodesia declared unilateral 
independence, whereupon Great Britain passed legislation37 making it a criminal 
offence to supply oil to Southern Rhodesia. The House of Lords accepted that Shell 
had covertly continued to supply oil, thereby prolonging the state of independence 
and thus the period during which Lonrho’s pipeline was out of use. Lonrho sued Shell 
for losses arising from the non-utilisation of its pipeline. Lord Diplock found that no 
civil right of action arose from legislation imposing criminal sanctions, except in two 
instances, namely: 
 
(W)here… it is apparent that the obligation or prohibition was imposed for the 
benefit or protection of a particular class of individuals...38 
 
                                            
31  1968. 
32  S 11(1) states: 
In any civil proceedings the fact that a person has been convicted of an 
offence by or before any court in the United Kingdom… shall… be 
admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving… that he committed that 
offence… 
33  S 11(2). 
34  Potts (or Riddell) v Reid [1943] AC 1 31. 
35  In Meah v McCreamer [1985] 1 All ER 367 the plaintiff’s claim was reduced by 25% 
because he had been a willing passenger in a car driven by a drunken person. 
36  [1982] AC 173. 
37  Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. 
38  185. 
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And 
 
(W)here the statute creates a public right… and a particular member of the 
public suffers… ‘particular, direct and substantial’ damage ‘other and different 
from that which was common to all the rest of the public.’39 
 
In C v Cairns40 a victim of childhood sexual abuse sued a doctor who had not 
reported the abuse. The victim’s claim in this case was unsuccessful due to the long 
time41 that had passed before the institution of the legal suit, but the court made the 
following statement:42 
 
First, a question was raised as to whether a doctor could ever be liable in 
these circumstances where the act causing the later damage was the 
criminal act of a third party… If the non-negligent performance of the act (or 
omission) complained of would have prevented (indeed would have been 
intended to prevent) later foreseeable criminal conduct then arguments as to 
remoteness or novus actus are unlikely to succeed. 
 
The case clarifies the test for causation:43 
 
Had the defendant acted differently (non-negligently) would (has it been 
proved that) the claimant have been spared further damage? 
 
At times, the development of the law of tort has aided the administration of criminal 
justice, for example in the former rule that prosecutions for a felony had to precede 
an action for tort on the same facts. The granting of exemplary (punitive) damages is 
another example of this synergy.44  
 
The tort system is based on the tenet that those who have sustained harm due to a 
wrong should be restored to their pre-injury position by the wrongdoer. In England, 
however, tort damages reach very few victims of injury and at a high cost. This cost 
is met by a large sector of society contributing to liability insurance.45 Thus the 
problems encountered in enforcing the delictual liability of the offender46 in South 
Africa occur equally in an affluent country such as Great Britain.  
                                            
39  185. 
40  [2003] EWHC 437 (QB). 
41  From 1975 to 2000. 
42  Ibid. [47]. 
43  Ibid. [48]. 
44  Murphy J Street on Torts 579 – 582. “Exemplary damages” refers to the awarding 
of damages with a punitive rather than a merely restitutionary objective. See Par 3 3 
(infra). 
45  The Law Commission for England and Wales Part IV Consultation Options and 
Issues for Reform. (September 2002) http//www.lawcom.gov.uk 
46  Ch 4 Par 4 2.1 (infra). 
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The viability of the suit for tortious damages is further limited by the provisions of the 
Offences against the Person Act.47 A person convicted of common assault at a 
summary trial who has received a probation order, been discharged, or has served 
the sentence of imprisonment and paid any fine and costs imposed, cannot be sued 
on the same cause in a civil court.48 The same applies where a charge of common 
assault has been summarily heard and dismissed. This applies only where the case 
was dismissed on the merits and the criminal proceedings were instituted by or on 
behalf of the person aggrieved.49 The court will then issue a certificate of dismissal 
stating the grounds for the dismissal.50 The conviction or discharge only protects the 
person actually convicted or acquitted from further action and not, for example, his or 
her employer.51 The practical solution to the victim’s dilemma is to sue first and 
prosecute later.52  
 
3 2 4 India 
 
Criminal restitution in tort functions substantially as in England and Wales.53 
However, the frequent occurrence of major disasters in India has given rise to the 
concept of the mass tort.54 Most of the acts giving rise to mass tort cases are criminal 
in nature55 and the distinction between crime and tort is relaxed.56 The liability of 
industry has occupied the attention of the Supreme Court.57 
                                            
47  1861. 
48  S 45. 
49  See Halsbury’s Laws of England Volume 11(1) 4 ed (1990) par 502; Jones M A 
Textbook on Torts 473; Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 58. 
50  Skuse v Davis (1839) 10 Ad & El 635. 
51  Dyer v Munday [1895] 1 Q B 742. 
52  North (1966) 29 MLR 16 quoted in Jones M A Textbook on Torts 473. 
53  Pillai P S A Law of Tort 8th ed (2002) 10. 
54  As the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (as amended by Act 104 of 1976) does not 
provide for group actions, this development was effected by the Supreme Court. See 
van As H J “Regshulp in Indië: Kan Suid-Afrika daaruit leer?” 2000 (1) Tydskrif vir 
Regswetenskap 171 178. 
55  For example, the Bhopal Gas Tragedy when the leakage of methyl isocyanate (MIC) 
from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal left thousands of people dead or injured. 
Union Carbide has been accused of culpable homicide and “…is officially a 'fugitive 
from justice,' defying orders of the US and Indian courts to face trial in India." Sarangi 
S of the Bhopal Group for Information and Action 
(March 2004) http://www.csrwire.com/article.cgi/2289.html  
56  See sources quoted in following two footnotes. 
57  Ramanathan U Compensation and Insurance in Parasuraman S & Unnikrishnan  
P V (eds) India Disasters report: Towards a Policy Initiative (2000) 107. This led to 
the promulgation of the Public Liability (Insurance) Act 6 of 1991 which legislated the 
concept of statutory insurance in terms of which persons handling and controlling 
hazardous substances are obliged to take out statutory insurance to provide relief on 
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There is a call for international law remedies – based on the violation of human rights 
– against large corporations:58 
 
Casting the Bhopal injuries in terms of human rights violations underscored 
the sense of irreparable harm. If the right to life is absolute and inalienable, it 
cannot be bought and sold on the open market of civil liability… (especially) 
where the prospect of low tort damages encourages companies to risk 
accidents rather than investing in safety equipment. The human rights 
language also holds the appeal of universality, so that a human who is 
injured by industrial hazards should have the same rights to care and 
compensation no matter where (in the world) the injury occurs.  
 
The Indian Supreme Court has developed the concept of mass tort in cases where 
hazardous substances or processes are involved. The following statement in M C 
Mehta v Union of India indicates the Court’s attitude in this regard:59  
 
We in India cannot hold our hands back and I venture to evolve a new 
principle of liability which English Courts have not done. We have to develop 
our own law… if we find that it is necessary to construct a new principle of 
liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen… on account of 
hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concomitant to an 
industrial economy… We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged 
in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential 
threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and 
residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty 
to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of the 
hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has 
undertaken… (I)f any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise 
must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no 
answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that 
the harm occurred without any negligence on its part… Such hazardous or 
inherently dangerous activity for private profit can be tolerated only on 
condition that the enterprise… indemnifies all those who suffer on account of 
the carrying on of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity regardless 
of whether it is carried on carefully or not. This principle is also sustainable on 
                                                                                                                             
a no fault basis to persons affected. This Act will be canvassed in Ch 8 (infra) which 
deals with state funded compensation in India. While statutory insurance is not 
concerned primarily with the issue of victims of crime, in many cases the two issues 
will coincide if the loss is occasioned by a criminal act. For example, the “Bhopal Gas 
Tragedy,” which is the locus classicus of mass tort cases, led to the criminal 
prosecution of the company (Union Carbide), its directors and managers (in addition 
to the civil case for restitution): Ramanathan U Business and Human Rights: Issues in 
India Paper delivered at International Council on Human Rights September 2000. 
(July 2002) http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftp/beyond_voluntarism.pdf 
See the above-mentioned website for a document prepared by the International 
Council on Human Rights entitled Beyond Voluntarism in which the international law 
responsibility of large corporations is discussed in the light of their human rights 
responsibilities. 
58  Anderson M R Public Interest perspectives on the Bhopal Case: Tort, Crime or 
Human Rights? in Robertson D & Dunkley J (eds) Public Interest Perspectives in 
Environmental Law (1995) 154 – 171 167. 
59  AIR 1987 SC 1086 WP 12739/1985 (1986.12.20) (Oleum Gas Leak Case) at 31. 
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the ground that the enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard 
against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
This liability is not based on fault, but arises as a concomitant element of being 
involved for profit in a hazardous industry. 
 
The restitution granted by the courts is not limited to the payment of damages in 
fiscal form.60 In (a different case of) M C Mehta v Union of India61 the court made an 
order in terms of which workers who had been laid off in the course of the relocation 
of a hazardous industry would be entitled to remain in their residences for a period of 
one and a half years (in addition to the payment of financial restitution). 
 
In the “landmark judgment”62 of Bodhisattwa Gautam v Subhra Chakraborthy63 the 
Supreme Court ordered the accused to pay interim damages of a basic monthly 
amount to a rape victim, pending a final award at the criminal trial,64 holding that 
fundamental rights are enforceable even against private bodies and individuals.65 
 
Turning to the enforcement of the tortious rights of the victim, provision for legal aid in 
India is not effective. In addition to this, India is presumably the only country in the 
world that penalises civil litigants by imposing a form of taxation on civil actions. 
Court fees are calculated as a percentage of the amount claimed.66 The quantum of 
awards in tort cases is usually low.67 Obtaining and enforcing judgments is 
problematical, time-consuming and prohibitively costly.68  
 
                                            
60  The issue of punitive damages will be discussed below in Par 3. 
61  WP 4677/1985 (1996.12.4) (Delhi Land Use Case). Full text of case available at: 
 (June 2002) http://www.elaw.org/resources/regional.asp?region=Asia 
62  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 161. 
63  1996 1 SCC 490. Summary at: (December 2003)  
http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICHRL/1995/69.html 
64  When any shortfall between the final award and the interim amount (from the date of 
filing the complaint) would also become payable. 
65  See Par 3 4 4 (infra) where it is shown that the general rule is that fundamental rights 
are not enforceable against ordinary legal subjects in India, but only against the state. 
66  Van As Regsverteenwoordiging as Element van Regstoeganklikheid: 301 et seq: In 
Kerala court fees are 10% of the amount claimed. 
67  Anderson M R Public Interest perspectives on the Bhopal Case: Tort, Crime or 
Human Rights? in Robertson D & Dunkley J (eds) Public Interest Perspectives in 
Environmental Law (1995) 154 – 171 167. 
68  Mishra “Chairman’s Page” (1987) 4 Indian Bar Review in van As “Regshulp in Indië:  
Kan Suid-Afrika daaruit leer?” 185. 
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3 2 5 New Zealand 
 
New Zealand’s law of tort is based on English law of tort.69 One act can have criminal 
as well as civil consequences.70 A criminal conviction is admissible in a civil case as 
evidence of the fact that the offender committed the offence,71 but does not give rise 
to any presumption that the offence was committed.72 Where the breach of a 
statutory duty amounts to both a crime and a tort, a defence in a criminal prosecution 
will not necessarily amount to a defence against a civil claim.73  
 
The question whether a statutory crime gives rise to a tortious cause of action is 
answered in accordance with the British case of Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co 
Ltd,74 namely that no civil claim arises from legislation imposing criminal sanctions, 
except: 
 
? When it is apparent that the obligation was imposed for the benefit of a 
particular class of individuals; or 
? Where the statute creates a public right and a particular member of the 
public suffers damage different from that suffered by the rest of the public. 
  
New Zealand is unique among the countries in this research, in that its legal 
dispensation does not permit a rigid distinction to be drawn between the liability of 
the offender to effect restitution to the victim, on the one hand, and compensation 
provided by the state, on the other. The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Act75 deprives the person who has suffered a personal injury due to 
an accident – which includes a criminal act – of a tortious claim against the 
wrongdoer in respect of the injuries suffered.76 The victim thus has only a claim 
against the Accident Compensation Scheme, which is dealt with in the same way as 
                                            
69  See Ch 2 Par 2 2 5 (supra). 
70  Todd S M D et al The Law of Torts in New Zealand (1991) 4. 
71  S 23 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 which abolished the rule in 
Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co [1943] KB 587 CA. 
72  The Law Commission of New Zealand has advocated the extension of this provision 
to include a presumption in its proposed Evidence Code 1999: New Zealand Law 
Commission: Evidence Report 55 Volume 2 Evidence Code and Commentary s 49. 
(June 2003) http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/documents/publications/Evidence2.pdf 
73  Todd S M D The Law of Torts in New Zealand  343 – 344. 
74  Supra. See Par 3 2 3 (supra). Todd S M D The Law of Torts in New Zealand 333. 
75  2001. See s 317. The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 
 – which regulates the Accident Compensation Scheme – will be discussed in Ch 5 
Par 5 5 2 (infra). 
76  This provision was already present in s 27 of the Accident Compensation Act of 
1982. Todd S M D The Law of Torts in New Zealand 27. 
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claims in respect of industrial and traffic related injuries. Restitution and 
compensation are thus linked by legislation. The victim does not, however, lose the 
tortious claim for damage to property. 
  
3 3 Punitive damages 
 
3 3 1  Introduction 
 
This refers to an amount of money paid to the aggrieved party, not only to 
compensate the latter for harm suffered, but also to punish the wrongdoer and 
discourage future violations. This fusion represents a combination of the received 
functions of private law and public (criminal) law respectively.77 For this reason the 
award of punitive damages is frowned upon by many authorities as this constitutes 
an unwelcome fusion of these criteria.78 
 
3 3 2 South Africa 
 
In Salzmann v Holmes79 punitive damages were awarded with reference to the rule 
in Roman-Dutch law that the sum awarded was originally in the form of a penalty and 
that ordinary verbal slander was still a crime. In South African Associated 
Newspapers Ltd and Another v Yutar80 the same principle was accepted without 
further consideration. In the case of damages for adultery it has been accepted that a 
punitive aspect is still present.81 
 
In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security82 the right to claim punitive or constitutional 
damages for the infringement of fundamental rights in the interim Constitution 
received judicial attention.83 The matter arose from an alleged assault suffered by the 
applicant at the hands of the police. In the court a quo84 the respondent had 
successfully excepted to the claim for constitutional damages, contending that “an 
action for damages in the nature of constitutional damages does not exist in law, and 
                                            
77  See Ch 2 Par 2 2 2 n 34 (supra) and Par 3 2 2 (infra). 
78  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg 8 n 28 and the authorities cited therein. 
79  1914 AD 471 480 483. 
80  1969 (2) SA 442 A 458 D – E. 
81  Bruwer v Joubert 1966 (3) SA 334 A 338C – D. 
82  1997 (7) BCLR 851 CC.  
83  S 10 deals with the person’s right to human dignity, while s 11 deals with the right to 
freedom and security of the person and s 13 deals with the right to privacy. 
84  Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (2) BCLR 232 W per van Schalkwyk J. 
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an order for payment of damages does not qualify as appropriate relief contemplated 
in section 7(4)(a) of the interim Constitution.” The Constitutional Court85 held that the 
term constitutional damages refers to a public law remedy existing in addition to 
normal delictual damages under private law. The aim is to vindicate the fundamental 
constitutional rights violated, deterring such assaults in future, punishing the state 
organs involved – thus fulfilling a punitive and preventative role – and also 
compensating the victim. The normal (delictual) common law remedies address only 
the last stated objective. The applicant’s contention was that section 7(4)(a) of the 
interim Constitution86 created a public law right to claim constitutional damages. On 
the facts the court declined to make an award of constitutional damages in addition to 
the normal delictual awards, though not ruling out the possibility that in future and in 
appropriate circumstances such an award might find a place in South African law.87 
Normal damages would sufficiently compensate the applicant and the court doubted 
that history had proved that an award of constitutional damages would serve much of 
a punitive effect. In order to be effective (in a punitive and preventative sense) such 
an award would have to be substantial,88 thus granting the victim a benefit in the 
nature of a windfall over and above normal damages and placing a heavy burden on 
the fiscus, something undesirable in a financially beleaguered country such as South 
Africa. 
 
Despite the refusal to extend the existing law in this particular instance, the court 
stated: 
 
If necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to 
secure the protection and enforcement of these all important rights.89 
 
 
And 
 
 
                                            
85  The majority judgment was handed down by Ackermann J. Didcott J, Kriegler J and  
 O’Regan J each gave separate judgments, but all concurred in the final order. 
86  Supra. S 7(4)(a) reads: “When an infringement of or threat to any right entrenched in 
this Chapter is alleged, any person referred to in par (b) shall be entitled to apply to a 
competent court of law for appropriate relief, which may include a declaration of 
rights.” (Emphasis added) 
87  See the discussion of this judgment in Stein A “Constitutional Jurisprudence” 1997 
Annual Survey of SA Law 45 79. Although the tendency of the judgment is negative 
regarding the awarding of constitutional damages generally, the judgment should not 
be understood to say that constitutional damages cannot ever be awarded. 
88  In this case the amount claimed for constitutional damages was R200 000, the 
 normal (delictual) damages claimed amounting to R130 000. 
89  P 862 [19]. The “all important rights” refer to the Bill of Rights. 
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The South African common law of delict is flexible and under section 35(3) of 
the interim Constitution should be developed by the courts with ‘due regard to 
the spirit, purport and objects’ of Chapter 3.90 
 
The court doubted whether the distinction between private law and public law has 
much relevance today. The last quotation above and the gist of the judgment show 
clearly that the court did not have any problem with a delictual (private law) remedy 
being used on its own to redress a violation of the Bill of Rights.91 The court went on, 
however, to express its disapproval of the use of an order of damages for a punitive 
purpose.92 
 
The court referred with apparent approval to “the creative fashioning of constitutional 
remedies which do not sound in money”93 in suitable cases, but did not elaborate on 
the nature of these remedies as the current facts did not require this. 
 
3 3 3 Great Britain 
 
Though the granting of punitive or exemplary damages has been the subject of much 
criticism, the phenomenon survives.94 In Rookes v Barnard95 Lord Devlin stated that 
exemplary damages constituted an unwarranted fusion of the rules of private and 
public (criminal) law, but retained them on grounds of precedent, identifying three 
categories: 
 
? Oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the state; 
? Wrongful conduct benefiting the defendant beyond the amount of 
damages payable to the plaintiff; and 
? Where authorised by statute. 
 
Restricting the granting of exemplary damages even further, Lord Devlin held that 
they could be granted only in respect of causes of action for which they had been 
granted prior to 1964.96 
 
                                            
90  P 882 [58]. 
91  See also 883 [60-61]. 
92  P 889 [70]. 
93  P 890 [74]. 
94  Murphy J Street on Torts 579 – 582. See also Kralj v McGrath [1986] 1 All ER 54; 
 Burrows A S Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (1987) 202 – 211. 
95  [1964] AC 1129. 
96  The year of the judgment – see previous footnote. 
 59
The British Law Commission has recommended that exemplary damages should be 
retained – preferring the term punitive damages – for cases where the “defendant 
deliberately and outrageously disregarded the plaintiff’s rights,” thus releasing them 
from the three rigid categories set out above. The restriction to pre-1964 causes of 
action should also be abolished.97 
 
3 3 4 India 
 
The following statement in M C Mehta v Union of India indicates the judicial attitude 
regarding punitive damages:98 
 
We would also like to point out that the measure of compensation... must be 
correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such 
compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous 
the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable... 
(Emphasis added) 
 
The reference to the deterrent effect of the amount of damages awarded indicates 
approval of the concept of punitive damages in cases involving large organisations 
dealing with hazardous substances. In M C Mehta v Kamal Nath,99 the court stated 
that “the object and purpose of such levy of exemplary damages was … to serve as a 
deterrent for others not to cause pollution in any manner.” Punitive damages can thus 
overlap with the objective in imposing a criminal penalty on the offender.100 However, 
in Charan Lal v Union of India the granting of punitive damages was censured:101 
 
It was urged that it is time in order to make damages deterrent the damages 
must be computed on the basis of the capacity of a delinquent to pay such 
damages… and not on the basis of actual consequences suffered by the 
victims. This is an uncertain promise of law. On the basis of evidence 
available and on the basis of the principles so far established, it is difficult to 
foresee any reasonable possibility of acceptance of this yardstick. And even if 
                                            
97  Law Commission Report Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages (1997) 
 184. 
 (June 2005) http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc247.pdf 
98  AIR 1987 SC 1086 WP 12739/1985 (1986.12.20) (Oleum Gas Leak Case) 32. 
99  WP 182/1996 (2002.03.15) (Beas River Case) at 8. Full text of case available at: 
 (July 2002) http://www.elaw.org/resources/regional.asp?region=Asia 
100  M C Mehta v Kamal Nath (supra) 9: 
Keeping in view all these and the very object underlying the imposition of 
imprisonment and fine under the relevant laws to be not only to punish the 
individual concerned but also to serve as a deterrent to others to desist 
from indulging in such wrongs which we consider to be almost similar to the 
purpose and aim of awarding exemplary damages… (Emphasis added) 
 In this case the amount of the punitive damages imposed by the court was limited as 
 the defendant had undertaken to do costly work in rectifying the ecological harm 
 inflicted on the environment. 
101  AIR 1990 SC 1480 1545. 
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it is accepted, there are numerous difficulties of getting that view accepted 
internationally as a just basis in accordance with law. (Emphasis added) 
 
In Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India102 the Supreme Court held that this 
passage was obiter. However, the opposite view was held in Indian Council for 
Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India and Others.103 The precise status of the law on 
this point has thus not been settled. 
 
As will be seen below104 the granting of punitive damages often coincides with the 
state being held liable for the acts of its servants. 
 
3 3 5 New Zealand 
 
Though New Zealand’s criminal practice is similar to that of England, the limitations 
created by Rookes v Barnard105 have expressly been rejected.106  
 
Exemplary damages can be claimed irrespective of whether the Accident 
Compensation Scheme has compensated the victim or not.107 In Donselaar v 
Donselaar108 the Court of Appeal held that as the no-fault regime only compensates 
a victim, it is still possible to claim exemplary damages for personal injuries as 
                                            
102  AIR 1992 SC 248 at 261. 
103  3 SCC 212 241 – 246: 
 We on our part find it difficult to say, with great respect to the learned 
 Chief Justice, that the law declared in Oleum Gas Leak Case is obiter. 
 It does not appear to be unnecessary for the purposes of that case. 
104  Par 3 4 4 (infra). 
105  Supra. See Par 3 3 3 (supra). The case stated that exemplary damages can be 
 granted only in the three instances existing prior to 1964: 
 Oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the state; 
 Wrongful conduct benefiting the defendant beyond the amount of 
 compensation payable to the plaintiff; and 
 Where authorised by statute. 
106  Taylor v Beere [1982] 1 NZLR 81. Todd S M D et al The law of torts in New Zealand 
(1997) 1129 – 1237.  
107  See Ch 5 Par 5 5 2 (infra). 
108  [1982] 1 NZLR 97. The granting of exemplary damages is criticised by an author 
attached to the University of Auckland, New Zealand (Beever A “The structure of 
aggravated and exemplary damages” (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 87) 
as follows: 
 Private law has a structure that does not provide for punishment - it is a basic 
tenet of private law that the claimant cannot expect to be put in a better 
position than he or she would have been in had he or she not been wronged.  
 The duty that, when breached generates compensatory damages, is owed to 
a specific claimant; the duty that, when breached leads to exemplary 
damages, is owed to society as a whole. Thus the liability that gives rise to 
compensatory damages is not the same as the liability that produces 
exemplary damages. 
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exemplary damages arise from the conduct of the wrongdoer (and not from the 
injury);109 in serious cases it is considered to be appropriate to punish the 
perpetrator, in addition to compensating the victim. The decision was in part based 
on the statutory prohibition on claims for personal injury and the perceived 
inadequacy of existing financial compensation. In X v Attorney-General,110 Williams J 
said: 
  
As to the law, in the pithy phrase employed by the learned authors of 
Hewston and Buckley: Salmond and Hewston on the Law of Torts…: 
‘Aggravated damages are given for conduct which shocks the plaintiff; 
exemplary damages for conduct which shocks the jury.’ 
 
The judge continued:111 
  
As to punitive or exemplary damages… it is enough to note that such 
damages are only awarded to punish the defendants because of the 
outrageous or contumelious way in which they have conducted themselves in 
committing the tort for which they are sued… (E)xemplary damages must be 
‘fairly and reasonable commensurate with the gravity of the conduct thus 
condemned.’ 
 
Initially, exemplary damages could be claimed only in cases of intentional conduct, 
but, pursuing precedents set by foreign courts,112 the New Zealand High Court now 
also awards exemplary damages in cases where the level of negligence amounts to 
an extreme disregard for the victim’s safety, warranting condemnation and 
punishment.113 However, in Ellison v L,114 the Court of Appeal held: 
 
We are prepared to accept for the sake of argument, though leaving the 
matter to be decided on another occasion, that in some cases of negligence 
exemplary damages may be awarded. But because negligence is an 
unintentional tort those cases are likely to be rare indeed. 
 
The court made it clear that exemplary damages will be awarded in cases of 
negligence only where there is an extreme degree of negligence, and not in cases of 
ordinary negligence.115 
                                            
109  This principle is acknowledged in s 319(1) of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, 
and Compensation Act. See Ch 5 Par 5 5 1 (infra). 
110  (1996) 2 NZLR 623 at 630. 
111  Supra 631. 
112  Coloca v BP Australia Ltd [1992] 2 VR 441; Robitaille v Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd 
(1981) 125 DLR (3d) 228. 
113  McLaren Transport Ltd v Somerville [1996] 3 NZLR 424 (1996) 1 BACR 262. 
114  (CA 287/96 19 November 1997). 
115  Miller J M “Compensation for mental trauma injuries in New Zealand” (1998)3 The 
Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies. 
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In cases of intentional, unlawful injuries or acts of a sexual nature, courts have 
awarded exemplary damages.116 One of the largest awards was in a case involving 
prolonged, serious domestic violence in breach of court orders and undertakings, 
where the award was $100 000.117  
 
3 4 Liability of the state 
 
3 4 1  Introduction 
 
Opinions differ as to whether the basis of the state’s liability for the actions of its 
agents is delictual or constitutional. 
 
3 4 2 South Africa 
 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies intervening)118 arose from a serious assault suffered at the hands of an 
individual with a history of assault who had been granted bail on a charge of rape, 
despite the attempts of interested parties to persuade both police and prosecutor to 
oppose bail. The plaintiff had instituted action for alleged dereliction of duty by the 
latter persons. The High Court had granted absolution from the instance on the 
grounds that prima facie a duty of care had not been proved. This finding was upheld 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal.119 The Constitutional Court120 overturned the 
finding of absolution from the instance and referred the matter back to the High Court 
for trial. This time the plaintiff’s claim met with success.121 
 
The court considered the plaintiff’s cause of action to be founded solely on delict 
arising from a breach of duty owed her by the police and/or the prosecutor, providing 
a causal link was proved between such breach and the injuries suffered. 
 
                                                                                                                             
(January 2003) http://www.massey.ac.nz/~trauma/issues/1998-3/miller1.htm 
116  In a case involving sexual misconduct by a doctor, the court awarded $10 000 (L v 
Robertson [2000] 3 NZLR 499) and in a case involving violent rape, the court 
awarded $20 000 (A v M [1991] 3 NZLR 229). 
117  M v L [1998] 3 NZLR 104. 
118  2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC) or 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
119  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 1 SA 489 (SCA). 
120  The unanimous judgment was delivered by Ackermann and Goldstone JJ. 
121  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2003 2 SA 656 (C). See 
discussion below in this paragraph. 
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The court was unambiguous regarding the fact that there was an obligation on all 
courts to develop the common law and to do so in keeping with the Constitution: 
 
(U)nder the Constitution there can be no question that the obligation to 
develop the common law with due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights is an obligation which falls on all of our courts including this 
Court.122 
 
However, the court emphasised that this duty was not taken lightly:123 
 
Moreover the issue in this case can hardly be described as an insignificant 
one, lying at an exotic periphery of the law of delict. On the contrary, the case 
raises issues of considerable importance to the development of the common 
law consistently with the values of our Constitution. 
 
The court proceeded to consider in terms of the common law the basis of the legal 
duty to act and concluded that the duty to act was based on reasonableness, namely 
whether it would be reasonable to expect a party to have taken positive measures to 
prevent the injury. However, the Constitution now took this test further:124 
 
(I)n determining whether there was a legal duty on the police officers to act, 
Hefer JA in Minister of Law and Order v Kadir125 referred to weighing and the 
striking of a balance between the interests of parties and the conflicting 
interests of the community. This is a proportionality exercise with liability 
depending upon the interplay of various factors. Proportionality is consistent 
with the Bill of Rights, but that exercise must now be carried out in 
accordance with the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ and 
relevant factors must be weighed in the context of a constitutional state 
founded on dignity, equality and freedom and in which government has 
positive duties to promote and uphold such values… (T)he Bill of Rights 
entrenches the rights to life,126 human dignity127 and freedom and security of 
the person… 128 It follows that there is a duty imposed on the State and all its 
organs not to perform any act that infringes these rights. (Emphasis added) 
 
The court went on to adopt the reference in Osman v United Kingdom129 to “a 
positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to 
protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.”  
 
                                            
122  P 1006 [34]. This is a paraphrase of s 39(2) of the Constitution. 
123  P 1015 [59]. 
124  1009 [43 – 44]. 
125  1995 1 SA 303 (A) 318 E – H. 
126  S 11. 
127  S 10. 
128  S 12. 
129  29 EHHR 245 305 Par 115. 
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The Constitutional Court thus supported the proposition that the Constitution creates 
a legal duty of protection vesting in the state to protect individuals not only from the 
actions of the state’s representatives, but also from the actions of other individuals. 
The breach of such duty can lead to the state being delictually liable to the victim. 
 
In order to allay fears that this approach could lead to the state being delictually liable 
in every case where a person suffers the effect of a crime, the court went on to 
state:130 
 
Fears expressed about the chilling effect such delictual liability might have on 
the proper exercise of duties by public servants are sufficiently met by the 
proportionality exercise which must be carried out and also by the 
requirement of foreseeability and proximity…. A public interest immunity 
excusing respondents from liability that they might otherwise have in the 
circumstances of the present case, would be inconsistent with our 
Constitution and its values. 
 
The court was thus extending a lifeline to the state to protect it from universal liability 
for the consequences of crime: The requirement of a causal link between the action 
or inaction on the one hand, and the injury suffered on the other hand, will be used to 
ensure that cases of state liability are kept in check. 
 
The following comment concerning this judgment sums up its significance:131 
 
(T)he judgment introduces a whole new dimension to the relationship 
between the state and its individual citizens, significantly strengthening the 
rights of ordinary people. The judgment is a demonstration both of the court’s 
independence and of the value to ordinary people of our constitutional 
democracy. 
 
Subsequent to the decision, it has been quoted in the press as a precedent for 
similar actions.132 
 
                                            
130  1012 [49]. 
131  Editorial “A salutary precedent” Business Day 20 August 2001. 
132  On 27 May 2002 an Eastern Cape shopkeeper, Martin Whitaker, was killed, the killer 
allegedly being an individual who had previously received a presidential pardon for 
crimes of violence, despite the fact that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had 
refused to grant him amnesty. Wyndham H in “Wyndham’s Week: How responsible is 
president for death?” Weekend Post 27 July 2002 6 explores the possibility of a 
similar action being brought against the president. This possibility was also mooted 
by Tony Leon, head of the opposition party in Parliament. Niland A “Family ‘can sue if 
suspect convicted’” Weekend Post 27 July 2002 1. 
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The matter was then heard by the Cape Provincial Division133 for a decision on 
whether the state owed Carmichele a duty to exercise reasonable care in the 
prevention of crime on these particular facts and whether the requisite causal link 
was present. The court held that that primary significance attached to the relevant 
constitutional imperatives. On the application of that test, the court found that the 
state owed Carmichele a legal duty to protect her against the risk of sexual violence 
perpetrated by the offender. The negligent failure to do so was unlawful. 
 
It then became necessary to determine whether the requirement of causality had 
been satisfied. The court had to decide whether: 
 
? Causality had to be determined by asking how the particular judicial 
officer who granted the offender bail would have decided the matter; or 
whether 
? Causality had to be determined by asking how a reasonable court would 
have decided the matter. 
 
The court elected to apply the second criterion – the objective approach – deciding 
that a reasonable court apprised of the full facts would have denied bail. It then had 
to be determined whether the omissions of the servants of the state were closely 
enough linked to the harm suffered by Carmichele. Applying the test laid down in 
International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley,134 the court found that the link between 
the omissions and the harm was indeed sufficiently close and ordered the payment of 
damages. An appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, the latter 
considering this to be a case where a “public law breach of duty can be transposed 
into a private law breach leading to an award for damages.”135 
 
Minister of Safety and Security v van Duivenboden136 was an appeal from a judgment 
of the Cape Provincial Division in which the Respondent had successfully sued the 
Appellant for damages. The matter arose from a shooting incident in which a certain 
Brooks shot and killed his wife and child, shooting and paralysing the Respondent in 
the process. Brooks had a record of abusive and threatening behaviour of which the 
                                            
133  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2003 2 SA 656 (C). 
134  1990 (1) SA 680 (A) 701 where the court applied the causa sine qua non test. 
135  Minister of Safety and Security and Another v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 
321 D – E. 
136  2002 6 SA 431 (SCA). Full text at: (July 2003)  
http://www.uovs.ac.za/faculties/law/appeals/in023/220802.htm 
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authorities were aware. In terms of legislation137 the Commissioner of Police may 
take steps to have a person declared unfit to possess a firearm if the latter shows, 
inter alia, the intention to kill or injure anyone, or if his or her possession of a firearm 
is not in the interests of any person as a result of the mental condition or inclination to 
violence of the possessor of the firearm. For a considerable period before the 
respondent was shot, various police officers were in possession of information that 
reflected upon Brooks’ fitness to be in possession of firearms.  
 
The court138 pointed out that a negligent omission is unlawful only if it occurs in 
circumstances that the law regards as sufficient to give rise to a legal duty to avoid 
negligently causing harm. The existence of a legal duty does not, however, 
automatically lead to liability. Negligence is also required; the test being whether a 
reasonable person in the position of the defendant would not only have foreseen the 
harm, but would also have acted to avert it. Negligence is not inherently unlawful. 
Where the negligence manifests itself in a positive act it is presumed to be unlawful. 
The court endorsed the test for negligence propounded in Kruger v Coetzee139 
namely, whether a reasonable person in the position of the party concerned would 
not only have foreseen the harm, but would also have acted to avert it. 
 
The court referred to Minister van Polisie v Ewels140 where it was held that a 
negligent omission will be regarded as unlawful conduct when the circumstances of 
the case are of such a nature that the omission not only evokes moral indignation, 
but the legal convictions of the community require that it should be regarded as 
unlawful. This was found to be in keeping with the approach followed in English law. 
However, the court emphasised that “the question to be determined is one of legal 
policy, which must perforce be answered against the background of the norms and 
values of the particular society in which the principle is sought to be applied.”141 The 
Constitution serves as the supreme source of the norms and values of South African 
society. No norms conflicting with the Constitution are valid. The court labelled the 
Constitution “a system of objective, normative values for legal purposes.”142 The 
court also acknowledged that a duty to prevent injury will more readily be placed on 
                                            
137  S 11 of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 amended by the Arms and 
Ammunition Acts Amendment Act 117 of 1992. 
138  The majority judgment was delivered by Nugent, JA. Howie JA, Heher AJA and Lewis 
 AJA concurred. Marais JA gave a separate, but concurring judgment. 
139  1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430 E – F. 
140  1975 3 SA 590 (A) 597 A – B. 
141  Ibid Par 16. 
142  Ibid Par 17. 
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the state than on an individual as it is “the very business of a public authority or 
functionary to serve the interests of others.”143 The court went on to say:144 
 
(I)t must also be kept in mind that in the constitutional dispensation of this 
country the state (acting through its appointed officials) is not always free to 
remain passive. The state is obliged by the terms of section 7 of the 1996 
Constitution not only to respect but also to “protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights” and section 2 demands that the obligations 
imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled. 
 
The public accountability of the state is an important factor in determining whether a 
duty to prevent injury rests on the state. However, this accountability can be enforced 
in a variety of ways – enforcement is not limited to granting a delictual claim to the 
victim:145 
 
The norm of accountability, however, need not always translate constitutional 
duties into private law duties enforceable by an action for damages, for there 
will be cases in which other appropriate remedies are available for holding 
the state to account. Where the conduct in issue relates to questions of state 
policy, or where it affects a broad and indeterminate segment of society, 
constitutional accountability might at times be appropriately secured through 
the political process, or through one of the variety of other remedies that the 
courts are capable of granting. 
 
Against this constitutional duty of protection, other factors must be weighed up:146 
 
It might be that in some cases the need for effective government, or some 
other constitutional norm or consideration of public policy, will outweigh 
accountability in the process of balancing the various interests that are to be 
taken into account in determining whether an action should be allowed. 
 
The court found that there were no external factors militating against the state’s 
liability and also no means to enforce the state’s liability other than by granting the 
Respondent a delictual claim. 
 
The court then considered the issue of causation, following the criteria adhered to by 
the Cape Provincial Division in Carmichele’s case,147 finding a “direct and probable 
chain of causation between the failure of the police to initiate an enquiry into the 
fitness of Brooks to possess firearms … and the shooting of the respondent.”148 
                                            
143  Ibid Par 19.  
144  Ibid Par 20. 
145  Ibid Par 20. 
146  Ibid Par 22. 
147  Supra. 
148  Ibid Par 30.  
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Marais JA based his concurring judgment purely on the law of delict, finding it 
unnecessary to refer to the Constitution and the concept of Constitutional 
accountability:149  
 
For all their150 momentous and enormous historic, symbolic, legal and 
emotional significance and status as the supreme law, in my view, their 
existence has little bearing upon this particular case… 
 
I hesitate to accept unreservedly that the listing in the Bill of Rights of a right 
(whether it be a newly accorded right or a longstanding one) necessarily 
gives rise to the existence of a legal duty to act where none existed 
previously… 
 
I doubt that the accountability of which section 41(1)(c) of the Constitution 
speaks ("All spheres of government and all organs of State within each 
sphere must… provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent 
government for the Republic as a whole…") can be regarded as prima facie 
synonymous with liability under the lex Aquilia for damages for omissions to 
act.  
 
The South African Law Reform Commission151 has cited this judgment as authority 
for the recommendation that the positive duties resting on state officials to act ought 
to be set out in legislation. While private citizens have the right to remain passive 
when the constitutional rights of others are threatened, the state has a constitutional 
duty to act in order to protect such potential victims from harm. The Commission 
“recommends that positive duties be visibly imposed on public office bearers 
responsible for the investigation of sexual152 offence matters by way of the multi-
disciplinary protocols.”153 Such protocols can be amended as the situation changes. 
 
The judgment is also seen to “delineate more closely the relationship between the 
right to freedom from violence as entrenched in section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution 
and concomitant duties on the state to take steps to protect this right.”154 
 
                                            
149  Ibid Par 2 – 4. 
150  Marais JA referred also to the interim Constitution. 
151  SA Law Reform Commission Sexual Offences Report Project 107 December 2002.  
 (July 2003) http://www.polity.org.za/pdf/SALCReportonSexualOff.pdf 
152  It is to be the borne in mind that the Report deals specifically with sexual offences, 
but, bearing also in mind that the van Duivenboden case did not deal with sexual 
offences, it is submitted that the recommendations of the SA Law Reform 
Commission ought not to be limited to sexual offences, to the exclusion of other 
offences. 
153  Ibid 30. 
154  Combrinck H & Barday R “Beyond Carmichele: developing the right to freedom from 
violence” (September 2002) 6/1 Gendernews (July 2003) 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/gender/gendernews2002/2002_1_beyond.php 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal subsequently granted the claim of a woman raped by 
a known dangerous criminal and serial rapist who had escaped from police custody 
in van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security,155 relying on the Constitutional Court 
judgment in the Carmichele case. 
 
In Hamilton v Minister of Safety and Security156 the Cape Provincial Division granted 
a claim to the victim of a shooting offence. The authorities had possessed information 
showing the perpetrator to be emotionally unsuitable to have a firearm licence. The 
facts of the case arose in September 1993 – before the passing of the interim 
Constitution. The court stated:157 
 
To my mind in September 1993 the community’s legal convictions demanded 
that the police exercise reasonable care in the prevention of violent crimes… 
 
In Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety and Security158 the Constitutional 
Court found that the rules of vicarious liability apply to the state as they do to any 
employer. Thus, the state is not ipso facto liable for all wrongs committed by its 
servants:159 
 
It was also contended in argument that the respondent should be held liable 
for the wrongful acts of the policemen whether they were acting in the course 
of their employment or not. No convincing argument was, however, advanced 
to sustain this submission, or to show why the common-law should be 
developed so as to impose an absolute liability on the State for the conduct of 
its employees committed dishonestly and in pursuit of their own selfish 
interest. 
 
In President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd160 the Constitutional Court held the state liable for damages, emphasising its duty 
to provide an effective legal remedy (as required by the rule of law and the 
Constitution) where constitutional rights have been breached by third parties.  
 
                                            
155  2003 1 SA 389 (SCA). 
156  2003 (7) BCLR 723 (C) Confirmed in Minister of Safety and Security v Hamilton 2004 
 2 SA 2 6 (SCA). See also Minister of Safety and Security v de Lima (SCA) 63/04. 
 Full text at: (March 2005) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/files/6304/6304.pdf 
157  741[32]. 
158  2003 (1) BCLR 14 (CC). In this case police officers abused their official status to steal 
property which had already been stolen from its owner. 
159  17[6]. 
160  Case CCT20/04 decided 13 May 2005.  
(May 2005) http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/modderklip.html 
This case dealt with the unlawful occupation of land. 
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From the above it is clear that the judiciary is employing the provisions of the 
Constitution in extending the law of delict to grant the victim of violent crime a remedy 
against the state; while having its roots in constitutional law, this remedy is 
administered by applying the rules of delict. 
 
3 4 3 Great Britain 
 
Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire161 arose from facts similar to those of 
Carmichele’s case.162 The estate of a victim of the “Yorkshire Ripper” sued the police 
on the basis of negligence, in that the latter had not properly investigated previous 
murders by the offender and thus not prevented the murder of the deceased. The 
claim rested on police failure to control another person to prevent harm to a third 
party.163 The House of Lords upheld the decision of the court a quo164 that the claim 
disclosed no cause of action. The court found that there was insufficient proximity 
between the parties to constitute an exception to the general rule that no duty is 
owed. A duty might arise between a gaoler and a person in the vicinity of a prison 
who suffered harm due to the escape of a prisoner.165 In this case, however, the 
deceased was a member of the general public and the risk borne by her was no 
greater than that borne by any other female member of the public. Policy 
considerations also played a role in the judgment; reference was made to the vast 
diversion of police resources to defending such actions and the risk of the police 
acting in a detrimentally defensive way in investigating crime.166 The facts in Hill’s 
case can be distinguished from those in Carmichele’s case: In the latter instance the 
offender had already been identified and placed in custody and that his case record 
proved that he was a risk to the public.  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights sets out certain rights and freedoms 
and English courts are authorised to grant remedies to enforce them. In terms of 
                                            
161  [1989] A C 53. In Stenning v Home Office [2002] EWCA Civ 793 the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that the prison authorities could be liable in damages to a prisoner for 
injuries inflicted by a fellow prisoner. 
162  See Par 3 4 2 (supra). 
163  This case was decided before the passing of the Human Rights Act. The decision 
 was thus based on tortious principles. 
164  Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1988] 2 WLR 1049. 
165  In Costello v Chief Constable of the Northumbria Police [1999] 1 All ER 550, [1999] 
 ICR 752 the Court of Appeal found that a police officer owed a tortious, common law 
duty of care to another police officer who was being attacked by a prisoner in the 
former officer’s presence. See also Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 
1004; Palmer v Tees Health Authority and another 45 BMLR 88. 
166  At 63 per Lord Keith. 
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section 8(2) of the Human Rights Act167 an order for damages is included in the relief 
which may be granted. The door has thus been opened for the state to be held 
tortiously liable for human rights violations. English law in general – and the law of 
tort in particular – have entered the arena of human rights.168 Two avenues exist 
regarding the liability of public bodies vis-à-vis persons suffering harm due to the 
unlawful acts or omissions of the state:  
 
? The common law tort of negligence can be extended; or  
? The legislation quoted above can serve as legal foundation.  
 
In Osman v United Kingdom169 the European Court of Human Rights favoured the 
former interpretation, but in the later judgment of Z v United Kingdom170 favoured 
applying the statute in preference to the common law, holding that the convention 
imposes a positive duty on the state to provide adequate protection to everyone 
within its jurisdiction. At the time of Osman v United Kingdom, the only basis for 
holding the police accountable was an action for negligence under the common law, 
while section 8 of the Human Rights Act171 creates a new (legislative) framework for 
liability. This could stunt the growth of the common law.172 Both the Osman173 and 
                                            
167  1998. 
168  Wright J Tort and Human Rights 1. 
169  [1999] 1 FLR 193. 
170  2001] 2 FCR 246 at [73]. This stance seems to be borne out by the European Court 
 of Human Rights in E and others v United Kingdom (App no 33218/96) [2003] 1 FLR 
 348, [2002] 3 FCR 700 at [115] where the court stated:  
If taking action at the present time, the applicants might, at least on 
arguable grounds, have a claim to a duty of care under domestic law, 
reinforced by the ability under the Human Rights Act 1998 to rely directly on 
the provisions of the Convention. 
171  1998. 
172  Wright J 3. Both these cases were quoted with approval in Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security and Another. 
173  In Barrett v Enfield London BC [1999] 3 All ER 193 at 199, [2001] 2 AC 550 at 559 
 560 Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained the problem in applying the reasoning of the 
 court in Osman’s case as follows: 
In English law the decision as to whether it is fair, just and reasonable to 
impose a liability in negligence on a particular class of would-be defendants 
depends on weighing in the balance the total detriment to the public interest 
in all cases from holding such class liable in negligence as against the total 
loss to all would-be plaintiffs if they are not to have a cause of action in 
respect of the loss they have individually suffered. (3) In English law, 
questions of public policy and the question whether it is fair and reasonable 
to impose liability in negligence are decided as questions of law. Once the 
decision is taken that, say, company auditors though liable to shareholders 
for negligent auditing are not liable to those proposing to invest in the 
company (see Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 1 All ER 568, [1990] 
2 AC 605), that decision will apply to all future cases of the same kind. The 
decision does not depend on weighing the balance between the extent of 
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the Z cases support claims such as that instituted by the victim in the Carmichele 
case, as is borne out by the following quotation from the Osman case:174 
 
In the instant case, involving the protection of a child and the right to life and 
where the damage caused was grave, the requirements of public policy could 
not dictate that the police should be immune from liability. Furthermore, the 
combined effect of the strict tests of proximity and foreseeability provided 
limitation enough to prevent untenable cases ever reaching a hearing and to 
confine liability to those cases where the police have caused serious loss 
through truly negligent actions. (Emphasis added) 
 
Similarly, in the Z case, it was decided that a contravention of article 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights175 entitled victims of abuses to176 ”… an 
appropriate means of obtaining a determination of their allegations that the local 
authority failed to protect them from inhuman and degrading treatment and the 
possibility of obtaining an enforceable award of compensation for the damages 
suffered thereby.” 
 
Even in instances where state liability is held to be founded on tort, there is a 
divergence of opinion as to whether a broader approach based on general principles 
ought to be followed, or whether a narrower, casuistic approach is to be followed in 
determining whether a duty to protect the victim rests on the state. In Anns and 
Others v London Borough of Merton,177 the broader approach was applied:  
 
In order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not 
necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous 
situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question 
has to be approached in two stages. First, one has to ask whether, as 
between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage 
there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in 
the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be 
likely to cause damage to the latter – in which case a prima facie duty of care 
arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary 
to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or 
to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is 
owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise… 
 
                                                                                                                             
the damage to the plaintiff and the damage to the public in each particular 
case. 
This case was quoted with approval in D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS 
Trust; K and another v Dewsbury Healthcare NHS Trust and another; RK and another 
v Oldham NHS Trust and another [2003] EWCA Civ 1151, [2003] 3 FCR 1 [14]. 
174  Ibid 314 Par 312. 
175  Which provides that everyone whose rights in terms of the Convention have been 
breached should have an effective remedy before a national authority. 
176  Ibid Par 111. 
177  [1977] 2 All ER 492 (HL) 498 G - H; [1978] AC 728. 
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In Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman and Others178 the House of Lords returned to the 
casuistic approach by referring to “a series of decisions… (that) emphasized the 
inability of any single general principle to provide a practical test which can be 
applied to every situation to determine whether a duty of care is owed and, if so, what 
is its scope.” It stated that “in addition to the foreseeability of damage, necessary 
ingredients in any situation giving rise to a duty of care are that there should exist 
between the party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed a relationship 
characterised by law as one of ‘proximity’ or ‘neighbourhood’ and that the situation 
should be one in which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law 
should impose a duty of a given scope upon the party for the benefit of the other.”179 
 
The court stated:180 
 
Whilst recognising, of course, the importance of underlying general principles 
common to the whole field of negligence, I think the law has now moved in 
the direction of attaching greater significance to the more traditional 
categorization of distinct and recognisable situations as guides to the 
existence of, the scope and the limits of the varied duties of care which the 
law imposes. 
 
England’s casuistic system of tort grants a remedy only if it fits into an exiting 
paradigm and thus experiences difficulty in extending the law of tort to cope with the 
requirements of the victim of crime, and it is not certain whether the new remedy is 
tortious or constitutional. 
 
3 4 4 India 
 
Like any other large organisation, the state is subject to mass tort liability.181 
 
The Constitution of India provides:182 
 
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law. 
 
                                            
178  [1990] 1 All ER 568; [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) – quoted with approval in DP and another 
 v United Kingdom, (App no 38719/97) [2003] 1 FLR 50, [2002] 3 FCR 385 at [95]. In 
 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1990] 2 All ER 908; [1991] 1 AC 398 it was 
 expressly held that the Anns case had been wrongly decided. 
179  617 G – 618 C. 
180  See previous footnote. 
181  See Par 3 2 4 (supra). 
182  Art 21 of Part III. 
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Thus the life and personal liberty of the individual are protected. Any law 
contradicting the fundamental rights will be void.183  
 
The Supreme Court of India has created binding precedents to ensure adherence to 
the fundamental rights where specific legislation is lacking.184 Fundamental rights 
violations are invariably concomitant with criminal liability:185 
 
There is a great deal of jurisprudence, both old and new on this issue that 
indicates that complicity in human rights atrocities may result in individual civil 
and criminal liability and may also result in collective liability of an 
organisation. 
  
The liability of the state for criminal actions of its representatives in violation of 
fundamental rights is influenced by the doctrine of sovereign immunity186 in terms of 
which the state is not tortiously liable for the acts of its agents when they are 
performing a sovereign – as opposed to a non-sovereign – function.187 The 
                                            
183  Article 13 reads: 
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the 
commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be 
void. 
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the 
rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this 
clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. 
 However, the Constitution of India does not have horizontal application [Unlike its 
SA counterpart. See Ch 1 Par 1 1 (supra)] which would protect individuals from 
infringement of their fundamental rights by other individuals [See Vidya Verma (Smt) 
v Dr Shiv Narain 1956 Cri L J 283; A K Gopalan v State of Madras (1950) 2 Mad L J 
42]. Any victim of the action of another individual would thus have to seek redress 
under civil law by way of tort [Chaudhari & Chaturvedi Law and Fundamental Rights 
4th ed (1998) 703]. However, this rule was not adhered to in the Supreme Court case 
of Bodhisattwa Gautam v Subhra Chakraborthy (supra). See Par 3 2 4 (supra) where 
it was stated that fundamental rights are enforceable even against private bodies and 
individuals, thus the law on this point is obscure. 
184  In Vishaka v State of Rajasthan 1997 SOL 177 the Supreme Court issued guidelines 
to prevent the sexual harassment of women in the workplace. The court relied on 
constitutional provisions and international rules and agreements. [The Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
commitments made by the Indian government at the Fourth World Conference on 
Women in Beijing and the Beijing Statement of Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary. See Coelho M A “Use of International Law in Domestic Indian Cases” 2001 
International Civil Liberties Report 131 – 139.  
(July 2002) http://www.aclu.org/library/iclr/2001/iclr2001_18.pdf ] 
185  Rajagopal B “Gujarat: A Plea and a Proposal” Programme on Human Rights 
and Justice, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(March 2004) http://www.web.mit.edu/phrj/publications/020327_the_hindu.html 
186  This doctrine is a legacy of India’s history as a British colony. 
187  In N Nagendra Rao and Co v State of Andhra Pradesh (1994) 6 SCC 205: AIR 1994 
SC 2663, the court distinguished between sovereign and non-sovereign functions as 
follows: 
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Constitution188 perpetuates this limitation by preserving the legal dispensation as it 
existed before independence.189 However, since 1962 the Supreme Court of India 
has been developing the right of the individual to sue the state for the criminal acts of 
its agents, thus eroding the doctrine of sovereign immunity.190 The term constitutional 
tort has been coined.191 The Constitution192 grants the necessary jurisdiction to the 
Supreme Court.193 
 
Because victims are usually not in a position to enforce their rights, public interest 
litigation plays a prominent role in India. The Supreme Court allows public-spirited 
citizens to approach it for relief on behalf of disadvantaged persons. In M C Mehta v 
                                                                                                                             
In a welfare state, the functions of the state are not only the defence of the 
country or administration of justice or maintaining law and order but extend 
to regulating and controlling the activities of people in almost every sphere, 
educational, commercial, social, economic and political. The demarcating 
line between sovereign and non-sovereign powers for which no rational 
basis survives has largely disappeared. Therefore, barring functions such 
as administration of justice, maintenance law and order and repression of 
crime etc, which are among the primary and inalienable functions of 
constitutional government, the state cannot claim any immunity.  
 In Agricultural Produce Market Committee v Ashok Harikuni and Another (2000) 8 
SCC 61 the court found that non-sovereign functions were functions of the state 
which could be undertaken by a private person or body.  
188  Art 300. 
189  The passing of the Government of India Act in 1968 did nothing to eliminate this 
protection of the state which can trace its origins back to the Charter Act of 1833. In 
the time of Jawaharlal Nehru the Indian Law Commission proposed a progressive 
elimination of this limitation on state liability, but legislation to this effect has not been 
passed. 
190  Baxi U “A perspective from India” (1990) E/CN.4/Sub 2/1990, 26 July 1990 
(July 2002) http://www.law.uu.nl/english/sim/specials/no-12/12-08.pdf 
Jaswal P S “Public Accountability for Violation of Human Rights and Judicial 
Activism in India: Some Observations” (2002) 3 SCC (Journal) 6. 
(June 2003) http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/2002v3a2.htm#Note8 
191  Ramanathan U “Compensation and Insurance” 8. 
192  Article 32 – particularly article 32(2) – of Part III: 
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part. 
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for 
the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or 
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, 
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, 
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. 
(3) … 
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as 
otherwise provided for by this Constitution. 
193      Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 150 – 
151. Article 226 grants the same powers to every High Court in the territory in which it 
exercises jurisdiction. 
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Union of India194 the Supreme Court also stated that the poor can seek enforcement 
of their fundamental rights by writing a letter to a judge.195 
 
In Rudul Sah v State of Bihar196 a person had been kept in custody unlawfully for a 
number of years. The Supreme Court relied on the Constitution197 to grant exemplary 
damages, but held that this was not a substitute for existing civil and criminal 
remedies, which could still be enforced. On the subject of state liability, the court 
stated:198 
 
One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be 
prevented and due compliance with the mandate of article 21 secured, is to 
mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative 
sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be 
corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to 
compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities 
which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection 
the powers of the State as a shield. 
 
In Sebastian M Hongray v Union of India199 the court issued a writ of habeas corpus 
for the release of two persons illegally kept under military custody. When they were 
not produced, the court used its contempt jurisdiction to order exemplary costs to be 
paid to the widows of the missing men. The court also issued a mandamus to the 
Superintendent of Police to commence a criminal investigation.200 This trend has 
been followed by the Supreme Court in various cases,201 treating the state’s liability 
for the criminal violation of fundamental rights by its agents as a constitutional 
matter.202 
 
                                            
194  Delhi Land Use Case (supra). 
195  In Khatri (II) v State of Bihar (1981) 1 SCC 627 630 Par 4 the Supreme Court 
stated: 
Why should the Court not be prepared to forge new tools and devise new 
remedies for the purpose of vindicating the most precious of the precious 
fundamental right to life and personal liberty? 
196  (1983) 2 SCC 746. 
197  Art 32. 
198  Ibid Par 13. 
199  (1984) 1 SCC 339; (1984) 3 SCC 81. (1984) 3 SCR 544 (AIR 1984 SC 1026). 
200  In terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, 2 of 1974. 
201  People’s Union for Democratic Rights v State of Bihar AIR 1987 SC 355, Rudal Sah v 
State of Bihar (1983) 4 Supreme Court Cases 141; People’s Union for Democratic 
Rights v Police Commissioner Delhi Police (1983) 4 Supreme Court Cases 731; 
Saheli v Commissioner of Police, Delhi 1990 1 Supreme Court Cases 422. 
202  In State of Maharashtra v Ravikant S Patil (1991) 2 SCC 373: (1991 AIR SCW 871) 
the award of compensation by the High Court to an awaiting trial prisoner for a 
violation of the fundamental right under art 21 of the Constitution was upheld. The 
prisoner had been handcuffed by the police during an investigation and taken through 
the streets in a procession. 
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Compensation will be awarded under this heading only “where the infringement is 
gross and its magnitude is such as to shock the conscience of the court.”203 In A S 
Mittal v State of U P204 the court referred to humanitarian considerations which could 
move a court to a grant of monetary relief in appropriate circumstances. 
 
In Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa205 “monetary amends” as exemplary damages 
were awarded to the mother of a person who died in police custody. The remedy was 
stated to be of a public law nature, based on strict liability for contravention of 
fundamental rights where sovereign immunity does not apply.206  
 
The state’s liability in this instance is in fact a form of restitution – not compensation – 
as the state is being held vicariously207 and strictly208 liable for a contravention of 
fundamental rights by its servants.209 The Indian Supreme Court thus recognises two 
distinct forms of state liability: 
 
? Tortious liability in cases where sovereign immunity is not applicable; and 
? Constitutional liability in cases where sovereign immunity would normally 
apply.210 
 
Whereas the cases cited thus far deal with the liability of the state on the basis of 
abuse of power by its agents, attention has recently been focussed on “culpable 
inaction”211 where timely action by agents of the state could have prevented criminal 
                                            
203  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 151. See 
also Singh Segal “Compensation to victims of State Excesses – A New Dimension in 
the Field of Victimology in India” in Bhatia K L Juris Vicissitude Law and Change 
Towards the 21st Century (1995) 179. 
204  AIR 1989 SC 1570. 
205  AIR 1993 SC 1960; 1993 Crl L J 2899. See also Nirmal C J Human Rights in India 
(2000) 167. 
206  Ibid Par 9 per Verma J. 
207  See also Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 
 139. 
208  This applies also in the case of the “mass tort” discussed above Par 3 2 4 where the 
state is (usually) not the defendant. 
209  Court orders often give the state the right to recoup from the wrongdoer the amount 
disbursed to the victim. For example in Arvinder Singh Bagga v State of Uttar 
Pradesh 1994 AIR SCW 4148 where the order of the Supreme Court read: “Having 
awarded such compensation, it will be open to the state to recover such amounts 
from the concerned Police Officers personally.” 
210  “The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable and alien to the concept of 
fundamental rights, there can be no question to such a defence being available in the 
constitutional remedy.” Per Verma J in Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa AIR 1993 SC 
1960 1969; 1993 Crl L J 2899 2912. 
211  An example of this is the case of R Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1989 Mad 205 where 
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victimisation. In Sri Lakshmi Agencies v Government of Andhra Pradesh212 the High 
Court stated: 
 
If no action was taken by the concerned individuals in tackling the law and 
order problem after eruption of violence by private individuals, then the state 
is liable to pay compensation for their wilful inaction, but the state cannot be 
made liable in not anticipating the eruption of violence. 
 
There is also a trend of ex gratia payments by the state in cases of “militancy.”213 
 
To summarise, there are three distinct possibilities of state liability arising from 
criminal acts: 
 
? The mass tort where a group of individuals sues a corporation or the state 
on principles of tort; 
? The constitutional tort where the state is liable for the criminal acts of its 
agents on constitutional grounds for (exemplary) damages. This liability is 
not based on tort; and 
? The case of culpable inactivity where the state effects an ex gratia 
payment to victim of criminal action due to the neglect of its agents in 
taking appropriate action. 
 
3 4 5 New Zealand 
 
The Bill of Rights Act214 guarantees fundamental freedoms. No specific mention is 
made of the rights of victims of crime per se, the contents of the Act being arranged 
under the following headings: Life and the Security of the Person; Democratic and 
Civil Rights; Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights; and Search, Arrest, and 
Detention. 
 
                                                                                                                             
the Madras High Court found that damage to and loss of property of members of the 
Sikh community following the assassination of Mrs Gandhi in 1984 could have been 
avoided had the police acted in time. 
212  (1994) 1 APLT Rep 341. See Ramanathan U “Compensation and Insurance”: 9. 
213  See Ramanathan U “Compensation and Insurance” 10. This occurred in the case 
of victims of militancy, where the state was unable to treat the incidents as disparate 
occurrences. The states of Punjab, Undra Pradesh and Assam, for instance, 
formulated schemes for paying a certain sum to victims of militant violence. Victims of 
state violence in the same context were not covered by these schemes, and have 
had to depend on the intervention of courts and the exercise of their discretion. 
214  1990. 
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Where a fundamental freedom is breached by public servants – invariably a criminal 
act – a right of action to sue the state for damages arises. This is seen as being a 
public law remedy rather than one based on tort.215 Strict liability principles apply.216  
 
3 5 Comparison 
 
A diagrammatical representation shows the following differences and similarities 
regarding: 
 
? Claims based on delict/tort; 
? Claims for punitive damages; and 
? Claims against the state: 
                                            
215  Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent’s case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA); Auckland 
Unemployed Workers’ Rights Centre Inc v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667; New 
Zealand Law Commission Wellington Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity Report 37 
May 1997 4 12; 31 91. 
(October 2003) http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/documents/publications/R37.pdf 
216  Whithair v Attorney-General [1996] 2 NZLR 45 57. 
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South Africa 
 
 
Great Britain 
 
India 
 
New Zealand 
 
Delict/tort 
 
Victim has delictual claim against offender. 
 
General principles of delict:  
Flexible system which can be adjusted to 
meet changing needs. 
 
Victim has tortious claim against offender. 
 
Casuistic system:  
Victim’s claim to fit into existing paradigms. 
 
Victim has tortious claim against offender. 
 
 British system is followed. 
 
“Mass tort” developed for major disasters 
on no-fault (absolute liability) basis. 
 
 
Victim has no tortious claim against 
offender for personal injuries – only for 
material losses. 
 
Compensation paid by Accident 
Compensation Corporation replaces 
tortious claim for personal injuries. 
 
Punitive 
damages 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
State 
liability 
 
Constitutional Court creating human rights-
based precedents whereby victims can 
hold state delictually liable for omissions of 
its servants, tempered by requirement of 
causality. 
 
 
Courts creating human rights-based 
precedents whereby victims can hold state 
liable for acts of its servants. 
 
Whether basis is tort or constitutional law 
is uncertain. 
 
Courts creating human rights-based 
precedents whereby victims can hold state 
liable for acts of its servants, based on: 
 
? Constitutional grounds (in 
cases of sovereign acts);  
? Culpable inactivity (in cases 
of non-sovereign acts); or 
? Mass tort 
 
Possibility of ex gratia payments by state 
setting binding precedent. 
 
 
Courts creating precedents based on Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 whereby victims can hold 
state strictly liable for acts of its servants.  
 
Considered public law, not tortious, 
remedy. 
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In both developed and developing countries, the law of delict/tort does not 
significantly alleviate the problems of victims of crime. This is corroborated by the fact 
that all four countries have criminal procedure legislation447 formalising – with varying 
degrees of efficacy – the victim’s restitutionary claim. 
 
New Zealand differs most radically from the other three countries in that its 
comprehensive victim compensation scheme deprives the victim of crime of a 
tortious claim, except in cases of damage to property. The other three countries grant 
victims full delictual/tortious claims against perpetrators.  
 
South Africa is the only country where punitive damages have generally not been 
granted, the Constitutional Court refusing to grant this avenue of redress, though not 
completely excluding the possibility of its being appropriate in special circumstances. 
The courts in the other countries remain cautious because punitive damages are 
seen as the – largely unwelcome – amalgamation of civil and criminal law and grant 
punitive damages only in unusual circumstances.  
 
In all four countries, constitutional law is increasingly being relied on as a basis for 
granting the victim of crime a claim against the state, but this development is more 
vigorous in the countries where an acute problem of criminal victimisation is coupled 
with the absence of a comprehensive victim compensation scheme, namely South 
Africa and India. While it is debated whether the victim’s claim against the state is a 
constitutional or a delictual/tortious remedy, once the claim has been granted the 
rules of law of delict/tort are applied.  
 
In the next chapter, the restitutionary provisions in the legislation of the four states 
that form the subject matter of this study will be considered and compared, as well as 
any other state-driven restitutionary initiatives, in order to show the machinery 
created by the state to foster restitution to victims of crime and to evaluate the 
efficacy thereof. 
                                            
447  See Ch 4 Par 4 2 (infra). 
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Chapter 4 
 
Restitution: Primary legislation, secondary legislation and state-initiated 
programmes 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
In addition to its primary legislation dealing with restitution, each of the countries that 
form part of this study has other enactments in terms of which victims of crime can 
obtain restitution from offenders. Furthermore, it will be shown that all four countries 
have certain state-initiated programmes to foster restitution.  
 
In this chapter, the primary and secondary legislation will be analysed and compared, 
followed by a consideration of state-initiated programmes to benefit victims of crime 
in order to determine whether sufficient statutory provision is made to grant victims a 
viable chance of obtaining restitution from those victimising them. 
 
4 2 Primary legislation 
 
4 2 1  South Africa: Criminal Procedure Act  
 
The Criminal Procedure Act1 has three sections which deal specifically with 
restitution by the perpetrator. Their subject headings are: 
 
? Section 297: Conditional or unconditional postponement or suspension of 
sentence, and caution or reprimand; 
? Section 300: Court may award compensation where offence causes damage 
to or loss of property; and 
? Section 301: Compensation to innocent purchaser of property unlawfully 
obtained. 
 
                                            
1  51 of 1977. 
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4 2 1 1  Section 2972 
 
Section 297(1)(a)(i) authorises a court of law to postpone the sentencing of a 
convicted person for up to five years3 on certain conditions, regarding inter alia:  
 
? Compensation (restitution);4  
? “The rendering to the person aggrieved of some specific benefit or service in 
lieu of compensation for damage or pecuniary loss,”5 
? “The performance without remuneration and outside the prison of some 
service for the benefit of the community under the supervision or control of an 
organization or institution which, or person who, in  the opinion of the court, 
promotes the interests of the community”6 (community service); or  
? “Any other matter.”7  
 
The section goes on to authorise the suspension of the whole or any part of the 
sentence for up to five years8 on the same conditions.9 In the former case the 
process of sentencing is postponed as a whole, while in the latter case sentence is 
imposed, but the execution thereof is suspended.10 
 
This section thus expressly authorises the following forms of restitution: 
 
? Financial; 
? In kind; and 
? Community service.11 
                                            
2  This is the longest section of the Criminal Procedure Act and only the relevant parts 
are discussed. 
3  This period can be extended by an appropriate court if the accused has been unable 
 to comply with the condition imposed through circumstances beyond his or her 
 control or for “any other good and sufficient reason.” S 297(7). 
4  S 297(1)(a)(i)(aa). The word “compensation” in the section is used in the sense of 
“restitution” as the term is used in this work – see Ch 1 Par 1 3 1 (supra). 
5  S 297(1)(a)(i)(bb). 
6  S 297(1)(a)(i)(cc). 
7  S 297(1)(a)(i)(hh). 
8  This period can be extended by an appropriate court if the accused has been unable 
 to comply with the condition imposed through circumstances beyond his or her 
 control or for “any other good and sufficient reason.” S 297(7). 
9  S 297(1)(b). 
10  The other provisions of the section are not relevant to this research. 
11  This can be seen as a form of restitution if one accepts the traditional view that a 
 crime is an act prejudicial to the community (and not just the individual victim): 
“(C)rimes… are a breach of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community, 
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The means used to encourage the perpetrator to effect restitution are postponement 
and suspension of sentence.12 
 
Where the crime is of a less serious nature, the suspension of sentence subject to 
restitution is deemed desirable. South African courts are generally in favour of 
sentences of this nature where appropriate.13 
 
Although the section refers to conviction of the accused on any offence, in S v 
Stanley14 Olivier J A stated that “there must be a rational and causal connection 
between the offence and the damage in respect of which the compensation order is 
made.” In this case an order was made regarding the loss of golf clubs in a stolen car 
although the accused was not charged with the theft of the golf clubs per se. The 
court found that the facts satisfied the requirement of a causal link even though the 
accused had not been convicted of the theft of the golf clubs. To require a more 
stringent legal requirement “would unduly restrict the use of the salutary sentencing 
option of a compensatory order.”15  
 
The following principles are relevant in the application of the provisions of section 
297:16 
 
? The objective is to keep the accused out of jail. The conditions of suspension 
must be neither too onerous nor too lenient; 
? The secondary objective is to remind the accused of the consequences of his 
or her actions; 
? The third objective is to redress the harm done to the victim. It must not 
appear as if the perpetrator is paying a fine to the accused; 
                                                                                                                             
considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity.” Blackstone W 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 8th ed (1778) Volume IV 5. 
12  Suspension occurs much more frequently than postponement. Kriegler Suid 
 Afrikaanse Strafprosesreg 5th ed (1993) 732. 
13  S v P 1986 2 SA (C), where the amount stolen was R40 and the accused only 18 
years old, earning R30 per month; S v Masongo 1972 4 SA 46 (T); S v Mila 1973 3 
SA 942 (O); S v Magkise 1973 2 SA 493 (O); S v Charlie 1976 2 SA 596 (A); S v 
Edward 1978 1 SA 317 (NC); S v Rolef 1990 1 SA 145 (C).  
14  S v Stanley 1996 2 SACR 570 (A) 574C. 
15  Ibid 574C. See also du Toit, de Jager, Paizes, Skeen & van der Merwe  
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (1998) 28 – 45 and the review by 
Cowling M of S v Stanley in 1997 (10) SA Journal of Criminal Justice 219 where the 
case is discussed with approval. 
16  Kriegler Suid-Afikaanse Strafprosesreg 735 – 736; S v Tshondeni, S v Vilakazi 1971 
4 SA 79 (T). 
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? The trial must not become a mere dispute regarding quantum. The accused 
must be aware that the court is ascertaining the extent of the loss and must 
be given the opportunity to adduce evidence in this regard;17 
? Quantum is determined by balancing three factors: 
o The extent of the loss; 
o The ability of the perpetrator to effect restitution; and  
o The culpability of the perpetrator.18 
? The assessment of the loss takes place after conviction. The loss suffered is 
not limited to financial loss, but includes non-patrimonial harm such as pain 
and suffering; 
? The award is not limited to the amount of the magistrate’s criminal (fine) 
jurisdiction;19 
? The ability of the accused to pay must be borne in mind. Payment in 
instalments may be ordered. An award less than the actual amount of the loss 
may also be ordered to keep the accused from serving a prison sentence 
which would result in the victim receiving no restitution whatsoever; 
? Although the quantum of the amount for pain and suffering is discretionary, 
the court must indicate on what basis it is assessed. An agreement between 
the victim and the accused in this respect is perfectly acceptable; and 
? It is acceptable that restitution be ordered on its own without a fine or other 
penalty being imposed. 
 
In Kriegler’s view the wording of section 297(1)(a)(i)(aa) allows for restitution to be 
made not only to the victim, but also to dependants of the victim. The writer says that 
the same cannot be said for paragraph (bb) where the “benefit or service” has to be 
rendered “to the person aggrieved.”20 This matter has not been decided by our 
courts, but it could be argued that “the person aggrieved” can be interpreted to 
include dependants of the direct victim, pursuant to the reasoning that they are also 
aggrieved. This would be in harmony with the common law which grants a delictual 
claim to the dependant. Especially in the light of what has just been said regarding 
paragraph (aa), it is difficult to see why the legislature would have wanted a different 
interpretation to be placed on paragraph (bb). 
                                            
17  This privilege is not specifically mentioned regarding the victim, but s 300(2) (see 
below) states that for the determination of quantum “…the court may refer to the 
evidence and the proceedings at the trial or hear further evidence either upon affidavit 
or orally.” 
18  Krugel W F & Terblanche S S Praktiese Vonnisoplegging 916. 
19  S 300 imposes certain limitations in this regard. See Par 4 2 1 2 (infra). 
20  Kriegler Suid-Afikaanse Strafprosesreg 736. 
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Paragraph (hh), which refers to conditions regarding “any other matter”, is extremely 
broad. However, it must be interpreted in the spirit of the remainder of the section. 
Thus there must be a logical and causal link between the condition imposed and the 
crime.21  
 
The case of S v Noordien22 deserves special attention. The accused who had been 
convicted of culpable homicide following the killing of his lover, was ordered to create 
a trust for the maintenance of her eight and a half year old son by her ex-husband 
(not the accused). Conradie J imposed a sentence of six years’ imprisonment 
suspended for five years with the usual conditions regarding the commission of a 
similar offence during the period of suspension. One of the reasons for the 
suspension of the sentence was the fact that imprisoning the accused would take 
away his ability to effect restitution.23 The further conditions imposed by the court 
contained full instructions regarding the structuring of the trust.24 This decision 
                                            
21  S v Enslin 1960 1 SA 882 (N). 
22  1990 2 SACR 172 (C). 
23  255 (i - j). 
24  As a (rare) example of the degree to which a court can cater for the needs of the 
 victim where the court fully applies its mind to the task, the full conditions are quoted: 
(2)(a) …pay into the trust account of his attorney of record, Mr Norman Vivian 
Snitcher, an amount of R36 000 by not later than 30 September 1990; 
(b) forthwith instruct his attorney of record at his, the accused’s, own expense 
to create a trust in favour of Gareth Michael Sharp, the beneficiary, to be 
known as the Michael Sharp trust, the deed of establishment of which is to 
contain the following provisions: 
(i) instituting the said attorney as trustee with power of assumption; 
(ii) empowering the trustee in his discretion to invest and reinvest all or 
any of the money in the trust in a unit trust or in a registered deposit 
receiving institution, or in a participating mortgage bond; 
(iii) that the trustee shall pay to Mrs Brigitte Shürstedt-Kochems on 
behalf of the beneficiary, or to the custodian for the time being, so 
much as the said Mrs Shürstedt-Kochems or the custodian shall 
request for the support and comfort of the beneficiary, but subject to 
the trustee’s right to refuse to make what in his opinion is an 
excessive payment; 
(iv) dispensing with the need to provide security to the Master of the 
Supreme Court for the trustee’s administration of the trust; 
(v) providing for the keeping of accounts of the trust and the auditing 
thereof; 
(vi) providing for the remuneration of the trustee; 
(vii) providing for the termination of the trust and for the payment to the 
beneficiary when he reaches the age of 21 of whatever capital and 
income remain in the trust; 
(viii) providing for payment of the costs of drawing the trust deed by the 
accused and for the registration thereof at the accused’s expense; 
(ix) providing for acceptance of the benefits of the trust by the 
beneficiary’s guardian; 
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represents a creative, effective and thus welcome application of the discretion 
extended to the courts in terms of section 297(1)(a)(i)(hh).  
 
In the unreported case of S v Cyril Salzwebel, Darryl Ivor Lottering, Charl Justin 
Lottering and Barry Quintin Lottering25 the Supreme Court of Appeal26 considered the 
judgment of the court a quo following a violent, racially motivated, attack leading to 
the death of one of the victims. The offenders were sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment, suspended subject to certain conditions. The State appealed against 
the leniency of the sentence, as all the accused would be able to avoid imprisonment 
by complying with the conditions of suspension. One of the conditions27 of 
suspension was that each of the respondents was to pay an amount of R3 000 into 
the Guardian’s Fund in monthly instalments of R50 on behalf of the minor children of 
the deceased. The Supreme Court of Appeal, having considered the purpose of 
sentence, imposed a sentence of twelve years imprisonment on each of the accused. 
Two years of their sentences were suspended on various conditions, one of which 
was that the payments into the Guardian’s Fund continue28 (during their period of 
incarceration) and be completed. Thus the imposition of a period of (unsuspended) 
imprisonment does not necessarily preclude restitution.29 
 
Section 297 can be used effectively in cases where the perpetrator has sufficient 
means, as was shown in Noordien’s case.30 The full order in the latter case31 shows 
the degree of effort which the court was willing to put into formulating an appropriate 
sentence and its concern for the plight of the (indirect) victim of the crime. It also 
                                                                                                                             
(3) pay the costs of drawing the trust deed and of having it registered in terms 
of Act 32 of 1944; 
(4) instruct his said attorney to: 
(a) certify to the Registrar of this Court that payment of the amount of 
R36 000 to the said attorney has been made; 
(b) deliver to the Registrar of this Court a copy of the registered trust deed 
not later than 31 July 1990. 
25  Supreme Court of Appeal Case number: 273/98 
Website of the Law Faculty of the University of the Witwatersrand 
(April 2002) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/scrtappeal/1999/salzwedel.pdf 
26  Per Mahomed C J delivering the unanimous judgment. 
27  In terms of s 297(1)(b) read with s 297(1)(a)(i)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
28  R1 350 of the R3 000 had already been paid by each offender. 
29  It will be seen below that courts are reluctant to impose sentences of restitution under 
s 300 unless it is clear that the offender has the  financial means to satisfy his or her 
obligations. The words of Mahomed C J imply that it is adequate if the offenders can 
find some means (other than current assets or future earnings) to settle their 
indebtedness: “It should be within their capacity to pay or cause to be paid what are 
relatively small instalments even while they are to be incarcerated with effect from the 
date of this order.” (Emphasis added). 
30  Supra. 
31  See footnote 24 (supra). 
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shows that the section can be applied constructively in the form in which it is drafted. 
The efficacy of the section is greatly enhanced by the fact that non-compliance with 
the conditions regarding restitution will be visited by the expectation of a severe 
sentence in cases where sentencing has been suspended32 or the execution of the 
suspended sentence where sentence has already been imposed.33  
 
The fact that section 297 allows the court to order payment of “compensation”34 and 
not just restitution for patrimonial losses – as is the case with section 300 – makes it 
a useful tool. Its application provides the offender with a powerful stimulus to raise 
the necessary finances to comply with the conditions of the court order.35  
 
Sentences in terms of this section are very scarce. The main reason for this is the 
lack of means of offenders.36 
  
4 2 1 2  Section 300 
 
Section 300(1) authorises a court to order a person who has been convicted of a 
crime causing damage to or the loss of property (including money) belonging to 
another person, to effect restitution to the victim for the damage or loss suffered. 
Application must be made by the injured party or by the prosecutor acting on his or 
her instructions. In S v Msiza37 a court made an order in terms of section 300 without 
application being made by the complainant. The court of appeal declared the order 
invalid because of this circumstance, coupled with the fact that the complainant had 
not given evidence regarding his damages and the offender had not been afforded 
the opportunity to lead evidence or make representations regarding the amount of 
the damages. The audi alteram partem rule had thus not been applied. 
 
The amount of restitution ordered in terms of this section by a regional or district 
magistrates’ court may not exceed the limits published by the Minister in the 
Government Gazette from time to time.38 In S v Brand39 the amount of the order 
                                            
32  S 297(1)(a)(i). 
33  S 297(b). 
34  Which includes awards for non-patrimonial harm such as pain and suffering. 
35  Van Dokkum N “Compensation for victims of sexual crimes”  286; S v Edward 1978 1 
SA 317 (NC).  
36  Kriegler Suid-Afikaanse Strafprosesreg 755. 
37  1979 4 SA 473 (T). See also S v Sigwadi & Another [2005] JOL 14657 (Tk). 
38  Currently the amounts are fixed at R300 000 for regional courts and R60 000 for 
 district courts respectively in terms of Government Notice No R1410 of 30 October 
 1998. 
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made in a regional court was R240 675,24, thus exceeding the fine jurisdiction of the 
court (at the time). The High Court decided that this was unacceptable without a 
formal waiver from the victim and quashed the award. The court referred to the fact 
that an order in terms of section 300 has the status of a civil judgment and, in effect, 
required a waiver of part of the claim to reduce it to the stipulated amount 
(R200 000)40 in accordance with the rules of abandonment in the law of civil 
procedure.  
 
Section 300(2) states that the court may determine the quantum of the award by 
referring to the evidence at the trial or further evidence given orally or upon affidavit. 
 
Such an order will have the effect of a civil judgment of the district court of the area 
where the trial took place,41 irrespective of whether made by a district court, a 
regional court or a high court. The means to enforce a civil district court judgment are 
by issuing a writ of execution in terms of which the deputy sheriff is mandated to 
attach the property of the execution debtor and to sell it by public auction.42 The 
alternative is to take steps against the debtor in order to obtain settlement of the debt 
by means of instalments.43 While sections 65(A) – (M) of the Magistrates’ Courts 
Act44 create the possibility of civil imprisonment for non-compliance with an order for 
the payment of a debt in instalments, the Constitutional Court has ruled that the 
imposition of civil imprisonment for non-payment of a debt in terms of the above-
mentioned sections is unconstitutional.45 In S v Medell46 the accused had been 
sentenced by a magistrate’s court to thirty months’ correctional supervision in terms 
of section 276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act. An order in terms of section 300 
was included in the sentence. The accused was poor and had no attachable assets. 
The effect of non-payment would have been the imprisonment of the accused. The 
High Court would not allow this, setting aside the section 300 order: 
 
In the light of the Constitutional Court’s decision, the beneficiary of a 
compensation order would not be able to obtain an order for the civil 
imprisonment of a defaulting judgment debtor. It follows that the criminal 
                                                                                                                             
39  1998 1 SACR 296 (C). 
40  At the time of the decision the maximum amount for an order in terms of s 300 
 was fixed at R200 000. 
41  S 300(3). 
42  S 66 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
43  S 65(A) - 65(D) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act (supra). 
44  Supra. 
45  Coetzee v Government of the Republic of SA, Matiso and Others v Officer 
Commanding, Port Elizabeth Prison and Others 1995 10 BCLR 1382 (CC). 
46  1997 1 SACR 682 (C). 
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courts should not be used (or abused) as a mechanism for the enforcement 
of judgment debts. Incarceration for failure to pay a compensation order per 
se in effect amounts to civil imprisonment for debt and as such cannot be 
permitted.47 
 
This leads to the anomaly that the accused who might have been spared a prison 
sentence48 and received an order in terms of section 300, can no longer be 
imprisoned for not complying with such an order, thus escaping imprisonment 
altogether. Should a court however impose a suspended sentence – of the whole or 
even merely part of the sentence – with restitution as a condition of suspension in 
terms of section 297(1)(a)(i)(aa), the offender could be incarcerated in the event of 
non-payment.49 
 
Section 300 creates a quasi-delictual right50 without reference to the law of delict, but 
in the context of the law of criminal procedure. This fusion is entrenched by the fact 
that the right is enforced in the manner of a civil judgment. An alternative 
dispensation was to be found in the repealed section 15 of the Stock Theft Act51 
which provided for the imposition of a compensatory fine. The juristic footing of this 
form of redress differed from section 300 insofar as it was in the nature of a fine and 
the perpetrator could be imprisoned in the case of non-payment, while section 300 
has the effect of a civil judgment (with no chance of imprisonment). In the case of an 
order under the Stock Theft Act, the injured party could still institute a civil claim in 
addition to the order granted against the offender by the criminal court.52 
 
                                            
47  Ibid 687j. 
48  Although an order in terms of s 300 is not a punishment and can accompany 
 other punishment, it is conceivable that a court might be more lenient towards an 
 accused in circumstances where an order of restitution appears to be viable. 
49  See S v Cyril Salzwebel, Darryl Ivor Lottering, Charl Justin Lottering and Barry 
 Quintin Lottering (supra). 
50  Following the classification found in Justinian’s Institutiones 3 13 2 where obligations 
which do not fit into the usual ex contractu or ex delicto/maleficio groupings are 
categorised as being quasi ex contractu or quasi ex delicto. Gaius’s Digesta 44.7.1 pr 
eschews this terminology, stating: Obligationes aut ex contractu nascuntur aut ex 
maleficio aut proprio quodam iure ex variis causarum figuris. Van der Merwe & Olivier 
(van der Merwe N J & Olivier P J J Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(1989) 4) agree with the latter classification. Boberg (Boberg P Q R The Law of Delict 
Volume I (1984) 16 – 17) views the use of the term “quasi-delictual” as being “at one 
time fashionable.” Further research regarding this aspect of the law of delict may be 
found in: Pauw P C (1979) 42 THRHR 240. Whatever the precise juridical nature of 
the rights obtained by the victim are, the fact remains that they are enforceable in 
terms of the law of civil procedure and not criminal procedure. 
51  57 of 1959. The current version of s 15 of the Act orders the court to direct the 
attention of the victim, if present in court, to the provisions of section 300 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act and limits a magistrate’s court to an award not exceeding 
R20 000. 
52  Dhltidhla v Ndhlovu 1949 NAC (N – E) 131; Mioti v Ziyendani 1951 NAC (S) 307. 
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In terms of section 300(4) a court may order that money taken from the accused 
upon arrest be used to pay the award to the injured party. 
 
The victim has a period of sixty days within which to renounce the award in writing 
and to effect repayment of any amount already received. Should the victim not 
renounce the order, he or she will not be entitled to sue the accused for any other 
form of restitution in a civil court. Thus an order in terms of section 300 takes the 
place of any other civil legal remedy that the injured party might have against the 
accused.53 
  
The term injured person as used in this section is strictly interpreted. If stolen goods 
are sold to an innocent purchaser and vindicated in his or her hands, the victim 
cannot receive restitution in terms of section 300,54 but will have to rely on the normal 
delictual action or on an order in terms of section 301.55 Following the same 
rationale, where a stolen ox was exchanged for goods, the court could not order that 
the goods be handed back to the innocent third party in terms of section 300.56 
 
Where a section 300 order was made against a married woman and there was no 
allegation that she was married out of community of property with exclusion of the 
marital power, the court presumed the marriage to be in community of property and 
ruled the section 300 order invalid due to the fact that she had no locus standi in 
judicio to defend herself against the making of the order without her husband’s 
assistance.57 
 
As section 300 provides exclusively for “damage to or loss of property (including 
money) belonging to some other person”58 an amount cannot be awarded in terms of 
this section for bodily or non-patrimonial harm (for example defamation) or for 
interference with a personal right to performance which the injured party had against 
another person (for example, in the case of theft of a thing which has yet to be 
                                            
53  Visser P J & Potgieter J M Law of Damages 138 – 139. This is probably based on the 
delictual rule that a plaintiff has only one chance to claim damages arising from a 
single cause of action and this is seen as a civil claim, which borne out by the fact 
that enforcement takes a civil law route. A restitution order under indigenous African 
law is thus also forfeited upon the acceptance of a s 300 order. Sitole v Kumalo 1938 
NAC (N & T) 257; Tusini v Ngubane 1948 NAC (N & T) 17. 
54  S v Zulu 1972 4 SA 464 (N); S v Mapedi 1965 2 SA 314 (G). 
55  See Par 4 2 1 3 (infra). 
56  R v Noko 1949 3 SA 456 (T). 
57  S v Wildschut 1983 4 SA 604 (T). 
58  S 300(1). 
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delivered to the victim). In short, the injured party has to be the owner of the property 
or money.59 Section 297 does not have this limitation. 
 
Section 300 should be limited to cases where the quantification of damages is 
relatively straightforward. However, van Heerden60 points out that the court’s powers 
are not taken away merely by the presence of the victim’s negligence in the 
causation of damage. During cross-examination the court has objective insight into 
the facts and the court has the authority to hear further evidence to assess the facts. 
The section is inappropriate in motor vehicle accident cases because a criminal court 
will not be in a position to determine the contributory negligence of the injured party. 
For this the private law system with its extensive battery of pre-trial pleadings should 
be utilised to clarify the issues between the parties.61 
 
The fact that the injured party has been indemnified by insurance, does not preclude 
an order in terms of section 300, although this fact will have a bearing on the order.62 
 
In S v Tlame63 it was held that an order in terms of section 300 can be made only if 
there is a conviction. In R v Booysen64 it was held that the order could not be made 
where the accused had been discharged with a caution or reprimand as this has the 
effect of an acquittal. To circumvent this perceived restriction, the court imposed a 
nominal fine. This interpretation is open to criticism. The compensation order is made 
after conviction and before sentence. At this stage it is thus by no means certain 
what sentence the court will impose, thus it is not known whether the court will settle 
for a caution or reprimand .65 
 
The constitutionality of depriving the victim of a (full) delictual claim in cases where 
he or she accepts the terms of the section 300 order is open to debate if one 
considers the terms of section 9(1) of the Constitution.66 Allowing the victim both 
                                            
59  See S v Liberty Shipping 1982 4 SA 281 (D) where the court refused to grant an 
 order in favour of the Department of Customs and Excise for the fraudulent non-
 payment of customs duty; Kriegler Suid-Afikaanse Strafprosesreg 756. 
60  Van Heerden “Artikel 300 van Wet 51 van 1977” 1984 (1) De Jure 192 196. 
61  R v Faburichi 1958 3 SA 802 (R); S v du Plessis 1969 1 SA 72 (N); S v Makaula  
 1970 4 SA 580 (E); S v Dunywa 1973 3 SA 869 (E); S v Lombaard 1997 1 SACR 80 
(T). 
62  R v van Zyl 1928 PH H61. 
63  1982 4 SA 319 (B). 
64  1920 EDL 390. 
65  Van Heerden “Artikel 300 van Wet 51 van 1977” 196 – 197. 
66  See the discussion of Tsotetsi v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1996 11 
 BCLR 1439 (CC) in Ch 5 Par 5 2 15 (infra). 
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claims would not necessarily grant him or her double damages: The private law claim 
could be a means to top up the shortfall in the section 300 order.67 
 
4 2 1 3  Section 301 
 
Section 301 deals with cases where an accused is convicted of theft (or other crime 
concerning the unlawful acquisition of property) and has sold the property to a bona 
fide purchaser. The bona fide purchaser can apply to court (on restitution of the 
property to its owner) for a refund of the purchase price (or lesser amount). This 
refund is paid from the money taken from the accused at arrest. In cases falling 
outside the strict terms of the section, the purchaser will have to rely on private law 
remedies against the accused – examples are: Where the accused had no money 
with him or her at the time of arrest, where the purchaser is in pari delicto with the 
accused or where the purchaser had not bought the item directly from the accused.68 
 
While section 301 limits the amount of restitution to the amount actually paid for the 
stolen goods, it does not deprive the injured party of his or her civil law rights69 
against the thief. 
 
4 2 1 4  Other sections 
 
Finally, section 34 (the return of stolen goods to the owner), section 28 (award of 
damages as a result of a wrongful search) and section 185A (protective custody for 
witnesses and/or their families who have been victimised or threatened) round out 
the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act relevant to victims of crime.  
 
Section 34 directs the judicial officer to make one of the following orders at the 
conclusion of the proceedings: 
 
? An article is returned to the person from whom it was seized; or 
? The article is returned to any other person entitled thereto; or  
? The article is forfeited to the state if nobody is entitled to it, or if the person 
who is entitled to it cannot be traced or is unknown. 
 
                                            
67  See penultimate footnote. 
68  Kriegler Suid-Afikaanse Strafprosesreg 758 – 759. 
69  Contra s 300 Par 4 2 1 2 (supra) 
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The court may hear additional evidence, whether oral or by affidavit. If the judicial 
officer does not make an order at the conclusion of the proceedings, any judicial 
officer of the court in question may make the order at a later stage. An order may be 
suspended pending appeal or review. In terms of section 34(5) read with section 
31(2) of the Act, registered notice must be given at the last known address of the 
person concerned and failure to take delivery of the property within thirty days will 
lead to forfeiture to the state.  
 
Section 34(6) allows the presiding officer to make an order at any stage of the 
proceedings if circumstances so require or where the trial cannot be disposed of. The 
reference to the person entitled to the goods does not entail a finding by the court on 
the issue of ownership. The principles of in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis 
and ex turpi causa non oritur actio are not applicable.70 Thus the court basically 
weighs up whether the person to whom restitution is to be effected has a stronger 
claim than the accused. Should this choice be unfeasible, forfeiture of the goods to 
the state becomes a possibility. 
 
Goods in respect of which an insurer has compensated the victim will be given to the 
insurer in terms of the usual contractual relationship between insurer and insured. 
Unless the court is informed of the fact of insurance, however, the order will be in 
favour of the complainant who will prima facie be seen as being entitled to the stolen 
items and the matter will be a civil one between insurer and insured.71 
 
Where money stolen has been paid into an official bank account by the clerk of the 
court,72 the court will order payment of an equivalent amount to the victim. The 
legislator did not intend that the same notes and coins be returned and the same 
reasoning applies in the case of stolen negotiable instruments.73 The same rules 
ought to apply in the case where the thief paid the money into a private bank 
account. The wording of the section makes it clear that the passing of an order is 
obligatory and application is not required. These circumstances favour the victim. 
Section 360 of the previous, repealed Criminal Procedure Act74 gave the court a 
discretion in making the order and usually it was made only if specifically applied for 
                                            
70  S v Campbell 1985 2 SA 612 (SWA). 
71  Hiemstra V G Suid-Afrikaanse Strafprosesreg 50. 
72  In terms of s 33(3)(a) which deals with the safekeeping of items required as evidence 
in court. 
73  Hiemstra V G Suid-Afrikaanse Strafprosesreg  52. 
74  56 of 1955. 
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by the complainant.75 Thus the rights of the victim enjoy slightly greater protection in 
terms of the current Act. It is difficult to find the motivation for the fact that section 300 
imposes less favourable requirements from the victim’s point of view than those 
imposed by section 34: As seen in the discussion of section 300, a restitution order 
has to be applied for specifically and the court has a discretion in its granting. The 
fact that the order can be made before conclusion of the trial where circumstances 
warrant this, can be used to the benefit of the victim who may urgently need the 
property. The wording of the section makes it clear that its provisions are subject to 
the provisions of other laws regarding the forfeiture of goods. An example of this is 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act76 which authorises a court to make a 
confiscation order to deprive a convicted person of the proceeds of crime, though, as 
will be seen below, a confiscation order does not preclude restitution from taking 
place. The section does not apply to goods bought with stolen money. In this case 
the complainant is left with only a civil, delictual claim.77 
 
4 2 2 Great Britain: Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act78 
 
The Power of the Criminal Courts Act79 gave criminal courts the power to order an 
offender to pay restitution to the victim. This power was later extended and the courts 
now have an obligation to make such an order, thus once again bringing into 
question the distinction between crime and tort.80 In the words of a English writer:81 
 
In this respect the distinction between crime and tort has become more 
blurred, though since tort originated in trespass, which to our eyes was in 
medieval times quasi-criminal, tort may only be returning to its roots. 
 
Lately the state has taken upon itself (through the courts) the responsibility to effect 
restitution by the offender to the victim in the same legislation that deals with criminal 
procedure.82 However, in a criminal case the primary objective is punitive – restitution 
                                            
75  Hiemstra V G Suid-Afrikaanse Strafprosesreg 51. 
76  121 of 1998. See Par 4 3 1 4 (infra). 
77  S v Msikinya 1966 4 SA 1 (E). 
78  2000. 
79  1973, s 35(1), replaced by the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Powers of 
Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. See Par 4 3 2 (infra). 
80  See the discussion of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 in Ch 4 
Par 4 3 2 (infra). See also the S A Constitutional Court’s attitude regarding the validity 
of a rigid distinction being drawn between public and private law in Fose v Minister of 
Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC) discussed in Ch 3 Par 3 3 2 (infra).  
81  Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (1989) 10. 
82  As a court has to give reasons if it fails to order restitution. See Ch 4 Par 4 2 2 5 
(infra). 
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being merely an ancillary function – while in a civil case the primary objective is 
restitution;83 this distinction is, however, not absolute in the light of restorative 
justice’s placing of the emphasis on the victim in the criminal justice system.84 
Throughout history English law has shown an awareness of the need for restitution 
for victims of crime and the legislative measures dealing therewith have become 
better structured. 
 
This Act85 has various provisions dealing with reparation, which can be equated with 
restitution, but, the term does not bear exactly the same meaning throughout the Act.  
 
4 2 2 1  Deferment of sentence86  
 
A court may defer the passing of sentence to enable it to consider the behaviour of 
the offender in the interim and any change in his or her circumstances. The period of 
deferment is limited to six months and the consent of the offender is required. One of 
the aspects that the court is allowed to consider, is the making of reparation by the 
offender.87  
 
This legislation does not allow for the possibility of including a condition of restitution 
in the deferment of sentence. The only way to do this is by passing a compensation 
(restitution) order88 in conjunction with, or instead of, sentence.89 Deferment takes 
place before sentence is passed. An offender has a legitimate expectation that a 
custodial sentence will not be passed where he or she has complied with the 
expectations of the deferring court; by the same token, a custodial sentence may be 
passed if the offender has made no significant effort to comply with the conditions of 
deferment: “(I)f the offender successfully completes the period of deferment (by 
complying with the court’s requirements regarding restitution), he or she can certainly 
                                            
83  Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 10. 
84  See Ch 2 Par 2 3 (supra). 
85  The Act consolidates various items of repealed legislation which together had the
 same effect. 
86  S 1. Previously dealt with in substantially the same terms in s 1 of the 
Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (as amended). 
87  “Reparation” is not defined in this s, but s 73 deals with “reparation orders” made 
against young offenders under 18 years of age. In the latter section reparation 
specifically excludes the payment of compensation (restitution) and includes 
reparation made to the victim or the community at large, though in s 23(2)(a), which 
also deals with youthful offenders, mention is made of “financial or other reparation”. 
Thus it would be reasonable to assume that “reparation” could take a pecuniary or 
non-pecuniary form for the purposes of deferment of sentence. 
88  See Par 4 2 2 5 (infra). 
89  In terms of s 130(1). 
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expect not to be sent to prison (a conditional discharge or a probation order is a more 
usual result).”90 This can be seen as a resurrection of an idea of the 1980s where 
reparation was used in mitigation of sentence. Deferment of sentence allows the 
court to ask for an undertaking from the offender to “tap into reparation and 
restorative justice schemes, where they exist, at the pre-sentence stage… The 
activities carried out and the progress shown would act as a mitigating factor in any 
subsequent sentence passed.”91 
 
It is the court’s duty to make clear – preferably in writing – to the offender what 
purposes the court has in mind with the deferment and what is expected of him or her 
during the period of deferment. Failure to clarify this can lead to an appeal. 
Deferment must also not be used by a court simply because it is unable to decide on 
sentence.92 
 
In terms of the Magistrates’ Association Guidelines,93 voluntary restitution is a 
mitigating factor in determining sentence.94 
 
However, the value of reparation (as opposed to other forms of conduct or change in 
the circumstances of the offender) is not very highly rated when deferment of 
sentence is considered by the courts – probably in keeping with the principle that the 
offender ought not to be allowed to buy his or her way out of prison:95 
 
The purpose of deferment is therefore to enable the court to take into account 
the defendant’s conduct after conviction or any change in circumstances and 
then only if it is in the interest of justice to exercise the power. It will, one 
imagines, seldom be in the interests of justice to stipulate that the conduct 
required is reparation by the defendant. (Emphasis added) 
 
Possibly the lack of effectiveness96 of deferment in England could be remedied by 
the adoption of provisions similar to those found in Section 297 of the South African 
                                            
90  Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (2004) 5 – 53. 
91  Halliday Report Making Punishment Work July 2001 Par 6 20; 44. See also Easton S 
& Piper C Sentencing and Punishment – The Quest for Justice (2005) 179. 
92  Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (2004) 5 – 50. 
93  In 1992 the Magistrates’ Association, a voluntary body of which most magistrates are 
members, published its sentencing guidelines which consist mainly of an offence-by-
offence consideration of sentencing. See Wasik M & Turner A “Sentencing Guidelines 
for Magistrates” 1993 Criminal Law Review 345. 
94  As well as “low value” and “impulsive action.” Examples of “plus” factors are “large 
amount”, “planned”, “sophisticated”, “vulnerable victim” and “adult involving children”.  
95  R v George (1983) 6 Cr App R (S) 211 per Lord Lane CJ.  
96  See Easton S & Piper C Sentencing and Punishment – The Quest for Justice (2005) 
179. 
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Criminal Procedure Act97 where a court may impose various reparation options as a 
condition in deferring sentence for up to five years. 
 
4 2 2 2  Youth offender contracts98 
 
These are agreements between the offender and the Youth Offender Panel99 
containing stipulations for the prevention of re-offending. They may include terms 
dealing with financial or other reparation made by the offender, not only to the victim 
of the offence, but also to someone “affected by the offence.”100 However, redress 
does not end there: Mediation between victim and offender and unpaid work in the 
community are forms of redress that are also mooted, amongst other measures 
calculated to prevent re-offending, for example, the attendance by the offender at a 
school or place of work, or the staying away from specified places or persons. The 
victim’s consent is required for any measure which may involve him or her.101 
 
4 2 2 3  Reparation orders for young offenders102 
 
These orders require reparation103 in non-pecuniary form. The court has to give 
reasons for not making a reparation order where empowered to do so.104 While the 
interests of the young offender are protected by the limitations placed on the order,105 
the consent of the victim is required before a reparation order can be made.106 The 
court is also required to consider the attitude of the victim when complying with this 
section.107 
  
The emphasis is on the rehabilitation of youthful offenders rather than on the rights of 
victims. A reparation order may not accompany a custodial sentence and may be 
made only after consideration of a written report by a probation officer, a social 
worker or a member of a youth offending team. The court is obliged to explain the 
effect of the order to the offender. Failure to comply with the terms of the reparation 
                                            
97  See Par 4 2 1 1 (supra). 
98  Ss 23 – 27 deal with youth offender contracts. 
99  Established in terms of s 21. 
100  S 23(2)(a). 
101  S 23(4). 
102  Ch VI of the Act deals with reparation orders for offenders under the age of 18.  
103  To a specified victim or to the community at large. 
104  S 73(8). 
105  S 74 prohibits, for example, interference with the offender’s attendance at an 
institution of learning. 
106  S 74(1)(b).  
107  S 73(5)(b). 
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order can lead to the sentencing of the offender as if the reparation order had never 
been made.108 
 
However, the introduction of restorative justice provisions has not significantly 
reduced re-offending by young offenders.109 
 
4 2 2 4  Suspended sentences110 
 
A court passing a sentence of imprisonment of not more than two years may order 
that the sentence shall not take effect unless, during a period specified in the order, 
the offender commits in Great Britain another offence punishable with 
imprisonment.111 The period specified may not be shorter than one year or longer 
than two years and the court must consider the making of a compensation 
(restitution) order as well.112 The Act does not provide for conditions of suspension 
(other than the commission of a subsequent offence). Fines can be imposed in 
addition to the suspended sentence but the fine itself cannot be suspended. As a 
court has no authority to stipulate restitution as a condition of suspension, the 
punitive nature of a suspended sentence acting as a means to encourage the 
offender to comply with the requirements of restitution are not available. As a court 
may impose a suspended sentence only if it can be justified by the exceptional 
circumstances of the case,113 suspended sentences are rarely passed.114  
 
4 2 2 5  Compensation (restitution) orders 
 
The power to grant these orders was given to English criminal courts in the early 
1970s.115 In response to public opinion this power was extended by further legislation 
preceding116 the Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act.  
                                            
108  Schedule 8 of the Act.  
109  Home Office September 2001 An Exploratory Evaluation of Restorative Justice 
Schemes viii. 
(December 2003) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/crrs09.pdf 
110  Ch V of the Act. 
111  S 118. 
112  S 118(5). 
113  S 118 4(b). 
114  United Kingdom Bar Council September 2003 Joint Response to the Independent 
Inquiry into alternatives to Custody by the Bar Council Law Reform Committee and 
the Criminal Bar Association (December 2003) 
http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/document.asp?documentid=2323&languageid=1 
115  By s 35 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. See Rogers W V H Winfield and 
Jolowicz on Tort 10. 
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The imposition of a compensation (restitution) order is an obligation when sentencing 
an offender.117 A compensation (restitution) order can be the sole order on 
conviction,118 except in cases where a minimum penalty is prescribed by law.119 The 
order may be made both for the offence of which the accused is convicted as well as 
for any other offence taken into consideration when determining sentence. 
 
Application is not required. The Act requires a court to give reasons if it refrains from 
making a compensation (restitution) order in circumstances where it is empowered to 
do so.120 The victim has the opportunity to set out the loss suffered in his or her 
Victim Personal Statement.121 In cases where the imposition of both a fine and a 
compensation (restitution) order is considered to be appropriate, the court is directed 
to give precedence to the compensation (restitution) order if the offender’s means are 
insufficient to support both.122  
 
Regarding the nature of the loss for which restitution is payable, the Act specifically 
includes personal injury under loss or damage.123 Where stolen goods are recovered 
undamaged, their value should not be the subject matter of an order.124 The Act 
places limitations on the amount of the order that can be made by magistrates’ 
courts,125 but the Crown Court is not subject to such limitations. 
 
The beneficiary need not be the complainant. The requirements are satisfied as long 
as someone suffered a “personal injury, loss or damage.”  
 
                                                                                                                             
116  Criminal Justice Act 1998, ss 104 – 105. Even before the current Act was passed, s 
35 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (as amended) already had the same 
wording as the current s 130(1). Ss 130 – 134 set out the main provisions of the law 
concerning restitution. See also Miers D 1989 Criminal Law Review 32. 
117  Ss 130(1) and 130(3). 
118  S 130(1): “A court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence,  
instead of or in addition to dealing with him in any other way, may… make an 
order…” (Emphasis added) 
119  S 130(2) ibid. 
120  S 130(3). In R v Ingram [2002] EWCA Crim 672 at [12] the court said that 
 “…there is a presumption that an order should be made.” 
121  See Par 4 3 2 4 (infra). 
122  S 130(12). 
123  S 130(1)(a). 
124  R v Hier 62 Cr App R 233; R v Boardman 9 Cr App R (S) 74; [1975] AC 421. 
125  Powers of Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 131(1).  
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The court must not make an order unless the liability of the offender has been clearly 
proved.126 In R v Kneeshaw127 the accused had pleaded guilty to the burglary of a 
house, admitting to the theft of some property, though denying the theft of certain 
rings. In this case the court required the victim to make application and to show as a 
matter of evidence that the rings were in fact the subject matter of the theft. 
  
When determining the quantum of the order the court is directed to consider “any 
evidence and representations that are made by or on behalf of the accused or the 
prosecutor.”128 The court may not “simply pluck a figure out of the air.”129 When there 
is doubt as to the precise quantum, the court must make an order in respect of only 
that amount which has been proved, leaving the victim to claim the balance by civil 
action.130 The court considers the means of the accused when determining the 
amount payable and should not impose an order in excess thereof.131 The general 
rule adopted is that the offender should be able to settle the amount within a period 
of two years, without further offending to achieve this.132 Where two or more persons 
are convicted of an offence, the wealthier may be ordered to pay more than the 
poorer.133 The parties are liable jointly and severally and if only one of them has any 
resources, it is appropriate to make the order against him or her alone.134 
 
In R v Martin135 the offender had assaulted the victim and had been ordered to pay 
restitution of £200 in addition to serving a year in prison. On appeal the order was 
challenged on two grounds: 
 
? Firstly, that it was improper to make a compensation (restitution) order which 
would necessitate the offender’s selling her car. This was alleged to be 
inappropriate, as the car had not had any connection with the assault. The 
                                            
126  R v Kneeshaw [1975] QB 57, [1974] 1 All ER 896; Barnard D The Criminal Court in 
Action (1988) 253. 
127  Supra. 
128  S 130(4). 
129  R v Swann and Webster 6 Cr App R (S) 22 at 23. See also R v Vivian 68 Cr App R  
 53. (These decisions were made in terms of s 35 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 
1973.) 
130  Barnard D The Criminal Court in Action 254. 
131  S 130(11). R v Stanley (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 446; R v Kirk [2001] EWCA Crim 
2122. 
132  R v Daly [1974] 1 All ER 290, [1974] 1 WLR 133. 
133  R v Bagga (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 497. 
134  R v Beddow (1987) 9 Cr App R (S) 235. 
135  (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 424. 
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Court of Appeal rejected this argument, the only criterion being that the value 
of the asset should be sufficient to satisfy the order,136 and 
? Secondly, that it would be incorrect to combine a compensation (restitution) 
order with a lengthy period of imprisonment. The Court of Appeal rejected this 
argument as well, the only relevant criterion being the ability of the offender to 
effect restitution.137 
 
The victim does not lose his or her civil claim when a compensation (restitution) order 
is granted, but the civil claim will be reduced by any amount actually received in 
terms of the compensation (restitution) order.138 
 
The order is enforced as if it were a fine imposed by a magistrates’ court (even if 
imposed by a Crown Court).139 A quasi-tortious right140 is created without reference 
to the law of tort, but in the context of the law of criminal procedure. The enforcement 
of the right also takes a public law route.  
 
When a Crown Court makes an order, it may allow time for payment and order 
payment in instalments.141 If the offender defaults, the magistrates’ court has the 
power to commit him or her to a period in custody.142  
 
The rights of the beneficiary are protected by sections 6(5) and 6(6) of the Proceeds 
of Crime Act.143 If the court makes both a confiscation order and a compensation 
                                            
136  See also R v Chambers (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 318; R v Stewart (1983) 5 Cr App R 
 (S) 320. 
137  See also R v Normanton [2003] EWCA Crim 959. 
138  S 134. 
139  In terms of s 76(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, “…where default is made in 
paying a sum adjudged to be paid by a conviction or order of a magistrates’ court, the 
court may issue a warrant of distress for the purpose of levying the sum or issue a 
warrant committing the defaulter to prison.” 
140  See Par 4 2 1 2 and n 50 (supra). 
141  S 141. 
142  As determined by Schedule 4 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. Schedule 4 lays 
 down periods of imprisonment which can be imposed by magistrates’ courts in the 
 event of non-payment of fines or orders.  
143  2002. The Act creates an Assets Recovery Agency and provides for the making of a 
confiscation order against an offender who has benefited from the proceeds of crime. 
See Attorney General v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd Third Party) [2001] 1 AC 268 
where the House of Lords held that an injunction restraining the defendant from 
receiving royalties (the defendant was a spy currently living in Russia who had written 
a book concerning his criminal activities) was interlocutory in character. In the 
absence of any realistic prospect of the defendant facing criminal proceedings and a 
(final) confiscation order being made, the interlocutory order would not be valid as it 
would have the practical effect of being a final order which would be contrary to the 
intention of the legislature. 
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(restitution) order against the same person in the same proceedings, and he or she 
does not have sufficient means to satisfy both orders, the court must direct that the 
shortfall in the compensation (restitution) order be paid out of the sum recovered 
under the confiscation order. The court thus reduces the confiscation order to 
accommodate the compensation (restitution) order. 
 
Research shows that victims are more interested in restitution (even partial) from the 
offender, than severe sentences:144 Compensation (restitution) orders form part of 
what was described in 1998 as a “reawakening interest in the victims of crime”145 and 
intended “…as a convenient and rapid means of avoiding the expense of resorting to 
civil litigation when the criminal clearly has the means which would enable 
compensation to be paid.”146  
 
The fact that a compensation (restitution) order can be the sole order on conviction is 
possibly an indication of the blurring of the line between crime and tort. Is this an 
example of restitution taking the place of punishment? This is a vexed question,147 
but the generally preferred the view is that the victim’s needs are of importance and 
                                            
144  Shapland J “Victims, the Criminal Justice System and Compensation” (1984) 24 
 British Journal of Crime 131 144 – 145: 
Victims were, again, not particularly punitive either in the sentence that they 
would wish their offenders to get or in their reactions to the sentence that 
those offenders who were convicted finally received. Their suggested 
sentences seemed to be very much within those of current English 
sentencing practice. They did however, feel that compensation for the 
offender should have played a much larger part than in fact it did (only 20 
per cent of victims whose offenders were sentenced received compensation 
orders and many of these were for small amounts). These reactions on 
sentencing are not just confined to the victims of violent crimes, as in our 
study. The recent British Crime Survey… has also suggested that: “victims’ 
recommendations are broadly in line with present practice”, and that 
compensation is important. How, then, did victims view state compensation 
and compensation by offenders? They regarded compensation not as 
mainly a matter of money or of financial assistance (charitable or 
otherwise), but rather as making a statement about the offence, the victim 
and the position that the criminal justice system was prepared to give to the 
victim. Even the element of payment in proportion to suffering and loss was 
subordinated to this symbolic function. This was most obvious in victims’ 
enthusiasm for compensation from offenders as part of the sentence of the 
court. (Emphasis added) 
145  Clarkson C M V & Keating H M Criminal Law: Text and Materials Forth edition (1998) 
88. 
146  Per Lord Scarman in R v Inwood (1974) 60 Cr App R 70 73. 
147  See Zedner “Reparation and retribution: are they reconcilable?” (1994) 57 MLR 228; 
van Ness “New wine in old wineskins: four challenges of restorative justice” (1993) 4 
Criminal Law Forum 251. 
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that a compensation (restitution) order is not a penalty.148 English courts frown on the 
idea of the offender buying his or her way out of prison by means of restitution. 
Restitution is seen as a mitigating factor.149 The fact that current legislation makes 
provision for the passing of a compensation (restitution) order on its own without 
punishment, however, revives the spirit of the ancient law where restitution was seen 
as the primary means of dealing with the offender. 
 
If the offender is acquitted of the offence from which the loss or injury flowed, but is 
convicted of some other offence related to the subject matter, a compensation 
(restitution) order cannot be made.150 This supplies another reason why restitution 
cannot take the place of punishment completely. 
 
Factors indicative of the high regard for the rights of the victim to restitution, are:151 
 
? Application does not have to be made for compensation (restitution) orders; 
? Courts are obliged to consider making compensation (restitution) orders; 
? Compensation (restitution) orders are given precedence over fines; 
? Compensation (restitution) orders are enforced as if they were fines and 
offenders face the ultimate possibility of custody in the event of non-
compliance; and 
? Compensation (restitution) orders take precedence over confiscation orders 
where the means of the offender are insufficient to satisfy both. 
 
This procedure is not suitable where there are complex questions concerning 
quantification of loss. Due to the reduced onus of proof in civil cases and the fact that 
the offender might have an insurance policy indemnifying him or her against civil 
liability, a civil action may offer the victim certain advantages. The possibility of 
claiming exemplary damages could be another one of these advantages. 
 
                                            
148  See, for example s 154(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which states that a “’fine’ 
includes a pecuniary penalty but does not include a pecuniary forfeiture or pecuniary 
compensation.” There are, however, instances of compensation orders being made to 
remind the offender of his wrongdoing: Wasik “The place of compensation in the 
penal system” 1978 Criminal Law Review 599. 
149  R v Copley (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 55; R v Barney (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 448. 
150 R v Derby 12 Cr App R (S) 502; R v Halliwell 12 Cr App R (S) 692. See also Archbold 
Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 5 – 415. 
151  In R v McInerney; R v Keating [2002] EWCA Crim 3003 [2003] 1 All ER 1089 [2003] 
 1 Cr App Rep 627 [51] the Court of Appeal emphasised the importance of courts’ 
 ordering restitution wherever appropriate. 
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Though a compensation (restitution) order should be made only where the offender’s 
responsibility is clear, civil liability is not a legal precondition. A compensation 
(restitution) order can be made even if there is no civil liability.152 Application of this 
legislation can thus give rise to a remedy where none previously existed under civil 
law. 
 
4 2 2 6  Responsibility of parent or guardian to pay compensation 
 
A parent or guardian can be held responsible to comply with a compensation 
(restitution) order made against a young offender.153 The criteria for the making of the 
order are that “the court is of the opinion that the case would best be met by the … 
making of such an order…”154 In such cases the court has no option but to order that 
the parent or guardian pay the amount, unless they cannot be found155 or it would be 
unreasonable.156 Reference157 to the financial means of the offender will be 
interpreted as relating to the means of the parent or guardian.158 Where a local 
authority has parental responsibility for the young offender, the former will bear this 
obligation in place of the parent or guardian.159 
 
This dispensation is reminiscent of the early Anglo-Saxon concept of the collective 
guilt of the offender’s kin.160 
 
4 2 2 7  Restitution orders in respect of stolen goods161 
 
 
Restitution orders in respect of stolen goods can be combined with deferment of 
sentence.162 The concept of (stolen) goods includes money and things severed from 
                                            
152  R v Chappell (1984) 128 SJ 629; R v Horsham JJ, ex parte Richards [1985] 1 WLR  
986. See also Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 10; Archbold Criminal 
Pleading, Evidence and Practice 5 – 415. 
153  S 137. 
154  S 137(1)(b). 
155  S 137(1)(b)(i). 
156  S 137(1)(b)(ii). 
157  In s 130(11). 
158  S 138(1)(b). 
159  Ss 137(8) – 137(9). 
160  See Ch 2 Par 2 2 3 (supra). 
161  Ss 148 – 149. S 28 of the Theft Act 1968 granted courts the power to order restitution 
by means of the delivery of stolen goods or goods bought with the proceeds of the 
disposal thereof. This s has been repealed in Schedule 12 of the Powers of Criminal 
Courts (Sentencing) Act. The Powers of Criminal Courts Act (now repealed) did not 
make reference to restitution orders and the matter was dealt with solely by the Theft 
Act. 
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land by theft.163 The crime of theft itself does not have to be proved – an offence of 
which theft is the gist164 is adequate, but it has to be proved beyond dispute that the 
goods were stolen from the victim or that they represent the proceeds of their 
disposal.165 Anyone having possession of the stolen goods may be ordered to effect 
restitution, not just the convicted person. Where the stolen goods have been 
disposed of, goods obtained from their disposal may be substituted. Similarly, money 
taken from the offender at the time of apprehension may be paid to the victim in lieu 
of the goods.  
 
The purchase price of stolen goods must be refunded to a bona fide purchaser out of 
money taken from the accused on apprehension.166 The Act extends the same 
protection to the person who has bona fide lent money with the stolen goods as 
security. The court has a discretion as the order is not obligatory. Specific application 
by the person entitled to restitution is not required.167 A total of 621 restitution orders 
were made in 1996.168  
 
4 2 2 8 The Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act in practice 
 
The following statement underwrites the efficacy of the legislation discussed:169 
 
Furthermore, even in serious cases the existence of the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme and the power of the criminal court to make direct 
compensation orders against defendants nowadays do much to remove the 
incentive to bring a civil action. If reported cases are anything to go by, 
actions for trespass to the person tend to arise from allegedly improper police 
conduct and to serve more as a vindication of personal liberty than as a 
vehicle for compensatory harm. 
 
                                                                                                                             
162  S 148(2). 
163  Immovable property cannot be stolen, though “once severed from the realty” a thing 
becomes a chattel and capable of theft: Hunt P M A SA Criminal law and procedure 
(1970) 564. 
164  For example, handling dishonestly obtained goods. In R v Webbe; R v Mitchell; R v 
Davis; R v Moore; R v White [2001] EWCA Crim 1217 [32] it was stated “that a court 
passing sentence in handling cases should always have in mind the power to make 
restitution orders under ss 148 and 149 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Sentencing) 
Act 2000.” 
165  R v Ferguson [1970] 2 All ER 820, 54 Cr App R 410; R v Thibault (1983) 76 Cr App 
R 201. 
166  S 148(4). 
167  The only exception is s 148(2)(b) which deals with the restitution of goods acquired 
from the proceeds of stolen goods, where application is mentioned as a requirement. 
168  Under s 35 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. Select Committee on Home 
Affairs Third Report: (September 2002) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhaff/486/486ap05.htm 
169  Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 53 – 54. 
 107
The following factors indicate that this legislation is highly refined: 
 
? A victim of crime does not have to choose between a compensation 
(restitution) order and a civil law claim; 
? In most – almost all – cases a victim does not specifically have to apply for a 
compensation (restitution) order; 
? A compensation (restitution) order can be enforced in the same way as a fine 
(and does not merely have the force of a civil judgment); 
? A compensation (restitution) order can cover a broad spectrum of harm, not 
being limited to patrimonial loss; 
? The Act has a battery of legislation dealing with restitution by young 
offenders, including holding the guardian liable; 
? Courts are instructed to favour a compensation (restitution) order above a fine 
where the offender has limited means; and 
? The benefits of a compensation (restitution) order are not restricted to the 
owner of goods, but are extended to those whose personal rights have 
suffered. 
 
While it is not suggested that statistics provide a conclusive answer to questions 
regarding the efficacy of any legal enactment, the availability of statistical records 
goes a certain way to indicating what impact this Act has had in practice. Statistics170 
of compensation (restitution) orders passed in the magistrates’ courts show the 
following trends: 
                                            
170  All statistics below found in or based on information found in Criminal Statistics in 
England and Wales 1999 (2001 Cm 5001) Table 7.20, unless otherwise indicated. 
 108
21
70
0
11
36
00
15
20
0
90
00
0
10
00
0
86
80
0
98
00
89
10
0
97
00
90
70
0
10
40
0
96
40
0
99
00
98
60
0
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
1989 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Crimes involving violence
All crimes (excluding summary motoring offences)
 
Compensation (restitution) orders in violent crimes have thus dropped from  
21 700 in 1989 to around 10 000 per year. This represents a percentage of 43% of all 
compensation (restitution) orders, the average amount of violent crime compensation 
(restitution) orders being £218. The percentage of offenders (not just violent crimes) 
ordered to pay restitution as a percentage of all offenders sentenced during the 
period is 14%. The average amount for all compensation (restitution) orders was 
£156. 
 
Statistics for compensation (restitution) orders in the Crown Court are: 
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This also represents a sharp decline. The average amount of compensation 
(restitution) orders in violent crimes was £491. Just 7% of offenders sentenced in the 
relevant period (not just violent crimes) were ordered to make restitution. The 
average amount for all compensation (restitution) orders was £1 338. 
 
The decline in compensation (restitution) orders is exacerbated by the fact that the 
total number of violent crimes recorded in England and Wales rose from 176 962 in 
1989 to 376 579 in 1999.171 In cases where there is a vast discrepancy between the 
means of the offender and the severity of the loss, the courts will usually not make a 
compensation (restitution) order.172 The reason for the actual decline in 
compensation (restitution) orders could be the efficacy of the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme combined with the lack of means of offenders.173 
 
Reeves and Mulley point out that compensation (restitution) orders have the “hidden 
danger” of leading to further frustration and dissatisfaction of victims because the 
orders are often not complied with, due to factors such as offenders’ lack of 
means.174 In order to address this problem the undertaking is made in the White 
Paper, Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead,175 that the government will consider 
instituting a victim’s fund to ensure that victims receive immediate payment in terms 
of compensation (restitution) orders; the court would then pursue defaulting criminals. 
 
                                            
171  Criminal Statistics in England and Wales 1999 (2001 Cm 5001) Table 2.15. 
 (December 2003)  
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm50/5001/5001-t2-15.htm 
172  Miers D Compensation for personal victimisation in the UK 8. 
173  See Ch 5 Par 5 3 2 (infra) and Jones M A Textbook on torts 472 quoting Veitch and 
Miers (1975) 38 MLR 139 152 where it is shown that there is a trend of academic 
thought that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme has superseded the law of 
tort. 
174  Reeves H & Mulley K “The new Status of Victims in the UK: Opportunities and 
Threats” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal 
Justice (2000) 125 142. 
175  CM5074 published February 2001. See Par 4 3 2 1 (infra). 
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4 2 3 India: Code of Criminal Procedure176 
 
4 2 3 1  Court order to effect restitution  
 
A distinction is made between cases when a fine is imposed and cases when no fine 
is imposed:177 
 
? When a fine is imposed 
 
A court may order the whole (or part) of a fine to be applied:178 
 
? To defray the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution; 
? As restitution to any person for any loss or injury caused by the offence as 
would be recoverable in a civil court; 
? As restitution in terms of the Fatal Accidents Act;179 and/or 
? As restitution to any bona fide purchaser of illegally procured property which 
has been vindicated. 
 
The imposition of a fine is a sine qua non for making an order.180 Orders are 
discretionary; courts are not obliged to make restitutionary orders. The victim does 
not have to make special application. Actual payment is suspended subject to the 
finalisation of an appeal.181 Amounts awarded are taken into account in subsequent 
civil suits.182 
                                            
176  1973, 2 of 1974. The Code of Criminal Procedure contains the law of criminal 
procedure of India. The Law Commission of India drafted a comprehensive report for 
the revision of the 1898 Code which was embodied in its 41st Report in September 
1969. One of the objectives of the Report was stated as follows [Basu D D Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973 1]: 
(T)he procedure should not be complicated and should, to the utmost extent 
possible, ensure a fair deal to the poorer sections of the community.  
 Although the Code represents a codification of the law, there has been significant 
judicial interpretation of it in the century since its forerunner was promulgated. The 
two Codes have much in common and, where relevant, case law dealing with the 
Code of 1898 will be quoted in the discussion of the current Code. The Code of 
Criminal Procedure was extensively amended by the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Amendment) Act 45 of 1978. 
177  S 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
178  S 357(1). 
179  See Ch 5 Par 5 4 1 (infra). 
180  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 88. Subs 
357(3) (infra) deals with compensation when no fine is imposed. 
181  S 357(2). 
182  S 357(5). 
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Whether the reference183 to “the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution” 
refers to the complainant’s expenses or the state’s expenses, is not clear.184 As the 
section refers specifically to the fine being applied to defray expenses it would seem 
to be pointless to make the order in favour of the prosecution, as the state would in 
any case receive the fine in the normal course of events. On the other hand, 
Mundrathi maintains that it does, in fact, refer to the state’s expenses and proceeds 
to criticise this provision resoundingly, as “substantial justice to the victim gives way 
to unjust gain of the oppressor.”185 Should the former interpretation be the correct 
one, circumstances could arise where a third party (not the complainant) could 
benefit from the order if the third party could prove that he or she had properly 
incurred valid expenses in bringing the accused to justice.186 
 
As an amount may be awarded for any “loss or injury caused by the offence,”187 the 
court’s power is not limited to patrimonial losses. The requirement that the claim must 
be “recoverable by such person in a civil court,”188 combines civil and criminal law.189 
The section does not seek to create a new causa for the victim, but seeks to create a 
public law avenue to enforce an existing private law right.190 The victim does not 
have to choose between the remedy under the Code and the remedy under civil law. 
 
? When no fine is imposed 
 
Courts may impose free-standing restitution orders in cases where no fine is 
imposed.191 However,192 the award is recoverable as if it were a fine.193 A conviction 
                                            
183  See above [S 357(1)(a)]. 
184  See s 359 discussed below where similar wording is used and specifically linked to 
the complainant (who may not be a victim of the crime). 
185  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power  89. No 
authorities are cited by the author. 
186  As the wording does not refer specifically to the complainant’s being the beneficiary 
of the order. 
187  S 357(1)(b). 
188  S 357(1)(b). 
189  On the one hand, the section refers to a fine; on the other hand, the claim is equated 
with a civil claim, presumably insofar as cause of action and the calculation of 
quantum are concerned. A fine is thus applied to settle a civil claim. 
190  S 357(1)(c) which authorises a court to apply the fine to pay an amount to persons 
entitled to restitution in terms of the Fatal Accidents Act extends a remedy to enforce 
a claim created by a different statute. 
191  S 357(3). 
192  In terms of s 431 which forms part of Ch XXXII, dealing with “Execution, Suspension, 
Remission and Commutation of Sentences.” 
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is a condition precedent for the order,194 which can be made in favour only of the 
person who suffered loss or injury due to the commission of the offence.195 The 
court’s jurisdiction is not limited to the amount of the fine. Thus the effect is that the 
court’s discretion as to quantum is limited to the amount of the fine where a fine is 
imposed, while it is not limited in this way where no fine is imposed. Also in the 
former case the categories of restitution are explicitly identified, while in the latter 
case the term compensation is used without reference to the categories stipulated.196  
 
When a substantial sentence of imprisonment is imposed, Indian courts are not likely 
to impose heavy fines unless the circumstances are exceptional.197 In Guruswami v 
State of Tamil Nadu198 the court tempered its reluctance to impose restitutionary 
fines concomitant with sentences of imprisonment, holding that in a case of murder 
the dependants of the deceased should receive proper restitution.199 
 
Subordinate legislation passed in certain states200 makes the awarding of the fine (or 
part thereof) in terms of this section obligatory (as opposed to discretionary) where 
the victim belongs to “Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes,” unless the perpetrator 
also belongs to “Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes.”201 
 
                                                                                                                             
193  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 88. Subs 
(3) was not in the original Code and was added because the existing legislation 
allowed for compensation to be ordered only where a fine was imposed. The drafters 
of the Code in its current form felt that this was unacceptable. Subs 357(3) was 
added on recommendation of the Indian Law Commission, made in its 41st report. 
194  Basu D D Criminal Procedure Code, 1973  838. 
195  Basu D D Criminal Procedure Code, 1973  839. 
196  In s 357(1)(a) – (d).The reason for this distinction is probably to be found in the fact 
that s 357(3) dates from a later period than s 357(1). 
197  For example where justified by the magnitude of the offence, the pecuniary 
circumstances of the accused, the motive of the accused and the pecuniary gain that 
the offender obtained from the commission of the offence – Mundrathi Law on 
Compensation: to Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 144. Mohammed Sah and 
others v Emperor AIR 1934 Lah 519; Palaniappa Gounder v State of Tamil Nadu AIR 
1977 SC 1323 (Pars 11 – 13); Adamji v State of Bombay A 1952 SC 1229; Sarwan 
Singh v State of Punjab 1978 4 SCC 111. 
198  1979 3 SCC 799. 
199  The Supreme Court reduced a sentence of death to a sentence of life imprisonment, 
ordering the offender to pay a fine which would be paid over to the dependants of the 
deceased. When deciding the quantum of the fine, the court must bear in mind that - 
in terms of s 357(1) - the claimant receives restitution only if the fine is “recovered.” 
200  Bihar Act 9 of 1985; Madhya Pradesh Act 29 of 1978; Karnataka Act 27 of 1987; 
West Bengal Act 33 of 1985. 
201  Definitions whereof are to be found in Articles 366(24) and 366(25) of the Constitution 
of India. 
 113
Basu202 supports the liberal exercise of these powers in the interests of justice. 
Ramanathan203 is of the opinion that because the criminal trial has tended to focus 
on the crime and the criminal, and reparation has been treated essentially as a civil 
remedy, this discretion vested in the courts has been under-utilised. The link required 
between conviction and restitution also reduces the effectiveness of this provision for 
the victim.  
 
Mundrathi states:204 
 
Section 357… does not provide speedy or sure relief… There is a case to 
provide interim or immediate compensation to the victim on the lines of Motor 
Accident claim cases,205 so as to meet the immediate needs caused due to 
the loss. 
 
Problems surrounding the application of these provisions are:206 
 
? Offenders usually lack the means to effect restitution; 
? Courts are reluctant to use criminal law proceedings for purposes of 
reparation; 
? Courts are reluctant to impose fines together with substantial sentences of 
imprisonment; 
? Maximum fines laid down by legislation are no longer realistic; and 
? The requirement of a conviction subjects reparation to the vagaries of criminal 
law. 
 
In theory no fine should be paid over to the state while the victim remains 
uncompensated, provided the latter’s right to compensation meets the stated 
requirements, of which the foremost is that the recipient must have a valid civil claim. 
However, the theory is seldom put into practice. 
 
                                            
202  Basu D D Criminal Procedure Code, 1973  839 citing Hari Krishna & State of Haryana 
v Sukhbir Singh AIR 1988 SC 2127(Pars 10 – 11). See following footnote. 
203  Ramanathan U “Compensation and Insurance” 5. 
204  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 89. 
205  See Ch 5 Par 5 4 1 2. 
206  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 147 – 
148. 
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4 2 3 2  Order to pay costs in non-cognisable207 cases 
 
A restitution order can be made against a convicted offender in favour of the 
complainant for “the cost incurred by him in the prosecution.”208 This covers costs for 
matters incidental to the trial and not losses suffered as a result of the commission of 
the offence itself.209 Conviction of the offender is a prerequisite for the making of the 
order. Failure to pay the amount ordered can lead to imprisonment of up to thirty 
days. 
 
This is another210 instance where a criminal procedural form of enforcement is 
afforded to effect restitution. The term complainant is used, thus the section could be 
invoked even if the complainant were not a victim of the crime.211  
 
4 2 3 3  Orders recoverable as fines 
 
Any money payable by virtue of an order in terms of the Code is recoverable as a 
fine212 and the court may enforce payment by issuing a warrant of attachment.213 
 
While serving the full period of imprisonment usually relieves the offender of the 
obligation to pay a fine, this does not apply when the fine is of a restitutionary 
nature.214 
 
Mundrathi comments:215 
 
Though sections 421 and 431 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide for 
compensation recoverability procedures, for this the victim would again have 
to resort to courts thus snuffing out all hopes of expedient recovery.  
 
Thus the means provided to enforce payment of restitutionary orders are ineffective. 
                                            
207  S 2 (Definitions): A cognisable offence is one where the alleged offender may be 
arrested without a warrant, while a non-cognisable offence is an offence where a 
warrant is required. 
208  S 359. 
209  Which are dealt with by s 357. See Par 4 2 3 1 (supra). 
210  See above. 
211  For example, someone reporting a so-called victimless crime, such as a traffic 
offence. 
212  Unless an alternative method of recovery is prescribed: S 431. 
213  S 421. 
214  S 421. The imposition of a fine in such cases does not of necessity provide for 
an alternative of imprisonment, but serves to effect restitution to the victim.. 
215  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 90. 
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4 2 3 4  Suspended sentences216 
 
The suspension of sentences is an executive function in India, as opposed to a 
judicial function. Specific application has to be made to the “appropriate 
Government”217 for suspension of sentence subject to such conditions as the 
offender accepts.218 No provision is made for a court to suspend its sentence,219 
though the opinion of the court may be sought.220 
 
Reference is made to “any conditions which the person sentenced accepts.”221 
Restitution is not specifically mentioned, but can be implied because the condition of 
suspension “may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is 
suspended...”222 However, Basu223 does not include restitution in his list of conditions 
of suspension, thus suspension subject to restitution is not encountered in India. 
 
4 2 3 5  Disposal of property 
 
? At conclusion of trial 
 
A court may order the return of property to a person entitled thereto at the conclusion 
of the inquiry or trial.224 Property includes the following: 
 
? Property that has been produced in court at the trial, including property placed 
under the control of the court while not necessarily produced physically in 
court;225 
                                            
216  S 432 of the Code deals with the suspension of sentences. 
217  The government of the area where the conviction took place. The exception is the 
 case of offences falling under ss 489A to 489D of the Indian Penal Code which deal 
with forgery of currency and bank notes. In these cases the Central Government and 
not the State Government is the appropriate authority [Khastgir P Criminal Major Acts 
1178]. 
218  As in other countries, sentencing itself is seen as a judicial function, but the execution 
thereof after conviction and sentencing is an executive function: Basu D D Criminal 
 Procedure Code, 1973 954. 
219  The only exception to this is to be found in s 389 which empowers the Appellate 
Court to suspend execution pending the appeal before it, including the time required 
to present the appeal where the accused has indicated his intention to appeal. 
220  S 432(2). 
221  S 432(1). 
222  S 432(4). 
223  Op cit 952 – 957. 
224  S 452(1). 
225  Basu D D Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 1004. 
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? Property in custody of the court;226 
? Property in respect of which an offence has been committed or any property 
into which it has been converted even if the property is not produced in 
court;227 and 
? Property used in the commission of the offence.228  
 
A court is not obliged to make an order. Although the section’s wording does not 
expressly require notice to be given before disposing of the property, courts interpret 
the words “person claiming possession” and the exigencies of natural justice to 
require that an order can be given only after notice to the parties,229 unless the order 
is passed as part of the judgment in the criminal case.230 
 
The order cannot be made before the trial is over as this would be tantamount to 
prejudging the case.231 
 
The court relies on the evidence already before it in the main case, together with 
other relevant circumstances on the record. No special enquiry is required.232 
Regarding the identity of the beneficiary, Basu233 says the following: 
 
The expression “entitled to possession”… does not refer to ownership234 but 
the right to present possession, determined in a summary manner, without 
entering into or affecting the question of title, which should be decided by a 
Civil Court. 
 
The burden of proof required is not the same as that in a criminal trial as the matter is 
quasi-civil.235 
                                            
226  Bal Kaur v State of HP (1976) Cr L J 1928 (HP). 
227  Felicidade v D’Souza (1978) Cr L J 1189 (Goa). The term converted is sufficiently 
broad to include the case of a sum of stolen money being deposited into a bank 
account. 
228  The implement used for cutting wire in the case of theft of wire is an example (Nanak 
v State of UP (1974) Cr L J 1402 (All)), while the vehicle used to transport the 
offender to the scene of the crime and to transport the stolen goods was excluded 
from this category (Balamal v State of Gujarat A 1970 Guj 26). 
229  Ramakrishma v Seethamma A 1939 Mad 916; Himangshu v Sobhan A 1959 Cal 782; 
Bombay Cycle Agency v Pandey (1975) Cr L J 820 (830) DB. 
230  Govind v State of UP (1986) Cr L J 1478 Or (DB). 
231  Basu D D Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 1004. 
232  Meena v State of HP (1990) Cr L J 1445 All; Govindachari v State (1979) Cr L J 428;  
Prakash v Jagdish A 1958 MP 270. 
233  Op cit 1005. 
234  Madhavan v State of Kerala A 1979 SC 1829. 
235  Basu D D Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 1006. In cases involving motor vehicles, 
 there is a rebuttable presumption that the registered owner in terms of the Motor 
 Vehicles Act 59 of 1988 is prima facie entitled to possession. 
 117
  
Courts may grant an order of financial compensation against the state where the 
goods have been lost in police custody and the state cannot prove the due diligence 
of its servants.236  
 
Courts can require security for return of the property should the beneficiary of the 
order prove not to be entitled to the property on appeal or revision.237 However, if 
such security is not given, the order can be executed only after two months or after 
finalisation of the appeal.238 The requirement of security highlights the fact that the 
court order is not to be seen as a final decision on the matter of ownership. 
Ownership is a matter for a civil court and the criminal court acting in terms of this 
section proceeds on the basis of who is prima facie entitled to possession. 
  
Once an order for restitution has been made, the state has a statutory – and not 
merely tortious – duty to return the property to the beneficiary. The state will be civilly 
liable for damages where the property is lost due to the negligence or dishonesty of 
its servants. The state will not have the defence of sovereign immunity in this 
instance.239 
 
4 2 3 6  Payment to innocent purchaser from money found on accused 
 
A court may order a refund of the purchase price to a bona fide purchaser of stolen 
property out of money taken from the accused upon arrest and the property is 
returned to the person entitled thereto. Application by the purchaser is required.240  
 
The court is not expected to decide the matter of ownership; it simply decides who is 
“entitled to possession.” Should the offender have had no money in his possession 
when arrested, the purchaser will have to fall back on his civil, tortious remedy.241 
 
                                            
236  Tookappa v State (1977) Cr L J 1850 Knt. 
237  Section 452(2). 
238  Unless the goods are livestock or perishables: S 452(4). 
239  Prithwiraj v State (1979) Cr L J 96 (Cal); State of Gujarat v Memon A 1967 SC 1885.  
See Ch 3 Par 3 4 4 (supra) regarding state immunity. 
240  S 453. 
241  Roshan A 1957 Punj 297. 
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4 2 3 7  Appeal against orders 
 
A right of appeal exists242 against the orders discussed in the previous two 
paragraphs. A number of matters are noteworthy:243  
 
? The right of appeal is open to any person aggrieved, and is not limited to the 
offender or the victim of the offence. 
? The restitutionary order itself is appealable separately from the judgment and 
sentence in the criminal trial. 
? However, the court hearing the appeal from the criminal case also has the 
power to deal with the restitution order. 
 
Natural justice requires notice to be given to the party concerned before a court sets 
aside or modifies an order in terms of its powers of appeal.244 
 
4 2 3 8  Restoring possession of immovable property 
 
When a person has been dispossessed245 by force or criminal intimidation, the court 
may, upon conviction of the offender, order that possession of immovable property 
be restored.246 No other form of unlawful dispossession is mentioned, thus this 
remedy would not be available against an unlawful occupier who obtained 
possession in some way not involving force or intimidation.247 The victim would have 
to rely on the normal civil remedy.  
 
The order has to be made within one month of the conviction.248 This does not apply 
in the case of an appeal, confirmation or review, when the higher court can make the 
order without being limited in terms of time.249 
 
This remedy does not impact on the civil law rights of the parties.250 Thus an order 
does not constitute a judicial confirmation of ownership,251 but serves as a counter-
                                            
242  To the court that normally hears appeals in the particular instance. 
243  S 454. 
244  Iswar v State (1989) Cr L J 2019 Or. 
245  S 456(1) grants the court the right to order the eviction of the occupier by force. 
246  S 456. 
247  Pargan v State of UP (1979) Cr L J 903 All. 
248  S 456(1). 
249  Basu D D Criminal Procedure Code 1010. S 456(2) was drafted to make it clear that 
the order of the superior court may be made “while disposing of the appeal,” as this 
point was ambiguous in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898. 
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spoliation measure. An investigation into the civil law merits of ownership is not 
envisaged. 
 
4 2 4 New Zealand: Sentencing Act252 
 
Formerly the Criminal Justice Act253 contained the main legislation dealing with 
restitution.254 In 1992 an investigation255 concerning sentences of reparation was 
conducted. In 2000 a referendum was held asking whether greater emphasis on the 
needs of victims was required with provision for restitution and compensation. A 
resoundingly positive response was recorded256 and the Sentencing Act257 was 
passed. Just prior to this, the Minister of Justice, Phil Goph, stated:258 
 
Increased funding for victim support is accompanied by changes in the 
Sentencing Act to introduce a strong presumption in favour of reparation. 
There will be an extension of reparation to allow payments for physical harm, 
and not just property loss or damage and emotional harm. Victims' views will 
be given greater prominence by courts. 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
250  S 456(4). 
251  Which is consistent with the other provisions of this nature in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 
252  2002 9. 
253  1985. 
254  The former Act introduced the concept of the sentence of reparation. This 
 nomenclature was perpetuated in the current Act.  
255  Department of Justice Galaway B & Spier P Sentencing to Reparation: 
Implementation of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 (1992).  
256  “New Zealand Expands Official Recognition of Restorative Justice” Restorative 
 Justice Online International Centre for Justice and Reconciliation (January 2003) 
 http://www.restorativejustice.org/rj3/Feature/October02/NewZealand.htm 
257  2002. Restorative justice is provided for in the Sentencing Act. S 7 provides for 
holding an offender accountable for harm done to the victim and the community, and 
for promoting in the offender a sense of responsibility for, and acknowledgement of, 
that harm, and provides for the interests of the victim of the offence and for reparation 
for harm done. S 8(j) requires the court to take into account any outcomes of 
restorative justice processes that have occurred, or that the court is satisfied are likely 
to occur, in relation to the particular case. S 8(i) requires the court to take into 
account the offender’s personal, family, whanau, community, and cultural background 
in cases with a partly or wholly rehabilitative purpose. S 9(2)(f) says the court must 
take into account as a mitigating factor any remorse shown by the offender, or 
anything described in s 10. See Ch 4 Par 4 2 4 & 4 3 4 (infra). 
Restorative Justice Trust  
(May 2004) http://www.restorativejustice.org.nz/ 
258  New Zealand Government Executive Protecting New Zealand and New Zealanders 
 2001  
(August 2002) http://www.executive.govt.nz/budget2001/protecting-safer.htm 
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On the promulgation of the Sentencing Act, the New Zealand Minister for Courts 
referred to it as the first key item of sentencing legislation in the world to empower 
courts to utilise restorative justice principles, benefiting victims by placing them at the 
centre of the sentencing process. Suspended sentences were abolished because 
they were considered ineffective.259 
 
4 2 4 1  Definitions 
 
The term reparation is applied to refer to restitution effected by the offender to the 
victim of crime. One of the purposes of the Act is “to provide for the interests of 
victims of crime.”260  
 
A victim is:261 
 
? A person against whom an offence is committed; 
? Every person who, due to an offence committed by another person, suffers 
physical injury or loss of or damage to property;  
? A parent or guardian of a child who falls within the categories above;262 and 
? Every member of the immediate family of a person who dies or is rendered 
incapable as a result of an offence committed by another person.263 
 
A person charged with the same offence cannot also be a victim.264 The concept of 
victim is defined broadly in order to include all persons harmed by the crime, 
including surviving family members of victims. Harm is not limited to personal injury 
and includes proprietary losses. 
 
4 2 4 2  Significance assigned to reparation 
 
Preparatory to dealing with sentences of reparation per se, the Act contains various 
provisions indicating the significance attached to restitution and the role thereof in the 
sentencing milieu. 
                                            
259  Robson M “‘World First’ for Restorative Justice” June 2002 Te Ara Whakatika.   
 New Zealand Department for Courts 
 (August 2005) http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/courts/tearawhakatikajun02.pdf 
260  S 3(d). 
261  S 4(1). 
262  Unless the parent or guardian is charged with the offence. 
263  Unless that family member is charged with the offence.  
264  For example, an accessory after the fact. S 4. 
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Two of the stated purposes of sentencing are:265 
 
? Providing for the interests of the victim of the offence; and 
? Providing reparation for harm done by the offence. 
 
The court when sentencing the offender must take account of:266 
 
? Any offer of amends, whether financial or by means of the performance of any 
service, made by or on behalf of the offender to the victim; 
? Any agreement between the offender and the victim as to how the offender 
may remedy the wrong or ensure that the offence will not recur; 
? Any measures taken by the offender or the family of the offender to: 
o Make restitution to the victim or family of the victim; or 
o Apologise to the victim or family of the victim; or 
o Otherwise make good the harm that has occurred. 
o Effect any remedial action. 
 
In R v Clotworthy,267 the Court of Appeal pronounced the following words of caution: 
 
An element of apparent inconsistency can arise if the public perception is that 
those with an ability to pay reparation can in effect buy themselves out of a 
full time custodial sentence. Against that must, of course, be balanced the 
clear legislative policy… which provides that a sentencing Court must 
consider imposing a sentence of reparation in every case and… must impose 
such a sentence unless it is satisfied that it would be clearly inappropriate to 
do so. 
 
In this case the Court of Appeal overturned a suspended sentence of imprisonment 
imposed by the court a quo,268 substituting a longer, unsuspended sentence and 
reducing the reparation order on the grounds that the offender would not be able to 
comply with it. A reparation order – which the offender had already settled – was 
imposed. The court’s stance apropos reparation was expressed as follows:269 
                                            
265  S 7(1)(c) & (d). 
266  S 10(1). 
267  (CA 114/98 29 June 1998) 21. 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1998/ca114.html#Number1 
268  The Sentencing Act has abolished the suspension of sentences. Alternatives are 
sentences of home detention, community based sentences and the adjournment of 
sentencing pending the outcome of rehabilitative and restorative justice. Hall G “The 
Sentencing Act 2002 - new bottle, same wine?” Lawtalk, New Zealand Law Society: 
(January 2003) http://www.nz-lawsoc.org.nz/lawtalk/583hall.htm 
269  See also R v Drinkrow (CA 229/96 22 August 1996). 
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We would not wish this judgment to be seen as expressing any general 
opposition to the concept of restorative justice… Those policies must, 
however, be balanced against other sentencing policies… Which aspect 
should predominate will depend on an assessment of where the balance 
should lie in the individual case… (T)he restorative aspects can have, as 
here, a significant impact on the length of the term of imprisonment which the 
Court is directed to impose.  
 
On the other hand, in R v Andrew270 the Court of Appeal approved the following 
approach: 
 
The District Court saw as its first priority doing whatever it could to ensure 
that the young man who had been duped by the appellant was repaid as 
quickly as possible. It expressly reached the decision to impose non-custodial 
penalties because ‘although the brazen nature of the offending really calls for 
a prison term,’ that would have delayed the prospect of reparation being 
effected. 
 
The Clotworthy and Andrew cases271 can be distinguished on the basis that the 
former involved crimes of serious violence, while the latter involved crimes of 
dishonesty. In each case a court will have to harmonise the interests of the 
community with the interests of the individual. The dividing line is fine. The judgment 
in R v Morgan272 shows that courts are reluctant – even in non-violent cases – to 
allow a tenuous prospect of token reparation to serve as a pretext for sparing the 
offender from a custodial sentence. In this case of burglary the loss amounted to 
$16 000. Reparation of $40 – $100 per week was offered depending on the 
                                                                                                                             
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1996/ca229.html#Numb
er1 
 R v Curin (CA 219/98 28 July 1998). 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1998/ca219.html#Numb
er1 
 R v Hunter (CA 36/02 31 May 2002). 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2002/ca036.htm#Number1 
 R v McCallister (CA 17/01 31 May 2001). 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2001/ca017.htm#Number1 
 R v Hare (CA 332/99 15 November 1999). 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1999/ca332.htm#Number1 
270  (CA 419/95 10 November 1995) 5. 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1995/ca419.html#Number1 
271  Supra. The latter favours restitution, while the former expresses caution. 
272  (CA 311/97 25 September 1997) 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1997/ca311.html#Number1 
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offender’s finding seasonal employment. An amount of $250 had already been paid 
to the insurer. In the light of the offender’s “lengthy history of offending persisting 
over a period of some 17 years,”273 the Court of Appeal endorsed the sentence of 
two years’ imprisonment imposed by the court a quo,274 thus effectively stifling any 
prospect of restitution. 
 
In deciding an appropriate sentence, the court must take into account whether the 
redress was genuine and capable of fulfilment, and whether it has been accepted by 
the victim as expiating or mitigating the wrong.275 If a court determines that it is 
nevertheless appropriate to impose a sentence, it must take the redress offered into 
account when determining the appropriate sentence.276 The following approach has 
been approved by the Court of Appeal:277 
 
(T)he Judge took three years as his starting point. He deducted 6 months for 
the reparation and arrived at the sentence of two and a half years plus $6 000 
reparation… (A)lthough many other factors must be taken into account, the 
three most important variables have tended to be the total sum involved, the 
extent of the reparation, and the plea. 
 
In R v Hawkins278 the Court of Appeal held:279 
 
The substantial reparation order was also a factor to be taken into account in 
assessing the final sentence of imprisonment but any attempt to lay down any 
amount of tariff for reparation if it fetters a discretion of a sentencing Judge is 
to be avoided. 
 
Courts are also given the authority to adjourn proceedings pending the making of 
reparation.280 
 
                                            
273  Ranging from twenty previous convictions of burglary to charges of assault, indecent 
assault and possession of cannabis. Op cit Par 7. 
274  See also R v Whitelaw (CA 392/01 21 February 2002) 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2001/ca392.htm#Number1 
275 S 10(2). See also R v Constable (CA 551/99 24 May 2000) 5 – 6. 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1999/ca551.htm#Number1 
276  S 10(3). 
277  R v Harvey (CA 237/01 19 September 2001) 9; 13. 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2001/ca237.htm#Number1 
278  (CA 51/02 22 May 2002) 9. 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2002/ca051.htm#Number1 
279  per Gendall J. 
280  S 10(4). 
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These provisions emphasise the value of restitution. New Zealand courts remain 
aware of the importance of formulating a sentence which balances the restitutionary 
interests of the victim with the interests of the community in penalising criminal 
behaviour. The most common reason for not granting a sentence of reparation 
appears to be the inability of the offender to comply therewith within a realistic 
period.281 
 
4 2 4 3  Sentences of reparation 
 
A reparation order may be imposed in respect of:282 
 
? Loss of or damage to property; 
? Emotional harm;283 
? Loss or damage consequential284 on any emotional or physical harm or loss 
of or damage to property. 
 
Property is not restricted to tangibles and has been interpreted to include the right to 
recover a debt.285 The cost of medical care arising from a physical injury is 
                                            
281  R v Prescott (CA 360/00 1 November 2000)  
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2000/ca360.htm#Number1 
R v Rollo [1981] 2 NZLR 667. “Restitution should not be ordered where the defendant 
has no present or prospective ability to pay.” Doyle & Hodge Criminal Procedure in 
New Zealand 177. 
282  S 32 in Part 2 of the Act deals with reparation. S 320 of the Injury Prevention, 
Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 gives the right to be heard to the 
Accident Compensation Corporation when a determination is being made in terms of 
the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act. As will be seen, the 
Accident Compensation Scheme pays entitlements to victims of crime who have 
suffered personal injuries. See Ch 5 Par 5 5 2 (infra). 
283  S 32(2) provides: “Despite subs (1), a court must not impose a sentence of reparation 
in respect of emotional harm, or loss or damage consequential on emotional harm, 
unless the person who suffered the emotional harm is a person described in par (a) of 
the definition of “victim” in s 4. 
284  Under previous legislation (s 22(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985) only 
damage to property, and emotional harm, were covered, thus leading to the following 
interpretation (Doyle & Hodge Criminal Procedure in New Zealand 177): 
The courts will not allow the reparation provisions to be used by victims to 
recover tangential financial loss resulting indirectly from an offence. In 
Cooper v Ward (1988) 3 CRNZ 366 Speight J refused a Crown appeal 
whereby it was sought to use the provisions of s 22(1) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985 to recover $11 500 spent in an undercover operation to 
purchase cannabis. 
S 32(1)(c) of the new Act has been added to allow for the claiming of such “tangential 
financial loss.”  
285  Doyle and Hodge Criminal Procedure in New Zealand 177; Jane v Police 
(unreported) High court, Christchurch Holland J 9 March 1988 AP 243/87. 
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included,286 as is payment effected by an insurer.287 In R v Black288 electricity 
stolen289 from two power supply authorities was treated as property. In R v Harvey290 
reparation was ordered for the emotional distress caused by the dishonesty of an 
accountant with respect to his clients.  In R v Shaw291 the offender had transferred 
her assets to a trust in anticipation of a sentence of reparation. The Court of Appeal 
held that it was acceptable to make a reparation order based on the value thereof to 
discourage fraud and evasion. 
 
A court may pass a sentence of reparation even if the offender has to rely on 
relatives to comply with it. However, there will have to be evidence that this 
assistance is likely to be forthcoming. In R v Lepupa,292 Gault J stated that family 
collective responsibility for a reparation order could be appropriate, particularly in 
light of well recognised responses by certain cultural groups to offending by family 
members.  
 
Courts are directed293 to consider any alternative avenue of financial aid at the 
disposal of the victim, whether utilised or not.294 Reparation orders must not be 
made295 in respect of consequential loss for which the victim will receive entitlements 
from the Accident Compensation Scheme.296 
 
                                            
286  R v Taimanu (CA 377/02 20 February 2003) 
(June 2003) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2002/ca377.htm#Number1 
287  R v O’Rourke [1990] 1 NZLR 155. 
288  (CA 465/99 18 April 2000) 10.  
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1999/ca465.htm#Number1 
See also R v Dunsmuir (CA 410/95 4 March 1996) 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1995/ca410.html#Number1 
289  S 218 of the Crimes Act 1961 reads: “Electricity is hereby declared to be a thing 
capable of being stolen; and every one commits theft who fraudulently abstracts, 
consumes, or uses any electricity.” 
290  Supra. 
291  (CA 183/97 25 September 1997) 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1997/ca183.html#Number1 
292  (CA 129/97 18 August 1997) 22. 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1997/ca129.html#Number1 
293  S 32(3). 
294  S 32(4). 
295  S 32(5). 
296  Operated in terms of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 
2001. As will be seen, the Accident Compensation Scheme pays entitlements to 
victims of crime who have suffered personal injuries. See Ch 5 Par 5 5 2 (infra). 
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A court may not place an obligation on the offender to perform any service to the 
victim in a sentence of reparation.297 
 
In circumstances where a sentence of reparation may be imposed, a court must 
impose it “unless it is satisfied that the sentence would result in undue hardship for 
the offender or the dependants of the offender, or that any other special 
circumstances would make it inappropriate.”298 The fact that no application for a 
sentence of reparation is made on behalf of the victim does not absolve a court from 
this duty. However, the lack of such application can be considered in deciding the 
appropriateness of granting a sentence of reparation.299 With regard to whether a 
reparation sentence is appropriate,300 the Court of Appeal held as follows in R v 
Batt:301 
 
(T)here is some difficulty in formulating the terms of a satisfactory reparation 
order in the circumstances of this case. The house is in the nature of a bach, 
run-down and in need of repair, and located in an area which may not attract 
a ready sale. Clearly, an order that Mrs Batt make reparation of a fixed sum 
by a certain date would be unsatisfactory. The house might not sell by that 
date or for a price which would cover the amount specified in the order. Mrs 
Batt would then be in the position of not being able to comply with the order. 
We consider that such an order would be unrealistic. 
 
In Ruka v Department of Social Welfare302 the Court of Appeal voiced the following 
obiter dictum: 
 
Where there is no realistic prospect of payment being made within a very few 
years an order should not be made, at least for the full amount sought.303 
 
A court failing to impose a sentence of reparation under prime facie appropriate 
circumstances is compelled to give reasons for failing to do so.304 A sentence of 
                                            
297  S 32(7). 
298  S 12(1). 
299  R v Batt (CA 27/01 31 May 2002) 8 16. 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2001/ca027.htm#Judgment1 
300  Before the passing of the current Act, the matter was dealt with in S 24 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 which used the phraseology: “The court shall consider 
imposing a sentence of reparation in every case, and, subject to s 22 of this Act, shall 
impose such a sentence unless it is satisfied that it would be clearly inappropriate to 
do so.” (Emphasis added) 
301  Supra 17. 
302  (CA 43/96 1 October 1996) 2. 
303  In this case the reparation order was for the amount of $44 759,93 payable at a rate 
of $10,00 per week. In Belmont v Police (unreported Wellington Registry M 258/86 13 
October 1986) it was held that 13 years was too long a period. See Doyle & Hodge 
Criminal Procedure in New Zealand 177. 
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reparation may be combined with other sentences.305 Where a court deems it 
appropriate to impose a fine as well as a sentence of reparation, but the means of 
the offender are insufficient to discharge both, the court has to favour the sentence of 
reparation over the fine.306 
 
While there is no restriction on the imposition of cumulative custodial and reparation 
sentences, it is inappropriate to direct that reparation be made following a sentence 
of imprisonment if an offender lacks the means to effect payment.307 In R v Cunard308 
the Court of Appeal309 held that “to make a reparation order in the absence of any 
ability on the part of the appellant to meet it, when its terms would require payments 
over a period in excess of 10 years,310 offends against the principles applicable to 
such cases.”311 In R v Lynn312 the Court of Appeal held that an order based on the 
ability of the offender to find employment after an effective period of three years’ 
imprisonment was inappropriate, there being no realistic likelihood of his being able 
to comply with the order. In R v Munro313 the Court of Appeal had to consider a 
sentence of reparation passed by the court a quo which provided for payment of 
$2 500 at a rate of $30 per week, the first payment being due six weeks after the 
offender’s release from prison. However, the court a quo also directed that because 
the reparation sentence might be impracticable it should be the subject of review, 
both as to the quantum of the sentence and the rate of payment, following the 
offender’s release. While the Court of Appeal accepted the possibility of a reparation 
order being subject to review on the offender’s release,314 it declined to confirm the 
imposition of a reparation order following on “such a significant sentence of 
                                                                                                                             
304  S 12(3). 
305  S 12(2). 
306  S 14(2). 
307  R v Rollo [1981] 2 NZLR 667 R v Jarvis (CA 306/86, 2 March 1987) R v Brown (CA 
267/92, 26 November 1992) Sargeant v Police (1998) 15 CRNZ 454. 
308  (CA331/01 3 December 2001). 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2001/ca331.htm#Number1 
309  per Doogue J. 
310  That is, after serving a sentence of imprisonment. The amount of the order was to be 
$20 per week. 
311  Supra 29. 
312  (CA 90/01 13 June 2001). 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2001/ca090.htm#Number1 
313  (CA 132/02 24 July 2002)  
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2002/ca132.htm#Number1 
314  “…presumably by the Registrar in terms of the provisions of Part III of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957…” Supra 17. 
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imprisonment”315 – three and a half years – combined with the unlikelihood of the 
offender’s being gainfully employed on his release. However, a sentence of 
imprisonment is not always seen as a bar to a sentence of reparation: In R v 
Bowden316 a reparation order was made for payment of $1 000 in instalments of $10 
per week, the first payment to be made seven days after the offender’s release from 
prison, the total sentence of imprisonment amounting to twenty seven months, the 
offender being twenty seven years of age. It appears from the judgment that the 
offender was in a position where he was likely to find employment and the defence 
did not challenge the order of restitution.317 
 
Regarding quantum, a court may instruct a probation officer to prepare a reparation 
report canvassing the following matters:318 
                                            
315  Supra 18. 
316  (CA 102/01 26 June 2001) 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2001/ca102.htm#Number1 
317  Except to have it reduced as it reflected an incorrect amount of loss suffered. 
318  S 33 assists the court in determining the quantum of the sentence of reparation.  
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In the case of emotional harm: 
The nature of that harm and any consequential loss or damage. 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of any 
loss or damage 
consequential on 
physical harm:  
 
 
The nature of the 
loss or damage;  
 
   
 
 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The extent to which 
the victim is likely to 
be covered by 
entitlements under 
the Injury 
Prevention, 
Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation 
Act.319 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of loss of or damage to property: 
The value of that loss or damage and any consequential loss or damage. 
 
This broad spectrum of information covers both the amount of the loss and the ability 
of the offender to effect reparation. A court is not, however, obliged to seek a report if 
it is in a position to make the reparation order without the reparation report.320 A court 
can also order an offender to make a declaration regarding financial capacity.321 
 
                                            
319  2001. See Ch 5 Par 5 5 2 (infra). 
320  S 33(2). 
321  Ss 33(3) and 42. Providing false information is a criminal offence: S 43. 
The maximum 
amount that the 
offender is likely to 
be able to pay 
under a sentence 
of reparation; 
 
and 
 
The frequency and 
magnitude of any 
payments that 
should be required 
under a sentence 
of reparation, if 
provision for 
payment by 
instalments is 
thought desirable; 
 
and 
 
The financial 
capacity of the 
offender. 
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When making the reparation report, the probation officer has to attempt to mediate 
between victim and offender in order to achieve consensus. If an agreement is 
reached, the probation officer must report the terms thereof to the court. Should 
agreement regarding the amount not be achieved, the probation officer must record 
the respective positions of the parties and make an assessment of the loss.322 The 
victim:323 
 
? Does not have to face the offender or participate in the preparation of the 
report; 
? Is entitled to receive a copy of the report; and 
? Is entitled to receive a copy of the conditions of reparation ordered by the 
court. 
 
The court may order a lesser amount than the actual loss if the offender has 
insufficient means to settle the full loss and/or may order payment in instalments. The 
interests of the victim are protected because the reparation order is settled before 
any fine which the offender is ordered to pay.324 
 
In cases of more than one offender, a sentence of reparation can be passed against 
the offender who has the ability of effecting reparation, irrespective of the relative 
fault of the co-offenders in the commission of the offence. Apportionment based on 
degrees of fault takes place only when it is not done at the expense of the victim, but 
in the interests of justice between the perpetrators as “(t)he basis of reparation is not 
intended to be punitive but restorative.”325 
 
The following matters have to be canvassed in a sentence of reparation:326 
 
? Total amount to be paid; 
? Whether the amount is to be paid in one lump sum or in instalments; 
                                            
322  S 34. 
323  S 37. 
324  S 35. 
325  R v Lewis (CA 7/98 17 June 1998) 15. 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1998/ca007.html#Number1 
 For an example of apportionment see R v T, J A and C E Barclay (CA 419/97; 420/97 
& 421/97 3 December 1997)  
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1997/ca419.html#Number1  
326  S 36. 
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? If a lump sum, whether it is to be paid immediately or at some specified 
date;327 and 
? If instalments, the times and the amount of the instalments. 
 
All these aspects have to be canvassed for the sentence of reparation to be valid.328 
 
The victim does not lose the right to claim the balance by tortious means in instances 
where the sentence of reparation does not extinguish the loss completely.329 Where 
the conviction is overturned on appeal, the sentence of reparation also falls away, 
leaving the victim with a tortious claim.330 
 
A sentence of reparation can be enforced in the same way as a fine.331 The 
remission of the whole or any part of the amount required to be paid under a 
sentence of reparation does not affect the right of the victim to bring civil 
proceedings, or make claims under the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Act332 to recover the amount remitted.333 
 
                                            
327  A court can specify a period for payment, failing which payment will be enforced by 
means of imprisonment. R v T, J A and C E Barclay (supra). 
328  R v Batt (supra) 11. 
329  S 38(2); R v Lynn (supra); R v Black (CA 465/99 18 April 2000). 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1999/ca465.htm#Number1 
330  R v Butcher (CA 59/97 30 July 1997). 
 (November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1997/ca059.html#Number1 
331  S 145(2). 
332  Supra. 
333  S 145(3). 
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4 2 4 4  The Sentencing Act in practice 
 
As evidenced by numerous reported decisions, the matter of restitution is regularly 
aired in court. However, a table of statistics334 shows that sentences of reparation 
were granted in only 6,8% of all criminal cases during 1996: 
 
Offence Type Resulted in Reparation Did Not Result in Reparation 
  Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Violent 531 3.2%335 16045 96.8% 
Other against 
persons 
48 1.3% 3553 98.7% 
Property 11400 20.0%336 45467 80.0% 
Drug 21 0.2% 11587 99.8% 
Against justice 25 0.2% 13896 99.8% 
Good order 132 1.4% 9622 98.6% 
Traffic 678 1.1% 62720 98.9% 
Miscellaneous 299 1.7% 17083 98.3% 
TOTAL 13134 6.8%337 179973 93.2% 
 
 
Property offences are most likely to result in sentences of reparation, followed by 
violent offences. The statistics have remained reasonably stable and within close 
                                            
334  In 1998 the New Zealand Ministry of Justice released a report regarding the 
sentencing of offenders during the period 1987 - 1996.  
Ministry of Justice Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 1987 – 
1996 The Use of Reparation as a Sentence Ch 8. 
(August 2002) http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/1998/conviction/ch_8.html 
335  This was 3,7% in 2001. 
 Ministry of Justice Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 1992 – 
2001 Ch 6 Par 6.3 Table 6.8. 
(August 2002)  
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2003/conviction-sentencing-2002/ch-6.html#6.3 
336  This was 21,5% in 2001. See reference in previous footnote. 
337  This was 7.1% in 2001. See reference in previous two footnotes. 
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parameters.338 The report339 shows the number and proportion of convictions for 
each of the main property offences that resulted in a sentence of reparation for each 
of the years 1991 to 1996: 
 
  Number Resulting in Reparation Percentage Resulting in Reparation 
Offence 
Type 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Burglary 1515 1542 1635 1495 1430 1369 19.2 21.2 22.2 21.7 21.2 20.4 
Theft 2029 2178 2288 2243 2297 2290 14.0 14.8 14.8 16.3 17.9 17.1 
Receiving 
stolen 
property 
269 286 360 302 285 276 8.3 8.0 8.8 8.7 9.1 8.7 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Conversion 
337 333 321 392 370 363 10.0 11.6 12.6 14.7 13.1 12.8 
Fraud 3917 4415 3931 5253 5791 3992 21.9 20.6 20.2 24.2 26.2 18.6 
Arson 27 27 35 31 40 49 18.8 17.0 18.6 16.2 20.9 29.7 
Wilful 
damage 
2095 2070 2359 2710 2972 2818 56.6 57.3 57.5 55.5 57.4 58.1 
Other 
property 
420 357 399 427 374 243 10.4 9.3 9.8 10.6 8.8 5.6 
TOTAL 10609 11208 11328 12853 13559 11400 19.4 19.5 19.8 22.4 23.7 20.0 
  
 
The average for sentences of reparation imposed in respect of property offences, 
was thus around 20% for the period reflected. A later report340 reflects a slightly 
higher figure of 21.5% for 2001. 
 
The quantum of sentences of reparation during 2001 varied from 50 cents to $562 
301. Of the total amount of reparation imposed in 2001, 78%341 was in respect of 
property offences.342 
                                            
338  Ministry of Justice Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 1987 – 
1996 The Use of Reparation as a Sentence Ch 8; Ministry of Justice Conviction and 
Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 1992 – 2001. 
339  See previous footnote. 
340  Ministry of Justice Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 1992 – 
2001 Ch 6 Par 6.4 Table 6.13. 
341  $10,2 million of a total of $13,2 million. 
342  Ministry of Justice Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 1992 – 
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A sentence of reparation is seldom imposed on its own without some penalty. In 
2001 only 20% of reparation sentences were imposed without other sentences. Half 
of the reparation sentences in 2001 also had community-based sentences imposed, 
with reparation being most commonly imposed in conjunction with periodic detention. 
In 2001, 10% of reparation sentences were imposed together with custodial 
sentences, compared with 3% in 1992.343 Thus the perceived reluctance of the courts 
to impose sentences of imprisonment together with restitution orders is diminishing. 
 
Empirical research was undertaken to determine the reasons for the non-granting of 
reparation. The report summarises the reasons for the non-granting of sentences of 
reparation as follows:344 
 
None of the judges who participated in the study indicated that a lack of 
information was the reason why they had not imposed reparation. The major 
reason for non-imposition was because the loss had been made good or the 
property was recovered. No or insignificant victim loss arising from the 
offence, reparation not being sought by the police, the offender being given a 
custodial sentence, and the offender having insufficient means were other 
reasons which the judges gave for not imposing reparation. The insufficient 
means of the offender was mentioned most frequently during the interviews 
with the judges. (Emphasis added) 
 
The major problem thus appears to be the non-ability of the offender to effect 
reparation. 
 
4 3 Other legislation, bills and state-initiated programmes 
 
The issue of restitution is not limited to the “main” legislation discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs; in each of the four countries there are other Acts in terms of 
which victims of crime can also receive restitution from offenders. These enactments 
will be considered below in order to give a complete picture of the restitutionary rights 
of victims of crime in the respective jurisdictions. While some of these enactments 
                                                                                                                             
2001 Ch 6 Par 6.3. 
343  Ministry of Justice Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 1992 – 
2001: Ch 6 Par 6.3. 
344  Ministry of Justice Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 1987 –
 1996 The Use of Reparation as a Sentence:  
(August 2002) 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/1998/conviction/ch_10.html#10.8  
The Non-Use of Reparation for Property Offences 
See also: Ministry of Justice Spier P Conviction and Sentencing of offenders in New 
Zealand: 1987 to 1996 (1997). 
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might not often be implemented, they form an inalienable part of the whole. In 
addition to legislation, there are also certain state-initiated programmes reflecting 
policy regarding victims of crime. The fact that these initiatives have the potential to 
grow into sources of legally enforceable rights, is illustrated by England’s Code of 
Practice for Victims of Crime (which evolved from that country’s Victim’s Charter).345 
While the Victim’s Charter enumerated expectations of victims vis-à-vis the criminal 
justice system, the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime contains enforceable rights. 
 
4 3 1 South Africa 
 
4 3 1 1  International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act346 
 
The Act provides for mutual recognition between South Africa and foreign states of 
sentences and restitutionary orders.347 South African authorities may request the 
assistance of a foreign state in recovering a fine or restitutionary order made by a 
South African criminal court where the offender does not have sufficient local 
property to satisfy it.348 A foreign sentence or restitutionary order may be 
registered349 providing it complies with the following requirements:350 
 
? It must be final and not subject to review or appeal; 
? The court which made the order must have had jurisdiction; 
? The person against whom the order was made, must have had the 
opportunity of defending himself or herself; 
? The order must not be capable of complete fulfilment in the country in which it 
was imposed; and 
? The person concerned must hold property in South Africa. 
 
 
Once registered, a foreign order will have the effect of a civil judgment of the South 
African court where it has been registered.351 
 
As countries such as Great Britain352 and New Zealand353 have more comprehensive 
restitutionary legislation than South Africa, it is anomalous that foreign victims can 
                                            
345  See Par 4 3 2 3 (infra). 
346  75 of 1996. 
347  Ch 3: Ss 13 – 18. 
348  S 13. 
349  S 17. 
350  S 15(1). 
351  S 17. 
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obtain better restitution from offenders with property in South Africa than South 
African victims. 
 
4 3 1 2  Correctional Services Act354 
 
Chapter VI of this Act deals with community corrections. In terms of section 1, the 
term refers to “all non-custodial measures and forms of supervision applicable to 
persons who are subject to such measures and supervision in the community”355 
controlled by the Department of Correctional Services. The principle objective of 
community corrections is to enable persons “to lead a socially responsible and crime-
free life during the period of their sentence and in future,”356 while ensuring the safety 
of the community. 
 
Section 52 of the Act deals with conditions which may be ordered in conjunction with 
community corrections. The court, the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board or 
the Commissioner of Correctional Services may stipulate that the offender, inter alia: 
 
? Pays damages to victims;357 
? Participates in mediation between victim and offender or in family group 
conferencing;358 and/or 
? Contributes financially towards the cost of the community corrections to which 
he or she has been subjected.359 
 
Though various conditions360 may be imposed concurrently, section 52(2) sets out 
certain restrictions on the concurrent imposition of conditions. Parole – including day 
                                                                                                                             
352  See generally Par 4 2 2 (supra). 
353  See generally Par 4 2 4 (supra). 
354  111 of 1998. 
355  In terms of s 51 of the Act, community corrections applies to:  
Persons who are under correctional supervision in terms of the Criminal 
Procedure Act; 
Prisoners granted temporary leave; 
Prisoners on day parole; 
Prisoners on parole; and 
Persons who are placed under the supervision of a correctional official in 
terms of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
356  S 50(1). 
357  S 52(1)(e). Compensation has the meaning of restitution as the latter term is used in 
this research. See Ch 1 Par 1 3 1 (supra). 
358  S 52(1)(g). 
359  S 52(1)(h). 
360  S 52(1)(a) – 52(1)(q) enumerates the various possible conditions. This discussion 
limits itself to conditions relevant to restitution. 
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parole – may not be conditional on compensation (restitution), unless compensation 
(restitution) was part of the original sentence.361 Compensation (restitution) cannot be 
imposed as a condition in cases of supervision by a correctional officer where such 
supervision is ordered in conjunction with or in lieu of bail – this applies equally to the 
other two conditions bulleted in the previous paragraph.362 Compensation (restitution) 
cannot be a condition where temporary leave is granted – this applies equally to the 
second, but not the third condition bulleted in the previous paragraph.363 
 
A person ordered to pay compensation (restitution) and/or to make a contribution to 
the costs of the community corrections must provide the Commissioner with a 
statement of personal income and expenditure. The Commissioner will determine the 
contribution which the person is to pay to the costs of the community corrections and 
can adjust the amount. A person ordered to pay compensation (restitution) by a court 
must submit proof of payment of such compensation (restitution) to the 
Commissioner.364  
 
If the Commissioner is satisfied that a person has failed to comply with the conditions 
attached to his or her community corrections, the Commissioner may:365 
 
? Reprimand the person: 
? Instruct the person to appear before the court, the Correctional Supervision 
and Parole Board or other body which ordered the community corrections; 
? Issue a warrant for the arrest of the person. Within forty-eight hours of arrest 
the person will have to be brought before a court which will make an order as 
to his or her further detention.366 
 
The Commissioner may also apply to the court, the Correctional Supervision and 
Parole Board or other body which ordered the community corrections for a change in 
the conditions imposed, where circumstances dictate this.367 
 
When a court has ordered the payment of victim compensation (restitution) and it is 
not paid directly into court, the correctional official will order payment as a condition 
                                            
361  S 52(2)(a) and 52(2)(c). 
362  S 52(2)(b).  
363  S 52(2)(d).  
364  S 63. 
365  S 70(1). 
366  S 70(2)(b). 
367  S 71. 
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of correctional supervision. Agreement is to be reached between the official and the 
person liable as to whether the amount will be paid in a lump sum or in instalments, 
taking into account all relevant factors. In the case of instalments, the period may not 
exceed three years. The Department of Correctional Services is responsible for 
notifying the victim of the arrangements. Payment is effected by the offender directly 
to the victim, but can also be effected at the Community Corrections Office. Non-
payment amounts to a contravention of the conditions of supervision. When the full 
amount has been paid, the court ordering the payment has to be informed in writing. 
Should the period of correctional supervision elapse before full payment has taken 
place, the victim has to be informed and requested to deal with the matter personally 
in future. The court must also be informed in writing.368 
 
The question arises: To what extent are the provisions of the Act favouring the victim 
of crime applied in practice? In an interview369 with the Head: Community Corrections 
in Port Elizabeth,370 Mr W Coutts, it was ascertained that his department is currently 
administering only two cases of compensation (restitution) in terms of the Act. He 
estimated that at any given time his department deals with no more than four or five 
instances of compensation (restitution) out of a total of 800 cases of community 
corrections. The provisions of the Act regarding conditions relating to victim/offender 
mediation and the making of financial contributions by the offender towards the cost 
of community corrections are not applied because the structures to provide for their 
implementation do not exist at present. 
 
Regarding compensation (restitution), Mr Coutts said that in his experience the 
courts always make the order and it is not left to the Department of Correctional 
Services. This leads to difficulties where offenders lose their employment and thus 
the means to comply with the orders. This problem is compounded by the fact that 
the matter of restitution has to be finalised within a three year period. Much red tape 
is generated because matters have to be referred back to the courts for amendment 
of the original order (in bona fide cases) because the officials of the Department of 
Correctional Services cannot interfere with the terms of a court order. It seems that 
this problem would be resolved if the courts were more inclined to leave the matter in 
                                            
368  Correctional Services Regulation 152(c) (26 June 2000) 6 – 7 sets out the procedures 
summarised in this paragraph. This document is available on the intranet of the 
Department of Correctional Services:  
(July 2003) http://intranet.dcs.gov.za/border/engels/CSOB%207%20map-11.htm 
369  Held in his office in Port Elizabeth on 24 July 2003. 
370  The powers of the Commissioner of Correctional Services are delegated to various 
regional heads. 
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the hands of the Department, which has the means to assess the ability of the 
offender to effect restitution. This applies particularly regarding the structuring of 
instalments. In all local cases money is paid directly to the courts or the victim, and 
not the Department of Correctional Services. 
 
4 3 1 3  Domestic Violence Act371 
 
Section 2 of this Act obliges any member of the South African Police Service to 
render assistance to the complainant at the scene of domestic violence or as soon as 
possible thereafter and to explain (in writing and verbally) the remedies at the 
disposal of the complainant in terms of the Act. 
 
Section 4 provides for application for a protection order. The clerk of the court is 
obliged to explain his or her rights to the complainant. Not only the complainant, but 
also any person “who has a material interest in the wellbeing of the complainant”372 
may bring the application.  
 
Section 7(1) provides that the protection order may prohibit certain actions, such as 
committing any acts of domestic violence or entering a residence shared by 
complainant and respondent; provisions regarding the following restitutionary matters 
may be included in the protection order: 
 
? The payment of rent or mortgage instalments;373  
? The payment of emergency monetary relief. This has the effect of a civil 
judgment.374  
 
The court must make a decision even if there is other legal relief available to the 
complainant.375 
 
Section 8 obliges the court making the protection order to make a suspended order 
authorising the issue of a warrant of arrest in the case of non-compliance – which 
constitutes a criminal offence.376 
                                            
371  116 of 1998. 
372  For example, a counsellor, health service provider, member of the SAPS, social 
worker or teacher. 
373  S 7(3). 
374  S 7(4). 
375  S 7(7). 
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The fact that a protection order applies in perpetuity, and the possibility of the arrest 
of the accused before having the chance to put his or her case to a magistrate has 
raised questions regarding the constitutionality of a protection order.377 
 
4 3 1 4  Prevention of Organised Crime Act378 
 
The Act379 allows a court to deprive a convicted person of the proceeds of crime by 
means of a confiscation order380 and for a restraint order to be made in anticipation of 
the granting of the confiscation order.381 The purpose of a restraint order is to 
preserve property so that it might in due course be realised in satisfaction of a 
confiscation order. Section 26(1) authorises the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions to apply to a High Court, ex parte, for an order “prohibiting any person 
… from dealing in any manner with any property to which the order relates.” The 
remaining provisions of Part 3 confer wide powers upon the court regarding the terms 
of a restraint order. In particular, it may appoint a curator bonis to take charge of the 
property that has been placed under restraint, order any person to surrender the 
property to the curator, authorise the South African Police Service to seize the 
property, and place restrictions upon encumbering or transferring immovable 
property. It may also make a provisional restraint order having immediate effect and 
simultaneously grant a rule nisi calling upon the defendant to show cause why the 
order should not be made final.  
 
The Act creates the Criminal Assets Recovery Committee. The plight of victims of 
crime was not forgotten by the legislature when the Act was drafted: In terms of 
Section 68(c) the Committee has inter alia the duty to: 
(A)dvise Cabinet in connection with the rendering of financial assistance to 
any other institution, organisation or fund established with the object to render 
assistance in any manner to victims of crime.382 (Emphasis added) 
 
Confiscated and forfeited funds are paid into the Criminal Assets Recovery 
Account383 and disbursed to, inter alia, institutions that render assistance to victims of 
                                                                                                                             
376  S 17. 
377  Dicker L “The Prevention of Family Violence Act: Innovation or Violation?” 1994 De 
Rebus 212; Rutenberg v Rutenberg unreported CPD case (912/95). 
378  121 of 1998. 
379  Ch 5 which encompasses ss 12 to 36. 
380  S 18(1). 
381  Ss 25 and 26 which fall within Part 3 of Ch 5. 
382  Ss 65 and 68(c). 
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crime.384 The interests of the victim are also acknowledged in section 30 which 
provides that the court may allow a person to make representations in connection 
with the realisation of property if: 
? The person is likely to be directly affected by the confiscation order; or  
? The person has suffered damages or injury as a result of an offence or 
related criminal activity committed by the defendant. 
 
If such person has instituted civil proceedings (or intends to do so within a 
reasonable time) or has obtained a judgment, the court may order the curator bonis 
to suspend the realisation of the property for an appropriate period in order to satisfy 
the claim plus costs. The court may also make such ancillary orders as it deems 
expedient. This refers specifically to the instance where the victim has instituted a 
civil claim, but remains silent regarding the effect that a confiscation or restraint order 
has on the restitutionary rights of the victim in terms of section 300 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.385 
 
The relationship between confiscation and restitution came up for consideration in 
the Supreme Court of Appeal case of National Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Rebuzzi.386 At the request of the company from which the respondent had stolen 
money, the appellant had applied successfully to the High Court, ex parte, for a 
provisional restraint order. The order prohibited all persons from dealing with the 
respondent’s property and bank accounts. A curator bonis was appointed to take 
charge of them. On the extended return day the matter came before Goldstein J who 
set aside the provisional order.387 The judge was of the view that the legislature could 
not have intended a confiscation order to be made where there was an identifiable 
victim who had a claim for recovery of the proceeds of the crime. Otherwise the 
realisation of the defendant’s assets in satisfaction of the confiscation order would 
deprive the victim of the means of satisfying his or her claim:388 
                                                                                                                             
383  See s 63. 
384  S 69A(1)(b) read with s 68(c). 
385  See Par 4 2 1 2 (supra). 
386  Supreme Court of Appeal Case number: 94/2000. 
 Law Faculty of the University of the Free State 
(April 2003) http://www.uovs.ac.za/faculties/law/appeals/2311012.htm 
 See also Cowling M “Review of National Director of Public Prosecutions v Rebuzzi 
2000 (1) SACR 227 (W)” in (2000) 13 S A Journal of Criminal Justice 231; National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Mcasa and Another 2000 1 SACR 263 (Tk). 
387  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Rebuzzi 2000 2 SA 869 (W). 
388  Ibid 875 C – D. 
 142
(T)he proceeds of confiscation orders are intended by the Act to accrue to the 
State. It follows that if a court were to convict the respondent and were to 
make a confiscation order in terms of Section 18 and were to give effect to 
such intention, it would deprive the complainant of the benefit of obtaining 
payment of its loss … 
 
After noting that section 18(1) confers a discretion on the court concerned, the judge 
continued:389 
 
(I)t seems to me inconceivable that a confiscation order could be made in the 
present circumstances where PG Bison Ltd, a known complainant, is entitled 
to compensation or repayment of money stolen which far exceeds the total 
assets under restraint. It would be absurd to provide for the granting of a 
confiscation order which would deprive the complainant of compensation for 
the wrong perpetrated upon it. 
 
The judge concluded that the court was not competent to make a restraint order. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal did not agree with this view, Nugent A J A stating:390 
 
In my view Sections 30(5) and 31(1) make it clear that the legislature did not 
intend a confiscation order to be withheld merely because an identifiable 
victim has an equivalent claim for recovery of his loss. Not only do those 
sections recognise that a confiscation order might co-exist with a claim by the 
victim (which would hardly have been provided for if the legislature intended 
that to be avoided) but they provide the means to avoid the claims competing 
for the defendant’s property. Where the defendant’s property has not yet 
been realised section 30(5) expressly authorises the High Court to suspend 
the realisation until the victim’s claim or judgment has been met, and where 
the property has been realised. Section 31(1) enables the High Court to direct 
the manner in which the proceeds are to be distributed. There is no reason to 
think that a court that called upon to give such directions will not recognize 
the claim of a victim and order that it be paid before any moneys accrue to 
the State bearing in mind that section 31(1) expressly provides that it does 
not have a preferential claim. Thus the making of a confiscation order need 
not deprive the victim of the means of recovering his loss, nor is there reason 
to think that it will ordinarily do so. 
 
Both the intention of the legislature and the way in which the Act has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Appeal are sympathetic to the restitutionary 
interests of the victim.391 In fact, restraint and confiscation orders serve to protect the 
restitutionary interests of the victim as disposal of property is prevented pending 
finalisation of the victim’s claims. The provisions of the Act can be used to prevent 
disposal of the property in fraudem creditoris, the creditor and the victim being one 
and the same person in this instance. 
                                            
389  Ibid 875 E – F. 
390  Ibid [17]. 
391  In NDPP v Cook Properties 2004 8 BCLR 844 (SCA) [18] it was held that the 
objectives of the Act “transcend the merely penal.” 
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4 3 1 5  Child Justice Bill392 
 
One of the goals enumerated in the preamble to the Child Justice Bill is “to entrench 
the notion of restorative justice in respect of children.” Section 2(b)(iii) states as an 
object of the Bill “supporting reconciliation by means of a restorative justice 
response,” while section 1 defines restorative justice as “the promotion of 
reconciliation, restitution and responsibility through the involvement of a child, the 
child’s parent, the child's family members, victims and communities.” 
 
Chapter 6 of the Bill has the heading Diversion, which is the “diversion of a child 
away from the formal court procedures to the informal procedures established by 
Chapter 5.”393 Chapter 5 deals with preliminary inquiries. A preliminary inquiry must 
be held in respect of every child before plea in order to decide whether the matter is 
to be conducted in the courts or by way of diversion.394 A court trying a charge can 
also refer the matter for diversion.395 Diversion is seen as a tool to effect restorative 
justice. While restitution is included in the definition of restorative justice in section 1, 
it is not specifically mentioned in subsections 44(a) – 44(f) as one of the purposes of 
diversion, but subsection 44(e) does refer to “the delivery of some object as 
compensation for the harm” which amounts to restitution under a different guise. 
Section 45(3)(b) requires that diversion must “include a restorative justice element 
which aims at healing relationships, including the relationship with the victim.” 
Section 46(1)(a) places the burden on the Cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of the Act to “develop suitable diversion options.” However, section 47 
already provides for, inter alia, the following diversion options: 
 
? Symbolic restitution to a specified person, persons, group or institution. 
? Restitution of a specified object to a specified victim or victims of the offence. 
                                            
392  B49 of 2002. Website of the SA Government 
(April 2003) http://www.doj.gov.za/bills/childjusticebill.htm 
On 11 August 2005 the bill was still listed as being before the Portfolio Committee on 
Justice and Constitutional Development of the National Assembly  
Website of Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
(August 2005) http://www.pmg.org.za/overview/update.htm 
393  S 1. Various diversion initiatives have been operative in SA since the early 1990s. For 
a comprehensive discussion of diversion in the SA context see Wood C Diversion in 
South Africa: A review of policy and practice, 1990–2003 (October 2003) Occasional 
Paper 79 Institute for Security Studies. 
 (August 2005) http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/papers/79/Paper79.html 
394  S 25(1). 
395  S 59. 
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? Performance under supervision and without remuneration of some service for 
the benefit of the community. 
? Provision of some service or benefit to a specified victim or victims in an 
amount which the child or the family can afford. 
? Payment of compensation (restitution) to a maximum of R500 to a specified 
person, persons, group or institution where the child or his or her family is 
able to afford this.396 
? Where there is no identifiable person or persons to whom restitution or 
compensation could be made, provision of some service or benefit or 
payment of compensation to a community organisation, charity or welfare 
organisation. 
? Referral to appear at a family group conference or victim-offender mediation 
at a specified place and time. 
 
A child justice court397 convicting a child of an offence may refer the matter to a 
family group conference or for victim-offender mediation.398 These are known as 
restorative justice sentences. 
 
Passing of sentence can be postponed, or a sentence can be suspended for up to 
three years subject to conditions dealing with, inter alia, compensation (restitution), 
symbolic restitution or an apology.399 
 
Section 71 provides for the following forms of restitution in lieu of punishment: 
 
? Symbolic restitution to a specified person, group of persons or institution. 
                                            
396  Regarding who bears the responsibility to compensate the victim and a possible 
overlap with s 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act, NICRO raised the possibility of the 
victim fraudulently using both avenues to obtain double restitution. NICRO submitted 
that as a general rule restitution in monetary terms should be excluded as children do 
not have the means to pay victims and parents should not be held financially 
accountable for their children’s offending. Community service rendered to the victim 
as a form of symbolic compensation was preferred. 
Submission On The Child Justice Bill ( Bill 49/2002) 
NICRO (National Institute for Crime Prevention and the reintegration of offenders) 
(March 2005) http://www.childjustice.org.za/submissions/NICRO.htm 
397  Any court (other than a Children’s Court in terms of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983) 
dealing with a matter that has not been diverted. S 50(1)(a). 
398  S 65(1). For a discussion of a pilot project of victim offender conferencing in SA, see 
Dissel A “Restoring the Harmony: Piloting Victim Offender Conferencing in South 
Africa” Restorative Justice Online 
 (October 2005) http://www.restorativejustice.org/resources/docs/dissel 
399  S 70. 
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? Payment not exceeding R500 to a specified person, group of persons or 
institution where the child or his or her family is able to afford this. 
? An obligation on the child to provide some service or benefit or to pay 
compensation to a community charity or welfare organisation identified by the 
child concerned or by the child justice court if there is no identifiable person to 
whom restitution could be made. 
 
Regarding responsibility for harm caused by a child while performing community 
service, section 83 provides for recovery of damages from the state by the person 
suffering the loss. 
 
The benefit of diversion is that it promotes the aims of restorative justice by: 
? Allowing the victim to express his or her views on the harm caused; and 
? Promoting reconciliation between the offender and the victim(s) and 
community.400 
 
Concerns have been expressed regarding the constitutionality of diversion 
programmes in cases of serious offences. It is contended that diversion could defeat 
the expectations of the victim in these cases, the exclusion of a full criminal trial 
derogating from the gravity of the offence. The possibility exists that diversion will be 
excluded in the case of certain (more serious) offences when the Act is passed.401 
This supports the conclusion that while restitution is important to victims of crime, the 
latter also have the desire to see the offender punished. 
 
On the other hand, the concern has been expressed that, by diverting children away 
form the criminal justice system, “we also remove them from a system with finely-
tuned procedural safeguards.”402 This echoes one of the major criticisms of 
restorative justice.403 It is thus important that careful consideration be given to the 
                                            
400  Gallinetti J “The Child Justice Bill – Children in Conflict with the Law” May 2002  
LRG News and Views for Magistrates. 
(July 2003) http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/lrgru/newslets/2002-may/childjus.htm 
401  Odongo G O “Public Hearings by the Justice and Constitutional Development 
 Portfolio Committee on the Child Justice Bill” (2003) 5/1 Article 40 2. 
(July 2003) http://www.childjustice.org.za/downloads/Article_40_march_2003.pdf 
402  Skelton A “Setting Standards for Diversion”  June 2001 Cyc-Online 
 (July 2003) http://www.cyc-net.org/cyc-online/cycol-0601-skelton.html  
403  See Ch 2 Par 2 3 2 (supra). 
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structuring of the diversion system in order to ensure its credibility and efficacy. The 
inference is that the balance between victim and offender rights will have to be 
carefully maintained if the policies of restorative justice are to be successfully 
integrated into the criminal justice system. 
 
4 3 1 6  Victims’ Charter404 
 
The government initiated the Victim Empowerment Programme – as part of the 
National Crime Prevention Strategy – in response to the problem of victimisation. In 
May 1996 a document was drawn up by an Interdepartmental Strategy Team, 
emphasising the plight of the victim, adhering to a broadly restorative justice 
strategy.405 
 
By August 2001, the Draft Victims’ Charter had been developed in consultation with 
various parties.406 Subsequently the Service Charter for Victims of Crime (Victims’ 
Charter)407 was finalised, receiving Cabinet approval on 1 December 2004.408 It is 
accompanied by a subsidiary document, the Minimum Standards on Services for 
Victims of Crime,409 with the following headings: 
 
? Part I – Your rights as a victim of crime; 
? Part II – The processes and responsibilities of the relevant departmental role-
players within the criminal justice system; 
? Part III – Minimum standards on services for victims of crime; and 
? Part IV – Complaint mechanisms. 
 
                                            
404  Drafted by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
(May 2002) http://www.doj.gov.za/info/victimcharter2001.htm 
405  The Interdepartmental Strategy Team consisted of representatives from the 
Departments of Correctional Services, Defence, Intelligence, Safety and Security, 
Justice and Welfare. 
Department of Safety and Security: White Paper on Safety and Security “In Service of 
Safety” September 1998. 
(May 2002) http//www.gov.za/whitepaper/1998/safety.htm 
406  Including the SA Police Service, the Department of Social Development, the 
Department of Health, the Department of Correctional Services, the SA Law 
Commission and the academic sector.  
407  SA Government Website (December 2004) 
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/policy/vc/2004vc.pdf 
408  SA Government Website Press Statement: Cabinet approves the South African 
Service’s Charter for Victims of Crime (December 2004) 
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/m_statements/2004/2004%2012%2002%20prs_vc.htm 
409  SA Government Website (December 2004) 
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/policy/vc/2004vcms.pdf 
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In the Foreword to the Victims’ Charter, the Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development states that the document “is compliant with the spirit of the South 
African Constitution… and the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power”410 and adheres to the tenets of 
restorative justice.411 
 
The Preamble affirms the South African government’s commitment to “promote the 
rights of victims in compliance with international obligations under human rights 
instruments…”412 Thus Government acknowledges its obligations in this respect, as 
opposed to the view that international instruments create mere expectations. 
 
The Victims’ Charter acknowledges that the victim has: 
 
? The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for dignity and 
privacy; 
? The right to offer information; 
? The right to receive information; 
? The right to protection; 
? The right to assistance; 
? The right to compensation; and 
? The right to restitution.413 
 
Compensation is defined as “an amount of money that a criminal court awards the 
victim who has suffered loss or damage to property, including money, as a result of a 
criminal act or omission by the person convicted…”414 Thus the government refuses 
to address the issue of victim compensation as the term is understood 
internationally.415 In Part III of the Minimum Standards on Services for Victims of 
Crime416 a simple explanation is given of the meaning and effect of sections 297, 300 
                                            
410  SA Government Website (December 2004) 
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/policy/vc/2004vc.pdf 
411  See Ch 2 Par 2 3 (supra). 
412  See previous footnote. 
413  The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill [B50 -2003] in its guiding 
principles also refers to the importance of restitution by offenders “which may include 
material, medical or therapeutic assistance to victims and their families and 
dependants” [l (iii)]. 
414  Service Charter for Victims of Crime Par 6. 
415  See Ch 1 Par 1 3 1 (supra). 
416  SA Government Website (December 2004) 
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/policy/vc/2004vcms.pdf 
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and 301 of the Criminal Procedure Act.417 A duty is placed jointly on the prosecutor, 
the police, the clerk of the court and the presiding officer to inform the victim of his or 
her rights in terms of these sections. This therefore opens the door to the possibility 
of state liability for the omissions of the police, prosecutors or courts should the victim 
not be informed of his or her rights;418 this coincides with the approach of English law 
regarding the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime which is seen as creating 
enforceable rights (as opposed to mere expectations) and also prescribes the 
machinery for enforcing these rights.419 Whether the South African government 
foresaw the prospect of being held liable at law for the undertakings set out in the 
Victims’ Charter, is debatable, especially in the light of the state of the local criminal 
justice system.420 
 
The meaning attached to restitution “refers to cases where the court, after conviction, 
orders the accused to “give back… the property or goods that have been taken… 
unlawfully, or to repair the property or goods that have been unlawfully 
damaged…”421 in order to restore the status quo. Part III of the Minimum 
Standards422 brings the family and dependants of the victim within the scope of 
restitution and places the obligation on the prosecutor to inform the victim that his or 
her request can be enforced by the court.  
 
Thus the difference between compensation and restitution appears to be that while 
restitution refers to the actual return (and/or repair) of property, compensation refers 
to the payment of pecuniary damages. This somewhat forced distinction could signify 
a governmental attempt to avoid the internationally accepted understanding423 of 
compensation as being state-funded damages, while restitution refers to damages 
claimed from the criminal. 
 
While the Victims’ Charter has the laudable object of informing the victim of his or her 
rights in straightforward terms, it does not create any new rights, but rather focuses 
the victim’s attention on pre-existing rights. At the same time the Charter is worded in 
                                            
417  See Par 4 2 1 (infra). 
418  Similar to the situation in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 
2001 (10) BCLR 995 CC as discussed in Ch 3 Par 3 4 2 (supra). 
419  See Par 4 3 2 3 (infra). 
420  See Ch 1 Par 1 1 (supra). 
421  SA Government Website (December 2004) 
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/policy/vc/2004vc.pdf 
422  SA Government Website (December 2004) 
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/policy/vc/2004vcms.pdf 
423  See Ch 1 Par 1 3 1 (supra). 
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such a way that the implementation of a victim compensation scheme would slot in 
very comfortably in the environment which it seeks to create. Whether this will be the 
case, awaits the decision of the government. 
 
4 3 1 7 Recommendations of the South African Law Reform Commission 
regarding reparation 
 
The South African Law Reform Commission’s Report424 on sentencing in criminal 
cases includes a section on reparation to victims of crime. The following approach is 
followed in the Report:425 
 
An ideal system should be seen to promote consistency in sentencing, deal 
appropriately with concerns that particular offences are not being regarded 
with an appropriate degree of seriousness, allow victim participation and 
restorative initiatives and, at the same time, produce sentencing outcomes 
that are within the capacity of the state to enforce in the long term. (Emphasis 
added)  
 
The Report comments favourably on English legislation which compels a court to 
pass a direct sentence of reparation (restitution), as opposed to an order that merely 
has the force of a civil court judgment, as is the case under South African law.426  
 
Before making its recommendations regarding a draft bill, the Report makes the 
following a priori comments:427 
 
Accordingly, (the SALRC) now proposes a sentence of reparation that must 
be considered as part of the substantive penalty in every case. Such a 
sentence is a radical departure, as inevitably it combines elements of what 
could otherwise be recovered as civil damages with a criminal penalty. The 
commission recognises that, although reparation must be considered in all 
cases, it will not always be feasible to impose it. It will also require that courts 
show a degree of flexibility. Courts will be required to balance consideration 
of the means of the offender with the amount that would be regarded as truly 
reparative. In order to ensure this flexibility and to allow for jurisprudence on 
the subject to develop, the provisions relating to reparation are stated in 
general terms and the possibility is left open for a victim also to proceed civilly 
to recover any further amount that may be due. 
 
                                            
424  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) Project 82 
Report (2000) 5 – 6 (2 7 – 2 8). 
Website of the University of the Witwatersrand 
(April 2003) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/report/project82.pdf 
 This Report is separate from the SA Law Reform Commission proposals for a victim 
compensation scheme which will be discussed fully in Ch 5 Par 5 2 2 (infra). 
425  Ibid xix. 
426  Ibid 74. See Par 4 2 1 2 (supra). 
427  Ibid 74. 
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 Sections 37 – 40 of the draft bill deal with reparation.428 A sentence of reparation may 
be imposed for any offence and must be considered in every case. Restitution may 
be ordered not only for loss or destruction of property, but also for physical, 
psychological or other injury, and loss of income or support. Quantum in awards 
made by lower courts are restricted to the latter’s fine jurisdiction. In assessing the 
reparation that a person convicted may be ordered to pay, courts must consider the 
means of the offender as well as the appropriate reparation. A sentence of reparation 
enjoys precedence over a fine where the means of the perpetrator are limited. 
Reparation may be imposed on its own or combined with any other sentence, but the 
overall sentence must reflect the principle of proportionality. In cases where the 
amount of the loss exceeds the award made, an additional civil action may be 
instituted. Courts must also determine the time for and the method of making 
reparation. If the victim is not present when sentence is considered, the court may 
direct that the victim be notified that he or she may attend the proceedings. 
 
The court may enforce the making of reparation by allowing the accused to make 
reparation on conditions and in instalments. The court can order amounts to be 
deducted from the wages of the offender and paid over to the clerk of the court (or 
registrar) who may, subject to the approval of a magistrate or judge in chambers, 
vary conditions and instalments. Any court of equal or superior jurisdiction may 
reconsider a decision and replace it with a new order. 
 
The court passing sentence may issue a warrant authorising the attachment and sale 
of any movable property of the offender which is mutatis mutandis the same 
procedure as that prescribed by section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Act429 for the 
enforcement of payment of a fine; however, there is one important difference: 
Provision is not made for the sale in execution of the immovable property of the 
offender. The reason for this distinction is not obvious and is not given in the Report. 
The court is not given the authority to impose an alternative sentence of 
imprisonment at the time of sentencing. However, in terms of section 40 of the draft 
bill, the defaulting offender can be brought before a court and sentenced to any other 
sentence which the original court might have been authorised to impose, bearing in 
mind any partial reparation which has already been made. 
 
                                            
428  What follows is drawn from these sections, unless otherwise indicated. 
429  Supra. 
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Reparation includes both restitution and compensation.430 Despite the international 
trend to limit use of the term restitution to offender reparation and compensation to 
state sourced reparation,431 the draft bill uses the terminology as follows: “Restitution” 
refers to the restoration of property to its owner, while “compensation” refers to the 
making good by the offender of damage resulting from the crime. 
 
The use of the terminology “any victim” in section 37(2) indicates that the concept of 
victim is not restricted to the owner of property or the person directly injured, but is 
broad enough to cover a dependant432 of the injured or deceased party, as well as 
the victim whose personal rights – as opposed to real rights - have been negatively 
affected. 
 
Section 46 of the draft bill creates procedures to reveal the financial position of the 
offender to enable the court to assess his or her ability to effect restitution. Sections 
47 and 48 deal directly with the interests of victims. Section 47 places the duty on the 
prosecution to bring the interests of the victim to the attention of the court by 
furnishing the court with particulars regarding: 
 
? Damage to or the loss or destruction of property, including money; 
? Physical, psychological or other injury; or 
? Loss of income or support. 
 
The restorative justice derived victim impact statement is thus mooted in South 
African legal practice. If made, the prosecutor has the duty to bring it to the notice of 
the court.  
 
Section 48 provides that if a person has been convicted of an offence involving 
violence and is sentenced to an unsuspended term of imprisonment of two years or 
more, the court must explain to a victim of the crime, including the next of kin of a 
deceased victim, that they may inform the Commissioner that they wish to be notified 
of any hearing of a Correctional Supervision and Parole Board where the conditional 
release of such offender is being considered, so that they may make representations 
on the risks that such release may hold. 
 
                                            
430  S 37(2). 
431  See Ch 1 Par 1 3 1 (supra) and s 37(2). 
432  See also wording of s 37(2)(c) where “loss of … support” is mentioned. 
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Neser433 refers to the draft bill as heralding “a new era in sentencing in South Africa.” 
It radically extends the purview of existing legislation: 
? The concept of victim is extended to cover all persons suffering from the 
consequences of the commission of the crime; 
? The quantum of damages is extended to cover all damage (in accordance 
with the criteria of civil delictual law); 
? The machinery for enforcement of payment is extended beyond the force of a 
civil judgment; 
? The rights of the absentee victim are protected;  
? Courts are compelled to consider restitution;  
?  Courts are empowered to order restitution suo motu without having to await a 
request from the victim (as is the case with section 300 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act);434 
? The victim is given a role and relevance in the sentencing process by the 
introduction of the victim impact statement;  
? The victim impact statement serves as a vehicle to bring the degree of the 
loss suffered by the victim to the attention of the court;  
? The prosecution435 is also given the responsibility to bring the victim’s loss to 
the attention of the court by means of the victim impact statement; and 
? Legal machinery is created to protect the interests of the victim even after the 
release of the offender. 
 
However, the following questions arise regarding the draft bill: 
 
? Why does it not follow the precedent set by the General Law Further 
Amendment Act436 in authorising a court initially to impose a period of 
imprisonment to be served if payment is not effected?437 
                                            
433  Neser J “Restorative Justice – A New Dimension of Sentencing in SA 
 Courts” (2001) 14 SA Journal of Criminal Justice 46 51. 
434  See Par 4 2 1(supra). 
435  See also Neser J “Reformation of Sentencing in SA” (2001) 14 SA Journal of Criminal 
Justice 84 88. 
436  See Par 4 3 1(supra). 
437  Possibly the answer to this question is to be found in the stance of the Constitutional 
Court regarding imprisonment for civil debts. See Coetzee v Government of the 
Republic of SA, Matiso and Others v Officer Commanding, Port Elizabeth Prison and 
Others (supra). However, it is questionable whether this is, in fact, a case of a civil 
debt as s 40(2) allows a court to impose a sentence that may have been imposed 
after conviction, in cases where the debtor is in default of payment. 
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? Why is the immovable property of the offender protected from a sale in 
execution? 
 
4 3 2 Great Britain 
 
4 3 2 1  Policy  
 
Because the English government has generated a wealth of policy documents 
regarding the role of victims of crime, this paragraph deals with underlying policy 
considerations. Newburn438 identifies three periods: 
 
? 1960 – 1975: The development of the concept of victim compensation; 
? 1975 – 1980: The development of specific schemes to support victims; and  
? 1980 onwards: The institutionalisation of victim support and the greater 
involvement of victims in the criminal justice process. 
 
A certain tension has developed due to the perception that victim support can be 
unfair to the accused, for example, in cases where victim support crosses the 
boundaries and becomes the coaching of witnesses, and integrity has to be shown to 
both interests.439 
 
Criminal justice policy has been the recipient of considerable governmental 
consideration in England; various policy documents have resulted in the current 
situation as set out herein. While the criminal justice issues considered and the 
changes proposed have been wide ranging and not restricted to the sentencing of 
criminals and the position of victims of crime, the latter did receive their fair share of 
attention. It is these aspects that will be considered.  
 
The White Paper, Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead,440 appeared in 2001. It states 
that the criminal justice system must deliver justice for all and that one of the means 
of achieving this is to be responsive to the needs of victims.441 Regarding sentencing 
philosophy, the statement is made that “current sentencing policy is not transparent 
to the victim and society about the reasons for different sentences or their actual 
                                            
438  Newburn T Crime and Criminal Justice Policy (1995) Longmans, London. 
439  Easton S & Piper C Sentencing and Punishment – The Quest for Justice (2005) 180. 
440  CM5074 published February, 2001.  
441  Introduction Par 4. 
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content…Nor does the existing framework do enough to encourage reparation to the 
person victim or the community.”442 One of the means to prevent re-offending is seen 
to be the community sentence443 which should contain four elements, namely a 
punitive component, a reparation component, an offending behaviour component 
(addressing the underlying cause of the offending) and a proceeds of crime 
component (offenders should be deprived of the benefits accruing from their crimes). 
The reparation component could involve reparation to the victim or the wider 
community in cash or kind. Victims and the community ought to have an input in 
determining the form of reparation. The modernisation of the criminal justice system 
includes granting victims of crime a “better deal”.444 Bringing criminals to justice 
cannot be effected unless victims have confidence in the system. Revision of the 
Victim’s Charter445 would ensure that victims receive monetary restitution.446 Though 
courts already have the duty to consider compensation in all appropriate cases,447 
the problem remains that offenders fail to comply with these orders. The undertaking 
is made in the White Paper that the government will consider instituting a victim’s 
fund to ensure that victims receive immediate payment in terms of compensation 
(restitution) orders. It would then become the court’s duty to pursue defaulting 
criminals. It is pointed out that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme448 is 
extremely generous, having paid out more that all other European schemes together 
in the previous year.449 
 
Easton and Piper see the approach reflected in the abovementioned literature as 
evidence of the rise of “actuarial justice.”450 It is accepted that crime cannot be 
eliminated, but the risk must be managed optimally.  
 
                                            
442  Part 2: Par 2 65. 
443  Part 2: Par 2 70. The aspect of reparation (inter alia) was also stated in the Halliday 
Report, Making Punishment Work, published in July 2001 and had already surfaced 
in the Green Paper of 1988 (Home Office 1988a: Par 1 5). See Easton S & Piper C 
Sentencing and Punishment – The Quest for Justice (2005) 21. 
444  Part 3: Par 3 95 et seq. 
445  See Par 4 3 2 3 (infra). 
446  Other rights proposed for victims are to be treated with dignity and respect, to receive 
support, to receive protection, to give and receive information and to be granted 
transparent criminal justice process (Par 3 104). 
447  See previous footnote. 
448  See Ch 5 Par 5 3 2 (infra). 
449  Par 3 96 and 3 119. 
450  Easton S & Piper C Sentencing and Punishment – The Quest for Justice (2005) 22. 
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In September, 2001 the Auld Review451 evaluated the criminal court system with a 
view to improving the delivery of justice. Emphasis was placed on the interests of 
victims and the concomitant promotion of public confidence in the rule of law. The 
report dealt substantially with the structuring of the judicial system and recommended 
the codification of the criminal law with Codes of offences, procedure, evidence and 
sentencing. Chapter 9 of the review is headed Decriminalisation and Alternatives to 
Conventional Trial. The Review points out that restorative justice has a place at 
various stages in the criminal justice process (not just at the sentencing stage). 
Restorative justice requires the offender's acceptance of guilt, his or her informed 
consent to the process, his or her recognition of the harm perpetrated and a desire to 
make reparation for it, the prospect of his or her rehabilitation, some involvement of 
the community and – where an individual victim in identifiable – the victim's willing 
involvement in the process.452 Regarding restorative justice the Review concludes: “I 
recommend the development and implementation of a national strategy to ensure 
consistent, appropriate and effective use of restorative justice techniques across 
England and Wales.”453 
 
In July 2002 the government released another White Paper, Justice for All,454 in 
response to the Halliday Report and Auld Review, emphasising the importance of 
rebalancing the system in favour of victims, witnesses and communities. It proposed 
bolstering support for victims by instituting a new Code of Practice and a 
Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses. The rebalance of the criminal justice 
system in favour of victims proposed in Justice for All is criticised by Jackson as 
being a cover for the imposition of increasingly punitive penalties, risking injustice to 
the accused while granting little tangible benefit to victims.455 As an example, he 
quotes the proposed tariff of sentence discount for those pleading guilty which he 
says “can lead to victim anguish when victims feel that the full gravity of an offence 
has not been brought home to defendants.”456 
 
In January 2004 the Home Office published Compensation and Support for Victims of 
Crime, a consultation paper aiming to improve services offered to victims of crime. It 
                                            
451  Auld (2001) Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales The Stationery 
Office, London. 
452  Ibid Par 63. 
453  Ibid Par 69. 
454  Cm 5563. 
455  Jackson J D “Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal Justice?” (2003) 
30(2) Journal of Law and Society 309 311 – 312. 
456  Ibid 314. 
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proposed the creation of a national Victims Fund which, working in conjunction with 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, would ensure that victims could access 
a variety of appropriate support services. The consultation paper set out how 
resources could best be used to meet the needs of victims of crime and sought views 
on various proposals. The possibility was mooted of making offenders pay more 
towards the compensation and support of victims by placing a surcharge on criminal 
convictions. The possibility of allowing the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority 
to recover money from offenders was also raised. The issue of how to compensate 
those criminally injured in the course of duty led to the suggestion that this 
responsibility should be transferred to certain employers. This, once again, raises 
one of the questions central to this thesis, namely: Is there any sound reason for 
perpetuating the maintenance of separate state-funded schemes for compensation of 
victims of crime as opposed to victims of traffic and industrial misfortunes? 
 
4 3 2 2  Criminal Justice Act457 
 
This is a major Act consisting of 339 sections and 38 schedules, further developing 
the government’s commitment to restorative justice as set out in the White Papers 
Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead and Justice for All discussed above.458 The Act 
aims to re-balance the criminal justice system by granting greater rights to victims, 
even at the expense of those accused of offending. The restriction of the rights of the 
accused has proved to be controversial; an example is the admission of proof of the 
accused’s previous convictions.459 The Act also shows a shift in the attitude 
evidenced in the Criminal Justice Act of 1991 where the prevailing viewpoint was that 
criminals should “get their just deserts,” retribution and culpability underlying the 
sentencing framework. Under the current Act, rehabilitation and reparation have 
assumed more significant roles.460 The purposes of sentencing are set out in statute 
for the first time; they are: Punishment, crime reduction, reform and rehabilitation, 
                                            
457  2003. 
458  See Easton S & Piper C Sentencing and Punishment – The Quest for Justice (2005) 
178 – 179. The Restorative Justice Consultation Paper (Home Office 2003a) set out 
the government’s intention to produce Codes of Practice (see below) dealing with the 
provisions of the Act. 
459  Easton S & Piper C Sentencing and Punishment – The Quest for Justice (2005) 24. 
460  Easton S & Piper C Sentencing and Punishment – The Quest for Justice (2005) 88; 
Erez E “Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice through Victim Impact 
Statements” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in 
Criminal Justice (2000) 165. 
 157
public protection and reparation.461 Thus it seems that, on the one hand, proving the 
accused’s guilt has become simpler, while, on the other hand, once a conviction has 
been secured, more concern is shown for the rehabilitation of the offender than 
before. 
 
Part 3462 of the Act introduces the sentencing concept of conditional caution. A 
conditional caution provides for an offender receiving suitable treatment without 
prosecution. Reparative conditions can be attached thereto. Non-compliance can 
lead to prosecution for the original offence. The deciding factor in determining 
whether a conditional caution should be imposed – rather than prosecution or a 
simple caution – is whether the imposition of specified conditions would constitute 
appropriate and effective means of addressing an offender’s behaviour or making 
reparation for the effects of the offence on the victim/community. In terms of the 
Code of Practice463 dealing with the interpretation of these provisions, conditional 
cautions are associated with the aims of restorative justice. A case study conducted 
in the area of jurisdiction of the Thames Valley Police suggests that conditional 
cautioning delivers benefits to both offenders and victims. Most cautions led to 
apologies that were usually seen as genuine expressions of remorse accompanied 
by formal reparation agreements in about a third of cases; most of these reparation 
agreements were fulfilled. The majority of participants believed that restorative 
cautions helped offenders understand the effects of the offence and experience 
shame.464 
 
Section 201(2) creates further possibilities for imposing reparative orders, stating that 
an “activity requirement” accompanying certain orders – for example community 
orders and suspended sentences465 – can “include activities whose purpose is that of 
reparation, such as activities involving contact between offenders and persons 
affected by their offences.” The aggregate number of days of such activity may not 
exceed sixty. 
 
                                            
461  Part 12 of the Act deals with sentencing. Section 142 states that “the making of 
reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences” is one of the matters to 
be taken into account in sentencing. Section 177(a) provides for community orders 
that can contain an “an unpaid work requirement.” 
462  Sections 22 – 27. 
463  Brought into force by statutory instrument (S12004 – 1683) October 2004. Par 2 5. 
464  Office for Criminal Justice Reform website  
 (June 2006) http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/criminaljusticesystem12.htm 
465  S 196. 
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4 3 2 3  Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act466 
 
The Act calls into existence the office of Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses as 
suggested in the White Paper, Justice for All.467 It is the incumbent’s duty to promote 
the interests of victims and witnesses, and to take appropriate action to encourage 
good practice in their treatment. The Act also provides for the Secretary of State to 
issue a Code of Practice outlining the services to be provided to victims by persons 
having victim-related functions. The Code can also cover any other aspect of the 
criminal justice system. The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime468  is to be kept 
under review by the Commissioner. The Code lists individuals and organisations 
deemed to be service providers with whom victims may come into contact, and 
enumerates the obligations of such service providers. The Code sets out the services 
that victims are entitled to receive from criminal justice agencies; for the first time, the 
latter have legislated obligations in this regard. The Code provides for keeping 
victims informed about the progress of cases. Victims are granted, inter alia, the 
following rights by law:469 To receive information about the crime within specified time 
scales (including the right to be notified of arrests and court cases and clear 
information from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority on eligibility for 
compensation470), to be told about Victim Support471 and to be referred to it, to an 
enhanced service for vulnerable or intimidated victims and the flexibility for victims to 
opt in or out of services. The agencies bound by the Code of Practice are: All police 
forces for police areas in England and Wales, the British Transport Police and the 
Ministry of Defence Police, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Court Service, the 
                                            
466  2004. 
467  See Par 4 3 2 1 (supra). 
468  Promulgated in terms of S 32 of the Act. Available at (June 2006) 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_code.pdf 
 The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime replaced the Victim’s Charter of 1996 
(revised 2001 – 2002) in April, 2006. 
(Jun 2006) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-victims/victims/Victims-
rights/?version=1 
469  The necessity for adding legal force to the promises set out in the Victim’s Charter is 
discussed in Jackson J D “Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal 
Justice?” (2003) 30(2) Journal of Law and Society 309 319. 
470  According to empirical evidence the low number of eligible claimants actually being 
successful in their claims, is due to lack of communication of basic information 
regarding compensation schemes: Groenhuijsen M “International Protocols on 
Victims’ Rights and some Reflections on significant recent Developments in 
Victimology” in Davis L & Snyman R Victimology in South Africa (2005) 335 337. 
471  Victim Support is national charity which helps over 1 million victims and witnesses per 
year. Staff and volunteers based in 386 schemes throughout England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland offer information, practical assistance and emotional support to 
victims. For an analysis of its work see Reeves H & Mulley K “The new Status of 
Victims in the UK: Opportunities and Threats” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) 
Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice (2000) 125. 
 159
joint police/Crown Prosecution Service Witness Care Units, the Parole Board, the 
Prison Service, Local Probation Boards, Youth Offending Teams, the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Authority, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel 
and the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Provision is made for making 
complaints directly to the agency involved and thereafter to the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman. In the context of this thesis it is notable that the Code472 does not 
require services to be provided in circumstances where the crime is subject to 
investigation in terms of the legislation applicable to work related incidences – this 
underlines the distinction drawn between victims of industrial crimes and other crimes 
in the English system.  
 
One of the multiplicity of obligations placed on the police is to respond to requests for 
information from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority to enable a victim’s 
claim for compensation to be assessed with the most accurate information available 
at the time.473 
 
4 3 2 4  Victim Personal Statement Scheme474 
 
The Victim Personal Statement Scheme475 is an example of the current restorative 
justice trend to grant victims of crime an input in the sentencing process.476 It extends 
an opportunity to victims to enunciate concerns and needs. The Home Office website 
describes the benefits Victim Personal Statement as follows:477 
 
A victim personal statement adds to the information you have already given 
to the police in your statement about the crime. The victim personal 
statement gives you the chance to tell us about any support you might need, 
and how the crime has affected you… physically, emotionally or financially... 
 
In the Victim Personal Statement the victim is afforded the opportunity of, inter alia, 
informing the court of his or her restitutionary needs.478 The following information is 
conveyed to the victim: 
                                            
472  At 3.9. 
473  At 5.28. Concerning the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, see Ch 5 Par 5 3 2 
(infra). 
474  Home Office UK website: 
(June 2003) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/victimstate.pdf 
475  Launched on 1 October 2001 by the Home Office’s Justice and Victim Unit. 
476  See Par 4 3 2 1 (supra). 
477  See penultimate footnote. 
478  You should use the victim personal statement to give the police any information 
 160
If you want to claim compensation from the offender, you may need to 
provide supporting details or proof… The police officer will be able to give you 
advice about this. You would also need to provide proof if you claimed that a 
medical or social problem had been made worse by the crime. 
 
According to Miers,479 the Victim Personal Statement has superseded the role of the 
prosecutor in informing the court of the restitutionary needs of the victim. The idea of 
victims (and/or their families) having a say in the sentence imposed on offenders is 
criticised on the grounds that it undermines accepted norms of justice. The inclusion 
of victim input in the sentence imposed is the most controversial aspect of the pro-
victim movement and practice has shown it to have had little impact on the criminal 
justice system and victim satisfaction.480 Some writers state that a firm theoretical 
basis has not been formulated for victim participation in the adversarial criminal 
justice system.481 It is argued in some quarters that there is no clear reason for 
victims being given a role in the sentencing process as the therapeutic value to the 
victim, and the benefits to sentencing outcomes, have not been proved.482 Victim 
impact statements are criticised for allowing the subjective views of the victim to 
upset the dispassionate impartiality of the court and for creating false expectations 
                                                                                                                             
you did not include in the witness statement. You can say whatever you like in 
your personal statement. For example, you may want to tell us:  
if you want to be told about the progress of your case; 
if you would like extra support (particularly if you are appearing as a witness at a 
trial); 
if you feel vulnerable or intimidated; 
if you are worried about the offender being given bail (for example, if the offender 
knows who you are); 
how the crime has affected you if you feel racial hostility was part of the crime;  
how the crime has affected you if you feel that you were victimised because of 
your faith, cultural background or disability; 
if you think you will try to claim compensation from the offender for any injury, 
loss or damage you have suffered; 
if the crime has caused, or made worse, any medical or social problems (such as 
marital problems); or 
anything you think might be helpful or relevant. 
479  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK 7; Edwards I “Victim 
participation in sentencing: the problems of incoherence” 2001 Howard Journal of 
Criminal Justice 39 54; Erez E “Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice 
through Victim Impact Statements” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a 
Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice (2000) 165. 
480  Erez E “Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice through Victim Impact 
Statements” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in 
Criminal Justice (2000) 165 – 166. 
481  Erez E “Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim 
Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice” 1999 Crim L R R 545; Sanders A 
Community Justice, Modernising the Magistracy in England and Wales (2001) 448. 
482  Edwards I “Victim Participation in Sentencing: The Problems of Incoherence” (2001) 
40(1) Howard Journal 39. 
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which are shattered if the victim is not believed.483 However, the Home Office 
maintains that the Victim Impact Statement “is not primarily a sentencing tool”484 and 
that it is only one of many factors taken into account when sentences are decided. 
Erez expresses a balanced view:485 
 
The research suggests, however, that there is every reason to include, and 
no reason to fear, integrating a victim voice through victim impact statements. 
The VIS practice has demonstrated potential benefits to the justice system as 
well as to victims… With proper safeguards, the practice can also increase 
victims’ sense of control over the process… Accurate information on victim 
harm can enhance justice in adversarial legal systems, particularly in terms of 
sentence proportionality. 
 
 
4 3 2 5  National Association of Victims Support Schemes 
 
The National Association of Victims Support Schemes was founded as a result of the 
Council of Europe’s adoption of guidelines regarding victims of crime.486 The National 
Association of Victims Support Schemes states its raison d’être as follows:487 
The National Association of Victims Support Schemes is the umbrella 
organisation for Victim Support in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It 
develops policies for Victim Support's own services and for the treatment of 
victims and witnesses generally.  
The prime objective of the victim movement in England is to assist the victim rather 
than to concentrate on the rights of the victim. This indicates that English law already 
provides ample protection for the rights of the victim.488 
                                            
483  See Hoyle C Cape E Morgan R & Sanders A  Evaluation of the ‘One Stop Shop’ and 
Victim Statement Pilot Projects (1998) Home Office Research Development and 
Statistics Directorate 5 and sources quoted there. 
484  Victim Personal Statements Circular 35/2001 Justice and Victims Unit, Home Office, 
London. 
485  Erez E “Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice through Victim Impact 
Statements” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in 
Criminal Justice (2000) 165 179. See also Goldstein A S “The Victim and 
Prosecutorial Discretion: The Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982” 
(1984) 47 Law and Contemporary Problems 225 and Erez E & Laster K “Neutralising 
Victim Reform: Legal Professionals’ Perspectives on Victims and Impact Statements” 
(1999) 45(4) Crime and Delinquency 530. 
486  Maguire M E & Pointing J (eds) Victims of Crime: A New Deal? 1. 
487  National Association of Victims Support Schemes website 
(June 2003) http://natiasso03.uuhost.uk.uu.net/navss.htm 
488  Moolman C J “Victim rights in Anglo-American and continental European countries:  
What can SA learn?” 278. 
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4 3 3 India 
 
4 3 3 1  Police Act489 
 
In terms of this Act, an area may be proclaimed as being in a “disturbed or 
dangerous state or that, from the conduct of the inhabitants of such area… it is 
expedient to increase the number of police.”490 Provision is made for the cost of the 
additional police force to be borne by the inhabitants of the area.491  
 
Magistrates492 receive applications, hold enquiries and make orders identifying 
persons who have suffered losses493 as a result of riot or unlawful assembly and 
quantify the amounts to which they are entitled. Such orders also stipulate the 
payments to be made by the inhabitants of the area, but the State Government may 
exempt any persons or section of inhabitants from liability.494 The period for 
applications is limited to one month; the applicant must be blameless and is deprived 
of any further civil claim. 
 
Mundrathi495 refers to this as a punitive tax which is frequently the only effective 
remedy where offences are committed by large numbers of (usually indigent) 
offenders who are often not identifiable and not convicted. The concept of punitive 
taxation bridges the distinction between restitution and compensation: On the one 
hand, offenders – albeit en masse – effect restitution to victims; on the other hand, 
the term “taxation” refers to funds paid to the state, forming part of the fiscus.496 This 
form of collective responsibility for restitution is not found in the other legal systems 
canvassed in this research. The constitutionality of singling out a particular sector of 
the community for the imposition of a punitive tax is debatable. 
 
                                            
489  1861. 
490  S 15(1). 
491  S 15(3). 
492  S 15A. 
493  Physical as well as proprietary. 
494  S 15(5). 
495  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 148 – 
149. In the same context, Mundrathi refers to the Bombay Police Act (1951 (Bombay 
Act 22 of 1951)) which provides for the levying of contributions on a community where 
riots occur, or where participants in an unlawful assembly commit certain offences. 
Amounts levied are then paid out to the victims of the offences.  
496  The fact that offenders contribute the amount paid to victims is a characteristic of 
restitution; the fact that some non-offending persons also contribute, is a 
characteristic of compensation. 
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4 3 3 2  Probation of Offenders Act497 
 
The objective of this Act is “to provide for the release of offenders on probation or 
after due admonition and for matters connected therewith.”498 Courts releasing 
offenders on probation may order them to pay reasonable restitution for loss or injury, 
and costs.499 The reference500 to restitution being paid to “any person” means that 
dependants of the victim – or the latter’s estate – may receive restitution, and not just 
the victim personally. Payment can be recovered in the same way as a fine. A civil 
court subsequently trying a suit for damages has to take the amount paid in terms of 
this section into consideration when determining quantum. 
 
Mundrathi criticises these provisions as being “inadequate from the victim’s point of 
view,”501 chiefly because the making of the award is solely within the discretion of the 
court as to what is reasonable under the circumstances.502 
 
4 3 4 New Zealand 
 
Victim’s Rights Act503 
 
The Victims of Offences Act504 improved the rights of victims of crime, dealing with: 
 
? Treatment of victims; 
? Victims’ access to services; 
? Early information for victims of certain information; 
? Information about proceedings for victims; 
? Restitution of victims’ property; 
? Victim impact statements; 
                                            
497  1958. 
498  Preamble. In Ratanlal v State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444: (1964) 7 SCR 676 the 
court stated that the Act, “is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of 
reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the 
object of Criminal Law is more to reform the individual offender that to punish him.” 
499  S 5. 
500  S 5(1). 
501  Mundrathi Law on Compensation: To Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 95.  
502  The wording of the s is not peremptory. In 1997 the Government of Punjab 
considered amending the Act, but recommended to the central government that no 
amendments were necessary. Website of the Government of Punjab  
(March 2004) http://www.doitpunjab.gov.in/gprlaw.asp 
503  2002. 
504  1987. 
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? Non-disclosure of victims’ residential addresses; 
? Obtaining victims’ views on bail in certain cases; and 
? Notifying victims of the release or escape of offenders in certain cases. 
 
The Act505 created the Victims’ Task Force with, inter alia, the following functions:506 
 
? To develop guidelines to promote the principles set out in the Act; 
? To assess the adequacy of existing services available to victims; 
? To promote the distribution of information about services available to 
victims; 
? To consider further measures to assist victims; 
? To receive requests for financial assistance from community 
organisations working to assist victims; 
? To consider whether provision should be made, in cases where an 
offender is sentenced to make reparation, for the Crown to make an 
immediate advance to the victim;507 and 
? To make recommendations to the Minister of Justice on matters 
relating to victims. 
 
The Victims Task Force was legislated to expire on 31 March 1993.508 It acted as a 
watchdog over the criminal justice system and as an advocate for victims’ rights. At 
the time of its termination much remained to be done to address victims’ rights. 
Tighter legislation was recommended.509 
 
 The Victims’ Rights Act510 replaced the Victims of Offences Act. The changes 
brought about were:511 
 
                                            
505  S 12. 
506  S 13. 
507  Though this was never legislated further, it provides an example of the blurring of the 
division between restitution and compensation. 
508  S 16. 
509  “National Conference to provide stocktake on provisions for victims of crime” Media 
release of Health Studies Faculty Auckland University of Technology 2 December 
2002. 
(January 2003) http://www.aut.ac.nz/corp/newsrelease/?140 
510  2002. S 54. 
511  Ministry of Justice Victims' Rights Act 2002: A Guide for Agencies Dealing with 
 Victims of Offences (December 2002). 
(June 2003) http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/other/pamphlets/2002/victims-
2002/introduction.html 
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? It expanded the range of persons defined as victims by including parents and 
guardians of child victims and close family members;512 
? It gave persons not strictly victims under the Act input into proceedings;513 
? It mandated the provision of assistance and information to victims;514  
? It encouraged the holding of meetings between victims and offenders, in 
accordance with principles of restorative justice;515  
? It prohibited the disclosure of the victim’s address;516  
? It required a victim impact statement in all cases;517  
? It required that victims’ views on orders prohibiting publication of the 
offender’s name be sought;518  
? It provided comprehensive rights of notification to victims of the occurrence of 
specified events relating to the offender;519 and 
                                            
512  S 4. R v Peachey (CA 92/01 17 July 2001) 16 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2001/ca092.htm#Number1 
The Court of Appeal, acting in under the Victims of Offences Act, accepted a victim 
impact statement made by the mother of a victim as evidence of the impact of the 
offence on the victim (not the mother). 
513  S 14 provides that certain information can be given to a victim’s support person  
instead of to the victim personally if the latter cannot receive it or understand it. S 20 
allows the taking of a victim impact statement from a person who was disadvantaged 
by an offence (but who is not a victim) and from whom information on the effects of 
the offence could be ascertained. S 40 allows a victim to appoint a representative for 
certain purposes. 
514  Ss 7 & 8. 
515  S 9(1) states: “If a suitable person is available to arrange and facilitate a  meeting 
between a victim and an offender to resolve issues relating to the offence, a judicial 
officer, lawyer for an offender, member of court staff, probation officer, or prosecutor 
should, if he or she is satisfied of the matters stated in subs (2),  encourage the 
holding of a meeting of that kind.” 
516  S 16 prevents the disclosure of a victim’s address in a court of law except by 
 leave of the judicial officer which will be given only if the disclosure is directly relevant 
 to the case and its evidentiary value outweighs any prejudice to the victim’s rights. 
517  S 17 requires the prosecutor to make all reasonable efforts to obtain a statement from 
the victim regarding physical and emotional harm, damage to property and other 
effects suffered by the victim. 
518  S 28. There is a strong presumption in favour of open justice and the offender’s 
identity will be protected only in exceptional cases: R v Liddell [1995] 1 NZLR 538, at 
547; Lewis v Wilson & Horton [2000] 3 NZLR 546, at 558; R v Kealey (CA 63/01 31 
May 2001); (November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2001/ca063.htm#Judgment1 
R v Bain (CA 255/95 22 July 1996). 
(November 2002) 
http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=1995/ca255j.html#Number1 
519  Ss 34 – 39 are relevant: 
34. Notice of release on bail of accused or offender. 
35. Notice of temporary release from, or escape or absconding from, or death in, 
prison detention or home detention, of accused or offender. 
36. Notice of convictions for breaching release or detention conditions and of 
decisions on recall orders. 
37. Notice of discharge, leave of absence, or escape or death of accused or offender 
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? It provided for victim participation in certain decision-making processes.520 
 
According to the New Zealand Ministry of Justice the Victims’ Rights Act turned “…a 
number of directives for the treatment of victims into enforceable rights.”521 Officials 
are expected to treat victims of crime with courtesy and compassion and to respect 
their dignity and privacy.522 A victim or member of a victim's family who has welfare, 
health, counselling, medical, or legal needs arising from an offence should have 
access to appropriate services.523 Restorative justice meetings524 are encouraged.525 
These principles are guidelines and do not confer rights that are enforceable in a 
court of law though there is a complaints procedure.526 Depending on their nature, 
complaints can be addressed to:527 
 
? The person required to accord the right to the victim; 
? An Ombudsman;528  
? The Police Complaints Authority;529 or  
? The Privacy Commissioner.530  
 
A victim may exercise his or her rights under the Act, irrespective of whether anyone 
is arrested, charged or convicted of the offence in question.531 Law enforcement 
                                                                                                                             
who is compulsorily detained in hospital. 
38. Exception to s 37 once certain offenders no longer liable to detention for sentence 
imposed for offence. 
39. Notice of proposal to consider making deportation order and of hearing of appeal 
against deportation order. 
S 47: Victim may participate in process for offender's release from prison or release 
to or from home detention. 
S 48: Victim may make submissions on making of deportation order or offender's 
appeal against deportation order  
Ministry of Justice Victims' Rights Act 2002: A Guide for Agencies Dealing with 
Victims of Offences: Introduction. See Par 4 3 2 3 (supra) regarding the position in 
Great Britain. 
522  S 7. The heading “Principles guiding treatment of victims” includes ss 7 – 10. 
523  S 8. 
524  Meetings between the victim and the offender to resolve issues relating to the 
offence. 
525  S 9. 
526  S 10. S 50 provides that the Act does not give rise to a claim for damages arising 
from a breach of the rights contained therein. However, if that breach amounts also to 
a breach of rights for which there is an existing claim for compensation in terms of 
other areas of the law, that claim is not affected. 
527  S 49. 
528  In accordance with the Ombudsmen Act 1975. 
529  In accordance with the Police Complaints Authority Act 1988. 
530  In accordance with the Privacy Act 1993. 
531  S 4 which deals with the interpretation of the Act includes in the definition of offence 
“an alleged offence (whether or not a person is convicted of the offence) committed 
against the victim.” 
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agencies holding property for evidentiary purposes must, to the extent that it is 
possible to do so, return it as soon as practicable.532 
 
4 4 Comparison 
 
Firstly, a tabular comparison of the law dealing with restitution in the four countries 
targeted in this research will be given revealing differences and similarities regarding: 
 
? Principal legislation dealing with restitution; 
? Other legislation dealing with restitution;  
? Bills/proposals for legislation to promote restitution; 
? Other state-initiated measures to promote restitution; and 
? Reasons for the low number of restitution orders. 
 
 
 
                                            
532  S 51. 
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Principal 
legislation 
dealing with 
restitution 
 
 
Criminal Procedure Act 1977: 
 
 
S34: Restitution of stolen property – no 
application required. 
 
S297: Postponement or suspension of 
sentence conditional on restitution for 
patrimonial or non-patrimonial loss - not 
necessarily in financial form. 
 
S300: Restitution order (patrimonial losses 
only) effective as civil judgment releasing 
offender from further liability if not 
renounced by victim - application required. 
 
S301: Refund of purchase price to bona 
fide purchaser of stolen property out of 
money taken from offender. 
 
 
 
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) 
Act 2000: 
 
S1: Deferment of sentence pending 
reparation. 
 
S23: Youth offender contracts providing for 
financial or other reparation with consent of 
victim. 
 
S73-74: Reparation orders for young 
offenders providing for non-financial 
reparation with consent of victim in non-
custodial cases. 
 
S118: Courts imposing suspended 
sentences directed to consider separate 
restitution order - no provision for 
restitution as condition of suspension. 
 
S130-134: Restitution orders compulsory 
(no application is required and reasons 
must be given if not made) and 
enforceable as fines without victim losing 
civil claim:  
Financial and non-financial losses.  
Precedence over fines. 
 
S137: Parent/guardian of young offender 
can be ordered to settle restitution order. 
 
S148: Court can order: 
Restitution of stolen property (or of 
property obtained from proceeds thereof);  
Payment of its value out of money found 
on offender;  
Payment of damages to bona fide 
purchaser of stolen property (or person 
lending money on security thereof) out of 
money found on offender. 
 
 
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973: 
 
 
 
S357: Court order to effect restitution out of 
fine providing civil claim exists. 
 
S359: Order to pay costs (not losses) of 
complainant in non-cognisable cases. 
 
S431: Money ordered to be paid under 
Code recoverable as fine. 
 
S452: Court can make order for disposal of 
property at conclusion of trial – state can 
be liable if goods lost in police custody.  
 
S453: Order for restitution to innocent 
purchaser of stolen property out of money 
found on accused.   
 
S456: Order to restore possession of 
immovable property forcibly dispossessed. 
 
Sentencing Act 2002: 
 
 
S10: Court has to consider restitution 
offered when considering sentence. 
 
S32: Sentences of reparation compulsory 
(no application is required and reasons 
must be given if sentence not passed) and 
are enforceable as fines without victim 
losing civil claim (subject to provisions of 
Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Act 2001):  
Financial and non-financial losses.  
Assistance from offender’s family group 
can be taken into consideration. Sentences 
of reparation precedence over fines.  
Courts consider alternative sources of 
financial aid at disposal of victim. 
 
S33: Reparation report drafted by 
probation officer to assist court in 
establishing quantum. 
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Other 
legislation 
dealing with 
restitution 
 
International Co-Operation In Criminal 
Matters Act  1996: 
 
Provides for mutual international 
recognition of sentences and restitutionary 
orders between South Africa and foreign 
states.   
Foreign orders registered and have effect 
of civil judgment of the court where 
registered. 
 
Correctional Services Act 1998: 
Court, Correctional Supervision and Parole 
Board or Commissioner of Correctional 
Services may order restitution as condition 
of community corrections: 
Non-compliance can lead to enforcement 
of original sentence of imprisonment. 
 
Domestic Violence Act 1998: 
Miscellaneous orders protecting victims of 
domestic violence, including payment of 
emergency monetary relief.  Court making 
protection order must make suspended 
order authorising issue of warrant of arrest 
in case of non-compliance which is criminal 
offence. 
 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 1998: 
Recognition of restitutionary rights of victim 
when property is confiscated in favour of 
Criminal Assets Recovery Committee. 
 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003: 
 
Aims to re-balance criminal justice system 
by granting greater rights to victims, even 
at the expense of those accused of 
offending. 
Purposes of sentencing set out in statute 
for the first time: Punishment, crime 
reduction, reform and rehabilitation, public 
protection and reparation. 
Introduces conditional caution sentence: 
Provides for offender receiving suitable 
treatment without prosecution. Reparative 
conditions can be attached.  
Creates further possibilities for reparative 
orders: Activity requirement (which can be 
restitutionary) can accompany certain 
orders, e g community orders and 
suspended sentences. 
 
 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 
2004: 
 
Creates Commissioner for Victims and 
Witnesses to promote interests of victims 
and witnesses, and to take appropriate 
action to encourage good practice in their 
treatment.  
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime: Lists 
individuals and organisations service 
providers with whom victims may come 
into contact, enumerates obligations of 
service providers; 
Sets out services victims entitled to receive 
from criminal justice agencies that have 
legislated obligations in this regard for the 
first time. 
 
 
Police Act 1861: 
 
Contributions are levied on community and 
paid out to victims of offences of riot and 
unlawful assembly - punitive tax. 
 
 
Probation of Offenders Act 1958: 
 
Court releasing offender on probation can 
order payment of reasonable restitution for 
loss or injury, and costs, to victim. 
 
 
Victims of Offences Act 1987 and  
Victims’ Rights Act 2002: 
 
Law enforcement agencies and courts to 
return property held for evidentiary 
purposes as promptly as possible.  
Sentencing Judge must be informed of any 
physical or emotional harm, or any loss of 
or damage to property, suffered by victim 
and any or effects of offence on victim. 
Victims’ Task Force created to promote 
victims’ interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa Great Britain India New Zealand 
 
 
170 
 
 
Bills/ 
proposals for 
legislation to 
promote 
restitution 
 
 
Child Justice Bill 2002: 
 
Various provisions for patrimonial and non-
patrimonial restitution. 
 
South African Law Reform Commission 
Sentencing (New Sentencing Framework): 
 
Court must consider making an order of 
reparation, but has final discretion.  
Order not restricted to patrimonial loss. 
Victim does not lose civil cause of action 
where damages exceed amount of order.  
Restitution is favoured above fine.  
Court may issue warrant of attachment and 
sale of offender’s movable property. 
Victim impact statement introduced. 
 
   
 
Other measures 
to promote 
restitution 
 
 
Victims’ Charter:  
 
Promotes principles of restorative justice, 
but does not create new rights for victims. 
 
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime: 
 
Creates enforceable rights for victims in 
place of mere expectations. 
 
Victim Personal Statement Scheme: 
 
Provides victim with means to inform court 
of restitutionary needs. 
 
National Association of Victims Support 
Schemes:  
 
Develops policies for treatment of victims. 
 
  
Criminal Justice Assistance 
Reimbursement Scheme: 
 
Assessor considers applications for 
compensation for material loss caused by 
victimisation as a result of assisting in the 
administration of justice. 
 
Reasons for low 
number of 
restitution 
orders 
 
 
Lack of means of offender. 
 
Offender not identified. 
 
Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (S300): 
Courts cannot order restitution suo motu; 
 
Lack of means of offender. 
 
Difficulty of proving required elements of 
tort. 
 
High cost and uncertainty of litigation. 
 
Lack of means of offender. 
 
Offender not identified. 
 
Court fees are calculated as percentage of 
amount claimed. 
 
Lack of means of offender. 
 
Loss made good or property recovered. 
 
No victim loss arising from offence. 
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Magistrates’ courts are limited in amount of 
restitution; and 
Restitution orders are limited to certain 
classes of loss, leaving victim with no claim 
for balance. 
 
Secondary victimisation and traumatisation 
of victim. 
 
Civil court cannot accept record and 
conviction of criminal court as proof of 
facts. 
 
Problems in legal aid system. 
 
High cost and uncertainty of litigation. 
 
 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861: 
Person who has been convicted on charge 
of common assault and has complied with 
sentence, cannot be sued in civil court. 
 
Problems in legal aid system. 
 
High cost and uncertainty of litigation. 
 
Reparation not sought by police. 
 
Offender given custodial sentence. 
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4 4 1  Restitution: Similarities 
 
Taking action against offenders was originally left solely to victims who enforced 
offender restitution. The concept of the state – as opposed to the victim – taking legal 
action against the offender on behalf of the community was a subsequent historical 
development. Criminal law became a system protecting primarily the community’s 
interests, relegating the victim’s interests to second place. The latter approach 
marginalised the victim. However, the victim’s entitlement to the state’s granting him 
or her efficacious legal means to enforce restitution in respect of harm suffered was 
never denied. 
 
The main right of recourse at the disposal of the victim was980 the private law of 
delict/tort which does not constitute an adequate vehicle to ensure restitution. All four 
countries examined have criminal procedure legislation formalising the victim’s 
restitutionary rights, passed in an attempt to bolster the shortcomings of private law 
in addressing the issue of restitution. However, the promise of a cheaper, speedier 
solution to that offered by the private law of delict/tort has not brought about an 
appreciable improvement on rates of restitution. 
 
Courts are extending state liability981 vis-à-vis the victim in cases where criminally 
inflicted harm can be attributed to conduct982 of agents of the state. This evolution 
follows in the wake of growing interest in the individual’s human rights and restorative 
justice. 
 
In most cases restitution (in terms of common law and in terms of criminal justice 
legislation) does not effectively redress the harm done to victims of crime. Reasons 
for this are: 
 
? The lack of means of offenders.  
? Various practical difficulties in the justice system pertaining to 
obtaining/enforcing orders of restitution. 
? Strict adherence by the judiciary to the distinction between private law and 
public law.983 
                                            
980  And still is in SA and India. 
981  Regarding punitive damages, see Ch 2 par 2 2 (supra).  
982  The concept “conduct” includes acts as well as omissions.  See Snyman  C R 
 Criminal Law  51.   
983  The need for the strict distinction between private law and public law is being 
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International law urges countries to have legislation effectively providing for 
restitution. 
 
Restorative justice – which is widely adhered to – aims generally at the involvement 
of victims of crime in the sentencing process and has restitution as one of its 
foundations. 
 
4 4 2  Restitution: Differences 
 
The legal systems of South Africa, India and New Zealand developed in a colonial 
milieu, adopting westernised legal systems. However, all three countries 
acknowledge the validity of indigenous law. South Africa would therefore be following 
an established international trend, were it to consult customary law, with its heritage 
of ubuntu, in order to supplement its victims of crime regime.  
 
While England and New Zealand have absorbed the principles of restorative justice 
in their legal dispensations, this cannot be said of South African and India. South 
Africa professes to espouse the principles of restorative justice in principle.  
Restitution is legislatively better provided for in Great Britain and New Zealand than 
in India and South Africa.  
 
South Africa is the only country where: 
 
? The victim has to apply for an order of restitution; 
? An order of restitution is limited to patrimonial loss; 
? An order of restitution is enforceable merely as a civil judgment and not as a 
fine; 
? The victim loses the right to institute a civil claim for the shortfall left by an 
order of restitution;  
? A court can impose a suspended sentence on condition that the offender 
effect restitution; and 
? South Africa’s Criminal Procedure Act984 is pertinently criticised as providing 
inadequate means to enforce restitution for the reasons stated in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
                                                                                                                             
challenged by courts in all four countries. 
984  Par 4 2 1 2 (supra).  S 300.  
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Some of the most striking differences include: 
 
? India is the only country where a punitive tax can be imposed on a section of 
the community in order to address the losses suffered by victims of unlawful 
assemblies and riots; 
? In New Zealand the victim’s tortious claim against the offender is restricted to 
a claim for material losses as compensation for personal injuries is effected 
by the Accident Compensation Corporation; and 
? Punitive damages have virtually been excluded from the realm of victim’s 
rights in South Africa. 
 
Great Britain and New Zealand fulfil international expectations with regard to 
restitution, while India and South Africa fall short of these standards. However, no 
matter how well-drafted a country’s criminal justice legislation is, as a vehicle to effect 
restitution it has universally been proved to be ineffective in granting any real relief to 
the victim of crime.  
 
In the next chapter, state-funded compensation will be considered in order to 
compare the dispensations in each of the four countries for providing state-funded 
compensation to victims of injury – which is sometimes, but not always, criminally 
caused – and to consider compensation schemes for victims of crime, where they 
exist. 
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Chapter 5 
 
State-funded compensation for victims of crime 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
While this work focuses on the position of victims of crime, an analysis of the 
dispensation made for state-funded compensation of victims of industrial and traffic 
related injury is necessary despite the fact that such victims are not per definition 
victims of crime. This is borne out by the fact that New Zealand’s – highly successful 
– Accident Compensation Commission offers protection to all victims of injury without 
distinguishing in principle whether they are victims of crime or victims of other types 
of injury. As will be seen in this chapter, New Zealand’s system evolved from its 
industrial and traffic related dispensations. Thus it is deemed essential to consider 
the way in which states deal with all victims of misfortune if conclusions are to be 
drawn regarding the possible advantages and disadvantages of instituting in South 
Africa a system similar to that of New Zealand. 
 
Great Britain and New Zealand led the world in instituting comprehensive state-
funded compensation schemes for victims of crime.1 The Indian state of Tamil Nadu 
has a Victims Assistance Fund in terms of which the Tamil Nadu government 
provides limited compensation to victims of crime.2 South Africa has no victim 
compensation scheme, but the South African Law Reform Commission has compiled 
a report on the viability of establishing a victim compensation scheme. 
 
Various theoretical bases seek to explain why the state should accept liability for 
consequences suffered by victims of crime, including: 
 
? The legal liability theory: In terms of this theory, the liability of the state to 
compensate the victim of crime is based on the fact that the state has a duty 
to protect the individual against the commission of crimes and, by allowing the 
crime to be perpetrated, has neglected this duty; 
? The social contract theory: The state has a moral duty to protect the 
individual. The state thus accepts the responsibility to compensate the 
                                            
1  See Ch 2 Par 2 2 1 (supra). 
2  See Par 5 4 2 (infra). 
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individual victim for losses suffered on humanitarian grounds, but it cannot be 
said that the state has a legal liability arising from the commission of crimes; 
? The accountability theory: The state and the individual stand in a partnership 
vis-à-vis each other. The individual pays taxes and the state pays 
compensation to the individual should the latter fall victim to criminal action. 
The state acts responsibly by limiting the commission of crime to a minimum, 
while the individual acts responsibly in order to keep taxes to a minimum; and 
? The utilitarian theory: The victim who knows that the state will back him or her 
up when a crime is committed, will cooperate with the criminal justice system 
and even become involved in the combating of crime.3 
 
Internationally the social contract theory currently enjoys the widest support4 though 
in the light of recent trends reflected in the Constitutional Court judgment of 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another5 the question can be 
raised whether the legal liability theory is not more in keeping with current South 
African thinking. Carmichele’s case substantiates the view that the legal liability of the 
state is being extended for the acts of criminals vis-à-vis individuals. The Court’s 
declared reliance on the Bill of Rights to extend the common law to defend the 
individual’s right against the state for protection from criminal actions can be used as 
an argument in support of extending existing legal methods of redress or reparation 
when criminal acts have been perpetrated to include, inter alia, a victim 
compensation scheme.6 
 
 
                                            
3  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A compensation scheme for victims of 
crime in SA) Discussion paper 97 47 – 48. 
4  See previous footnote. 
5  2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC). See further Ch 3 Par 3 4 2 (supra). 
6  See Ch 3 Par 3 4 2 (supra). Although it will be seen that the Constitutional Court 
viewed the liability of the state as resting on a delictual basis (subject to the normal 
delictual limitation of a causal link being proved between the acts or omissions of the 
servants of the state and the harm suffered) reference to the English law in Ch 3 Par 
3 4 3 (supra) shows that English courts are not certain whether claims of this nature 
should be based on tort (delict) or constitutional law. If the latter view is accepted, the 
requirements of tort (delict) are not per se applicable and the approach could be 
adopted that the state is liable for allowing and thus compensating all criminal harm. 
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5 2 South Africa 
 
5 2 1 Legislation 
 
5 2 1 1  Probation Services Act7 
 
In terms of its preamble, the purpose of this Act is: 
 
(T)o provide for the establishment and implementation of programmes aimed 
at the combating of crime; for the rendering of assistance to and treatment of 
certain persons involved in crime… 
 
The Minister of National Health and Welfare8 may establish programmes dealing 
with, inter alia: 
 
? The assessment, care, treatment, support, referral for and provision of 
mediation in respect of victims of crime.9  
? The compensating of victims of crime.10  
? Restorative justice as part of appropriate sentencing and diversion options.11 
 
Restorative justice is defined as “the promotion of reconciliation, restitution and 
responsibility through the involvement of a child, and the child’s parents, family 
members, victims and the communities concerned.”12 
 
The minister has not yet used the powers granted to establish programmes for the 
benefit of victims of crime.13 Thus the Act confers the capacity to create structures to 
promote the cause of victims of crime, but these structures have yet to be put into 
place. As the minister is given the authority to establish programmes dealing with the 
compensation of victims of crime, the Act confers the authority on the minister to 
                                            
7  116 of 1991. 
8  S 3. Government Gazette No 15658, Notice No 81, Regulation Gazette No 
 5308 of 29 April 1994 assigns the administration of the Act to this minister. 
9  S 3(d). 
10  S 3(h). 
11  S 3(l). 
12  S 1. 
13  The Regulations (Notice No 1364, Regulation Gazette No 5372 of 5 August 1994, 
Government Gazette No 15895) passed by the minister in terms of S 16 of the Act, 
are procedural in nature and do not relate directly to the portions of S 3 referred to 
above dealing with victims of crime. The only other Regulations passed in terms of 
the Act (Notice No 82, Regulation Gazette No 5308 of 29 April 1994, Government 
Gazette No15658) deal with the date of commencement (29 April 1994) of the Act. 
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establish a victim compensation scheme. However, the concept of compensation is 
not defined in the Act and it is therefore not clear whether the term refers to state-
funded compensation or restitution by the offender. 
 
5 2 1 2  Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act14 
 
During May 2000 the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security 
System for South Africa – which became known as the Taylor Committee – was 
established to investigate a comprehensive, affordable system of social protection for 
South Africa. The Committee considered existing forms of protection provided by 
Government in the areas of health, labour and transport. The Report of the 
Committee was submitted in March 2002 under the title Transforming the Present - 
Protecting the Future.15  
 
The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act establishes the 
Compensation Fund, administered by a Compensation Commissioner.16 Employers 
contribute to the Fund on an annual basis. The main purpose of the Act is to provide 
for compensation in cases of disablement or death caused by occupational injuries or 
diseases endured by employees in the course of their employment.17 The Act18 
provides compensation to the injured employee who might have difficulty in proving 
the delictual liability of the employer or a third party, or generally in enforcing the 
claim, perhaps because the employee’s own negligence contributed to the injury.19 
The Act creates the possibility of compensation for victims of crime in cases of 
criminally inflicted injury.20  
                                            
14  130 of 1993. 
15  Website of the Department of Social Development 
 (April 2003) http://www.gov.za/yearbook/2002/social.htm 
16  S 15. 
17  See the objectives of the Act. 
18  And its predecessor, the Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941. 
19  Van Jaarsveld & van Eck Principles of Labour Law (1998) 389. The employee is 
entitled to compensation even if the injury is due to his or her own fault, but not where 
the accident is attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of the employee, 
unless the accident results in serious disablement or the employee dies in 
consequence of the accident and leaves behind a dependant, wholly financially 
dependant on the deceased: S 22(3); van Jaarsveld & van Eck: 391. 
20  An example would be where the employer criminally causes injury to the employee by 
acting contrary to a prohibition imposed by an inspector in terms of s 30 of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1994. In terms of s 30 an inspector may 
prohibit an employer in writing from continuing or commencing with the performance 
of a specified act and to prohibit in writing the user of plant or machinery from 
continuing or commencing with the use of such plant or machinery. Failure to comply 
with such an order constitutes a criminal offence. 
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The Act modifies the common law by providing that an employee or any dependant 
of an employee claiming damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease 
resulting in the disablement or death of an employee is limited to a claim under the 
provisions of the Act.21 The employer is indemnified from delictual liability in these 
cases, though third parties causing the injury or disease are not. This indemnification 
applies to claims based on an employer's vicarious liability for acts of employees and 
claims arising from the employer's own negligence and includes claims for pain, 
suffering and loss of amenities of life.22 As the Act provides for limited compensation 
based on the earnings of the employee, the amount to which the claimant is entitled 
is limited.23 No compensation is provided for non-patrimonial harm.24 In cases where 
                                            
21  S 35(1). 
22  However, an employee is not prohibited from claiming full common law damages 
 where the injuries arise from the deliberate wrongdoing of the employer. See Kau v 
 Fourie 1971 3 SA 623 (T) 620 - 630; Mphosi v Central Board for Co-operative 
 Insurance Ltd 1974 2 SA 19 (W) 22 A. 
23  Ss 47 – 64 (read with Schedule 4 as amended by Government Notice No. 292 
 of 21 February 1997, by s 36 of Act 61 of 1997, by Government Notice No. 554 of 
 30 April 1999, by Government Notice No. 73 of 4 February 2000, by Government 
 Notice No. 77 of 1 February 2001 with effect from 1 March 2001, by Government 
 Notice No. 68 of 1 February 2002 and by Government Notice No. 141 of 3 February 
 2003 with effect from 1 March 2003.) deal with the calculation of the amount of 
 compensation.:  
Temporary total disablement 
Compensation is payable in the form of periodical payments at the rate of 75% of his 
or her monthly earnings subject to a maximum of R8 784,75 per month.. 
Permanent Disablement 
Compensation where the degree of disablement is 30% takes the form of a lump sum 
made up of 15 times the employee's monthly earnings subject to maxima and minima of 
R98 430,00 and R18 885,00 respectively, proportionally reduced if the disablement is less 
than 30%. If the degree of permanent disablement is 31% or more, compensation takes 
the form of a monthly pension. The pension for total permanent disablement (100%) is 
calculated in the same manner as for periodical payments in respect of temporary total 
disablement. If an employee's permanent disablement is less than 100%, the pension is 
reduced proportionately.  
Compensation Where an Employee Dies 
The widow or widower is entitled to the payment of: 
  a lump sum the equivalent of twice the monthly pension to which the  
  employee would have been entitled if a 100% disablement occurred; 
  a pension equivalent to 40% of the pension to which the employee would 
  have been entitled, if 100% disabled. 
  Reasonable funeral costs to a maximum of R6 490,00. 
 Each child under 18 years of age is entitled to a monthly pension equal to 
 20% of the pension which would have been payable to the employee for 
 100% disablement, provided that the total pension payable to the widow or 
 widower and children does not exceed the amount that would have been 
 payable to the employee if 100% disabled.  
24  Such as pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life. The Recommendations of 
 the National Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Environment and Tourism’s 
 National Asbestos Summit held from 24 – 26 November 1998 in Johannesburg 
 required that compensation for pain and suffering should be included. 
 Available on Website of the SA Institute for Occupational Hygiene 
 (May 2003) http://www.saioh.org/Publications/AsbestosSummit.pdf 
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the employer was negligent, the Act25 provides for such increase in the normal 
amount of compensation as the Director-General of the Department of Labour “may 
deem equitable,”26 but this may not exceed the economic loss that the commissioner 
expects the worker to suffer.27 Though this still falls short of normal common law 
delictual entitlement, the element of fault is partially retained.  
 
Does the indemnification of the employer28 against delictual claims of the employee 
violate the employee’s constitutional rights?29 In Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading 
(Pty) Ltd (Minister of Labour intervening)30 the Constitutional Court decided that the 
indemnification was valid, holding that the provisions of the Act must be viewed as a 
whole, putting employees in a better position than they would have been in terms of 
the common law. The Act effects a particular balance as employees can claim from 
the Compensation Fund regardless of negligence, and employers are protected 
against employees’ claims, in return for contributing to the Fund.31 
 
The Taylor Committee identified the following major problems in the system:32 
 
? Large numbers of workers, namely domestic workers, the unemployed and 
workers in non-standard forms of work33 are excluded; 
? The (re)integration of the worker into the labour market is not prioritised;  
                                            
25  S 56. 
26  S 56(4)(a). 
27  S 56(4)(b). In the Committee Report compiled prior to the drafting of 
 Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future, it is stated that very few claims are 
 instituted for increased compensation: Department of Social Development  Report of 
 Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security System for SA (Taylor 
 Committee) Committee Report No 11: Par 11.9; Thompson & Benjamin SA Labour 
 Law: A Commentary on the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
 Act (1998) HI - 37. 
28  In terms of S 35(1) of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act. 
29  The rights to equality before the law, equal protection of the law, access to the courts, 
 fair labour practices and not to be unfairly discriminated against: Bill of Rights, Ch 
 2 of the Constitution. 
30  1999 (2) BCLR 139 (CC). Although the case was decided in terms of the interim 
Constitution, there is no material difference between the relevant terms thereof and 
those of the (current) Constitution. 
31  Supra Par 16. 
32  Department of Social Development Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future. 
Draft Consolidated Report. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive 
System of Social Security for SA: Ch 12 Par 12.1 113. 
(April 2003) http://www.welfare.gov.za/Documents/2002/2002.htm 
Benefits to workers who develop certain occupational lung diseases are dealt with in 
terms of the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973. 
33  For example the self-employed and independent contractors. 
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? Duplication of payments – “double dipping” – takes place due to a lack of 
linkage with other social insurance and social assistance schemes; and 
? The relevant statutory framework is fragmented and the benefit structures and 
entitlements are not uniform.34 
 
In addition, the administration35 of the system has been subjected to severe 
criticism:36  
 
? The Public Protector has been approached to conduct a formal inquiry into 
the office of the Compensation Commissioner.37 
? Inadequate or no grounds for refusal of claims are given by the 
Commissioner.  
? Medical practitioners’ claims are paid out more readily than those of the 
actual recipients.  
? Employers are reluctant to report injuries as this influences their risk ratings 
that in turn influence the amount of their contributions to the Fund.  
? The system favours higher income earners because the quantum of a payout 
is determined by income.38  
? There is a substantial backlog in the finalisation of claims.  
? On 1 February 2005 the Compensation Commissioner was suspended 
pending an investigation into allegations of management irregularities and 
bringing the Department into disrepute.39 
 
                                            
34  Department of Social Development Transforming the Present Protecting the Future:  
Ch 12 Par 12.2 Page 113.  
35  The word “notorious” is used to refer to the (poor) administration of the Fund.  
Department of Social Development  Report of Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive Social Security System for SA (Taylor Committee) Committee Report 
No 11: Par 11.12. 
36  Stein J “Workers Compensation System Failing” Business Day 15 March 2000. 
 (April 2003) http://www.bday.co.za/bday/content/direct/1,3523,579985-6078-0,00.html 
See also Report of Committee of Inquiry into a National Occupational Health and 
Safety Council in SA Benjamin & Greef. 
37  A review of records at the Workers’ Occupational Health Clinic in Woodstock, Cape 
Town, showed that of 22% of claims rejected at first submission, 15% were 
successful on appeal, a painstaking and expensive procedure for claimants who are 
usually poor, if not destitute. 17% of successful claimants, most of them dying of 
cancer, died before compensation was paid out. See source quoted in previous 
footnote. 
38  See also Jeebhay M F et al  Submission to the Committee of Enquiry into 
Comprehensive Social Security – 2001 Department of Public Health and Primary 
Care, University of Cape Town 23. 
39  Website of the SA Department of Labour 
(February 2005) 
http://www.labour.gov.za/media/statement.jsp?statementdisplay_id=9949 
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5 2 1 3  Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act40 
 
The Act establishes the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate gross 
human rights violations in order to make reparation to victims.41 Reparation includes 
“any form of compensation42, ex gratia payment, restitution, rehabilitation or 
recognition.”43 
 
Amnesty may be granted to a perpetrator.44 Thereafter the latter can no longer be 
held criminally liable for the act in question; nor can he or she be held civilly liable for 
any losses suffered by the victim. If the relevant deed was perpetrated during the 
course and within the scope of the perpetrator’s employment by the state, the state is 
also discharged from civil liability. Other organisations or persons are also exempt 
from vicarious liability.45 The constitutionality of this provision was confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others.46 Thus the victim is entitled 
                                            
40  34 of 1995. 
41  The Preamble to the Act provides for: 
(I)nvestigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of 
the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed 
during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the 
Constitution… the taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, 
and the rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity of, 
victims of violations of human rights (and) the establishment of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission… 
Victims are defined as those who suffered “physical or mental injury, emotional 
 suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial impairment of human rights” due to a gross 
 violation of human rights or as a result of a politically motivated act for which amnesty 
 has been granted and includes those who suffered similarly in order to assist such 
 persons. Dependants and relatives are included in the definition. See s 1. 
42  In this instance the legislature has used the word “compensation” to refer to a state 
 funded payment as s 42 (see the following Par in the main text) refers to the creation 
of a President’s Fund. 
43  Definition section. 
44  S 20. 
45  S 20(7). In terms of S 20(9) the granting of amnesty will not invalidate a civil judgment 
which has already been granted, but, in terms of S 20(8), a criminal prosecution or 
conviction will immediately become void. 
46  1996 8 BCLR 1015 (CC). Dugard (Dugard J “International Law and the South African 
Constitution” (1997) Vol 8 No 1 12 European Journal of International Law 77) 
considers this judgment disappointing from the perspective of international law. 
Robinson (Op cit 481) explores whether and when the International Criminal Court – 
and thus international law in general – might defer to national reconciliation 
programmes that involve amnesties. The author proposes a stratified system. In 
situations of transition from mass violence, involving large numbers of perpetrators, 
the International Criminal Court could accept a national programme whereby only 
those most responsible are prosecuted and low-level offenders are dealt with by a 
truth commission. National programmes whereby amnesties may be sought even by 
those persons most responsible for international crimes are least likely to be 
acceptable. While it could be in the interests of justice to accept a programme 
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only to the reparation offered in terms of the Act. The court’s ratio decidendi was that 
the process of reconciliation could not function in the absence of full amnesty, as 
perpetrators would not be willing to effect full disclosure while the threat of legal 
action prevailed. Regarding the indemnification of the state for the acts of its agents, 
the court held:47 
 
They could have chosen to saddle the State with liability for claims made by 
insurance companies which had compensated institutions for delictual acts 
performed by the servants of the State and to that extent again divert funds 
otherwise desperately needed to provide food for the hungry... They were 
entitled to permit the claims of… the poor… to be preferred. 
 
Didcott J relied on the fact that, while victims are not granted any legally enforceable 
rights, they are given a quid pro quo for their loss. The Act48 establishes the 
Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation to consider applications for reparation. 
A President’s Fund is established for the payment of reparation to individuals.49  
 
The Act provides for two stages in the reparation process:50 
 
? Interim Reparation; and 
? Final Reparation Measures. 
 
The Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation has proposed to the President and 
to Parliament a Reparation and Rehabilitation Policy that has five parts:51 
 
1 Interim Reparation; 
2 Individual Reparation Grants;52 
3 Symbolic Reparation; 
4 Community Rehabilitation Programmes; and  
                                                                                                                             
promoting accountability, blanket amnesties would probably never be accepted. See 
also van der Vyver J D “Truth Commissions, state sovereignty and an emerging 
international criminal justice system for the new millennium” 2000(2) Tydskrif vir 
Regswetenskap 5. 
47  Ibid per Mahomed DP (Chaskalson P, Ackermann J, Kriegler J, Langa J, Madala  J, 
 Mokgoro J, O’Regan J and Sachs J assenting) 1039 [44]. 
48  Ch 5: Ss 23 – 27. 
49  S 42. The Fund will receive money appropriated to it by Parliament and contributions 
from other sources. 
50  S 4(f). 
51  Website of the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation: 
(May 2003) http//www.doj.gov.za/trc/reparations/summary.htm 
52  The recommendation is that individuals who qualify receive an amount of between  
R17 000 and R23 000 per year for 6 years. No means test is applied. 
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5 Institutional Reform. 
 
A broad spectrum of reparation and rehabilitation is envisaged, going far beyond the 
payment of financial benefits.53 
 
While the provisions of the Act are not directed primarily at the compensation of 
victims of crime per se, in most cases the victims of human rights violations will ipso 
facto be victims of crime54 even if many of the deeds complained of occurred before 
the existence of the Bill of Rights. A single action can amount to a common law crime 
as well as being a human rights violation.55 
 
The dispensation comes at a very high financial and political cost to the state, and it 
appears that the government of South Africa has become reluctant to commit itself to 
the implementation of the recommendations of the Committee on Reparation and 
Rehabilitation. In addition to this, the working of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission has become the subject of political issues.56 
 
On 21 March 2003 the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
released.57 In the foreword the chairperson, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, expresses 
himself as follows on the subject of reparation:58 
                                            
53  See the website cited in the penultimate footnote for details. Benefits are divided into 
three categories, namely Individual Benefits, Community Benefits and National 
Benefits. Individual benefits are arranged under the headings: Issuing of death 
certificates; Exhumations, reburials and ceremonies; Headstones and tombstones; 
Declarations of death; Clearing of criminal records and Resolving outstanding legal 
matters related to violations. Community benefits are headed: Renaming of streets 
and facilities; Memorials/ monuments and Culturally appropriate ceremonies. National 
benefits are: Renaming of public facilities, Monuments and memorials and a Day of 
remembrance and reconciliation. 
54  The SA Victim Empowerment Programme defines a victim as “a person who, 
individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, 
emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their rights, through 
acts or omissions that are violations of national criminal laws or of internationally 
recognised norms relating to human rights.”  (Emphasis added). 
55  For example a politically motivated murder: Derby-Lewis and Another v Chairman of 
 the Committee on Amnesty of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Others 
 2001 (3) BCLR 215 C. 
56  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation for 
victims of crime and victim empowerment): Ch 3 39 - 40. According to the source 
quoted, the state could end up paying out R2 864 400 000 over a six year period 
(R480m per year) to about 22 000 claimants. There has also been friction between 
the government and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission – see “Betrayal of the 
victims” Mail & Guardian 7 June 2002 and sources quoted in Ch 2 footnote 62.. 
57  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of SA Report 21 March 2003 
 S A Government website 
 (May 2003) http://www.gov.za/reports/2003/trc/ 
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I regret that at the time of writing we owe so much by way of reparation to 
those who have been declared victims. 
 
This criticism of governmental tardiness is repeated in the Report of the 
Rehabilitation and Reparation Committee.59 The Report states that the victim has a 
legitimate expectation of reparation which is enshrined in the Constitution.60 A 
country has an obligation in terms of international law to provide for reparation for 
victims of human rights violations. Amnesty from prosecution and civil liability for 
perpetrators can be reconciled with a country’s obligations in terms of international 
law “only where the state has simultaneously furnished some mechanism of 
investigation and some form of reparation for victims.”61 Archbishop Tutu sees the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an example of the operation of restorative 
justice.62 
 
5 2 1 4  Road Accident Fund Act63 
 
The Road Accident Fund pays compensation for loss or damages suffered64 for 
physical injury or death wrongfully caused by the driving of motor vehicles. 
Patrimonial and non-patrimonial losses are covered,65 but not patrimonial damage to 
property.66 Payment for future losses can be made by way of instalments instead of a 
                                                                                                                             
58  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of SA Report: Foreword Par 3. 
59  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of SA Report: Volume 6 S 2 
 Ch 1 Par 19 – 24. See also Editorial “Tutu voices fears over apartheid prosecution” 
 Mail & Guardian 21 April 2006 (April 2006) 
 http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=269724&area=/breaking_news/breaki
 ng_news__national/ 
60  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of SA Report: Volume 6 S 2 
Ch 2 The Case for Reparation and Rehabilitation: Domestic and International Law 
 Par 6 – 7. 
61  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of SA Report: Volume 6 S 2 
Ch 2 The Case for Reparation and Rehabilitation: Domestic and International Law 
 Par 42. 
62  Foreword to Consedine J C Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime (1997). 
63  56 of 1996. In the case of accidents which occurred before 1 May 1997, the 
 provisions of the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989 are 
 applicable. See generally Daniels MMF – RAF The Practitioner’s Guide C-3. 
64  Plus taxed party and party costs – s 17(2). 
65  Unlike the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act. See above. In 
terms of s 17(1)(b) the loss or damage must have been “suffered as a result of any 
bodily injury to himself or herself or the death of or any bodily injury to any other 
person…”  
66  Patrimonial loss includes matters such as medical and hospital expenses, costs of 
medical aids, past loss of earnings and past loss of maintenance. Non-patrimonial 
loss includes matters such as pain and suffering, disfigurement, diminished earning 
capacity and loss of amenities of life. Prospective patrimonial loss is treated in the 
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lump sum.67 The Fund is financed from a levy on fuel sold and from loans.68 While 
the Act does not require a criminal act69 before the liability to compensate will arise, it 
is usually the case that the act which gives rise to the claim will be criminal in 
nature.70 
 
No compensation is payable unless the driver or owner of the motor vehicle would 
have been liable.71 Thus the principles of delictual liability, including the requirement 
of fault, are retained. Once the Fund has provided compensation the driver and 
owner are indemnified from liability.72 An action against the Road Accident Fund 
therefore replaces the common law action based on delict against the owner or 
driver.73  
Generally there is no limit on the quantum of the Fund’s liability,74 except for a 
R25 000 limit where the person was being conveyed75 for reward, in the course of 
the lawful business of the owner, in the case of an employee of the driver or owner in 
                                                                                                                             
same way as non-patrimonial loss. Daniels: E - 13; Guardian National Insurance Co 
Ltd v van Gool NO 1992 (4) SA 61 A 63 D - G. 
67  S 17(4). In such cases the Road Accident Fund can provide an undertaking in 
terms of which it guarantees to pay a future claim or part thereof. 
68  S 5(1). According to the Committee Report submitted to the Taylor Committee, this 
kind of financing is “unique in its kind world wide,” but the report does not recommend 
the replacement of this financing system per se. 
Department of Social Development  Report of Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive Social Security System for SA (Taylor Committee) Committee Report 
No 11: Par 11.22. 
69  S 17(1)(b) refers to the “negligence or other wrongful act of the driver or of the 
owner of the motor vehicle or of his or her employee in the performance of the 
employee’s duties as employee.” 
70  For example negligent driving, or the driving of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol. 
71  But for the provisions of the Act – s 19(a). 
72  S 21. S 25 does extend to the Fund a limited right to recover the amount 
paid out to the injured party or his or her dependants from the owner (or driver when 
the vehicle was being driven without the owner’s consent) or from any person whose 
negligence or other wrongful act caused the loss or damage when: 
the owner or driver was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug 
which was the sole cause of the accident and the owner allowed the driver to 
drive the motor vehicle knowing that the driver was under such influence; 
a person without a licence drove the vehicle and the owner knowingly 
allowed this; 
the owner drove the vehicle under the influence which was the sole cause of 
the accident; 
the owner provided the Fund with false information relating to the accident 
and the Fund was materially prejudiced. 
73  Da Silva v Coutinho 1971 (3) SA 123 A 139 E – F. This echoes the provisions of s 
35(1) of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act which 
indemnifies employers from claims by employees injured in the course of their 
employment. 
74  Unlike the situation under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act. See above. 
75  S 18(1). 
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respect of whom subsection 18(2)76 does not apply, in the course of his or her 
employment or for the purposes of a lift club. The passenger may proceed against 
the driver personally (in terms of the common law) for the amount in excess of 
R25 000.77  
 
In Tsotetsi v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd.78 the Constitutional Court 
considered the constitutionality of similar measures limiting the amount of the Fund’s 
liability in terms of the previous Act. The validity of these limitations was considered 
in the light of the right to equality before the law under the interim Constitution.79 The 
accident having occurred before the commencement date of the interim Constitution, 
the court declined to give an answer to the question of constitutionality, simply basing 
its decision on the rule of interpretation that it is presumed that new legislation does 
not affect existing rights unless this is expressly indicated. Regarding accidents 
occurring after the commencement of the Constitution, the court stated obiter:80 
 
But the effect of declaring the impugned provisions invalid would have such 
an inordinate effect on the financial structure of the Fund that it may be that 
those interests of justice would be outweighed. That may well have been the 
case even if the accident had occurred after the Constitution came into 
operation. 
 
The ratio decidendi of the Constitutional Court in Jooste v Score Supermarket 
Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister of Labour intervening)81 indicates that this limitation would 
not be found unconstitutional. 
 
The Fund’s liability is excluded completely with regard to82 a person conveyed for 
reward on a motor cycle and a passenger who is a member of the driver’s household 
(or responsible for the latter’s maintenance). 
 
                                            
76  This refers to overlapping coverage provided by the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act. Subs 18(2) limits the amount payable by the Road 
Accident Fund to the difference between R25 000 and the amount payable in terms of 
the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act. 
77  For criticism of this provision see: Department of Transport Second Draft White 
 Paper on the Road Accident Fund (1997) Par 22  
S A Government website 
(April 2003) http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/white_papers/mmf.html 
78  1996 (11) BCLR 1439 CC. 
79  Supra. S 8(1) of the interim Constitution. 
80  1443 [10] per O’Regan J, delivering the unanimous judgment. 
81  Supra. 
82  S 19(b). S 19(e) deprives claimants of the right to compensation if they refuse to give 
the Fund their cooperation in the investigation of the claim. 
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Where the claimant is also entitled to a claim in terms of the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, this amount has to be deducted from the 
claim against the Road Accident Fund, unless the latter claim relates to sentimental 
damages and thus not compensated under the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act.83 
 
A presidential commission of inquiry was convened to deal with certain problems 
surrounding the Fund.84 The Minister of Transport identified these problems as 
follows:85 
  
It currently has an accumulated deficit of R7,2 billion despite three increases 
in income from the petrol levy over the past 18 months as there is a financial 
mismatch between premium income and benefits.  
Six other major problems identified in the Fund have been:  
High settlement costs taking up 20,2% of available expenditure (of which 
75% was in legal costs alone) compared to 18,3% on medical expenses and 
19,3% for loss of earnings;  
Settlement delays of between 34 months and 46 months on average;  
A cap of R25 000 for a passenger in a crash;  
General damages for sentimental (i e non-financial) losses that account for 
28% of claims expenditure;  
Benefits to dependents that were not apportioned even when the deceased 
breadwinner was almost wholly to blame for the accident which resulted in 
the breadwinner's own death; and  
Our high road crash rate (almost 10 000 people are killed and  
50 000 seriously injured in approximately 500 000 accidents every year).  
 
The Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005 (which will come into operation 
by Proclamation) legislates the following amendments: 
? General damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life will 
be restricted to those victims who have suffered serious injury; 
                                            
83  See Department of Social Development  Report of Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive Social Security System for SA (Taylor Committee) Committee Report 
No 11: Par 11.23.1. 
84  The commission of inquiry was chaired by Judge Kathleen Satchwell. 
85  Announcement of Minister of Transport, Mac Maharaj  Presidential Commission of 
Inquiry on Road Accident Fund 21 May 1999:  
(April 2003) http//www:polity.org.za/govdocs/pr/1999/pr0521a.html 
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? All claims for loss of income as a result of the victim being unable to work 
as a result of injuries will be payable in instalments and capped at 
R160 000 per annum; 
? All medical care will be restricted to state health care facilities or at state 
healthcare rates;  
? The right to compensation from the Road Accident Fund by any victim 
who is not a South African citizen or lawful permanent resident is 
excluded; and  
? The Act specifically excludes the right to claim from the person whose 
negligence caused the accident, the damages suffered or the shortfall 
between the actual amount of damages and that which may now be 
recovered from the Road Accident Fund. 
 
During the consultation stage of the Act parliament’s portfolio committee on 
transport86 labelled the bill as a temporary measure, stating that a total overhaul of 
the South African social security system was required.87 The constitutionality of the 
capping provision is the subject of large scale controversy.88 
 
As in the case of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, the 
Road Accident Act was considered by the Taylor Committee,89 which described the 
Road Accident Fund as “a public compensation/insurance system based on fault.”90 
The Compensation for Occupational Diseases and Injuries Act is not based on fault. 
While the Apportionment of Damages Act91 operates against someone claiming from 
the Road Accident Fund in respect of his or her own negligence, a passenger or the 
widow or other dependant of a fatally injured victim need only prove one percent 
negligence against the other party in order to succeed. The Committee Report 
compiled prior to the drafting of Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future, 
                                            
 86  Loxton L “Cronin rides over RAF's poverty plea” 7 September 2005 Business Report 
 Online (September 2005) 
   http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=561&fArticleId=2866810 
 87  Loxton L “RAF changes at end of long road” 8 September 2005 Business Report 
 Online (September 2005) 
   http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=561&fArticleId=2868513 
88  Hopkins K “Capping claims: Is it constitutional?” 2006 March De Rebus 45. 
89  See above. The authors of the Committee Report compiled prior to the drafting of 
Transforming the Present - Protecting the Future, relied on consultations with Judge 
Satchwell, but concentrated chiefly on social security issues: Department of Social 
Development Report of Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security 
System for SA (Taylor Committee) Committee Report No 11: Par 11.19. 
90  Department of Social Development Transforming the Present - Protecting the Future: 
Ch 11 Par 11.1 109. 
91  34 of 1956. 
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refers to this as being “in reality nothing else than faultless liability.”92 The same 
applies in respect of children under the age of 7 years, who are doli incapax. 
Consideration is given to the principles of delictual compensation and the conclusion 
is made that the delictual method of calculation of damages which seeks to place the 
victim in the position he or she would have occupied had the accident not occurred, 
is an “incomplete method of calculation (which) opens the door for speculation and 
disputes, unnecessarily costing the Fund money:”93 
 
When dealing with a Fund which cannot choose its risk and which is 
experiencing financial difficulties, it can be asked whether collateral benefits 
cannot be approached from a purely practical and functional viewpoint. If it is 
the purpose to place the accident victim in the same position (and not a 
better position) than before the risk occurred, one should perhaps merely 
require that an accident victim must disclose all State-provided benefits 
received from other sources than the Fund and that the amount paid by way 
of income-replacement compensation should be reduced by all such 
payments. This is a drastic deviation from the common law. (Emphasis in 
original) 
 
The recommendation is made that non-patrimonial damages94 should not be 
claimable from the Fund, in keeping with the model created by the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act.95 
 
The use of an undertaking to compensate a victim for future claims is seen as being 
preferable to the common law “once and for all” method of compensation as it 
prevents over-compensation96 and protects the victim from the inroads of inflation on 
a lump sum.97 
                                            
92  Department of Social Development Report of Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive Social Security System for SA (Taylor Committee) Committee Report 
No 11: Par 11.19.3.3. 
93  Department of Social Development Report of Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive Social Security System for SA (Taylor Committee) Committee Report 
No 11: Par 11.20.4. 
In the case of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, no 
amount is claimable for non-patrimonial loss or solatium. 
94  Or general damages. 
95  See penultimate footnote. 
96  For example, where the victim dies before using the money. 
97  Department of Social Development Report of Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive Social Security System for SA (Taylor Committee) Committee Report 
No 11: Par 11.20.4. 
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5 2 2 Recommendations of the South African Law Reform Commission98 
 
5 2 2 1  Structure of the report 
 
Discussion Paper 97 consists of nine chapters, its structure being summarised as 
follows:99 
 
? Chapter One: A broad introduction to the report and the issue of 
compensation for victims of crime. 
? Chapter Two: An overview of the violent crime situation in South 
Africa, which is considered essential to help provide the data for 
costing and assessing any compensation model. 
? Chapter Three: An overview of the debates concerning 
compensation.100  
? Chapter Four: An outline of the parameters usually applied in victim 
compensation schemes, which will need to be considered if a victim 
compensation scheme were to be established in South Africa.101  
? Chapter Five: The results of two case studies of selected police 
dockets.102  
? Chapter Six: Postulates various models and costings associated with 
establishing a compensation scheme in South Africa.103  
? Chapter Seven: Outlines the type of administrative structures that 
could be used to run and manage a victim compensation scheme. 
? Chapter Eight: Provides various options for funding a compensation 
scheme and the financing systems that may be involved if a 
compensation scheme were to be established. 
? Chapter Nine: Provides a list of recommendations emanating from the 
research. 
 
                                            
98  The SA Law Reform Commission was established by the SA Law Reform 
Commission Act 19 of 1973. The objects of the Commission are to do research with 
reference to all branches of the law of SA and to study and to investigate the law in 
order to make recommendations for its development, improvement, modernisation or 
reform. The Commission is an advisory body whose aim is the renewal and 
improvement of the law of SA on a continuous basis. 
99  5 – 6. 
100  This chapter analyses the motivations for and against establishing a compensation 
scheme for victims of crime, drawing heavily on international comparisons and 
experience. 
101  This chapter highlights the eligibility and ineligibility criteria that would need to be 
considered for any compensation scheme. These are based on various international 
approaches and best practice. 
102  The purpose of these docket analyses was to provide detailed information about 
 certain types of violent crimes, and to assess the usefulness of police information in 
 adjudicating possible claims for victim compensation. 
103  A number of models ranging from full compensation, through to more minimal or 
 targeted schemes are discussed and costed. 
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5 2 2 2  Motivation for a victim compensation scheme 
 
The following arguments favour the implementation of a victim compensation 
scheme:104 
 
? Victim empowerment on compassionate grounds builds confidence in the 
criminal justice system;105 
? State responsibility because the state has neglected its duty in allowing the 
commission of a crime;106 
? Restorative justice emphasises victim empowerment in the criminal justice 
process; 
? International law calls for greater responsiveness by states to the needs of 
victims;107 
? Difficulties in enforcing offender accountability is evidenced by the minute 
percentage of reported crimes that lead to convictions108 and the general lack 
of means of offenders; 
? The criminal justice system benefits as victim compensation schemes require 
that the crime be reported promptly and that victims cooperate with the 
police;109 
? The impact of crime on the state is reduced because possible financial 
reliance of victims on the state is prevented by helping them back to a 
productive status; 
? Victims’ psychological trauma is eased by the assurance that society takes 
their plight seriously; 
? The cycle of violence against women is broken by addressing their financial 
dependence, allowing them to leave abusive environments; and 
? The cycle of retributive violence and vigilantism is disrupted. 
 
The following arguments against victim compensation are submitted:110 
                                            
104  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 3 Par 3.3.2 47 et seq. 
105  The social contract theory. See Ch 2 Par 2 2 1 (supra). 
106  The legal liability theory. See Ch 2 Par 2 2 1 (supra). States are generally hesitant to 
accept this responsibility, relying rather on the social contract theory. 
107  See Ch 2 Par 2 2 1 (supra).  
108  5,4%, according to Issue Paper 97: Par 3.3.2.6 57. 
109  The utilitarian theory. See Ch 2 Par 2 2 1 (supra). For an economic analysis and 
justification of victim compensation and its positive effect on the reporting of crime, 
see Garoupa N “Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players” (2001) 2-
3 Economics of Governance 231. 
(April 2003) 
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/papers/1002003/10020231.pdf 
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? The cost to the state is high; 
? Various priorities compete for funding;111 and 
? Compensation schemes do not per se improve reporting of crime. 
 
The following views are expressed:112 
 
The persistence of victims’ negative perceptions and experiences of the 
criminal justice system, as well as the fact that their needs are not met, will 
undermine the legitimacy of the system and, in so doing, erode strides made 
in other areas of reform. Paying compensation will not bring back the loved 
ones of murder victims, but equally, catching and apprehending the criminals 
will not offset the costs associated with the loss of a breadwinner – without 
either, trust in the criminal justice system remains undermined. In this 
context, the idea of compensating victims of crime can easily hold its own 
next to a range of other needs in the criminal justice arena. At the very least, 
compensation has to be seen as a complementary component of victim 
support that is vital to the ensuring of the efficacy of the whole criminal justice 
system. 
 
 
5 2 2 3  Administrative procedure 
 
The following administrative procedure for dealing with compensation applications is 
proposed:113 
 
? Applications would be submitted to a central office on specially developed 
forms.  
? A cut-off date should be provided to prevent claims being lodged so late as to 
hinder consideration and investigation.  
? Provision should be made for the condoning of late filing.114 
? If exclusionary criteria exist,115 information attesting to the applicant’s status in 
this regard would have to be provided. 
? The application would have to include relevant medical information and 
evidence, with a medical practitioner or district surgeon’s report attached. 
                                                                                                                             
110  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 3 Par 3.3.3 63 et seq. 
111  For example, the payment of witness fees and the granting of additional financial 
support to trauma units. Discussion Paper 97: Ch 3 Par 3.3.3.3 64 – 66. 
112  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 3 Par 3.4 68. 
113  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 7 Par 7.2 176 - 177. The procedure is based on the British 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. See Par 5 3 2 (infra). 
114  Reasons for the delay should be given. It is envisaged, for example, that the late filing of 
applications by victims who are minors, have been hospitalised for extensive periods or 
even imprisoned would be condoned. 
115  Such as contributory behaviour or a previous criminal record. 
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? An affidavit from the investigating officer detailing the factual basis and status 
of the case, together with an assessment as to whether the injuries arose 
from a criminal attack, would be attached. 
? The application would have to be processed by administrative staff who would 
assess whether all the relevant documentation was in place, acknowledge 
receipt of the application and request the applicant to provide whatever 
additional information or supporting documentation might be absent or 
required. 
? Some portion of the applications would be analysed at this point to assess the 
presence of fraudulent applications. 
? The administrative officer would then assess complete applications and make 
recommendation to a senior assessment officer. 
? If the original application were incomplete and the applicant failed to provide 
the further particulars requested116 the administrative officer would 
recommend to the senior administrative officer that the case be closed, the 
applicant being informed of that decision in writing. 
? The senior administrative officer would review all completed applications and 
either request further information/evidence, or forward the application to the 
board for a decision. 
? Uncontroversial applications below a certain amount would be decided by a 
single board member, with decisions subsequently ratified by the board as a 
whole. 
? More controversial or larger applications would be motivated to the board by 
the administrative officer handling the matter. 
? After the board had made its decision, the applicant would be informed in 
writing as to the outcome. 
? The administrative team would complete the necessary requisitions, and 
instruct the financial office to make payments.117 
? In the case of rejected applications, the applicant would have the right to 
appeal to the board, and an appeal board would review the case.118 
? Decisions of the appeal board would not be appealable or reviewable. 
                                            
116  Within 12 months, provided that reasonable efforts had been made to contact the 
applicant. 
117  The payments system would require the signatures of at least three officials, and be 
 fully auditable. 
118  The applicant would be entitled to make verbal submissions to the appeal board. If 
 the appeal is founded on new information, or on the basis that the original information 
 used was incorrect, then it will be treated as a new application.  
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5 2 2 4  Funding 
 
Funding is a major issue.119 The following three sources of funding are proposed:120 
 
Donors Taxpayers Criminals 
 
? Grants from rnational 
and domestic 
individuals and 
institutions 
 
? Appropriations from 
Parliament 
? Dedicated taxes on 
goods and services (e g 
the consumption of 
alcohol or the purchase 
of firearms or 
ammunition) 
 
 
? Fines paid121 
? Bail forfeited 
? Proceeds of crime 
? Pursuing restitution 
orders on criminal 
conviction122 
 
 
5 2 2 5  Recommendations 
 
The recommendations123 are to be “read holistically and considered as inter-
dependant:”124 
 
? A comprehensive victim compensation scheme is not financially viable in the 
short term; 
? A number of areas are targeted for the introduction of compensation schemes 
over a period of three years, namely: 
o Persons disabled by violent crime;125  
                                            
119  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 8 Par 8.1 183: 
Nonetheless, for obvious reasons, the sheer scale of the financial implications of 
establishing a VCS will create difficulties for those who motivate for the necessity of 
such a scheme. In seeking to make the case for the establishment of such a VCS, it 
is, therefore, necessary that possible sources of funding be explored.  
120  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 8 Par 8.2.2 186.  
121  In its Report on sentencing in criminal cases, the SA Law Reform Commission 
favours reparation above fines where the means of the offender are limited. See Ch 4 
Par 4 3 1 (supra). If fines are to be applied to fund a victim compensation scheme, 
some reconciliation will have to be effected between the restitutionary interests of the 
individual victim and the claim of the victim compensation fund on money raised in 
this way, possibly by legislating that fines are firstly applied to effect restitution, and 
secondly to fund the victim compensation scheme. 
122  See previous footnote. 
123  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 (Recommendation) 201 et seq. 
124  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 201. 
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o Rape survivors;126 and 
o Dependants of indigent murder victims.127 
? The pilot schemes will serve a secondary purpose of laying a foundation for a 
full victim compensation scheme.128 
? Legal parameters should be set by the South African Law Reform 
Commission to establish eligibility criteria for compensation.129 
? A Crime Victims’ Fund is to be established to finance the targeted pilot 
compensation schemes.130 
                                                                                                                             
125  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.2.1 203: 
We recommend that by 2002, or sooner if possible, that (sic) limited 
compensation for rape survivors be implemented to assist them medically 
and to ensure they receive the appropriate social and psychological support. 
As was stated in the financing ss of this report the initial sum of R2 000 is 
proposed. This could be used by the survivor at her own discretion for the 
purchase of services and support not currently available through the State (or 
their private medical aid), i.e. counselling, medication, and/or to pay for lost 
time from work, as well as travel costs to see District Surgeons, police, courts 
officials, etc. We estimate the cost of this to be in the order of R141 million 
per year. The appropriate structure needs to be established to set this 
process up. Funding and administration needs to be a focus of this structure, 
which should work from the initial financing process and administration costs 
outlined in this report. The structure should ensure this recommendation is 
realised and that the legal parameters are established (see 9.3). In addition, 
they could also, if the programme is successful, consider increasing the 
amount of compensation to be in line with international standards. 
126  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.2.2 203: 
We recommend that by 2003 a grant be given to victims who have in some 
way been disabled as a result of violent crime. Such assistance should be 
dedicated to helping them purchase mechanical devices (e.g. artificial limbs, 
wheelchairs, hearing aids, etc) or making changes to their home, which may 
assist them to cope with such resultant disabilities. Small grants should be 
made available (in the range of R5 000) and the allocation of such 
compensation awards should be based on criteria of financial need. The 
appropriate structure needs to be established to set this process up. As with 
the recommendation above, attention will need to be paid to the financial, 
administrative and legal implications of the scheme. The scheme should only 
target those without private medical insurance. 
127  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.2.3 204: 
We recommend that by 2004 a further pilot victim compensation scheme be 
established that will initially target the poor (see 6.9 of this report). 
Specifically, the dependants of indigent murder victims should receive a 
minimum payment of R5 000 to R15 000 (increased to take account of 
inflation rates between now and the time of development of the scheme). If 
indigent murder victims’ dependants were paid out, we estimate that this 
would cost between R44.4 million and R255 million depending on at what 
level indigence or poverty was defined and the amount granted. We 
recommend that dependants of murder victims who are orphaned as a result 
of a violent crime receive special consideration, and additional resources to 
these victims be considered. An appropriate structure should explore this 
option and lay the foundation for its establishment in 2004. 
128  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.2 203. 
129  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.3 204. 
130  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.4  204 - 206. 
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? The recommendations contained in the Issue Paper are to be forwarded to 
the South African Treasury, the ministers responsible for the Criminal Assets 
Recovery Fund and the National Legislature.131 
? Employers are to be encouraged to take a greater interest in the impact of 
violent crime upon the workforce.132 
? The state should consider augmenting disability grants paid to those disabled 
by criminal actions.133 
? Police record keeping systems should be improved to facilitate planning.134 
? A system of witness fees should be instituted, particularly for the benefit of 
victims who are also witnesses.135 
? Record keeping in hospital trauma units should be investigated to facilitate 
planning.136 
? An injury surveillance system should be set up in all public health facilities for 
planning purposes.137 
? Awareness of the impact of crime should be increased, particularly by means 
of the Victim Empowerment Programme.138 
? Steps should be taken to improve the process of restitution by offenders.139 
? Consideration should be given to the inclusion of more extensive rights to 
restitution in the Charter of Victims’ Rights.140 
? The Issue Paper should be distributed widely to elicit response from all 
stakeholders and amongst other developing countries to establish a debate 
about compensation schemes generally.141 
? Once the abovementioned recommendations have been implemented, 
consideration should be given to the desirability of establishing a full victim 
compensation scheme; the issues to be considered being stated as 
follows:142  
o the financial feasibility of a compensation scheme relative to 
other government funding; 
                                            
131  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.5 206. 
132  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.6  206 - 207. The example is given of employers 
ensuring that employees are insured against disabilities resulting from crime. 
133  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.7 207. 
134  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.8 207. 
135  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.9 207. 
136  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.10 208. 
137  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.11 208. 
138  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.12  208 - 209. See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 (supra). 
139  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.13 209. See generally Ch 4 (supra). 
140  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.15 210. See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 (supra). 
141  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.16 210 - 211. 
142  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.17 211 – 212. 
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o the reach of the criminal justice system and whether a 
compensation scheme would be accessible to all – especially 
the poor; 
o the administrative services necessary and the capability of the 
civil service to effectively run the scheme; 
o the ability of the police to keep records, verify crimes and 
interface with a compensation granting body; 
o the reliability of medical record-keeping and verification of 
injuries, as well as the ability of health authorities to interface 
with a compensation granting body; 
o the resources and public service skills available to ensure the 
necessary checks and balances to minimise fraud; 
o the relative strength of the victim empowerment programme, 
and the victim aid services it provides, which would need to 
complement any compensation process; 
o the legal parameters of eligibility and types of injuries 
qualifying for compensation. 
 
? If, after implementation and assessment of the pilot schemes, it is decided to 
implement a full victim compensation scheme, the following guidelines should 
apply:143 
o the scheme should adopt a 'safety net' approach… and should 
ensure that its major beneficiaries are the poor; 
o South Africa should adopt a tariff scheme approach to 
compensation and not use a system based on common law. 
This is consistent with current international norms, and will be 
more cost-effective, less administratively burdensome and will 
not prejudice those who do not have an income, as the 
compensation rates would be standardised; 
o payments for compensation should be made as once-off 
payments rather than as annuities, or pensions, unless the 
approach of supplementing the disability grant process is 
adopted…; 
o the eligibility criteria for compensation (the parameters) should 
be finalised by the SA Law Reform Commission. Pragmatic 
concerns (e.g. finances) will need to be balanced against 
ensuring maximum benefit to applicants; 
o any scheme should ensure that those in need, and only those 
victims considered ‘blameless’ and those who co-operate with 
the criminal justice system, are the beneficiaries; 
o a public awareness campaign should go hand in hand with the 
development of the scheme;  
o administration costs of the scheme should not exceed the 
benefits to victims. 
 
Regarding eligibility, the following issues are to be considered: 
 
? Compensation should be paid only in cases of death or serious injury;144 
                                            
143  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 9 Par 9.17.2 212. 
144  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.3.1 75. 
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? An intentional145 criminal act should be required with the victim being 
blameless;146 
? Claims for property, with the exception of personal items such as hearing aids 
and spectacles, should not be allowed;147 
? Compensation should be paid in the case of the “Good Samaritan” injured in 
the course of trying to prevent a crime or apprehend a criminal;148 
? Generally, compensation should be limited to crimes committed within South 
Africa’s national boundaries;149 
? Compensation should be limited to nationals, permanent residents, lawful 
aliens and visitors from countries with reciprocal agreements regarding 
compensation;150 
? A claim should become prescribed unless lodged within a stipulated period;151 
? Only victims or their dependants benefit;152 
? The victim must be prepared to assist in the prosecution of the offender;153 
? Compensation is limited to crimes committed after a certain date and 
retrospective claims are not allowed;154 
? Compensation is paid even if the offender is not identified and victims receive 
no restitution;155 
? Compensation should not be paid in respect of an injury for which there is an 
alternative source156 of reparation;157 
? Consideration will have to be given to the role of the claimant’s own previous 
criminal activities;158 and 
? Only crimes reported to the police should be eligible for compensation.159 
 
Analysis of these recommendations shows them to be detailed and based on 
international practice, rather than radically innovative. The distinction drawn between 
                                            
145  Including dolus eventualis and sometimes even negligence, as in the case of culpable 
homicide. See following footnote. 
146  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.3.2 76. 
147  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.3.3 77. 
148  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.3.4 77. 
149  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.3.5 78. 
150  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.3.6 78. 
151  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.3.7 78. 
152  Not employers and insurance companies. Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.3.8 80. 
153  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.3.9 80. 
154  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.4.1 81. 
155  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.4.2 81. 
156  Whether from the state or private sector. 
157  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.4.3 81 - 82. 
158  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.4.4 82. 
159  Discussion Paper 97: Ch 4 Par 4.4.5 83. 
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“comprehensive” schemes and others is, it is submitted, redundant as all schemes 
set parameters regarding which victims qualify for compensation – or not; parameters 
are amended from time to time as dictated by current national circumstances; in 
short, victim compensation schemes are anything but uniform in their approach.160 
 
5 3 Great Britain 
 
5 3 1 Legislation 
 
5 3 1 1  Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act161 
 
The link between statutory insurance and compensation to victims of crime may not 
be immediately obvious, but:162 
 
If an accident happens at a workplace, it is not uncommon for there to be a 
prosecution under the criminal code for failure to comply with statutory law 
followed by a separate action for negligence or breach of contract under civil 
law. 
 
The liability of the employer vis-à-vis an injured employee163 can take on three 
forms:164 
 
? Vicarious liability for the negligence of fellow employees; 
                                            
160  See Sarnoff S K Paying for Crime: The Policies and Possibilities of Crime Victim 
Reimbursement (1996) 58. 
161  1969.  
162  Clarke T Managing Health and Safety in Building and Construction (1999) 9: The 
(unreported) Derby Crown Court case involving the Derby City Council referred to by 
Clarke illustrates the alacrity with which English courts find in favour of criminal 
liability on the side of employers and their subcontractors. The criminal actions of 
third parties can also lead to industrial injuries. 
163  Article 4 of the Employment Injury Benefit Convention 121 of 1964 [Full text available 
 in Blanpain R, Javillier J-C and Servais J M (eds) Codex International Labour and 
 Social Security Law (2002) 153] requires states to provide for injury benefits in cases 
 of industrial injuries: 
 National legislation concerning employment injury benefits shall 
protect all employees, including apprentices, in the public and private 
sectors, including co-operatives, and, in respect of the death of the 
breadwinner, prescribed categories of beneficiaries. 
  Article 1 provides that “the term legislation includes any social security rules as well 
 as laws and regulations.” The International Labour Organisation states on its website 
 that International Labour Conventions have the legal status of international treaties  
  [(September 2002) http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/english/conve.htm] 
This must be understood to refer to ratified conventions. [Dugard J International Law: 
A South African Perspective 218] The Convention has not been ratified by Great 
Britain, SA and India. 
164  Jones M A Textbook on Torts 252. 
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? Primary liability for the breach of a personal, non-delegable duty; and 
? Liability for the breach of a statutory duty. 
 
The relevance of this for victims of crime is: 
 
? A breach of the statutory duties of the employer under industrial safety 
legislation amounts to a criminal act;165 and 
? The employee also has a tortious claim for injuries arising from non-
compliance with these statutory duties. 
 
The Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act compels the employer to take 
out insurance against liability for bodily injury or disease sustained by employees 
arising out of, or in the course of, their employment. Failure to insure constitutes a 
criminal act.166 The policy must be issued by an insurer authorised to do so in terms 
of the Financial Services and Markets Act.167   
 
While minimum cover of £5 000 000 is required,168 most employers negotiate cover 
of £10 000 000 or more.169 The Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) 
Regulations170 also specify certain conditions that may not be included in a policy, 
but there is no prohibition on stipulating a right of recourse by the insurer against the 
employer in respect of amounts paid out in terms of the policy. 
 
The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations171 provide that breach of 
a duty imposed by the Regulations does not per se confer a civil right of action. What 
is required – in addition – is an injury as a result of the contravention.172 
                                            
165  The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 allows the Secretary of State to make 
Regulations in relation to safety at work. This process has been accelerated to 
ensure compliance with the European Community Framework Directive on Health 
and Safety – Council Directive 89/391. See further: Jones M A Textbook on Torts 
261; Clarke T Managing Health and Safety in Building and Construction (1999) 8 et 
seq; Pitt G Employment Law (1997) 371; 384. 
166  S 5. 
167  2000. The Financial Services Authority maintains a register of authorised insurers.  
Authorised insurers issue Certificates of Insurance to employers negotiating and 
renewing insurance policies. Employers are required to display these certificates (or 
copies thereof) at each place of business for the information of employees, or risk 
criminal prosecution. 
168  Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1998 No 2573. Regulation 
3. 
169  Health and Safety Executive The Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act: A 
Guide for Employers (September 2002) http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hse40.pdf 
170  (Supra) Regulation 2. 
171  1999. Regulation 22(1). 
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Jones173 cautions prospective plaintiffs: 
 
(T)here is little consistency in the standards applied to breaches of industrial 
safety legislation... (T)he language used in legislation seems to be largely 
haphazard, yet it is upon the accident of language that the issue is made to 
turn. Moreover, unless the facts of the case fall within the precise statutory 
wording the claimant will be unable to maintain an action for breach of 
statutory duty… 
 
Contributory negligence has an impact on the claim,174 but courts are not concerned 
solely with whether the employee’s actions contributed to the injuries, but whether 
these actions themselves can be blamed on the employee.175 
 
Compensation is paid out under the aegis of the social security system where it 
cannot be claimed under these tort-inspired legal rules.176 
 
5 3 1 2  Road Traffic Act177 
 
Part VI of the Act deals with inter alia the requirement of compulsory insurance (or 
giving of security) against third-party risks.178 A car owner allowing another person to 
use a car which is not insured – or not insured for that particular driver179 – will be 
personally liable if the driver does not possess the means to compensate a third 
party in the event of an accident.180 
 
                                                                                                                             
172  The harm suffered will have to be proved in accordance with normal tortious 
 principles. See Harpwood V Principles of Tort Law (1998) 20. 
173  Op cit: 263. 
174  In terms of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. 
175  For example in cases where the employee works long hours in unpleasant conditions.  
See Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries [1940] AC 152 HL. 
176  For a full exposition see: Lewis R Compensation for Industrial Injury (1987). 
177  1988 (c. 52). Full text: 
(September 2002) 
 http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/Ukpga_19880052_en_1.htm 
178  S 143(1)(a) of the Act states that “a person must not use a motor vehicle on a road 
unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person such a 
policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with 
the requirements of this Part of this Act…”. S 143(1)(b) prohibits a person from 
causing or permitting another person to use an uninsured vehicle on a road. 
Insurance is not required in respect of vehicles owned by “a person who has 
deposited and keeps deposited with the Accountant General of the Supreme Court 
the sum of £15 000…” [S 144(1)] or for vehicles owned by certain listed public 
authorities. 
179  This would be the case where the car is insured ‘owner-driver only’. 
180  Monk v Warbey (1935) 1 KB 75; Richards v Port of Manchester (1934) 152 LT 413. 
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Compulsory insurance policies are issued by authorised insurers181 and provide for: 
 
? Death; 
? Bodily injury; 
? Damage to property; and 
? Payment directly to a medical practitioner or hospital for emergency 
treatment.182 
 
Insurance is not required in respect of death or injury to passengers carried by 
reason of a contract of employment though it is required in respect of death or injury 
to passengers carried for hire or reward.183 In Cooper v Motor Insurers’ Bureau184 it 
was held that the driver is excluded from protection in terms of the Act.185 
 
Cover is not required in respect of:186 
 
? Death or injury of an employee in the course of his or her employment with 
the insured; 
? Damages in excess of £250 000 in respect of damage to property; 
? Damage to the insured vehicle;187 
? Damage to goods carried for reward in the insured vehicle; 
? Liability for goods under a person’s control; or 
? Contractual liability. 
 
                                            
181  S 145. Subss (5) and (6) deal with the requirements for being an authorised insurer. 
182  See ss 158 – 159. Policies must also offer protection in compliance with the  
relevant laws of member states of the European Community. 
183  The Road Traffic Acts of 1930 and 1960 did not require insurance covering death or 
injury to passengers except in vehicles in which passengers were carried for hire or 
reward or by reason of a contract of employment. The Road Traffic Act of 1972 and 
the current Act require insurance to cover the former eventuality, but not the latter. 
See Taylor P J: 743. 
184  (1985) All ER 449 (QB). The owner of a defective motorcycle had allowed someone 
to ride it. An accident ensued and the rider claimed compensation on the basis of the 
owner’s negligence in not informing him of the defective brakes of the motorcycle. 
185  This does not mean that the driver would not have a claim based on tort against the 
owner, but then the means of the owner to satisfy such a claim becomes a possible 
stumbling block. 
186  S 145(4). 
187  While the compulsory insurance policy required by the Act provides cover for damage 
to vehicles of other parties, insurance cover for the vehicle of the insured is not a 
legal requirement. However, statistics show that 82% of insurance policies taken out 
in Great Britain during 1982 included comprehensive cover for damage to the 
insured’s vehicle. Meyer U “Third Party Insurance in Europe: Comparative Study of 
the Economic Statistical Situation” University of Bamberg 78 (September 2002)  
http://www.uni-bamberg.de/sowi/economics/meyer/forschung/kfz/study-english.pdf 
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Agreements regarding the restriction of liability vis-à-vis passengers188 or the fact that 
a passenger has willingly accepted the risk of negligence on the part of the user do 
not cancel any liability.189 However, it has been held that a voluntary passenger in a 
getaway vehicle would not be entitled to compensation.190 In Pitts v Hunt191 a plaintiff 
who rode home on a motor cycle with someone who had drunk too much and did not 
have a licence was denied compensation because he had participated in criminal 
activity and had encouraged the driver to drive dangerously. The court relied on the 
maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio. Thus the legislative condonation of the 
acceptance of the risk of negligence on the part of the driver does not protect a 
passenger who knowingly participates in a criminal act. 
 
The use of a vehicle for car-sharing (lift club) purposes where the passengers 
contribute to running costs, is covered by compulsory insurance policies. However, 
the scheme must be operated on a non-profit basis.192 
 
Accidents involving uninsured and untraced drivers are dealt with by the Motor 
Insurers’ Bureau, a company limited by guarantee, which administers a Central Fund 
financed by levies contributed by insurers.193 The system functions as follows: 
 
? In terms of a series of agreements between the Bureau and the Secretary of 
State protection is provided for victims of uninsured drivers and untraced 
drivers;194  
? In the case of uninsured drivers the Bureau undertakes to satisfy judgments 
which would have been covered had the driver been insured.195 One specific 
exclusion from this assumed liability is the case where a claim is made by a 
willing passenger who knew that the vehicle was being used without 
                                            
188  Any prior agreement is void insofar as it restricts the liability of the user to take out a 
policy of insurance in respect of passengers, or to impose any conditions with respect 
to the enforcement of such liability of the user: S 149. S 149 does not specifically 
refer to paying or non-paying passengers, thus it operates in favour of all passengers. 
There is, however, some doubt as to whether the insured will be protected where he 
or she is being carried as a passenger. See Taylor P J et al Bingham and Berrymans’ 
Motor Claim Cases 750. 
189  S 149(3). 
190  Ashton v Turner (1980) 3 All ER 870 (QB). 
191  (1990) All ER 344 (QB). 
192  S 150. 
193  And thus indirectly from the premiums charged to insured members of the public. 
194  Motor Insurers’ Bureau “Notes for the Guidance of Victims of Road Traffic Accidents” 
(December 2003) http://www.apil.com/pdf/publicdocs/notes.pdf Also on The Law 
Society website: (December 2003) http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/ 
195  This takes place in terms of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement dated 21 December 
1988. Taylor P J 765. Full text of Agreement at 771 et seq. 
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insurance, or that it had been stolen, taken unlawfully or used in connection 
with crime;196 and 
? In the case of untraced drivers197 compensation is paid for personal injury, but 
not damage to property. Where there is doubt as to whether the driver has 
been correctly identified the claimant may claim under both headings. The 
Bureau then decides how to deal with the claim.198 
 
Where a vehicle is used with the criminal intention of inflicting injury, the Bureau is 
liable to compensate the victim.199 This liability arises from the Motor Insurers’ 
Bureau Agreements – and not from a policy of insurance – as a person may not be 
indemnified against the consequences of his or her own criminal acts.200 
  
Where any accident leads to physical injury or death and the injured party requires 
medical treatment at a hospital, the insurer must pay the expenses reasonably 
incurred by the hospital, subject to certain limits as to quantum.201 Where emergency 
treatment of the victim by a medical practitioner is required, the vehicle user202 must 
pay the practitioner:203 
 
? £15204 in respect of each person receiving emergency treatment; and 
? A sum in respect of the mileage covered to and from the place where the 
emergency treatment is carried out. 
 
                                            
196  The onus is placed on the claimant to take all reasonable steps to ascertain whether 
the car was insured. In terms of the Agreement certain procedural requirements are 
also imposed on the claimant. In terms of s 151(4) of the Act the same rule would 
apply even had the vehicle been insured. 
197  In terms of the Untraced Drivers Agreement dated 22 November 1972. Taylor P J et 
al Bingham and Berrymans’ Motor Claim Cases 766. Full text of Agreement at 784 et 
seq. 
198  See penultimate footnote. 
199  Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1964] 2 QB 745, [1964] 2 ALL ER 742 [1964] 3  
WLR 433, 108 Sol Jo 422, [1964] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 37 CA; Gardner v Moore [1984] AC 
548, [1984] 1 All ER 1100, [1984] 2 WLR 714 128 Sol Jo 282, [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
135, HL. 
200  See sources quoted in previous footnote. 
201  £2 000,37 for an in-patient and £200,04 for an out-patient – s 157(2). 
202  However, s 145(3)(c) requires that the insurance policy must cover this liability as 
well. 
203  S 158. 
204  Amount implemented by the Road Traffic Accidents (Payment for Treatment) Order 
 1987 SI 1987/353. 
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Once the insurer has paid compensation in terms of the Act, the driver or owner of 
the vehicle is indemnified against further claims. However, the insurer may claim 
from the driver: 
 
? The full amount if the driver did not have a driving licence; and 
? The difference between the amount paid and the ceiling of the insurer’s 
liability in terms of the insurance policy.205 
 
Insurance for road traffic injuries to persons sustained in the course of their 
employment is dealt with under the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) 
Act.206 
 
5 3 1 3 Social Security Contributions and Benefit Act,207 Social Security 
Administration Act208 and Social Security Act209 
 
The Social Security Contributions and Benefit Act210 provides for the levying of 
contributions payable by earners, employers and others. These monies go to the 
National Insurance Fund and are utilised for the payment of benefits and towards the 
cost of the National Health Service. 
  
The Social Security Act211 created the Compensation Recovery Unit for the 
recouping of social security benefits from tortfeasors.212 The Social Security 
Administration Act213 provides that a person effecting a payment in consequence of 
an accident, injury or disease must deduct the gross amount of any relevant social 
security benefits due.214 If the amount of the benefit recoverable by the state from the 
compensator is greater than the amount to be paid to the injured person, the 
                                            
205  Where the former exceeded the latter. S 151(7). 
206  S 1. 
207  1992. 
208  1992. 
209  1998. Though there are many legislative enactments making up the complex system 
of social security law in Great Britain, the abovementioned three Acts can be 
described as the principle sources of law on this subject. Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, 
Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 278; Clarke T Managing Health and Safety in 
Building and Construction 45. 
210  S 1. 
211  1989. S 22. 
212  Harpwood V Principles of Tort Law  354. 
213  S 82 of Part IV (as amended by the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 
1997).  
214  Recovery of Social Security Benefits and Payments into Court: a Lord Chancellor’s 
Department Consultation Paper.  
(September 2002) http://www.lcd.gov.uk/consult/general/payments.htm 
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compensator is liable to pay the full amount of the benefit recoverable to the state.215 
The compensator’s liability is thus not limited to the amount due by the compensator 
to the injured party.216 
 
The Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act determines the heads of damages 
against which specified social security benefits may be recovered and illustrates 
that there is a plethora of social security benefits available. 217 
 
In terms of the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act218 and the Social Security 
(Recovery of Benefits) Regulations219 certain amounts are exempted from payment 
to the state, including awards under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme220 
and payments under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act.221 The 
exclusion of these amounts is one of numerous examples of how the system allows 
for overcompensation of the victim at the expense of the state. 
 
The following statement summarises the prevailing state of the system of social 
security:222 
 
The present system of social security is extraordinarily complicated, there 
being about 30 different cash benefits which may properly be called ‘social 
security…’ 
 
 
                                            
215  S 82(1)(b) of the Social Security Administration Act. 
216  Jones M A Textbook on Torts  617. 
217  Schedule 2 deals with the calculation of compensation payments. 
218  Schedule 1. 
219  1997. Regulation 2. 
220  See par 5 3 2 (infra). 
221  In terms of s 130 which deals with compensation (restitution) orders against 
convicted persons. See Ch 4 par 4 2 2 5 (infra). 
222  Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 21. On the same page (n 11) Rogers 
also refers to the fact that compensation in terms of the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme falls outside the legal and administrative framework of social 
security, despite the fact that it also represents an instance of the state providing 
financial assistance to “victims of misfortune.” See also Rogers W V H Winfield and 
Jolowicz on Tort 32; Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 
280; Larkin P “Social security provision for disability: a case for change?” (1998) 9/5 
Journal of Social Security Law 11. 
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5 3 2 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 
 
5 3 2 1  Motivation for Scheme 
 
An official Justice Report223 of 1962 stated the following as the raisons d’être for the 
institution of a victim compensation scheme: 
 
First, the analogy with war injuries and riot damage was regarded as strong. 
The State has always accepted the obligation to provide for the victims of war 
injury and the dependants of those killed in war. And the damage is in some 
cases at least, provided for by the State under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886. 
 
Secondly, the State exhorts the citizen to protect his property against theft 
but discourages the citizen from carrying weapons to protect his property or 
his person. 
 
Third, the citizen is under a duty to assist the State, e.g. by going to the 
assistance of a policeman effecting an arrest or suppressing violence and he 
may be deterred from doing so by the absence of compensation for injury. 
 
Fourth, neglect of interests of the victims of crime has made it more difficult to 
follow an enlightened penal policy because every demand for better 
treatment for criminals is met by complaints that society is looking after the 
criminal better than the victim. 
 
Fifth, the State having prohibited the victim from taking the law into his own 
hands to obtain redress, should provide him with an effective alternative. 
 
Sixth, offenders are often imprisoned for long periods and so the State 
deprives the victim of any chance of effective redress against the offender. 
 
 
Cane224 refutes these motivations as follows: 
 
? In wars people are required by their governments to risk their safety. In any 
case, war pensions are treated as the “sacred cow” of the social security 
system. 
? Citizens have more to gain than to lose from living in a weapon-free society. 
? There is no reason why the altruistic act of the person assisting a police 
officer should be rewarded more highly than, for example, that of a person 
rescuing a child from a burning house. 
? The underlying premise, namely that persons who suffer harm as a result of 
government policy ought to be compensated is of doubtful validity and can 
                                            
223  Justice Report on Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence Cmnd 1406 (1962)  
London. 
224  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 253 – 255. 
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only be accepted if it could be proved that victims of penal policy were more 
deserving than victims of other forms of government policy. 
? Taking the law into one’s own hands is not restricted to victims of crime and 
the state does not generally undertake to augment the insufficient means of 
defendants. 
? Statistics prove that a relatively small percentage225 of offenders convicted of 
indictable offences receive custodial sentences. 
 
Academic arguments in favour of the Scheme are:226 
 
? The state has a more direct responsibility in the case of crime than in the 
case of accidental injury because of its responsibility for the maintenance of 
law and order. 
? The Scheme can be seen as supplementing the law of tort. Victims of crime 
are also victims of tort, but their claims are usually unenforceable due to the 
lack of means of offenders. The state is simply guaranteeing payment of a 
legally valid claim. 
? Public sentiment requires that victims of crime be compensated and this 
expectation has been realised by the Scheme, which has been in existence 
for a substantial period. 
 
The latter argument seems to be favoured by the English government which denies 
an actual liability to compensate the victim of crime, but at the same time bows to 
“public instinct”227 which calls for this form of compensation. This can be summarised 
as follows:228 
 
Society is seen to recognise and sympathise with the innocent victim’s 
suffering and this serves to reaffirm that the victim’s faith, and that of the 
general public in society and its institutions has not been misplaced…(the) 
role (of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme) is to symbolise social 
solidarity with the victim of violence. 
 
An American perspective views the matter as follows:229 
 
                                            
225  About 20% in 1996. 
226  Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 33. 
227  Lord Dilhorne HL Debates 5th series Volume 257 column 1353. 
228  Duff P “Criminal Injuries Compensation: the Symbolic Dimension” 1995 Juridical 
Review 102. 
229  Greer D S “A transatlantic perspective on the compensation of crime victims in the 
United States” (Fall 1994) 85 (2) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 333. 
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Crime victims do not have an unequivocal right to compensation from the 
state, in the sense that they do have a fully-fledged right to damages from 
tortfeasors. Correlatively, the state has no duty to provide such compensation 
(though it is almost universally the case that it will do so) either in recognition 
of a moral or social responsibility, or for strategic considerations linked to the 
maintenance of law and order, or to attempts to improve the administration of 
criminal justice. The absence of a duty enables the state to limit (and in 
extremis to withdraw) the provision of compensation. The imperfect nature of 
the victim's right also tends to facilitate the refusal of compensation to 
undeserving claimants. 
 
Despite the criticism levelled at the Scheme, public feeling supports it as an 
indispensable element of the aid rendered by the state to injured members of the 
populace.230 
 
5 3 2 2  Background 
 
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme was introduced in 1964 to provide 
state-funded payments to victims of violent crime who suffer personal injuries.  
 
In 1967 New Zealand231 instituted a single scheme whereby all accidental injuries – 
whether caused by industrial, traffic-related or criminal activity – were compensated 
by the state on a no-fault basis. In 1973232 Britain appointed a Royal Commission to 
consider:233 
 
(T)o what extent, in what circumstances and by what means compensation 
should be payable in respect of death or personal injury (including ante-natal 
injury) suffered by any person: 
 
(a) in the course of employment; 
(b) through the use of a motor vehicle or other means of transport; 
(c) through the manufacture, supply or use of goods or services; 
(d) on premises belonging to or occupied by another; or 
(e) otherwise through the act or omission of another where compensation 
under the present law is recoverable only on proof of fault or under the 
rules of strict liability; having regard to the cost of compensation, whether 
by way of compulsory insurance or otherwise. 
 
                                            
230  Jones M A Textbook on Torts 472. 
231  As a result of the Woodhouse Report.  
 New Zealand Government, Wellington Compensation for Personal Injury in New 
Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry. (Woodhouse Report) (1967). 
See Ch 9 Par 9.2 (infra). 
232  This was prompted by the thalidomide incident which led to the birth of about 400 
deformed children as a result of the taking by their mothers of the drug thalidomide.  
233  Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal 
Injury (Pearson Report) Cmnd 7054 (1978). 
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The Pearson Report did not recommend that Britain adopt a comprehensive scheme 
of state funded compensation along the lines of the New Zealand system.234 It did not 
advocate the abolition of the tort system, but addressed the imbalance between the 
relatively liberal benefits payable in cases of industrial accidents compared to traffic 
accidents. 
  
Originally the Scheme was administratively based. Payments were made ex gratia 
and were subject to judicial review, but not appeal.235 The Criminal Justice Act of 
1988236 paved the way to placing the Scheme on a statutory footing. However, the 
legislative scheme was not implemented due to fears of the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board237 that this would promote delays in finalising claims.238  
 
As the administratively based scheme was “inherently incapable of delivering… a 
service which produces awards reasonable quickly, and in an understandable and 
predictable manner,”239 the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act240 were 
repealed241 and a statutory scheme was inaugurated. Currently both Schemes exist 
side by side, the former Scheme dealing with applications received before 1 April 
1996. The statutory Scheme is receptive to claims made after that date. Many 
decisions under the administrative Scheme are also applicable mutatis mutandis to 
the legislative Scheme.242 
 
The Home Office243 promulgated the current version of the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme244 on 1 April 2001.245 It is this document246 that will serve as 
                                            
234  The reason stated was that consideration of a comprehensive scheme would have 
extended beyond the terms of reference of the Commission, which excluded most 
domestic accidents. See Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 37 for criticism 
of this conclusion. The Report contained 188 recommendations, but no legislative 
measures can be traced directly to it. See Rogers W V H Winfield and Jolowicz on 
Tort 37 n 99. 
235  Jones M A Textbook on Torts 469. 
236  Ss 108 to 117. 
237  Now the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. 
238  Jones M A Textbook on Torts 469. 
239  Home Office Compensating Victims of Violent Crime: Changes to the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Scheme (1993 Cm 2434) Pars 2, 10 – 12.  
240  1988. 
241  By the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995. 
242  Jones M A Textbook on Torts 471; Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation 
in the UK: Meeting European Standards 9. 
243  Represented by the Secretary of State, Jack Straw. 
244  In terms of ss 1 to 6 and s 12 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act. 
245  As a result of a report: Home Office Compensation for Victims of Violent Crime: 
Possible Changes to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (1999). 
246  The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2001. TSI (Issue Number One 4/01).  
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the basis of this discussion, as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act is the 
enabling legislation and does not reflect the actual rules in terms of which the 
Scheme functions. There is also a Guide to the Scheme which sets out the working 
of the Scheme in lay terms.247 In addition to the latter there is a separate Guide 
dealing with compensation in fatal cases.248 
 
Claims officers of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority decide claims. 
Appeals can be made to adjudicators on the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals 
Panel.249 Though the Scheme functions under review of the Secretary of State, there 
is no right of appeal to the latter.250 The following extract from R (on the application of 
E) v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel251 sets out the status and modus 
operandi of these bodies: 
 
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority is a public body which has 
been established to administer the Scheme. Decisions made by the Authority 
whether to award compensation are essentially administrative decisions. The 
award of such compensation is a disbursement from public funds in 
circumstances in which Parliament has decided that it is in the general public 
interest to do so. The Authority has a general duty to the public at large to 
make payments where they are provided for by the Scheme, and a 
corresponding general duty to the public not to make payments which are 
unnecessary or unjustified. 
 
The Panel becomes involved if an applicant wishes to appeal from a decision 
of a claims officer… 
 
In discharging its functions, the Panel adopts an inquisitorial approach, 
consistent with the administrative nature of the Scheme and with its 
fundamental purpose of disbursing public funds in the circumstances 
prescribed or authorised by Parliament. The Scheme also provides that 
hearings should be informal. The Panel is assisted in its task by Presenting 
Officers… 
 
It would not be in the general interests of applicants for the Panel to adopt a 
more adversarial approach to its hearings. Many applicants are 
unrepresented or represented by non-professionals. An inquisitorial approach 
is more likely in these circumstances to ensure that all the relevant facts are 
brought out into the open for proper consideration. 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
References below refer to the paragraphs of this document. 
247  Guide to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (2001) Hereinafter referred to 
as the Guide.  
(September 2002) http://www.cica.gov.uk/nonhtdocs/guide_inj_comp2001.pdf 
248  Guide to Applicants for Compensation in Fatal Cases. Hereinafter referred to as 
the Guide in Fatal Cases.  
(September 2002) http://www.cica.gov.uk/nonhtdocs/guide_fatal_cases.pdf 
249  Pars 2 – 3. 
250  Pars 3 – 4. 
251  [2003] EWCA Civ 234 at [10]. 
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5 3 2 3  Requirements for compensation 
 
Compensation is paid in the event of criminal injuries sustained in Great Britain252 
and directly attributable to:253 
 
? Crimes of violence;254 or 
? Offences of trespass on a railway; or  
? The (attempted) apprehension of (suspected) offenders, the (attempted) 
prevention of offences, or the giving of help to any constable engaged in such 
activity.  
 
The offender must have acted intentionally or recklessly with regard to the infliction of 
injury per se. Thus a person wishing to commit suicide, who criminally255 damages a 
gas pipe in order to do so, has not committed a crime of violence vis-à-vis a 
policeman investigating a gas leak who is injured in the ensuing gas explosion.256 
This is in keeping with the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of 
Violent Crimes257 which requires compensation for victims of “intentional crimes of 
violence.” (Emphasis added)  
 
The inclusion of the offence of trespass on a railway was brought about due to the 
mental stress suffered by train drivers as a result of people committing suicide by 
throwing themselves in front of trains.258 In terms of the Offences Against the Person 
Act259 this constitutes an offence.260 In the words of Cane261 “(i)t is the nature of a 
crime, not its consequences, which determines whether it is a crime of violence.” The 
                                            
252  In R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Walker [2000] 2 All ER 917 a Ministry of Defence 
scheme, the Criminal Injuries Compensation (Overseas) Scheme to compensate 
military personnel for criminal injuries sustained abroad was considered. The Scheme 
excluded injuries resulting from war operations or military activity by warring factions. 
The House of Lords decided that an act, though criminal under international law, 
could nevertheless be “military activity” for the purposes of the scheme. Thus a 
soldier taking part in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia who was injured by a round 
fired at his accommodation block by a Serbian tank was excluded from 
compensation. 
253  Par 8. 
254  Including arson, fire-raising or an act of poisoning. 
255  In terms of s 1 (1) (c) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. 
256  R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Clowes [1977] 1 WLR 1353. See 
Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 258. 
257  Council of Europe European Treaty Series No 116 
258  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 259. 
259  1861. S 34. 
260  Unlawfully endangering the safety of railway passengers. 
261  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 259. 
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author criticises this extension of the Scheme, asking why train drivers should be 
treated more generously than262 victims of, for example, train crashes or fires in 
public places, but the inclusion of the offence of trespass on a railway was due to “a 
great deal of political pressure exerted by the train drivers’ unions.”263  
 
In the case of injuries sustained as a result of the apprehension of an offender the 
victim will be compensated only if he or she was “taking an exceptional risk which 
was justified in the circumstances.”264 Thus the law enforcer who is injured in the 
normal course of duty will not be entitled to compensation in terms of the Scheme.265 
In R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Ince266 it was held that to it 
was not necessary that an offence was in fact about to be committed. At the time of 
injury the victim was attempting to prevent an offence, having received information 
that an offence was imminent. It was irrelevant that the information was false. 
Furthermore, even though the deceased's death was due to his own carelessness, it 
was still attributable to the attempted prevention of an offence. “Directly attributable” 
does not mean “solely attributable.” 
 
The conviction of the offender is not required – though this will aid in proving the 
claim267 – nor need the offender be identified.268 This is also the case where there 
can be no conviction due to age, insanity or diplomatic immunity.269 What is required, 
                                            
262  Home Office Criminal Injuries Compensation: A Statutory Scheme (1986) Ch 6. 
263  Op cit 259. See also Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: 
Meeting European Standards 13; R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte 
Webb [1987] QB 74. 
264  Par 12. 
265  This category was included in the current scheme despite criticism that law 
enforcement officers are entitled to industrial injury benefits. Its inclusions was 
probably due to lobbying by the police and Fire Brigades Union: Miers D 
Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European Standards 13. 
266  [1973] 3 All ER 808 [1973] 1 WLR 1334 137 JP 869. In this case the victim, a police 
officer, was killed in a collision when crossing a red traffic light while responding to a 
radio message addressed to all police cars stating that suspects were breaking into a 
nearby Territorial Army depot. See also R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex 
parte Lawton [1972] 3 All ER 582 [1972] 1 WLR 1589 136 JP 828.  
267  See R (on the application of Gravett) v Criminal Injury Compensation Appeals Panel 
[2001] EWHC Admin 1193, 67 BMLR 21. Likewise the lack of a conviction can be 
considered in deciding whether a crime of violence has occurred. 
268  Subject to one exception: See Par 17(a) which is discussed below. 
269  Par 10. Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting 
European Standards 15. In R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte 
Welch (Unreported) Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/3206/99 at [8] it 
was found that the term “insanity” is to be understood in its legal meaning: 
From (the available evidence) it was quite impossible for the Board to be 
satisfied that at the time of committing the act Mr Gorman was labouring 
under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know 
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know that he 
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is proof that the injuries were caused by a crime of violence and not merely an 
accident. Cane270 points out the theoretical anomaly in requiring criminal intention to 
injure in the case of a sane adult offender on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
determining in the case of a child or an insane person whether they had the requisite 
intention when they are legally incapable of forming intention. The Court of Appeal 
held in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel, ex parte August and 
Brown271 that the correct approach is not to regard the classification of particular 
offences as a question of law, but to treat the inquiry whether a crime of violence has 
been perpetrated as a question of fact, the answer depending on “a reasonable and 
literate man’s understanding of the circumstances in which he could under the 
scheme be paid compensation for personal injury caused by a crime of violence.” 
The offence charged was buggery272 involving a thirteen year old, an offence which 
could be committed with or without physical violence and where the consent of the 
victim was immaterial. The court decided that it was open to the Board to take the 
applicant’s consent into consideration in deciding whether a crime of violence had 
been committed. In another case the court found that intercourse with a girl aged 
twelve did not per se amount to a crime of violence.273 
 
Compensation is paid in respect of personal injury, which includes not only physical 
injury, but also mental injury and disease. Mental injury or disease can result from a 
physical injury or a sexual offence (without any physical injury). In Millar (P's curator 
bonis) v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board274 P was conceived as a result of 
incestuous sexual intercourse between a man and his fifteen-year-old daughter. P 
had severe congenital mental and physical handicaps arising directly from the 
consanguinity of her parents. It was held that the concept of injury presupposes a 
pre-injury state capable of comparison with the post-injury state. As P never had, nor 
                                                                                                                             
did not know what he was doing was wrong. Consequently, their finding 
that he was a person with learning difficulties, and therefore did not have 
a sound mind, is not a finding that he was insane. 
270  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 261. 
271  [2001] 2 All ER 874 Par 22 - 24 (joined appeals). The court referred with 
approval to R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Warner [1986] 2 All 
ER 478, sub nom R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Webb [1987] 
QB 74. See also R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Schofield [1971] 
2 All ER 1011, [1971] 1 WLR 926 DC at 1013D; R (on the application of E) v Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel (supra). 
272  Sexual Offences Act 1956 s 12. 
273  R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Piercy (Unreported) Queen's 
Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/399/96. See also Miers D Compensation for 
Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European Standards 13. 
274  44 BMLR 70. 
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could have, any unaffected existence, she had not sustained a personal injury. 
Personal injury can best be illustrated diagrammatically:275 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Injuries arising from the use of a vehicle are not covered by the Scheme unless the 
vehicle was used deliberately to inflict injury.276 The latter liability is also covered in 
terms of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau Agreements.277 In Gardner v Moore278 it was 
decided that the victim could choose between the two systems, the court holding that 
remedies under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme and the Motor Insurers’ 
Bureau Agreement are not necessarily mutually exclusive alternatives.279  
                                            
275  See Par 9. 
 276  An example of this would be road rage. R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 
 ex parte Marsden [2000] RTR 21; R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte 
 Keane and Another (Unreported) Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) 
 CO/650/96, CO/581/96. 
277  Par 11. See Par 5 3 1 (supra). 
278  [1984] AC 548. 
279  (Supra) 562E. Injuries caused by dogs will be considered only if the dog was 
deliberately set on the injured person or if the attack was the result of the owner’s 
failure to control an animal which was known to be vicious towards humans and the 
lack of control amounted to recklessness: Guide Par 7.20. 
Physical 
injury 
Mental injury or disease resulting 
from physical injury. 
Endured a reasonable fear of immediate 
personal physical harm; or 
Was a non-consenting victim to a sexual 
offence (which does not include a victim 
who consented in fact but was deemed in 
law not to have consented; or 
Had a close relationship with the person 
suffering physical or mental injury, and 
witnessed it (or was closely involved in the 
aftermath thereof); or 
Was employed in the business of a railway 
and witnessed (or was closely involved in 
the aftermath of) another person sustaining 
physical injury directly attributable to the 
offence of trespass on a railway. 
Mental injury or 
disease: 
 
*  Not resulting from 
physical injury; or  
 
*  Resulting from a 
sexual offence; 
 
Personal 
injury 
Providing 
the 
applicant: 
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Compensation may be withheld or reduced if the applicant:280 
 
Fails to take reasonable 
steps to report the matter to 
the appropriate authorities;281 
or 
 
Fails to co-operate with the 
police in bringing the 
assailant to justice; or 
 
Fails to give reasonable 
assistance to the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation 
Authority in connection with 
the application. 
Behaves in such a way 
(before, during or after282 the 
commission of the offence) 
as to render the giving of 
(full) compensation 
inappropriate (specific 
mention is made of the 
consumption by the victim of 
drugs or alcohol which 
contributes to the injury283). 
Appears by reason of his or 
her character (as shown by 
previous criminal convictions 
or other evidence available to 
the claims officer) to have 
rendered the granting of (full) 
compensation inappropriate. 
 
 
 
Regarding the previous convictions of the claimant, Miers284 states that “(t)he 
exclusion of those with criminal records has been an article of faith for the Scheme, 
irrespective of the absence of any causal relationship between the claimant’s 
character and the victimising event.” This applies not only to the conduct of the 
victim, but also to the conduct of the applicant where the victim has died since 
sustaining the injury (whether or not as a consequence thereof).285 
 
In the context of the applicant’s behaviour, Harpwood states:286 
 
                                            
280  Par 13. R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, ex parte Salt (Unreported) 
Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/1661/98 provides an example of how 
English courts interpret these provisions. The court relied on the Guide to the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme made by the Secretary of State under The 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 for the guidance of potential claimants, 
holding the Guide to be binding unless there are very good reasons to deviate from it. 
See also R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Maxted (Unreported) 
Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/2552/92. 
281  Only where there is a very good reason, will it be acceptable if the claimant did not 
make the report himself or herself, for example where the claimant is a child or has 
been injured in such a way as to render him or her unable to report the matter to the 
police: Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting 
European Standards 16. 
282  In R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Moore [1982] 2 All ER 90 the 
applicant’s claim was unsuccessful due to his conviction of an offence subsequent to 
his making application. 
283  Par 14. 
284  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
Standards 26. Regarding the precise meaning to be attached to the term “victim” in 
this context, see Miers D “Taking the Law into their own Hands: Victims as Offenders” 
in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice 
(2000) 77. 
285  Par 15. 
286  Op cit 232. 
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In the past, the Board took a moralistic approach to compensation in that it 
would reduce or withhold a payment in the light of the claimant’s own ‘way of 
life’, even if it was unconnected causally with the injury. 
 
She goes on to state that this attitude was criticised because it deprived the victim of 
a remedy when the law of tort would have allowed a claim. This led to the limitation of 
the grounds for the reduction or withholding of an award to those set out above. 
However, according to Cane287 the position is still that “even the most tenuous 
connection between the applicant’s conduct or character and the injuries can bar 
compensation” even though the Authority can no longer take into consideration the 
“way of life” of the claimant.  
 
The Guide makes specific mention of children playing dangerous games,288 
emphasizing that the behaviour of the assailant must amount to a crime of violence 
and that no award will be made where there is little to choose between the conduct of 
the assailant and the injured party. Likewise the Guide specifies instances of fighting 
where compensation is withheld.289 
 
The Guide provides a detailed scale of penalty points indicating the extent to which 
an applicant’s previous convictions reduce or nullify an award.290 
 
Awards will not be made if there is any likelihood that the assailant might benefit from 
the award. An award will also not be made to an applicant under eighteen years of 
age unless the claims officer is satisfied that it would not be against the victim’s 
interests.291 
 
                                            
287  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 265.  
288  Guide Par 7.22. 
289  Guide Par 8.14: 
Where the injury is suffered in the course of a fight in which the injured party 
was a voluntary participant, even if the degree of violence had escalated 
beyond that foreseen by the injured party. 
Where the injured party struck the first blow, even if the degree of retaliation 
was not commensurate with the act of aggression. 
Where the incident formed part of a pattern of violence between the parties in 
which the injured party was a voluntary participant. 
Where the injured party was attempting to exact revenge. 
Where the attack was provoked by the injured party. 
Where the injured party’s abuse of alcohol or illicit drugs contributed to the 
attack. 
290  Guide Pars 8.15 – 8.17.  
291  Par 16. 
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Where the victim and assailant were living in the same household as members of the 
same family at the time of the injury, the award will be withheld unless: 
 
? The assailant has been prosecuted (or the claims officer feels that there are 
good reasons why a prosecution was not instituted); and 
? In cases of violence between adults in the family: The applicant and assailant 
have ceased to live in the same household and are unlikely to do so again.292 
 
5 3 2 4  Categories of claims 
 
Compensation is paid out in respect of personal injuries and not for damage to or 
loss of property, with the exception of certain equipment under the category of 
special expenses. Loss of earnings are also provided for. There are five categories of 
claims.293 The total of all awards arising from an injury may not exceed £500 000, but 
must qualify for the minimum award, which is set at Level 1 (£1 000).294 The 
categories of claims are: 
                                            
292  Par 17. In the original system the co-habitation of the parties at the time of the 
injury was a absolute bar against compensation being awarded: R v Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board, ex parte Staten [1972] 1 All ER 1034 [1972] 1 WLR 569 136 JP 
311. 
293  Par 23: 
A standard amount to be determined by the nature of the injury with 
reference to the Tariff of Injuries. 
An additional amount in respect of loss of earnings where the applicant has 
lost earning capacity for more than 28 weeks. 
An additional amount in respect of special expenses where the applicant has 
lost earning capacity for more than 28 weeks. 
Benefits where the victim died. 
A supplementary amount where the victim died otherwise than as a 
consequence of the injury. 
294  Par 24 and 25. 
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Victim Standard 
Amount 
Injury: Physical, Mental, Sexual 
 
Tariff of Injuries: 
Level 1 (£1 000) to Level 25 (£250 000) 
 
Lump sum payment 
Additional 
Amount: Loss 
of Earnings 
After 28 weeks unemployed 
 
Ceiling: 1 ½ times gross average industrial earnings 
 
Lump sum payment calculated on principles of tort 
Additional 
Amount: 
Special 
After 28 weeks unemployed (or equivalent incapacitation) 
Physical aids 
Costs of (National Health Service and reasonable private 
health) treatment for the injury 
Special equipment 
Adaptations to accommodation 
Care (not available free of charge from public sector) 
Costs of the Court of Protection or of a curator bonis 
 
Calculated on principles of tort 
 
Victim’s 
Estate 
Funeral expenses 
Qualifying 
Claimants 
Supplementary 
Compensation 
Deceased would be entitled to compensation for loss of 
earnings and/or special expenses, but dies from causes not 
related to the criminal injury and before receiving the award. 
 
Calculated mutatis mutandis as Loss or Earnings and Special 
Expenses (supra) 
Standard Amount 
 
Level 10 or 13 
Standard 
Amount 
Dependency Loss of Income 
 
Calculated on principles of tort 
Payment in lieu of parent’s services at annual rate of Level 5: 
Special commitment given by parent 
 
Resultant losses: Actual costs incurred in replacing the 
deceased parent’s services 
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? Standard amount 
 
Under the administrative scheme compensation was calculated on a similar basis to 
tort damages, subject to certain restrictions.295 Following the precedent set by the tort 
system, payment was usually effected in the form of a lump sum. 
 
In 1994 the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, attempted to introduce a tariff system. 
This move was the subject of severe criticism on the basis that the tariff did not 
provide for adequate compensation.296 Ultimately the House of Lords ruled that the 
Home Secretary had acted ultra vires in attempting to introduce the new scheme 
without reference to Parliament.297 The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1995 
introduced a tariff-based scheme, albeit one more generous than the tariff proposed 
by the Home Secretary in 1994.298 The utilisation of a tariff-based scheme for non-
proprietary elements constitutes the major distinction between the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme and the common law of tort.299 
 
Miers300 summarises the benefits of the tariff-based scheme as follows: 
 
First, decisions in straightforward claims could be made speedily against 
publicly accessible injury descriptions with corresponding levels of award. 
Second, in the absence of any discretion under the tariff, decisions could be 
taken by relatively junior officials, rather than by the more experienced, and 
more expensive, Board members. Third, being no longer tied to increases in 
common law damages, the government could control exactly the tariff sums 
payable for each level of injury. 
 
                                            
295  Jones M A Textbook on Torts 470: 
An earnings limit of one and a half times the gross average industrial 
earnings. 
Deduction of all social security benefits and certain pensions. 
No allowance for the cost of private medical treatment unless it was 
essential. 
No exemplary damages. 
See also Harpwood V Principles of Tort Law 232; R v Secretary of State for the Home 
 Department and another: ex parte C Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) 
 O/3598/97; Cantwell v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board [2001] UKHL 36 2002 
 SCLR 185 2002 SC (HL) at [1]: 
(T)he scheme provided for the assessment of compensation on the basis of 
common law damages… 
296  See previous footnote. 
297  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 
2 AC 513 [1995] 2 All ER 244 [1995] 2 WLR 464. 
298  Harpwood V Principles of Tort Law 233. 
299  Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority Third Annual Report 1998 – 1999 Par 1.1. 
300  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
Standards 9. 
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The Scheme operates on the basis of a scale of fixed Levels of Compensation 
ranging from Level 1 (£1 000) to Level 25 (£250 000). The Tariff of Injuries attaches a 
level to a particular injury.301 Provision is made for mental illness. Different levels are 
attached to injuries of abuse (physical and sexual) depending on whether the victim 
is an adult or a child (a person under the age of eighteen). No distinction is made on 
the basis of subjective factors such as gender, age (other than where the victim is a 
child) and the financial circumstances of the victim.302 Provision is made for the 
addition of items to the Tariff of Injuries for which there is no current provision.303  
 
Where a tariff award is made in respect of a physical injury or a sexual offence, no 
separate award will be made for any accompanying mental injury because 
compensation for the latter is included in the tariff amount. However, in the case of 
physical injuries only, an additional award will be made for a mental injury if it carries 
a higher tariff award.304 
 
? Additional amount: loss of earnings 
 
This entitlement occurs only if the victim has lost earning capacity for more than 28 
weeks305 (because he or she will receive statutory sick pay for the first 28 weeks of 
continuing injury306). Social security benefits are thus deducted from compensation 
paid by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, and not vice versa. 
 
Various factors are taken into consideration when calculating loss of earnings.307 Lost 
earnings are calculated in terms of tables.308 Payment takes the form of a lump sum. 
                                            
301  For example minor multiple injuries are categorised as Level 1, while 
quadraplegia/tetraplegia is categorised at Level 25. Infection with HIV/AIDS comes in 
at Level 17, and so on. The Tariff of Injuries is detailed in nature, extending as it does 
from pages 22 to 54 of the document.  
302  Jones M A Textbook on Torts 471; Burn (1996) 93 (12) Law Society Gazette 22. 
303  Pars 28 – 29. In such cases the Criminal Injuries Compensation Panel may make a 
recommendation to the Secretary of State. 
304  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
Standards 19. 
305  Par 30. 
306  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
Standards 19. 
307  Par 31: 
Emoluments at the time of injury; 
Emoluments which became payable during the time of incapacity (whether 
arising from the injury or not); 
Changes in the applicant’s pension rights; 
Future social security, insurance and pension benefits; and 
Any other future pension. 
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For these calculations a ceiling of one and a half times the gross average industrial 
earnings is set for the emoluments of the victim.309 
 
? Additional amount: special expenses 
 
This category also comes into effect only if the injured person was deprived of 
earning capacity for more than 28 weeks. The “special expenses” envisaged are: 
 
? Loss of equipment used as a physical aid; 
? Costs associated with National Health Service treatment for the injury; 
? Costs of reasonable private health treatment; and 
? Reasonable costs of special equipment, adaptations to the applicant’s 
accommodation, care (which is not available free of charge from the public 
sector) and costs of the Court of Protection or of a curator bonis. 
 
While compensation for personal injury is calculated in accordance with the Tariff of 
Injuries, compensation for loss or earnings and special expenses is calculated in 
substantially the same way as for the law of tort.310 
 
? Compensation in fatal cases 
 
In the case of fatality, only funeral expenses are recoverable by the estate of the 
deceased.311 However, qualifying claimants have claims for compensation.312 
 
A person who is criminally liable for the death of the deceased cannot be a qualifying 
claimant.313 
 
                                                                                                                             
308  Note 3 of the Scheme’s founding document contains these tables. 
309  Par 34. 
310  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
Standards 19. 
311  Par 37. 
312  Par 38 defines “qualifying claimants” as: 
Partners (including same sex partners and dependent former spouses); 
Parents (including persons accepted as such by the deceased); and  
Children (including persons accepted as such by the deceased). 
313  Par 39. 
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The categories of compensation to which a qualifying claimant may be entitled are: 
 
? Supplementary compensation 
 
 “Supplementary compensation” may be paid to a qualifying claimant where a 
deceased who would have been entitled to compensation for loss of earnings and/or 
special expenses dies from causes not related to the criminal injury before receiving 
the award or even making application therefor.314 The amounts are calculated as 
explained above for loss of earnings and special expenses mutatis mutandis, subject 
to the usual ceiling of £500 000. 
 
? Standard amount 
 
If the victim has died as a result of the criminal injury, the qualifying claimant will be 
compensated on Level 13 (£11 000). If there is more than one qualifying claimant, 
each receives compensation on Level 10 (£5 500). A former spouse does not qualify 
under this heading.315 
 
? Dependency316 
 
A qualifying claimant financially or physically dependent on the deceased has a claim 
for loss of income which will be calculated mutatis mutandis in the same way as loss 
of earnings are calculated where the victim did not die. The claims officer will take 
into consideration the amount of the deceased’s earnings which the deceased 
utilised for his or her own maintenance in determining the value of the dependency, 
as well as the claimant’s own income from other sources. Where the deceased’s only 
normal income was derived from social security benefits, the claimant will have no 
claim under this heading. 
 
The qualifying claimant’s remarriage prospects are not to be taken into account in 
assessing the amount claimable.317 Traditionally the remarriage prospects of widows 
                                            
314  Par 44. An award becomes vested in a victim as soon as the Authority has made 
the award and if the victim dies thereafter the award passes to his or her estate even 
though the victim had not accepted or received payment of the award before dying: R 
v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Tong [1977] 1 All ER 171 [1976] 1 
WLR 1237 141 JP 105; R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain 
[1967] 2 QB 864 [1967] 2 All ER 770 [1967] 3 WLR 348. 
315  Par 39. 
316  Pars 40 – 41. 
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were taken into consideration in the law of tort when assessing their loss of support 
from their deceased husbands. In the evolving view of society this practice became 
unacceptable.318 The disregard of the widow’s remarriage prospects has been 
criticised because it “involves extraordinary generosity to one group of accident 
victims without regard to the needs of others.”319 A solution would be to effect 
periodical payments to widows – rather than a lump sum – subject to review as their 
circumstances change.320 
 
In cases where the qualifying claimant is under the age of eighteen, a payment in lieu 
of the “parent’s services at an annual rate of Level 5,” as well as other payments to 
cover “resultant losses” are available.321 The former amount (£2 000) is intended “to 
mark the special commitment given by a parent to a child”322 while the latter refers to 
the actual costs incurred in replacing the deceased parent’s services.323  
 
Dependency applications are not thwarted by the fact that an award had been made 
to the deceased before his or her death, but will be reduced by the amount paid to 
the deceased.324 
 
5 3 2 5  Deduction of other payments 
 
The following amounts are deductible in full from compensation for the same 
contingency, but not from amounts based on the Tariff of Injuries: 
 
? Social security benefits (or other state benefits); and 
? Insurance payments.325 
 
Before the institution of the tariff-based scheme in 1996, deductions could generally 
be made from the total award, and not just from the heads of damage to which they 
                                                                                                                             
317  Par 41. 
318  In 1971 the Fatal Accident Act was amended to reflect this view. See Buckley v John 
Allen & Ford Ltd [1968] 1 QB 845; Winn Committee Report Report of the Committee 
on Personal Injuries Litigation Cmnd 3691 1968. 
319  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (4th ed) 157. 
320  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (4th ed) 157. 
321  Par 42. 
322  Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority Third Annual Report 1998 – 1999 Par 1.3. 
323  Examples are the surviving parent giving up employment and paid help being 
obtained for the care of the minor. 
324  Par 44. The £500 000 overall limit applies to the total of payments to the victim 
and payments to qualifying claimants. 
325  Par 45. 
  
225
referred. The institution of the Tariff of Injuries has brought about what Miers326 refers 
to as the “ring-fencing” of general damages, in that tariff-based amounts are 
protected from deduction. 
 
Where the victim is alive, the amount for loss of earnings will be reduced by the 
amount of any pension the victim receives. Where the victim has died as a result of 
the injury, the amount due under the heading Dependency will be reduced by any 
pension the qualifying claimant receives as a result of the death.327 
 
A comparison can be made between the provisions of the Social Security (Recovery 
of Benefits) Act328 dealing with the recovery from social security benefits of damages 
received in personal injury actions, and the equivalent provisions of the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Scheme. Only amounts received in respect of damages for 
loss of earnings, the cost of care and loss of mobility329 during the relevant period 
(five years)330 may be recovered from social security benefits, whereas the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Scheme331 refers to “social security benefits (or other state 
benefits) or insurance payments” without any limitations. Also the limit of five years 
does not apply to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. The Act also does not 
apply in fatal cases, whereas the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme has the 
provisions set out above in this regard. An award will also be reduced by the full 
amount that the applicant has received in the form of:332 
 
? Damages awarded by a civil court; and 
? Damages paid by way of a settlement; and 
? Damages awarded by a criminal court.  
 
In this case the “ring-fencing” referred to above does not protect tariff-based 
amounts. Miers333 states that, where the offender can be required to pay for the 
                                            
326  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
Standards 22. 
327  Par 47. 
328  1997. 
329  Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 Schedule 2. 
330  Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 s 3. 
331  Par 45. 
332  Par 48. 
333  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
 Standard 23. 
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victim’s injuries, the taxpayer should be relieved of the burden, but by comparison 
with the annual total of awards, such sums are very small.334  
 
An applicant will be required to reimburse the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Authority upon receipt of any amount from one of the abovementioned sources 
subsequent to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority claim being paid out.335 
However, no provision is made in terms of which the claimant is obliged to institute 
civil proceedings and there is no provision for the subrogation of the victim’s civil 
rights to the state. 
 
5 3 2 6  Method of payment 
 
A lump sum is the normal method of payment.336 However, provision337 is made for: 
 
? Trusts; 
? Repayment and/or administration of an award; 
? Imposition of conditions attaching to an award; 
? Interim payments; and 
? Purchase of annuities. 
 
Though an award vests in the applicant upon notification of acceptance thereof, 
provision can be made for the balance of a trust fund to revert to the Authority.338 No 
provision is made for payment of a regular, periodical income to the applicant. 
 
5 3 2 7 Procedural aspects, the reconsideration of awards, re-opening of 
cases, reviews and appeals 
 
Claims are determined by claims officers, and a time limit of two years is set for the 
institution of claims.339 The onus to prove a claim (on a balance of probabilities340) is 
                                            
334  Statistics support his conclusions. Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority Third 
Annual Report 1998 – 1999 15; 28: In 1997/1998 the amount recouped by the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme in criminal court restitution orders was £159 
980, while £5 500 was recouped from other sources, including civil actions. The 
corresponding amounts in respect of 1998/1999 were £345 941 and £53 113, 
respectively. In 1998/1999 a total amount of £105 906 250 was paid out to claimants. 
335  Par 49. 
336  Par 51. 
337  Pars 50 – 52. 
338  Par 50. 
339  Par 18. This can be waived under appropriate circumstances if it is reasonable 
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placed on the applicant. Though legal representation is allowed, the cost thereof is 
not borne by the Scheme.341 Although written notification of the decision by the 
claims officer to the applicant is required, the appropriate paragraph342 does not 
require the giving of reasons by the claims officer. 
 
Provision is made for the reconsideration of an award before final payment in the 
case of new evidence or a change in circumstances.343 A claims officer can re-open 
a case “where there has been such a material change in the victim’s medical 
condition that injustice would occur if the original assessment of compensation were 
allowed to stand, or where he has since died in consequence of the injury.”344 This is 
limited to a period of two years after the final decision unless the claims officer is 
satisfied that there is no “need for further extensive enquiries.”345 
 
Provision is made for the review of decisions by claims officers.346 A review is 
conducted by a more senior claims officer. Reasons must be given with the written 
notification of the outcome of the review, unlike in the case of the original decision by 
the claims officer.347 In R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Cook348 
the following was said:  
 
                                                                                                                             
and in the interests of justice to do so. Particular problems are encountered in cases 
of sexual abuse of minors where a decision has to be made regarding the point at 
which the victim can be said to become aware of his or her right to claim. This is a 
question of fact which will have to be decided on the merits of each case: KR and 
others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd (in liquidation) and another [2003] 
EWCA Civ 85, [2003] 3 WLR 107, [2003] 1 FLR 1203, [2003] 1 FCR 385 and R (on 
the application of M) v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel [2003] EWHC 
243 (Admin), CO/4185/2002. 
340  Par 20. 
341  Par 19. 
342  Par 50. 
343  Par 53. 
344  Par 56. 
345  Par 57. The criteria for re-opening were set out as follows in R v Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board ex parte Williams (unreported) Queen's Bench Division (Crown 
Office List) CO/209/99 at [11]: 
I remind myself that my role is restricted to determining whether or not the 
decision is one which a reasonable Chairman, properly directing himself, 
could reach. In my judgment, the Chairman had to ask two questions. The 
first question is whether or not the applicant’s condition is directly attributable 
to the original injury. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, the 
second question is whether or not injustice would occur if the original 
assessment of compensation were allowed to stand. 
346  Pars 58 to 60. In Regina v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A  
[1999] 2 AC 330 the procedural aspects of review were canvassed. 
347  Pars 50 and 60. 
348  [1996] 2 All ER 144 [1996] 1 WLR 1037 per Aldous L J at p 150C. 
  
228
I believe it is clear that the board's reasons should contain sufficient detail to 
enable the reader to know what conclusion has been reached on the principal 
important issue or issues, but it is not a requirement that they should deal 
with every material consideration to which it has had regard. 
 
In R (on the application of M) v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel349 the 
importance of giving reasons was underlined: 
 
In my judgment the failure to give proper reasons is fatal. I shall assume, for 
the purposes of argument, that the failure to give proper reasons should not 
lead to the quashing of the decision if the conclusion reached by the Panel 
was the only possible conclusion on the evidence. 
 
 
An applicant can appeal to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel 
against review decisions.350 Adjudicators appointed by the Secretary of State serve 
on the Appeals Panel.351 
 
The appellant may bring a friend or legal adviser to assist in presenting the case, but 
the costs of representation will be for the account of the appellant. The adjudicators 
may, however direct the Panel to meet reasonable expenses incurred by the 
appellant and any person who attends to give evidence at the hearing.352 The 
procedure at hearings is informal. The adjudicators are not bound by rules of 
evidence. The appellant, the claims officer presenting the appeal and the 
adjudicators may call witnesses to give evidence and may cross-examine them.353 
 
The appellant may be represented354 and proof355 on a balance of probabilities is 
required.356 Hearings take place in private, but the panel may, subject to the consent 
of the appellant, allow observers, such as representatives of the media. However, the 
identity of the appellant must be protected.357 As in the case of reviews, reasons 
must be given for the decision.358 
 
                                            
349  [2001] EWHC Admin 720 at [72]. 
350  Pars 61 – 68. Pars 61 – 82 provide full details of the grounds for and procedure to be 
followed in appeals.  
351  Par 2. 
352  Par 74. 
353  Par 75. 
354  Par 74. 
355  The onus of proof rests on the claimant. 
356  Par 64 
357  Par 76. 
358  Pars 71 and 77. 
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Provision is also made for the rehearing of appeals where the appellant was not 
present at the original hearing.359 
 
Decisions on appeal are subject to judicial review.360 Regarding the courts’ role in the 
latter instance, the following principles were stated in R v Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board ex parte Thompstone; R v Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Board ex parte Crowe:361 
 
Is the applicant an appropriate recipient of an ex gratia compensatory 
payment made at the public expense? As with all discretionary decisions, 
there will be cases where the answer is clear one way or the other and cases 
which are on the borderline and in which different people might reach 
different decisions... the court can and should only intervene if the board has 
misconstrued its mandate or its decision is plainly wrong. (Emphasis added) 
 
In terms of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime promulgated in terms of the 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act, various obligations are placed upon the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Appeals Panel to ensure that claimants receive efficient service. One of the 
provisions is that, in the event of a claim for compensation being refused or reduced, 
an explanation must be given for the decision.362 
 
5 3 2 7  Evaluation 
 
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme adheres to the policy of compensating 
innocent victims only. In the scope of victim’s rights and restorative justice, this gives 
rise to questions of the exact meaning of the term victim. This arises when the 
person attacked takes the law into his or her own hands and fights back, injuring his 
or her assailant and the Scheme has to make a value judgment of what constitutes 
an “innocent” victim.363 In a case where a burglar had been shot (non-fatally) by a 
                                            
359  Pars 79 – 82. 
360  R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain (supra); R (on the 
application of Gravett) v Criminal Injury Compensation Appeals Panel (supra); R (on 
the application of Brierley) v Criminal Injury Compensation Authority [2001] EWHC 
Admin, CO/2106/2001; Harpwood V Principles of Tort Law 232. 
361  [1984] 1 WLR 1234 at 1239. This dictum was underwritten by the Queen's Bench 
Division in The Queen On The Application of Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals 
Panel v Shields [2001] ELR 164 at [23]. 
362  At 13.5. See generally Ch 4 Par 4 3 2 3 (supra). 
363  See Par 5 3 2 3 (supra). 
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householder, the Scheme withheld compensation,364  despite the burglar being 
entitled to a tortious claim. Miers365 justifies this on the basis that the taxpayer ought 
not to compensate offenders who just happen to become victims at the time of their 
own offending. While there is no doubt as to the probity of this attitude, it is 
conceivable that a situation of such great imbalance might arise that this principle 
would not be unassailable, for example, in the case of a youthful pickpocket shot 
when trying to steal a very small amount of money. This highlights the necessity to 
conduct an ongoing consideration of the content to be given to the concept of victim 
and the fact that private law and public law have different aims. What the South 
African perspective would be in the light of the Constitution, is a question which might 
vex the Constitutional Court in the future.366 The meaning of “victim-hood” becomes 
even more vexed when considering the Scheme’s inclusion of railway employees 
witnessing someone being injured while trespassing on a railway (usually to commit 
suicide):367 While the need to compensate such an observer is not disputed, the 
question arises whether the spectator is a victim of crime or a victim of a work-related 
injury. This kind of dilemma strengthens the view that the compartmentalisation of 
state-funded compensation according to the cause of the misfortune serves little 
purpose and is due for revisiting.368 This is borne out by Cane’s opinion that there are 
already various social security benefits available to victims of misfortune and there is 
no reason why victims of crime should be singled out for different treatment.369 Other 
writers have suggested that the Scheme is simply a cynical buying of victim 
cooperation370 or “essentially a symbolic act to show… concern for victims.”371 
 
The Scheme’s impact on English law is evidenced by Hill v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire372 where the Scheme’s existence was a factor in the court’s declining to 
impose a duty of care on the police in relation to victims of un-apprehended 
criminals. Some writers suggest that due to the success of the Scheme “…the law 
                                            
364  See Miers D “Taking the Law into their own Hands: Victims as Offenders” in Crawford 
A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice (2000) 
Ashgate, Dartmouth 77 91. 
365  See previous footnote. 
366  See Ch 1 Par 1 1 (supra). 
367  See Par 5 3 2 3 (supra). 
368  See generally Ch 6 (infra). 
369  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 253. 
370  Zedner L “Victims” in Maguire M Morgan R & Reiner R (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology 2 ed (1997) 577. 
371  Miers D in Meintjies-van der Walt L “Towards Victim Empowerment Strategies in the 
Criminal Justice Process” (1998) 11(2) SA Journal of Criminal Justice 157 172. 
372  [1989] A C 53. See also discussion of this case in Ch 3 Par 3 4 3.(supra). 
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relating to intentional torts has already been superseded.”373 This conclusion is 
based on the sizable amounts paid out by the Scheme and the financial inability of 
offenders to effect restitution. Thus the Scheme is altering the application of English 
law. However, concerning abuse of power by agencies of the state, the demise of the 
tortious action is not foreseen.374 In Z v United Kingdom375 the European Court of 
Human Rights held that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, while providing 
assistance to victims of crime, did not on its own satisfy the absolute obligation to 
protect persons from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
imposed by the European Convention on Human Rights.376  
 
The tariff system is controversial, as it does not consider the personal circumstances 
of the victim. The main factor in its favour is that it promotes transparency and the 
swift finalisation of claims.377 
 
According to empirical evidence gleaned in various countries, the low number of 
eligible claimants actually being successful in their claims is due to a lack of 
communication of basic information regarding compensation schemes. 378 The Code 
of Practice for Victims of Crime’s379 Section 13 deals with the rights of claimants in 
relation to the Scheme; many of these rights are calculated to improve 
communication between claimants and the Scheme. Section 5.3 places the 
obligation on the police to inform victims of victim support services available; 
presumably this would refer also to the existence and workings of the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Scheme. Section 13 further states that claims ought to be 
finalised within twelve months of submission. This is not always possible due to, for 
example, delays in the development of a full medical prognosis or the finalisation of 
the criminal trial for the evaluation of issues such as provocation. However, in 1998 – 
1999, 81,7% of claims received a decision within twelve months, the target having 
                                            
373  Jones M A Textbook on Torts 472 quoting Veitch & Miers (1975) 38 MLR 139 152. 
374  See previous footnote and Ch 3 Par 3 4 3 (supra). 
375  Supra. See also discussion of this case in Ch 3 Par 3 4 3 (supra). 
376  Article 3. 
377  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th ed) 267; Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Authority Third Annual Report 1998 – 1999 Par 1.2. 
378  Groenhuijsen M “International Protocols on Victims’ Rights and some Reflections on 
significant recent Developments in Victimology” in Davis L & Snyman R Victimology 
in South Africa (2005) 335 337. 
379  Par 13 6. See Ch 4 Par 4 3 2 3 (supra). 
 Code: Website of the Criminal Justice System 
 (July 2006) http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_code.pdf 
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been set at 90%. In many cases interim payments had already been made.380 During 
1998 – 1999 the first decision was accepted by claimants in 76,2% of claims. Of 
claims submitted to review, acceptance of 66,4% of decisions was recorded. Only 
8,9% of claims submitted went on appeal before the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Appeal Panel.381 During the same period 40 164 awards were made totalling an 
amount of £113,8m. Of this amount £102,2m resulted from payments under the tariff 
and £11,5m was paid for loss of earnings and/or medical/care costs in personal injury 
claims and dependency, loss of parental services and funeral expenses in fatal 
claims.382 A diagrammatical representation of disallowed claims displays the 
following tendencies:383 
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1 Delay in reporting the matter to the 
police. 
6 Claim not submitted within 2 years. 
2 Failure to cooperate with the police. 7 Injury below £1 000 minimum. 
3 Failure to cooperate with CICA. 8 Injury not resulting form crime. 
4 Conduct before, during and after 
incident. 
9 Other, e.g. pre-existing medical condition. 
5 Applicant’s criminal record.  
 
 
A calculation based on these figures shows that applicants’ own behaviour 
accounted for 47,8% of disallowed claims. 
                                            
380  Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority Third Annual Report 1998 – 1999 Par 2.7 – 
2.11. 
381  Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority Third Annual Report 1998 – 1999 Par 3.3. 
382  Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority Third Annual Report 1998 – 1999 Par 3.7. 
383  Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority Third Annual Report 1998 – 1999 Annex B.  
The total number of disallowed claims was 36 889. 
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Though Legal Aid is not available and there is no defendant against whom an order 
for costs can be made,384 many solicitors are willing to act on the understanding that 
their remuneration will be paid out of the ultimate award. Statistically, legal 
representation has been shown to have a positive effect on the success rate of 
claims.385 In 1990, Victim Support, the Law Society and the Trades Union Congress 
advocated giving the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board386 the power to pay 
applicants’ costs of investigating claims.387 This has not been generally 
implemented.388 
 
General legal opinion regarding the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
Despite strong criticism… the scheme has been regarded as a popular 
success.389 
 
Comparing the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme with similar schemes in 
other European Union countries, Miers390 states: 
 
That said, it seems to me that the UK model tends to maximal rather than the 
minimal provision. 
 
 
                                            
384  Guide Par 1.3. Applicants are referred to their local Citizens Advice Bureau or 
Law Centre for advice and to Victim Support for assistance. 
385  Cane P Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law  (6th ed)  271. 
386  Now the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. 
387  Home Affairs Committee Compensating Victims Quickly: the Administration of the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (HC 92, 1989 – 1990). 
388  Par 21 allows a claims officer to refer an applicant for a medical examination and 
provides that “reasonable expenses incurred by the applicant in that connection will 
be met by the Authority.” 
389  Jones M A Textbook on Torts 472. 
390  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
Standards 27. 
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5 4 India 
 
5 4 1 Legislation 
 
5 4 1 1  Workmen’s Compensation Act391 
 
An employer is required to effect restitution when an employee has:392 
 
? Suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, resulting 
in death, permanent total disablement, permanent partial disablement, or 
temporary disablement whether total or partial; or 
? Contracted an occupational disease. 
 
Any contract which seeks to limit the liability of the employer in terms of the Act is 
deemed to be unenforceable.393 However the employer is not liable: 
 
? Where the total or partial disablement of the employee does not continue for a 
period exceeding three days;394 
? In respect of any injury not resulting in death, caused by an accident which is 
directly attributable to:395 
o The employee having been at the time thereof under the influence or 
drugs, or 
o The wilful disobedience of an order or rule expressly intended to 
secure the safety of employees, or 
o The wilful removal or disregard of any safeguard or device provided 
for the purpose of securing the safety of employees. The burden of 
proving intentional disobedience rests upon the employer. 
                                            
391  8 of 1923. Because compensation payable to the employee is paid by the employer 
through the office of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, the decision 
whether this Act should be included in this chapter (dealing with state funded 
compensation) or Ch 4 (dealing with offender restitution) is vexed. It is dealt with in 
this chapter as the Act does not deal specifically with offender restitution and the 
compensation payable is not based on the criminal or common law civil liability or 
fault of the employer. However, the employee’s claim is forfeited where the 
employee’s own drunkenness or wilful act leads to the injury. 
392  S 3. This includes employees employed by a contractor, but excludes casual 
employees. 
393  S 17. 
394  S 3(1)(a). 
395  S 3(1)(b). 
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? When the employee has contacted a disease which is not directly attributable 
to the occupation;396 or 
? When the employee has filed a suit for damages against the employer – or 
any other person – in a civil court.397 
 
Disablement, which is the loss of the earning capacity, can be classified as total or 
partial. It can further be classified as permanent or temporary.  Section 4 deals with 
the quantification of compensation. An accident arising out of employment implies a 
causal connection between the accident/injury, and the work done in the course of 
employment. Employment should be the distinctive and the proximate cause of the 
injury. The three tests for determining whether an accident arose out of employment 
are: 
 
? At the time of injury the employee must have been engaged in the business of 
the employer and must not have been doing something for personal benefit; 
? The accident must have occurred at the place where he or she was 
performing his or her duties; and 
? The injury must have resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of 
service, or inherent in the nature or condition of the employment. 
 
Workers employed in certain types of occupations are exposed to the risk of 
contracting certain diseases, which are peculiar and inherent to those occupations. A 
worker contracting an occupational disease is deemed to have suffered an accident 
out of and in the course of employment and the employer is liable to pay 
compensation.398 
 
Payment is not effected to the employee directly. It is deposited, along with the 
prescribed statement, with the Commissioner who will then pay it to the employee. A 
receipt of deposit from the Commissioner serves as sufficient proof of the discharge 
of the employer’s liability.399 
 
Where the amount payable as compensation has been settled by agreement, a 
memorandum thereof is sent by the employer to the Commissioner, who registers it. 
                                            
396  S 3(4). 
397  S 3(5). 
398  S 3(2). 
399  S 8. 
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Where it appears to the Commissioner that the agreement ought not to be registered 
by reason of the inadequacy of the amount, or that the agreement has been obtained 
by fraud, undue influence or other improper means, he or she may refuse to record 
the agreement and may make such order (including therein any sum already paid 
under the agreement) as he or she thinks just in the circumstances. A registered 
agreement is enforceable under the Act.400 When an agreement is not registered, the 
employer remains liable to pay the full amount of compensation in terms of the Act.401 
 
A claim for compensation is made through the Commissioner. No claim for 
compensation is considered by the Commissioner unless a notice of accident has 
been given by the employee in the prescribed manner,402 except in the following 
circumstances:403 
 
? In cases of the death of the employee resulting from an accident which 
occurred on the premises of the employer, or at any place where the 
employee was working at the time of the accident if the employee died on 
such premises or at such place or in its vicinity; 
? Where the employer has knowledge of the accident from any other source, at 
or about the time of its occurrence; or 
? Where the failure to give notice was due to sufficient cause. 
 
Employers commonly negotiate insurance policies to indemnify themselves against 
liability in terms of the Act. Section 14 of the Act specifically protects the interests of 
the employee in cases where the employer is insolvent, or in liquidation. In such 
cases the employee obtains the rights which the employer would have had against 
the insurer, despite any legal provisions regarding the employer’s insolvency. Should 
the amount of the insurer’s liability not provide full compensation to the employee (as 
required by the Act), the employee obtains the right to prove for the balance in the 
insolvency or liquidation proceedings.404 
 
The employee who accepts benefits in terms of the Act loses his or her civil claim 
against all parties, not just the employer. 
 
                                            
400  S 28. 
401  S 29. 
402  S 10(1). 
403  S 10(4). 
404  S 14(2). 
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The fact that employers usually negotiate insurance policies to indemnify themselves, 
though not a statutory requirement, indicates that this Act stops just short of creating 
a system of statutory insurance. De facto, however, a similar effect is achieved. 
 
5 4 1 2  Motor Vehicles Act405 
 
Section 140 legislates the no-fault liability of the owner of a motor vehicle to pay 
damages where death or permanent disablement has resulted from an accident 
arising from the use of a motor vehicle. The amount payable in respect of death is a 
fixed sum of Rs50 000 and the amount payable in respect of permanent disablement 
is a fixed sum of Rs25 000. The claimant is not required to prove that the death or 
permanent disablement was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner 
of the vehicle or any other person. A claim is not affected by reason of any wrongful 
act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent 
disablement the claim has been made. These factors also do not influence the 
quantum of the amount recoverable. The claim is instituted before the Motor 
Accidents Claims Tribunal406 and is independent of any other claim which the injured 
party or dependents might have. If the owner is liable to pay damages on grounds of 
fault in addition to the no-fault liability provisions of section 140, the Act provides for a 
pro rata reduction of the amount payable in terms of section 140. 
 
Section 146 imposes compulsory motor vehicle (or third party) insurance. In the case 
of a vehicle carrying dangerous or hazardous goods a policy of insurance under the 
Public Liability Insurance Act is also required.407 The insurance policy must comply 
with the following requirements:408 
 
? It must be issued by an authorised insurer. 
? It must cover the insured against liability arising from the use of the vehicle in 
a public place in respect of: 
o Death of or bodily injury to any person; 
o Liability to the owner of goods carried in the vehicle; and 
o Damage to any property of a third party. 
 
                                            
405  59 of 1988. 
406  Government of Tamil Nadu State Transport Authority website 
(July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/sta/roads.htm 
407  6 of 1991. The Public Liability Insurance Act will be considered below. 
408  S 147. 
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Section 163 provides for fixed amounts of damages being paid409 in cases where the 
details of the vehicle causing the death or injury are unknown – the hit and run 
scenario: 
 
? Rs 25 000 in cases of death. 
? Rs 12 500 in cases of “grievous hurt.”410 
 
The Act further empowers the Central Government to promulgate rules regarding the 
functioning of a scheme to be administered by the General Insurance Corporation for 
the purposes of paying compensation.411 Claims are to be submitted to specially 
created Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals,412 with a right of appeal to the High 
Court.413 
 
Court fees payable in cases of claims are relatively low, presumably to assist the 
victim.414 
 
Traffic accidents are a major problem in India and the protection provided by the Act 
is deemed to be insufficient. In addition to the cover provided by the Act, the state of 
Tamil Nadu has instituted a scheme known as the Chief Minister’s Accident Relief 
Fund.415 Under this Scheme, relief is provided to victims of road accidents or their 
families on the following scale: 
 
Death  Rs10 000  
Total Disability  Rs 6 000  
Loss or one eye or one limb  Rs 4 000 
Other cases  Rs 500  
 
 
                                            
409  By one of the general insurance companies nominated by the General Insurance 
 Corporation of India for each district: Government of Tamil Nadu State Transport 
Authority website (July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/sta/roads.htm 
410  S 163(3)(b) 
411  S 163. 
412  S 165. 
413  S 173. 
414  Government of Tamil Nadu State Transport Authority website 
(July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/sta/roads.htm  
Court fees for claims of Rs1 lakh are Rs372,50 and for claims over one lakh, 
Rs372,50 plus one percent of the remaining claim amount, while court fees in other 
cases are around 10% of the amount claimed. 
415  Government of Tamil Nadu State Transport Authority website 
(July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/sta/roads.htm 
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No application is required. Immediately after an accident, the Deputy Superintendent 
of Police sends a report to the Revenue Divisional Officer listing details of the 
accident, victims and injuries. The Revenue Divisional Officer sanctions relief as set 
out in the scale. This scheme is intended to provide immediate relief to victims of 
road accidents in the period before they receive statutory compensation under the 
Act. The amount granted under the scheme is not set off against the amount 
awarded in terms of the Act.  This is thus an unadulterated form of victim 
compensation, payable by the state. 
 
In addition, families of persons dying in accidents involving State Transport 
Undertaking buses in Tamil Nadu are entitled to relief at Rs50 000 per death under 
the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund. Orders are passed by Government on an ad hoc 
basis depending on the circumstances of the accident. The award is reduced by the 
amount awarded by the Revenue Divisional Officer as set out in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
In Tamil Nadu a police officer investigating a traffic accident, must, without waiting for 
the result of the investigation or prosecution, immediately obtain the appropriate 
application forms from the injured party or the legal representative of the deceased 
and forward them to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal as a claim in terms of the 
Motor Vehicles Act. The police officer must also gather full particulars of the 
insurance certificate of motor vehicles involved in the accident and furnish them to 
the injured party or legal representatives of the deceased. An officer investigating an 
accident must, after a case is registered, forward copies of the first information report 
relating to the accident to the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction; and 
to the President of the appropriate District Committee for Legal Aid and Advice. The 
officer investigating the accident must also, immediately after the accident is 
registered, furnish the particulars to the nearest Legal Aid Committee or Centre. Thus 
various duties are placed on the police force to assist the victim in obtaining relief. 
 
5 4 1 3  National Human Rights Act416 
 
This Act provides for the National Human Rights Commission which, inter alia:417 
 
                                            
416  1993, 10 of 1994. 
417  Ch III S 12(a). 
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(I)nquire(s), suo motu or on a petition presented to it by a victim or any 
person on his behalf, into a complaint of 
(i) violation of human rights or abetment thereof or 
(ii) negligence in the prevention of such violation,  
      by a public servant. 
 
The Commission is granted such “functions as it may consider necessary for the 
protection of human rights.”418  Section 18 specifically grants the Commission the 
power to: 
 
? Recommend the prosecution of the responsible persons (or other appropriate 
action) where the inquiry has disclosed violation of human rights or 
negligence in the prevention thereof by a public servant. 
? Approach the Court for such directions, orders or writs as it may deem 
necessary. 
? Recommend the grant of such immediate interim relief to victims as deemed 
necessary. 
 
The Commission does not have the authority to make decisions that are per se 
binding on the government, but has powers to make recommendations and to 
approach the Supreme Court in order to harness its powers. However, the 
Commission’s recommendations are implemented as a matter of course by the 
state.419  
 
Section 30 of the Act provides for the constitution of Human Rights Courts by the 
Chief Justice of the High Court “for the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences 
arising out of violation of human rights.” 
 
The National Human Rights Commission frequently directs the state to pay 
compensation to victims of human rights abuses by public servants:420 
 
                                            
418  See previous footnote. 
419  See following two footnotes. 
420  National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Website. 
 (July 2002) http://nhrc.nic.in/ 
For further examples see Mundrathi Law on Compensation:To Victims of Crime and 
 Abuse of Power 172 – 174. Often the order of the Commission explicitly allows for a 
 right of redress against the wrongdoer which can be exercised by the state, thus 
 introducing an element of restitution (see Ch 1 Par 1 3 1). Usually, however, it is the 
 state which pays the compensation. 
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? The Commission ordered the Government of Bihar to pay compensation to 
the father of a boy who was killed in indiscriminate police firing. 
? On 19 May 1999 the Commission gave its recommendations on a case of 
what was claimed to be an “encounter” by the Uttar Pradesh police resulting 
in the killing of four persons. The Commission found it to be a case of “fake 
encounter” and ordered the Government to pay compensation of Rs4 lakhs to 
the next of kin of each of the victims within a period of four weeks.421 
? Margaret Alva, a former union minister, approached the Commission 
concerning a denial of basic rights to shelter and security when people were 
ejected from their homes for the purposes of the Naval Sea Bird Project. The 
Commission ordered the Governments of Karnataka and India, inter alia, to 
report on rehabilitation and resettlement measures and to release funds for 
the payment of compensation to victims.  
? When a request for compensation from the widow of a man electrocuted by 
an electric wire lying on the ground was denied by the Bihar State Electricity 
Board, the Commission petitioned the Government of Bihar to pay her Rs2 
lakhs in lieu of immediate interim relief. 
? The Commission ordered immediate interim monetary compensation for nine 
members of a family in Raipur, Madhya Pradesh who were illegally detained 
by the police for fourteen days. During this period they were tortured and 
coerced to pay a sum of Rs50 000 to the concerned officials.  
? The Commission directed the Government of Uttar Pradesh to pay interim 
relief of Rs1 lakh to an eight-year old boy who came into contact with an 
electric transformer, leading to the amputation of his arms.  
 
Often the order of the Commission explicitly authorises a right of redress against the 
wrongdoer to be exercised by the state, thus introducing an element of restitution. 
However, the state pays compensation to the victim, independent of any right of 
redress against the perpetrator. 
 
                                            
421  One lakh is equal to a hundred thousand (105). A hundred lakhs make a crore or ten 
million: Wikipedia (Jul 2006) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lakh. 
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5 4 2 Victim Compensation In Tamil Nadu422 
 
The state of Tamil Nadu has a Victims Assistance Fund in terms of which the 
Government of Tamil Nadu compensates victims of crime. There are also other forms 
of victim compensation specifically created for victims of caste/communal violence 
and murder or rape committed by the police. 
  
5 4 2 1  Compensation for victims of caste and police violence  
 
These forms of compensation are prescribed by various Government Orders of the 
Government of Tamil Nadu and apply only in cases of: 
 
? Caste or communal violence. 
? Murder and rape perpetrated by the police. 
 
? Government Order Ms No 629 of 3 May 1991423 
 
This Government Order imposes a uniform scale of compensation for death, injury 
and loss of property as a result of communal/caste clashes. The Government Order 
refers to the fact that, in the past, financial assistance was sanctioned on an ad hoc 
basis by the Government when riots had taken place and imposes a standardised 
scale of compensation to be disbursed from the Chief Minister’s Public Relief Fund: 
                                            
422  The state of Tamil Nadu is home to the Indian Society of Victimology. On 14 August 
1992 persons interested in cause of victims of crime met at the Department of 
Criminology of the University of Madras (Chennai) in Tamil Nadu and resolved to 
found the organisation. Prof K Chockalingam was elected as President of the Society. 
World Society of Victimology Website 
(July 2002) http://www.fh-niederrhein.de/fb06/victimology/india.htm 
423  Government of Tamil Nadu Website 
(July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/gorders/publo-e-629.htm 
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Nature of loss  Quantum of Relief 
Death per person killed in a family 
(whether earning or non-earning)  
Rs 10 000  
Permanent incapacitation per each 
member in a family.  
Rs 10 000 
Temporary incapacitation  Rs 2 000  
Grievous hurt/short of incapacitation  Rs 1 000  
Rape  Rs 5 000  
Loss of or damage to house : 
(a)   RCC roof or tiled house 
(b)   Thatched house 
(a) & (b) includes loss of movable 
property such as grains, clothes & other 
household effects.  
(a) Actual loss or Rs2 500 whichever is 
lower. 
(b) Actual loss or Rs1 500 whichever is 
lower. 
Loss of or damage to shops: 
Tiled shops, including loss of goods in the 
shop. 
Thatched shops or bunks including loss of 
goods in the shop.  
Actual loss or Rs2 500 whichever is 
lower.  
  
Actual loss or Rs1 500 whichever is 
lower.  
Loss of earning assets like vehicle, a 
boat, cattle.  
Actual loss or Rs2 000 whichever is 
lower.  
For loss of movable property such as 
grains, clothes and other household 
effects without loss of or damage to 
house, loss of articles in shops without 
loss or damage to building containing the 
shop.  
Relief under items 6 & 7 will disentitle 
relief under item 9.  
Actual loss or Rs1 000 whichever is 
lower.  
Damage to irrigation drinking water wells, 
tube wells, electric motor, fittings, fruit 
bearing trees etc. in the ownership of the 
victims.  
Actual loss or Rs1 000 whichever is 
lower.  
 
? Government Order Ms No 874 of 8 August 1996424 
 
This Government Order points out that the following categories of loss were not 
canvassed in the Government Order 629: 
 
? Death due to police firing; 
? Death due to police torture; and 
? Rape by the police. 
 
The Government Order creates a scale of compensation which imposes higher 
amounts of compensation – in certain instances – than the scale contained in 
                                            
424  Government of Tamil Nadu Website 
(July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/gorders/publo-e-874.htm 
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Government Order 629.425 The enhanced scale applies to victims of caste/communal 
incidents as well as to the victims of the police atrocities mentioned above. The 
provisions of Government Order 629 regarding time of payment and criminal 
proceedings are repeated verbatim.426 
 
? Government Order Ms No 153 of 1 January 1998427 
 
This Government Order increases the amount of compensation payable under 
certain categories, but creates no new categories for compensation. 
 
? Government Order Ms No 833 of 22 May 1998428 
 
On recommendation of the National Commission for Minorities, following a decision 
of the Delhi High Court429 this Government Order raises the amount of compensation 
in cases of death as a result of communal and caste clashes to Rs2 lakhs.  
 
? Government Order Ms No 836 of 26 May 1998430 
 
This Government Order serves only to increase the amounts of compensation 
payable under items 6 – 10 on the scale created by Government Order 629.431 
 
? Evaluation 
 
The scales show that a broad spectrum of loss is covered. They are not limited to 
personal injury, but include loss of property. Compensation in cases of personal 
injury is not linked to the actual quantum of the loss,432 thus non-patrimonial or 
emotional loss where personal injuries are concerned is included. No reference is 
                                            
425  See above. 
426  See above. 
427  Government of Tamil Nadu Website 
(July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/gorders/publo-e-153.htm 
428  Government of Tamil Nadu Website 
(July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/gorders/publo-e-833.htm 
429  After the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. 
430  Government of Tamil Nadu Website 
(July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/gorders/publo-e-836.htm 
431  See above. 
432  For example, category 1 refers to the death of a person irrespective of whether he or 
she was “earning or non-earning.” The death of a “non-earning” person would 
presumably lead to no financial hardship for the family, thus the object of the 
compensation must be to ameliorate emotional loss. 
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made to patrimonial loss in these cases. Only where damage to property is 
concerned, is reference made to actual financial loss.  
 
It is specified that payment must take place within a month of the event causing the 
loss and that there must be no “waiting for the result of criminal proceedings.”433 The 
objective is to provide immediate emergency compensation. 
 
These Government Orders make no reference to other remedies, for example of a 
tortious434 or constitutional435 nature, thus do not preclude the parallel institution of 
such remedies. Whether the amount paid in terms of this system is to be offset 
against the amount claimed in a court action, is not stated. If the analogy of section 
140(5) of the Motor Vehicle Act is followed, setoff will take place. However, if the 
example of the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister’s Accident Relief Fund is adhered to, setoff 
will not take place. Considering that this compensation is also paid from the Chief 
Minister’s Public Relief Fund, it would be reasonable to follow the latter route. 
 
5 4 2 2  Tamil Nadu Victims Assistance Fund 
 
Initially an amount of Rs1 crore was earmarked for the Fund, but this amount was 
increased to Rs1,25 crore for 2000 - 2001.436 
 
The objective is to provide “financial assistance to the victims of murder, serious 
injuries, rape and particularly to help women, children and bread winners in 
distress.”437 The Victims Assistance Fund was created on the initiative of the Director 
General of Police, who was assigned funds for sub-allocation to Commissioners and 
Superintendents of Police. The Citizens’ Charter of the Tamil Nadu Police states as 
one of its objectives to “enable restitution and compensation to victims of crime.”438 
 
                                            
433  See source quoted in footnote 58 (supra) Par 6. 
434  See Ch 3 Par 3 2 4 (supra). 
435  See Ch 3 Par 3 4 4 (supra). 
436  One lakh is equal to a hundred thousand (105). A hundred lakhs make a crore or ten 
million: Wikipedia (Jul 2006) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lakh. The Victims Assistance 
Fund was created by Government Order Ms No 1258 of 21 August 1995 read 
together with Government Order Ms No 89 of 24 January 1997 of the Home (Police-
XII) Department of the Government of Tamil Nadu.  
Tamil Nadu Police Policy Note 2000 – 2001.  
(August 2003) http://www.tn.gov.in/policy2002-03/police2002-03-8.htm 
437  Government Order MS 1258 of August 8, 1995. 
438  Tamil Nadu Police Citizens’ Charter  
(July 2002) http://www.tn.gov.in/citizen/police.htm 
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? Quantum of relief 
 
The following payments to victims of crime or their heirs are authorised:439 
 
Event Amount not exceeding To whom paid 
Murder Rs 10 000 Legal heir 
Grievous injury Rs 5 000 Victim 
Rape Rs 5 000 Victim 
 
The following factors are to be considered in deciding the quantum of the award: 
 
? Relief obtained from other schemes such as the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund; 
and  
? The indigent circumstances of the victim’s family.440 
 
Thus amounts recovered from other avenues of state-funded compensation are to be 
taken into account when the amount of the award is determined. It is also clear that 
the Victim Assistance Fund is not intended to supersede the other forms of relief 
already discussed. 
 
? Procedural aspects 
 
Each district has a District Victims Assistance Committee and the cities of Chennai, 
Madurai and Coimbatore have City Victims Assistance Committees. Each District 
Victims Assistance Committee has as Member-secretary the local District 
Superintendent of Police; in the City Victims Assistance Committees the Deputy 
Commissioner of Police (Headquarters) fulfils the same function. The structure is set 
out as follows:441 
                                            
439  No other crimes are mentioned. Government Order Ms No 89 of 24 January 1997 Par 
1. 
440  Government Order Ms No 89 of January 24, 1997 Par 2. 
441  Government Order Ms No 89 of January 24, 1997 Par 2. 
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Name of Committee Chairman Member 
District Victims 
Assistance Committee 
District Collector (i) District Superintendent of 
Police 
 
(ii) Assistant Public Prosecutor 
(Administration) 
City Victims Assistance 
Committees 
Commissioner of Police (i) Deputy Commissioner of 
Police (Headquarters) 
 
(ii) City Public Prosecutor 
 
Applications are thus heard by committees made up of police officials and 
prosecutors. Originally the Committees made recommendations which were 
transmitted to the Director General of Police in Chennai who would then release 
funds to the Superintendents and Commissioners of Police for payment to claimants. 
After considering a report of the Director General of Police after the scheme had 
been operative for one year, it was decided that the Committees would be given the 
authority to sanction relief from the Victims Assistance Fund. The Committees were 
also directed to meet at least once per month. This change was brought about “to 
speed up the processing of genuine cases and to provide faster relief to the 
victims/legal heirs.”442 
 
No mention is made of appeal or review procedures. Therefore only the normal 
judicial review procedures would be at the disposal of a dissatisfied claimant. 
 
Regarding future developments on the front of victim compensation in India, Shri I D 
Swami, Minister of State for Home Affairs stated:443  
 
(I)t is fifty years since our nation has got its independence and at the end of it 
we are yet to listen and respond to victims of crime and their advocates. The 
victims of crime are virtually invisible in the laws and policies that govern our 
justice systems. Tremendous strides are being taken by various legal and 
social bodies and also the Indian Society of Victimology, to enact victim’s 
rights laws in our country. The Bill on The Victims (Criminal Justice) Right to 
Assistance – 1996, drafted by the Indian Society of Victimology, will be given 
due importance and consideration by the present government to frame a 
national legislation to assist victims of crime in tune with the United Nations 
Declaration of Basic principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power.  
   
                                            
442  Government Order Ms No 89 of January 24, 1997 Par 4. 
443  In an address to the 3rd Biennial Conference of the Indian Society of Victimology at 
the Indian Institute of Public Administration, 26 November 1999. 
Press Information Bureau Government of India 26 November 1999. 
 (July 20020 http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/l1199/r261199.html 
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The Bill referred to above has not been promulgated as legislation, nor is there any 
sign that it has been tabled as a Bill in either houses of Parliament, the Rajya Sabha 
and the Lok Sabha.444 
 
Singh445 relies on article 41 of the Constitution to justify the introduction of a victim 
compensation scheme: 
 
The state shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, 
make suitable provision for securing the right towards, education and to 
public assistance in case of unemployment, old age, sickness and 
disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want. 
 
He sees the victim of crime as representing an example of “undeserved want.” 
 
5 5 New Zealand 
 
5 5 1 Accident Compensation Corporation 
 
The history of the first victim compensation scheme in New Zealand parallels that of 
Great Britain up to a point: The concept of state-funded compensation for victims of 
crime can be traced back to workers’ compensation and compensation for traffic 
accidents. New Zealand shows with particular clarity how the three concepts are 
linked, the three separate schemes having been amalgamated into one scheme, the 
Accident Compensation Scheme,446 which compensates victims of all accidents, 
whether industry, traffic or crime related.  
 
In 1900 the Worker’s Compensation Act created no-fault cover in respect of industrial 
accidents. It provided injured workers with weekly benefits and, in the case of death, 
compensation for dependants. The Act required employers to insure themselves 
against injuries to employees. Benefits provided by the Act were small and limited to 
a period of six years from injury. The right to sue employers on the basis of 
negligence was retained. In 1928 the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Parties Risk) 
Act introduced a compulsory third party insurance scheme. The scheme ensured that 
the victims of motor vehicle accidents could claim damages for personal injury. In 
                                            
444  Indian Parliament Website: Bills 
 (July 2005) http://rajyasabha.nic.in/ 
445  Singh D R Victimological Studies in India Paper submitted for the XIth International 
Symposium on Victimology 13 – 18 July 2003 Stellenbosch, SA 8. 
(August 2003) http://www.victimology.co.za/new%20papers/singh_3.pdf 
446  See below. 
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1964 New Zealand was the first country to initiate a criminal injuries compensation 
scheme for victims of crime.447  
 
In 1967, as a result of concerns about the inadequacy of workers’ compensation 
benefits, a Royal Commission was established to report on workers’ compensation. 
The Woodhouse Report448 recommended a completely new no-fault approach to 
compensation for personal injury. It recommended a scheme to cover all motor 
vehicle injuries and all injuries to earners, whether occurring at work or not. The costs 
of motor vehicle injuries were to be covered by a levy on drivers and owners of motor 
vehicles and, in the case of industrial accidents, by a levy on employers. The tortious 
right to sue in respect of motor vehicle injuries and non-work injuries to earners 
would also be revoked. 
 
The five guiding principles of the Woodhouse Report were: 
 
? Community responsibility; 
? Comprehensive entitlement; 
? Complete rehabilitation; 
? Real compensation; and 
? Administrative efficiency. 
 
In terms of the Accident Compensation Act449 the accident compensation scheme 
came into operation on 1 April 1974 under the administration of the newly established 
Accident Compensation Commission. 
 
The Act covered work and non-work related injuries to earners, and motor vehicle 
injuries. In 1973 the Act was amended450 to provide cover also for students, non-
earners and visitors to New Zealand. Three schemes were established: 
 
? The earners’ scheme, funded from levies paid by employers on wages paid to 
employees, and levies paid by self-employed people; 
? The motor vehicle accident scheme, funded from levies paid by owners of 
motor vehicles; and 
                                            
447  In terms of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963. See also Par 2.1 (supra). 
448  New Zealand Government, Wellington Compensation for Personal Injury in New 
Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Woodhouse Report) 1967. 
449  1972. 
450  Accident Compensation Amendment Act (No 2) 1973. 
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? The supplementary scheme, funded by the state, for persons not covered by 
either of the other two schemes. 
  
Benefits included: 
 
? Hospital and medical expenses; 
? Rehabilitation costs; 
? Associated transport costs; 
? Earnings-related compensation (payable from the seventh day after the 
accident at a rate of 80% of the average weekly earnings before the 
accident); 
? Lump sum payments for permanent loss or impairment; 
? Lump sum payments (up to a maximum of $10 000) for pain and mental 
suffering; and 
? Funeral costs and lump sum payments to surviving spouses and children in 
cases of the accidental death of a breadwinner.  
 
However, in its original form the arrangement was not financially viable. A political 
swing away from socialist ideology had the effect that legislation was passed in 
1992451 to “establish an insurance-based scheme to rehabilitate and compensate in 
an equitable and financially affordable manner those persons who suffer personal 
injury.”452 Consequently the extent of compensation was reduced.453 Prior to the 
promulgation of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act,454 the 
scheme underwent numerous amendments in terms of several Acts.455 
 
Currently the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act456 provides for 
a scheme by which all persons suffering personal injuries are compensated under 
the Accident Compensation Scheme. The latter operates on the no-fault principle and 
provides compensation for victims of all accidents, whether industry, traffic or crime 
                                            
451  Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. 
452  Tobin R “Nervous Shock: The Common Law; Accident Compensation?” 1992 New 
Zealand Law Journal 286; Versfeld C “Delict v No-Fault: The Equalisation Process” 
(1994) 6 Responsa Meridiana 318. 
453  For details see Versfeld C “Delict v No-Fault: The Equalisation Process” 329 et seq. 
454  2001. 
455  Accident Compensation Act 1982, Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Insurance Act 1992, Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance 
Amendment Act 1996, Accident Insurance Act 1998 and the Accident Insurance 
Amendment Act and Accident Insurance (Transitional Provisions) Act 2000. 
456  2001.  
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related. In other words, victims of crime are treated in the same way as victims of 
accidents. The victim has no tortious claim in instances falling under the aegis of the 
Accident Compensation Scheme.457 
 
5 5 1 1  Structure 
 
The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act458 perpetuates the 
existence of the Accident Compensation Corporation,459 a juristic person to which the 
administration of the Act is delegated.460 The Act refers to the existence of a social 
contract which entails “providing for a fair and sustainable scheme for managing 
personal injury”461 in the community. 
 
However, the Act goes beyond the payment of compensation to victims: A primary 
function of the Corporation is the promotion of measures to curtail personal injury.462 
Furthermore, provision is made for the disclosure of information by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation to the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services 
for the purpose of preventing injury to children arising from unlawful activity.463 
 
The Act464 directs the Accident Compensation Corporation to maintain the following 
Accounts: 
 
? The Employers' Account “to finance entitlements provided under this Act by 
the Corporation to employees for work-related personal injuries;”465 
? The Residual Claims Account to deal with claims which arose before certain 
relevant dates and which have become the responsibility of the Accident 
Compensation Corporation;466 
                                            
457  See generally: Website of the Accident Compensation Corporation:  
(November 2002) http//www.acc.org.nz/ 
Accident Compensation in New Zealand 1992 (updated 2001); Birch W F Accident 
compensation: a fairer scheme (1991) New Zealand Government, Wellington; Review 
by Officials Committee of the Accident Compensation Scheme (1986) New Zealand 
Government, Wellington; Hutchison D B Accident Compensation: New Zealand 
shows the way 10 et seq. 
458  2001. 
459  S 259. The Accident Compensation Corporation was created by the Accident 
Insurance Act 1998. 
460  S 262. 
461  S 3. See Ch 2 Par 2 2 1 (supra). 
462  S 263. 
463  S 283. 
464  S 166. 
465  S 167. Funded from levies paid by employers in terms of s 168. 
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? The Self-Employed Work Account “to finance entitlements provided under this 
Act in respect of self-employed persons who suffer work-related personal 
injuries in their self-employment;”467 
? The Motor Vehicle Account “to finance entitlements provided under this Act in 
respect of motor vehicle injuries;”468 
? The Earners' Account “to finance entitlements provided under this Act in 
respect of personal injury to earners469 who suffer personal injury that is a 
non-work injury;”470 
? The Non-Earners' Account “to finance entitlements provided under this Act in 
respect of personal injury (other than motor vehicle injury or medical 
misadventure injury) to non-earners;”471 and 
? The Medical Misadventure Account “to finance entitlements provided under 
this Act in respect of personal injury caused by medical misadventure.”472 
 
Funding of the various classes of entitlements is summarised in the following table:473 
                                                                                                                             
466  S 192. Funded from funds transferred from the Residual Claims Account set up in 
terms of s 303 of the Accident Insurance Act 1998. 
467  S 201. Funded (mainly) from levies paid by self-employed persons and private 
domestic workers. S 201(2). 
468  S 213. Funded inter alia from levies paid by every registered owner of a motor vehicle 
and levies paid by every person who holds a trade licence issued under s 34(1) of the 
Transport (Vehicle and Driver Registration and Licensing) Act 1986 and levies on the 
sale of fuel. S 213(2). 
469 In terms of S 6 “earner... means a natural person who engages in employment, 
 whether or not as an employee.” 
470 S 218. That is any injury other than a work-related personal injury, a motor vehicle 
injury or a personal injury caused by medical misadventure – s 218(1). In terms of s 
219(1) an earner must pay levies to fund the Earners' Account, while in terms of s 
223(1) a person who is or has been an earner may apply to purchase from the 
Corporation the right to receive weekly compensation in respect of a period for which 
he or she would not otherwise be entitled to receive weekly compensation. 
471 S 227. Funded from “appropriations by Parliament to the Non-Earners' Account.” S 
227(2). 
472      S 228. Funded from “levies payable by registered health professionals or any 
organisation that provides treatment under this Act” and “if there is no such levy or 
the levy relates only to funding part of the Account, from the Earners' Account (in the 
case of an earner) or the Non-Earners' Account (in the case of a non-earner). S 
228(2)(a) and (b). 
473  New Zealand Department of Labour’s Accident Insurance Website: 
(November 2002) http://www.tocover.govt.nz/Html/whopays.htm 
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Account Coverage Who Pays  How 
Employers  Work-related personal injury to 
employees from 1 July 2000 The employees employer at 
the time of the 
injury 
The employer pays an 
annual premium (which 
can be paid in instalments) 
directly to ACC 
Self-
Employed Work-related personal injury to self-employed persons The self-employed 
person 
themselves 
The self-employed person 
pays an annual premium 
directly to ACC. This 
premium also includes the 
earners component shown 
below 
Earners Non work-related, non motor 
vehicle personal injury to 
employees and self-employed 
persons 
The employee 
or self-
employed 
person 
themselves 
The employee has the 
premium deducted by the 
employer along with 
PAYE. This is collected by 
IRD and is paid to ACC 
Non-Earners Non work-related, non motor 
vehicle personal injury to those 
outside of the workforce 
The 
Government 
meets the cost 
This is funded from 
general taxation 
Motor 
Vehicle Personal injury arising out of a motor vehicle on a public road 
(including work-related motor 
vehicle injury) 
Motor vehicle 
owners  NZ Post collect an annual licensing premium at the 
time of motor vehicle 
registration. In addition, 
there is a petrol tax 
(currently 2C per litre) 
Medical Mis-
adventure Personal injury arising out of medical treatment Earners and Non-Earners These accounts are charged with the cost of 
medical misadventure 
claims on a pay-as-you-go 
basis 
Residual 
Claims  Personal injury incurred to people who were still 
incapacitated and/or receiving 
statutory entitlements in relation 
to injuries suffered before 1 July 
1999 or non-work, non motor 
vehicle injuries that occurred 
before 1 April 1992 
Employers and 
self-employed 
persons 
IRD collects the residual 
levy annually in May from 
employers and with 
terminal tax payments for 
self-employed 
 
 
5 5 1 2  Requirements for compensation 
 
A person (who does not have to be a citizen or resident of New Zealand) has cover 
for personal injury suffered in New Zealand on or after 1 April 2002. This cover 
includes personal injuries suffered as a result of:474 
 
                                            
474  S 20(2). 
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? An accident; 
? Medical misadventure; 
? Treatment given to the person for personal injury for which the person has 
cover; and 
? A work-related gradual process, disease, or infection suffered by the person. 
 
Personal injury includes the following:475 
 
? The death of a person; 
? Physical injuries suffered by a person;476 
? Mental injury suffered by a person because of physical injuries suffered by the 
person; 
? Mental injury suffered by a person in the circumstances described in section 
21;477 and 
? Damage (other than wear and tear) to dentures or prostheses that replace a 
part of the human body. 
 
Section 21 is headed “Cover for mental injury caused by certain criminal acts.” A 
person has cover for a mental injury if he or she suffers mental injury in or outside 
New Zealand and the causative act is of a kind listed in Schedule 3 of the Act. The 
offences listed in Schedule 3 are offences of a sexual nature. Thus mental trauma 
which does not fall under the purview of section 21 and does not arise from physical 
injuries suffered by the person, is not compensated in terms of the Act. Secondary 
victims, such as family members of the primary victim, are therefore not eligible for 
compensation. The same applies to a person enduring or witnessing a crime without 
being physically injured, for example the victim of a car hijacking who is not 
physically injured in the process. In such cases, the victim will have to sue in terms of 
the law of tort in the conventional way. Furthermore, “mental injury” is defined as “a 
clinically significant behavioural, cognitive, or psychological dysfunction.”478 Thus, 
only serious mental trauma is covered.479 Mental or nervous shock of a transient 
nature is not covered and the victim will have to resort to a tortious action. The 
                                            
475  S 26(1). 
476  Including, for example, “a strain or a sprain.” The reference to “a strain or a sprain” is 
taken directly from s 26(1)(b). 
477  See following par. 
478  S 27. 
479  As was the case in terms of s 3 of the previous Act, the Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Act of 1992. See Miller J M “Compensation for Mental 
Trauma Injuries in New Zealand” 3. 
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following statement of the Court of Appeal (which was made before the present 
dispensation vis-à-vis mental injuries was enacted) criticised what was to become, in 
effect, the current state of affairs:480 
 
It would be a strange situation if cover under the Act for a person suffering 
serious mental consequences caused by an accident were to depend upon 
whether or not some physical injury however slight also is sustained. Further 
it would create major difficulties should it be necessary in particular cases to 
separate physical and mental injuries. 
 
A person ordinarily resident in New Zealand is covered also in respect of personal 
injuries suffered outside the country.481 
 
Accident is defined as “the application of a force (including gravity) or resistance 
external to the human body, or involves the sudden movement of the body to avoid 
such a force or resistance external to the human body and… is not a gradual 
process.”482 However the concept includes, inter alia:483 
 
? The inhalation or oral ingestion of any solid, liquid, gas, or foreign object on a 
specific occasion; 
? A burn, or exposure to radiation or rays of any kind (excluding exposure to the 
elements), on a specific occasion; 
? The absorption of any chemical through the skin within a defined period not 
exceeding one month; and 
? Any exposure to the elements, or to extremes of temperature or environment, 
within a defined period not exceeding one month. 
 
The occurrence of a personal injury does not create a presumption that it was caused 
by an accident.484 
 
5 5 1 3  Categories of claims 
 
The following benefits or entitlements are conferred by the Act:485 
                                            
480  ACC v E [1992] 2 NZLR 426 434. In this case an employee who had had a nervous 
break-down as a result of being sent on a stressful management course, was held to 
have suffered personal injury by accident. In terms of current legislation such a 
person would not receive compensation and would have to sue the wrongdoer. 
481  S 22. 
482  S 25(1)(a). 
483  S 25(1)(b) – (e). 
484  S 25(3). 
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? Rehabilitation, comprising treatment, social rehabilitation,486 and vocational 
rehabilitation;487 
? First week compensation; 
? Weekly compensation; 
? Lump sum compensation for permanent impairment; and 
? Funeral grants, survivors' grants, weekly compensation for the spouse, 
children and other dependants of a deceased claimant and child care 
payments.  
 
Section 123 provides that entitlements are inalienable. 
 
When a claimant under the Act has also received an income-tested benefit in terms 
of the Social Security Act,488 an excess benefit payment is regarded to have been 
made and the Accident Compensation Corporation is obliged to pay the excess over 
to the government department administering the Social Security Act.489 The converse 
takes place when the Accident Compensation Corporation has paid before a 
payment in terms of the Social Security Act is effected.490 
 
5 5 1 4  Procedural aspects 
 
Section 317 of the Act states: 
 
 
(1) No person may bring proceedings independently of this Act, whether 
under any rule of law or any enactment, in any court in New Zealand, for 
damages arising directly or indirectly out of – 
(a) personal injury covered by this Act…  
 
 
                                                                                                                             
485  S 69. Details regarding the exact extent of each entitlement are to be found in the 
First Schedule to the Act. 
486  The purpose of social rehabilitation is to assist in restoring a claimant's independence 
to the maximum extent practicable. S 79. 
487     The purpose of vocational rehabilitation is to help a claimant to, as appropriate,--- 
(a) maintain employment; or 
(b) obtain employment; or 
(c) regain or acquire vocational independence. S 80(1). 
488  1964. 
489  S 252. 
490  S 253. Provision is made in the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation 
Act for the disclosure of information by the Accident Compensation Corporation to the 
Department responsible for the administration of the Social Security Act – s 281. 
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Thus the claimant who qualifies for compensation in terms of the Act is deprived of a 
tortious law suit for personal injuries. This would not include his or her right to sue for 
damage to property, and injuries not covered in terms of the Act.491 Furthermore, 
claimants’ rights to sue for exemplary damages are expressly preserved.492 
 
Part 3493 of the Act has the heading: “Code of ACC Claimants' Rights, and Claims.” It 
deals with the procedural aspect of lodging a claim with the Accident Compensation 
Corporation. Section 54 states: 
 
The Corporation must make every decision on a claim on reasonable 
grounds, and in a timely manner, having regard to the requirements of this 
Act, the nature of the decision, and all the circumstances. 
 
Part 5494 of the Act deals with dispute resolution. Provision is made for reviews of and 
appeals against decisions. As soon as practicable after receiving an application for 
review, the Accident Compensation Corporation must arrange for the allocation of a 
reviewer, even if it is considered that there is no valid right of review in the 
circumstances.495 The reviewer must comply with the principles of natural justice, 
exercise due diligence in decision-making and adopt an investigative approach with a 
view to conducting the review in an informal, timely, and practical manner.496 The 
reviewer makes an order of costs against the Accident Compensation Corporation if 
the review has been wholly or partially successful.497 Furthermore, the reviewer has 
the discretion to make an order for costs in favour of the unsuccessful applicant if the 
applicant has acted reasonably in applying for the review. 
 
A claimant or the Accident Compensation Corporation may appeal to a District 
Court498 against a review decision or a decision as to an award of costs and 
expenses under section 148.499  
 
                                            
491  See Par 5 5 1 1 (supra). 
492  S 319(1). 
493  Ss 39 – 66. 
494  Ss 133 – 164. 
495  S 137(2). 
496  S 140. 
497  S 148. 
498  In 1992 the District Court took over the role of the Accident Compensation Appeal 
Authority, which became defunct in terms of the Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Act. 
499  S 149. In terms of s 161(1) the District Court may dismiss, modify or quash the review 
decision. 
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Provision is made for an appeal on a question of law – only – to the High Court500 by 
either party, and thence to the Court of Appeal.501 
 
5 5 1 5  Suspension, withholding or cancellation of entitlements 
 
The Accident Compensation Corporation may suspend or cancel an entitlement if a 
claimant is not entitled to continue receiving it.502 The Corporation may also withhold 
any entitlement for as long as the claimant unreasonably fails to:503 
 
? Comply with any requirement of the Act relating to the claim; 
? Undergo medical or surgical treatment for the injury; or 
? Agree to, or comply with, an individual rehabilitation plan. 
 
A claimant is not entitled to any entitlement for:504 
 
? A personal injury that the claimant wilfully inflicts or causes to be inflicted on 
himself or herself; 
? Death due to an injury inflicted in the circumstances described in the previous 
paragraph; or 
? Death due to suicide. 
 
However, the Corporation remains liable to provide a claimant with entitlements if the 
personal injury or death was the result of mental injury. 
 
A claimant may not receive any entitlements while in prison505 or if convicted of the 
murder of the person from whose death the entitlement arose.506 
 
When a claimant has suffered personal injury in the course of committing an offence 
and is sentenced to imprisonment for committing the offence, the Accident 
Compensation Corporation may apply to a District Court asking for a determination 
that the Corporation must either provide the entitlements when the claimant is 
released, or that the Corporation must not provide all or certain specified entitlements 
                                            
500  S 162. 
501  S 163. 
502  S 117(1). 
503  S 117(3). 
504  S 119. 
505  S 121. 
506  S 120. 
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at any time because it would be repugnant to justice for the claimant to receive them. 
The possibility of a perpetrator of an offence receiving compensation emphasises the 
fact that the victim of crime is treated in the same way as other victims of misfortune, 
and not placed in a separate category. In determining whether it would be repugnant 
to justice for the claimant to receive an entitlement, the court takes the following 
matters into consideration: 
 
? The harm caused by the claimant's offence;  
? The gravity of the offence;  
? The claimant's personal culpability for the offence;  
? The extent of other penalties the claimant has already suffered because of 
the offence;  
? The claimant's personal circumstances;  
? The nature of the entitlement;  
? The strength of the claimant's need for the entitlement; and 
? The resources the claimant has to meet that need.507 
 
5 5 1 6  Evaluation 
 
The following comments are representative of attitudes towards the Accident 
Compensation Scheme:508 
 
Experience in New Zealand shows there is nothing which justifies a separate 
scheme for crime victims over the many other victims of accidental injury that 
inevitably arise from participating in a modern industrial society… 
 
There is no need for lawyers; nor are there the other expensive trappings of a 
compensation system based on showing fault or negligence in the courts. 
 
During the period of existence of the accident compensation scheme, exemplary 
damages have been awarded in certain cases.509 The following criticism of this 
approach has been voiced:510 
                                            
507  S 122. 
508  Miller J “Compensating Crime Victims within New Zealand’s No Fault Accident 
Compensation Scheme: the Advantages and Disadvantages” in Sumner C, Israel M, 
O’Connell M & Sarre R International Victimology: Selected Papers from the 8th 
International Symposium (1996) 256 – 257. 
(September 2003) http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/27/miller.pdf 
509  Manning J “Reflections on Exemplary Damages and Personal Liability in New 
Zealand” (2002) Part II New Zealand Law Review; “Exemplary Damages – the next 
wave”  (2001) September UK Insurance Law articles in association with Kennedys 
Legal500.com 1 (August 2005) http://www.legal500.com/devs/uk/is/ukis_034.htm 
510  “Exemplary Damages – the next wave” 2. 
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By widening the scope and availability of exemplary damages, New Zealand 
courts have unwittingly made the process of litigation more expensive. Where 
exemplary damages are sought, there are inevitably voluminous pleadings... 
Such claims are inevitably met with applications to strike out or to refine the 
pleadings. This prolongs the duration of a claim and increases its cost… 
What started here as a genuine attempt to assist those victims whose rights 
to compensation had been reduced, has developed into a body of case law 
with a momentum of its own… 
 
However, the following view has also been expressed:511 
 
Thus it appears clear that the amounts sought in exemplary damages claims, 
particularly in negligence cases, will be so limited from now on that it will 
probably not be worthwhile for plaintiffs to bring the action. 
 
 
The Scheme is thus perceived to be a success and has benefited victims of crime by 
placing the settlement of their claims outside the sphere of the litigation.  
 
Compensation afforded by the Scheme falls short of tortious damages as far as 
quantum is concerned. Questions might arise regarding the justification of denying 
the victim’s right to sue the offender for the shortfall. It can be argued that the 
objective of the Scheme is not to protect the offender from the consequences of his 
or her delinquency. Against this must be weighed the fact that the Scheme is funded 
by the transferral thereto of amounts that were previously paid by industry and the 
motoring public for insurance cover.512 This argument is not convincing where a 
crime was committed with the intention to injure (as opposed to, for example, an 
injury suffered as a result of the negligent driving of a car or a negligent industrial 
practice). The answer may lie in the amendment of the Scheme to allow restitution 
claims against perpetrators of intentionally injurious crimes (for example, rape and 
murder). 
 
The Scheme is also open to criticism regarding mental trauma cases: 
 
? Victims are not compensated unless some physical injury is suffered; and 
? Secondary victims are not compensated. 
 
However, in these cases, victims at least retain the right to sue offenders. 
                                            
511  Miller J M “Compensation for Mental Trauma Injuries in New Zealand” 8. 
512  Miller J “Compensating Crime Victims within New Zealand’s No Fault Accident 
Compensation Scheme: the Advantages and Disadvantages” 256. 
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A South African academic has expressed an assessment of the New Zealand 
Scheme in the following terms:513 
 
Viewed overall, the new system seems to be a great success. It has cured 
most, if not all, of the defects of the old system:514 it pays compensation 
quickly, reliably and economically to those who really need it, for as long as 
that need lasts. And it does so at much the same cost as the previous, 
inefficient system. Of course, nobody receives fantastic lump sum payments 
anymore – but the system of periodic payments guarantees generous 
compensation for life, which in a world beset by inflation is arguably better 
than a capital sum that might be inadequate for one’s future needs, even if 
wisely invested. Nor should one forget that very few claimants under the old 
system ever received the huge sums promised by the law of delict. 
 
The same academic points out515 that the Scheme has proved to be financially viable 
because: 
 
? The Scheme covers all victims of misfortune, thus saving on administrative 
costs; and 
? The Scheme operates on a “pay-as-you-go” basis which means that no 
reserve funds need be built up, as the state can adjust levies and benefits 
from year to year. 
 
Because New Zealand deals with all accident victims in the same way, the question 
arises whether victims of crime ought to be treated differently from other victims. The 
following statement is apposite:516 
 
Various answers have been offered but experience in New Zealand shows 
that there is nothing which justifies a separate scheme for crime victims over 
the many other victims of accidental injury that inevitable arise from 
participating in a modern industrial society. 
 
 
Concern has been expressed that the Scheme removes the deterrent value of the 
offender’s potential tortious liability:517 
 
                                            
513  Hutchison D B Accident compensation: New Zealand shows the way 12. 
514  The fault-based, delictual system. 
515  Op cit 12. 
516  Miller J “Compensating Crime Victims within New Zealand’s No Fault Accident 
Compensation Scheme: the Advantages and Disadvantages:” 257. 
517  New Zealand Government, Wellington Personal Injury; A Commentary on the Report 
of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New 
Zealand (1969) Par 252. 
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(I)t might be desirable to create a new criminal offence whereby a person 
guilty of reckless conduct causing or likely to cause injury to any person 
(perhaps including himself) can be convicted and fined or imprisoned. This 
would serve the function, which is inadequately carried out by the law of 
negligence at present, of punishing the wrongdoer. Such a law would remove 
one of the objections to the abolition of the common law right of action for 
personal injury. It would also be freighted with whatever deterrent value the 
present tort law has in preventing accidents.  
 
As yet, the issue has not been addressed conclusively by the New Zealand 
legislature.518 
 
5 5 2 Criminal Justice Assistance Reimbursement Scheme 
 
The Tribunals Unit of the Department for Courts provides administrative and registry 
support services to a number of tribunals that do not fall under the jurisdiction of 
individual High or District Courts and are thus administered centrally from Wellington. 
The Criminal Justice Assistance Reimbursement Scheme is one of these tribunals. 
 
An assessor (who is currently a judge) considers applications for compensation for 
any material loss caused by victimisation suffered in assisting the administration of 
justice.519 The assessor makes recommendations regarding applications to the Chief 
Executive, Courts520 for compensation from persons who have been victimised or 
suffered a loss of property or earnings due to their: 
 
? Giving testimony as a witness for the prosecution or defence in a criminal 
case punishable by imprisonment; 
? Assisting in the administration of justice by, for example, reporting a crime or 
voluntarily giving information to the police; or 
? Being in a close relationship with one of the abovementioned persons and as 
a result being victimised and suffering a loss of property or earnings.521 
 
                                            
518  Law Commission of New Zealand Dugdale D F Promoting Protection from Accidental 
Injury and Death Address to the Aviation Industry Association of NZ (Inc.) delivered at 
Rotorua on 21 July 2000. 
(September 2003) http://www.lawcom.govt.nz 
519  New Zealand Department for Courts Website  
(November 2002) http://www.courts.govt.nz/ 
520  New Zealand Register of Tribunals Website 
(November 2002) http://www.coat.gov.au/pdf/register_of_tribunals_new_zealand.pdf 
521  Miller J “Compensating Crime Victims within New Zealand’s No Fault Accident 
Compensation Scheme: the Advantages and Disadvantages” 257 – 256. 
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In reply to a question in Parliament concerning families driven from their homes by 
intimidation and threatening behaviour by gang members, New Zealand Minister of 
Justice, Tony Ryall, replied:522 
 
We have a witness protection scheme and a criminal justice reimbursement 
scheme for witnesses and their families. Police take complaints of victim 
intimidation very seriously and will prosecute. On conviction offenders can be 
ordered to compensate their victims. 
 
Thus, offenders found guilty of crimes resulting from victim intimidation, will also be 
subject to sentences of reparation in terms of the Sentencing Act,523 in addition to 
any compensation that the victim might have received from the Criminal Justice 
Assistance Reimbursement Scheme. 
 
5 6 Comparison 
 
Firstly, a tabular comparison of the law dealing with state-funded compensation in the 
four countries targeted in this research will be given revealing differences and 
similarities regarding – 
 
? Legislation providing compensation other than victim compensation 
schemes;  
? Victim  Compensation Schemes; 
? Theoretical basis/objective of for victim compensation; 
? Requirements for compensation; 
? Categories of claims; 
? Deductions from compensation awarded and factors influencing quantum; 
? Method of payment; and 
? Procedure. 
 
Secondly, the main similarities and differences regarding state-funded compensation 
will be highlighted in order to give an objective overview of the characteristics of each 
scheme, thereby constructing a foundation for making recommendations suitable for 
implementation in the South African milieu. 
                                            
522  Thompson A Questions Of The Day (7-12) Wednesday 23 June 1999 3:40 pm 
 (November 2002) http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL9906/S00055.htm 
523  See Ch 4 Par 4 2 4 (supra). 
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Legislation 
other than 
victim 
compensation 
schemes to 
provide 
compensation 
 
Probation Services Act  1991: 
Minister of National Health and Welfare 
has (unutilised) powers to  establish 
programmes regarding: 
Assessment, treatment, support, referral 
and mediation for victims of crime. 
Compensating victims of crime. 
Restorative justice as part of sentencing 
and diversion options. 
 
Compensation For Occupational Injuries 
And Diseases Act  1993: 
Employers contribute annually to the 
Compensation Fund which pays 
compensation in cases of disablement or 
death caused by occupational injuries 
sustained (or diseases contracted by) 
employees in the course of their 
employment. 
 
Promotion Of National Unity And 
Reconciliation Act  1995: 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
established to investigate gross human 
rights violations to make reparation to 
victims.  Reparation includes state-funded 
compensation, ex gratia payments, 
restitution, rehabilitation or recognition. 
Full amnesty granted to perpetrators. 
 
Road Accident Fund Act  1996: 
Road Accident Fund compensates for 
damages suffered (plus taxed party and 
party costs) for physical injury/death 
wrongfully caused by the driving of motor 
vehicles.  Patrimonial and non-patrimonial 
losses covered, but not patrimonial 
damage to property.  Payment for future 
losses can be in instalments instead of 
lump sum. 
 
Fund financed from levy on fuel. 
 
Employers’ Liability (Compulsory 
Insurance) Act  1969:  Compulsory 
insurance for injury/disease of employee 
arising out of/in the course of employment. 
 
Road Traffic Act  1988:   
Compulsory insurance (or giving of 
security) against third party risks arising 
from injuries and damage to property. 
Motor Insurers’ Bureau administers Central 
Fund (funded by levies contributed by 
insurers) which compensates victims of 
accidents involving uninsured and 
untraced drivers and cases where car used 
with criminal intent to cause injury. 
 
Social Security Act  1998 ;Social Security 
Administration Act  1992; Social Security 
Contributions and Benefit Act  1992:   
Vast number of social security benefits 
paid by state; 
Legislative measures to prevent 
overcompensation at the expense of the 
state by directing “compensator” to pay 
certain amounts directly to the state. 
 
 
Workmen’s Compensation Act   1923: 
In event of injury/disease of employee 
arising out of and in the course of 
employment, employer effects payment to 
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 
who then pays money over to employee.  
Employers usually have insurance for 
these contingencies.  Employee has to 
choose between a claim in terms of the Act 
and a civil claim. 
 
Motor Vehicles Act  1988: 
No-fault liability of the owner of a motor 
vehicle for fixed sum damages in cases of 
death or permanent disablement –does not 
deprive claimant of tortious claim for 
balance of damages (former amount 
deducted from latter). 
Compulsory insurance required: 
Issued by an authorised insurer; 
Providing cover against liability arising from 
the use of the vehicle in a public place for: 
Death of or bodily injury to any person; 
Liability to the owner of goods carried in 
the vehicle; and 
Damage to any property of a third party. 
Fixed amounts of damages paid by one of 
the general insurance companies 
nominated by the General Insurance 
Corporation of India in cases where the 
details of the vehicle causing the death or 
injury are unknown. 
Claims to Motor Accidents Claims 
Tribunals, with a right of appeal to the High 
Court. 
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister’s Accident Relief 
Fund:  Relief to victims of road accidents or 
their families on fixed scale. 
 
 
 
Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Act   2001: 
All persons suffering personal injuries as a 
result of - 
an accident; 
medical misadventure; 
treatment given to the person for personal 
injury for which the person has cover and 
a work-related gradual process, disease, or 
infection  
are compensated by the Accident 
Compensation Commission. 
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Delictually based liability with liability 
limited/excluded for certain passengers. 
National Human Rights Act  1993: 
National Human Rights Commission 
frequently directs the state to pay 
compensation to victims of human rights 
abuses by public servants. 
 
Tamil Nadu: Compensation for victims of 
caste/communal violence and murder or 
rape committed by the police: 
Government Orders provide for 
compensation in cases of: 
Caste/communal violence; and 
Murder/rape perpetrated by police. 
Uniform scale of compensation for death, 
injury and loss of property. 
Immediate compensation not subject to 
criminal conviction. 
 
 
Victim  
compensation  
Schemes 
 
 
None, but the Compensation Scheme for 
Victims of Crime in South Africa proposed 
by the South African Law Reform 
Commission will be considered. 
 
 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. 
 
Tamil Nadu Victims Assistance Fund. 
 
Accident Compensation Scheme. 
 
Theoretical 
basis/ objective 
of for victim 
compensation 
 
Victim empowerment on compassionate 
grounds - confidence in criminal justice. 
 
State responsibility - state has neglected 
duty in allowing commission of crime. 
 
Emphasises victim empowerment in 
criminal justice process. 
 
International law requires responsiveness 
by states to victims. 
 
 
Analogy with war injuries and riot damage 
where the State traditionally accepts the 
obligation to compensate. 
 
State exhorts citizens to protect property, 
but discourages carrying of weapons. 
 
Citizen under duty to assist state and may 
be deterred by absence of compensation. 
 
Enlightened penal policy difficult because 
of complaints that society is looking after 
 
The stated objective to provide financial 
assistance to victims of murder, serious 
injuries, rape, and to help women, children 
and bread winners in distress, indicates: 
 
An acknowledgement of state responsibility 
for the prevention of crime;  
A reference to public philanthropic instinct; 
and 
An acknowledgment that the occurrence of 
violent crime is unacceptably high. 
 
 
Social contract which entails “providing for 
a fair and sustainable scheme for 
managing personal injury” in the 
community. 
 
A primary function of the Scheme is to 
promote measures to reduce the incidence 
and severity of personal injury, including 
measures that:  
Create supportive environments that 
reduce its incidence and severity; and 
Strengthen preventative community action; 
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Difficulties in enforcing restitution:  
Minute percentage of convictions.  
Lack of means of offenders. 
 
Benefiting the criminal justice system: 
Requirement that crime be reported 
promptly and that victim cooperate. 
 
Reduction of impact of crime on state: 
Financial reliance of victim prevented by 
helping back to productive status. 
 
Helping victim deal with psychological 
trauma - society takes plight seriously. 
 
Violence against women: 
Addressing financial dependence. 
Enabled to leave abusive environment. 
 
Breaking cycle of retributive violence and 
vigilantism. 
 
Arguments against: 
Cost to state. 
Competing priorities for funding. 
Compensation schemes do not per se 
improve reporting of crime. 
 
criminals better than victims. 
 
State prohibiting victim from taking law into 
own hands should provide effective 
alternative. 
 
Imprisoning offender for long periods 
deprives victim of redress. 
 
State has a direct responsibility in the case 
of crime because of its responsibility for 
law and order. 
 
Scheme simply supplements the law of 
tort/offender’s lack of means.   
 
Public instinct requires victim 
compensation. 
 
Article 41 of the Constitution: 
The state shall, within the limits of its 
economic capacity and development, make 
suitable provision for securing the right … 
to public assistance … in other cases of 
undeserved want. 
 
The problem of police aggression is a 
further source of concern. 
 
and 
Encourage the development of 
preventative personal skills. 
Such measures include research, the 
provision of information or advice, the 
publication and dissemination of literature 
and information, campaigns, exhibitions, 
courses, and the promotion of safety 
management practices. 
 
Provision is made for the disclosure of 
information to the Department of Child, 
Youth and Family Services to prevent 
injury to young persons arising from 
unlawful activity. 
 
Requirements 
for 
compensation 
 
 
 
 
To be finalised by SA Law Reform 
Commission. 
 
Pragmatic concerns need to be balanced 
to ensure maximum benefits. 
 
Only blameless victims who co-operate 
with criminal justice system eligible. 
 
Only death or serious injury. 
 
Intentional criminal act required. 
 
 
Crime: 
A crime of violence; 
An offence of trespass on a railway; or 
The apprehension of an offender, 
prevention of an offence, or giving help to 
a constable engaged in such activity.   
 
Conviction or identification of offender not 
required. 
 
Personal injury, which includes mental 
injury and disease. 
 
 
Crime: 
Murder; 
Grievous injury; 
Rape. 
 
No mention of mental injury or disease. 
 
Award subject to stipulated maximum. 
 
Conviction or identification of offender not 
required. 
 
 
 
Personal injury as a result of: 
   An accident; 
   Medical misadventure; 
   Treatment given to the person for 
   personal injury; and 
   A work-related gradual process, disease, 
   or infection. 
 
Personal injury includes: 
   The death of a person; 
   Physical injuries; 
   Mental injury (serious) suffered by a 
   person because of physical injuries 
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No claims for property except personal 
items. 
 
Compensation paid in case of ‘Good 
Samaritan’ injured in the course of 
preventing crime/apprehending criminal. 
 
Only crimes committed in South Africa. 
 
Only nationals, permanent residents, lawful 
aliens and visitors from countries with 
reciprocal agreements. 
 
Prescription period. 
 
Only victims/dependants benefit. 
 
No retrospective claims. 
 
Compensation if offender not identified. 
 
Not in respect of injury with alternative 
source of reparation. 
 
Consideration to role of the claimant’s own 
previous criminal activities. 
 
Crime must be reported to the police.  
Lack of co-operation, behaviour or history 
of claimant can lead to loss/reduction of 
claim 
 
Provision made to prevent offender from 
benefiting 
 
   suffered by the person; 
   Mental injury (serious) suffered by a 
   person as a result of offences of a sexual 
   nature; 
   Damage to dentures or prostheses that 
   replace a part of the human body. 
 
No entitlement if claimant unreasonably 
fails to: 
   Comply with any requirement of the 
   Act;  
   Undergo medical treatment; or 
         Comply with a rehabilitation plan. 
 
No entitlement: 
   Wilfully inflicted injury/death; 
   Suicide; 
   While in prison; 
   Convicted of murder (death caused 
   claim). 
 
 
Categories of 
claims 
  
Standard Amount: Determined by nature of 
injury - Tariff of Injuries. 
 
Additional Amount: Loss of earnings. 
 
Additional Amount: Special expenses 
(Physical aids, costs of treatment, special 
equipment, adaptations to accommodation, 
care and costs of Court of Protection or of 
curator bonis). 
 
Benefits to qualifying claimants where 
victim died. 
 
See under previous heading. 
 
Basic lump sum subject to mitigating 
factors – see following heading. 
 
Entitlements are paid from: 
The Employers' Account to employees for 
work-related personal injuries; 
The Residual Claims Account for claims 
which arose before certain relevant dates 
and which have become the responsibility 
of the Accident Compensation Corporation; 
The Self-Employed Work Account for self-
employed persons who suffer work-related 
personal injuries in their self-employment; 
The Motor Vehicle Account for motor 
vehicle injuries; 
The Earners' Account for personal injury to 
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Supplementary Amount: Victim died 
otherwise than as a consequence of the 
injury. 
earners who suffer a non-work injury; 
The Non-Earners' Account for personal 
injury (other than motor vehicle injury or 
medical misadventure injury) to non-
earners; and 
The Medical Misadventure Account for 
medical misadventure. 
 
 
Deductions 
from 
compensation 
awarded and 
factors 
influencing 
quantum 
  
Amounts deductible in full from 
compensation for same contingency, but 
not from amounts based on the Tariff of 
Injuries: 
Social security benefits (or other state 
benefits); and 
Insurance payments. 
Following deductible in full (also from Tariff 
amounts): 
Damages awarded by a civil court; and 
Damages paid by way of a settlement; and 
Damages awarded by a criminal court. 
 
 
Award influenced by: 
Relief obtained from other state-funded 
schemes such as the Chief Minister’s 
Relief Fund; and  
Indigent circumstances of family. 
 
When a claimant has also received 
income-tested benefit under the Social 
Security Act, the ACC pays excess over to 
Department.  (Converse when ACC has 
paid before a payment under Social 
Security Act).   
 
Method of 
payment 
 
Once-off payments (not annuities or 
pensions) unless the approach of 
supplementing the disability grant process 
is adopted. 
 
Major beneficiaries should be the poor. 
 
Tariff scheme - not common law: 
Consistent with international norms; 
Cost-effective; 
Less administratively burdensome; and  
Not prejudicial to those without income 
(compensation rates standardised); 
 
Normally lump sum.   
 
Provision for: 
Trusts; 
Repayment and/or administration of an 
award; 
Imposition of conditions attaching to an 
award; 
Interim payments; and 
Purchase of annuities. 
 
 
Lump sum only. 
 
Rehabilitation and treatment;  
First week compensation; 
Weekly compensation; 
Lump sum compensation for permanent 
impairment; and 
Funeral grants, survivors' grants, weekly 
compensation for the spouse, children and 
other dependants of a deceased claimant, 
and child care payments.  
 
 
Procedure 
Applications be submitted to central office. 
A cut-off date provided.  
Provision for condoning late filing. 
If exclusionary criteria exist, information 
 
Claim submitted to Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Authority. 
 
Claims officer makes decision – reasons 
need not be given. 
 
District/City Victims Assistance Committee. 
Member-secretary: District Superintendent 
of Police/ Deputy Commissioner of Police.  
Committees meet at least once per month. 
 
 
Juristic person with perpetual succession - 
Accident Compensation Corporation 
 
Decision by ACC made on reasonable 
grounds in a timely manner, having regard 
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would have to be provided. 
Application to include relevant medical 
information and evidence, with medical 
practitioner or district surgeon’s report. 
Affidavit from the SAPS investigating 
officer detailing factual basis and status of 
case, with assessment whether injuries 
arose from criminal attack. 
Application processed by administrative 
staff who assess whether all the relevant 
documentation in place, acknowledge 
receipt and request absent information. 
Some portion of applications would be 
analysed to assess presence of fraudulent 
applications. 
Administrative officer would assess 
complete applications and make 
recommendation to senior assessment 
officer. 
If original application incomplete and 
applicant failed to provide further 
particulars requested administrative officer 
recommends to the senior administrative 
officer that case be closed. 
Senior administrative officer reviews 
completed applications and either request 
further information/evidence, or forwards 
application for board decision. 
Uncontroversial applications below certain 
amount decided by single board member 
and subsequently ratified by board as a 
whole. 
More controversial/larger applications 
motivated to board by administrative 
officer. 
After the board’s decision, applicant 
 
Claim to be instituted within two years and 
legal representation allowed, but costs for 
applicant’s own account. 
 
No legal aid, but solicitors usually prepared 
to take fees from award. 
 
Applicant must prove claim on a balance of 
probabilities. 
 
Reconsideration of award before final 
payment provided for in cases of new 
evidence or changed circumstances. 
 
Re-opening of case provided for in cases 
of change in medical condition/death. 
 
Review by more senior claims officer – 
must give reasons for decision. 
 
Appeals against review decision to 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals 
Panel: 
Appeals conducted informally. 
Representation allowed (as above). 
Hearing in camera and identity of appellant 
protected, except with latter’s consent. 
Reasons must be given. 
 
Appeal final, but judicial review allowed. 
 
No specific mention of appeal/review 
procedure is made, but usual judicial 
review available. 
to the Act, nature of the decision, and all 
circumstances. 
 
Review by reviewer appointed by ACC: 
Principles of natural justice;  
Investigative approach;  
Informal 
Costs order against ACC if the review 
wholly or partially successful or if applicant 
acted reasonably.   
 
Appeal to District Court against review 
decision or a decision as to an award of 
costs.  District Court may dismiss, modify 
or quash the review decision. 
 
Appeal on a question of law to the High 
Court, and thence to Court of Appeal. 
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informed in writing. 
The administrative team complete 
requisitions, and instruct the financial office 
to make payments. 
In the case of rejected applications, the 
applicant would have the right to appeal to 
board, and an appeal board would review 
case. 
Decisions of appeal board not appealable 
or reviewable. 
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5 6 1  Compensation: Similarities 
 
It is generally accepted that a modern state will assist victims of misfortune under 
certain circumstances. These circumstances are dictated, on the one hand, by the 
policy and means of the government, and, on the other hand, by the needs of the 
populace at a given moment. Each country’s unique circumstances determine the 
kind of aid that is extended; so developed and developing countries will extend 
different kinds of aid. In all four countries various compensatory initiatives have 
arisen to deal with the needs of the community – as and when they arise – on an ad 
hoc basis.  
 
While all four countries have various legislated dispensations in terms of which 
compensation is paid by the state to victims of criminally caused misfortune, in most 
instances the causative act is not required to be criminal per se; however, the cause 
of the harm often amounts to a criminal act.  
 
The disbursement of state funds is rationalised by means of various theories – there 
is no one single, universally accepted theoretical basis for the disbursement of state 
funds to victims of misfortune; governments are, however, reluctant to accept a 
legally binding obligation in this respect, relying rather on the social contract theory in 
terms of which compassion shown by the state is believed to build confidence in the 
criminal justice system.  
 
5 6 2  Compensation: Differences 
 
South Africa has no compensation scheme dedicated to the compensation of victims 
of criminal injuries per se. Its compensation systems for traffic and work-related 
injuries are both unsatisfactory and both systems are consequently subject to serious 
criticism. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has served as a unique, 
international example of the working of reparation for victims of human rights 
violations and thus the implementation of the principles of restorative justice. 
 
Britain’s Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme provides for the compensation of 
victims of criminal injuries. Though compensation for victims of crime is, like social 
security, disbursed from state funds, it is managed as a completely separate entity. 
No explanation for this phenomenon is given in the literature or in government 
documentation. While the Criminal  
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Injuries Compensation Scheme compensates victims of crime to the exclusion of 
other kinds of victims; the social security system compensates victims of misfortune 
without excluding victims of crime; this can lead to “double-dipping” and has as a 
consequence the over-disbursement of state funds.  The problem of “double-dipping” 
is compounded by the complexity and large number of social security benefits 
available to claimants. 
 
India has no victim compensation scheme dedicated to the compensation of victims 
of criminal injuries per se, with the minor exception of the Tamil Nadu Victim 
Assistance Fund. 
 
New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Commission compensates all victims of 
misfortune – whether criminally caused or not – in terms of the same rules. No 
distinction is thus made based on the source of funds for victim compensation and 
the target/destination of such compensation.   
 
In the final chapter conclusions will be drawn from the information reflected in this 
and previous chapters and recommendations will be made regarding restitution and 
compensation to victims of crime based on above-mentioned information. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Recommendations 
 
6 1 Conclusions 
 
Restorative justice has in the past few decades focussed attention on the 
predicament of victims of crime. The concept does not hold the same meaning 
universally and care must be taken to avoid accusations of the political manipulation 
thereof, for example, as in England where the government is accused of using it as a 
ruse to introduce increasingly punitive measures against persons accused of crime. 
As a common denominator, however, it is safe to assume that restorative justice 
accentuates the role of the victim of crime in the criminal justice process. Traditional 
viewpoints have delegated the victim to a secondary position because crimes have 
been seen as actions injurious to and punishable by the state. Restorative justice 
promotes the view that crime is a violation of relationships rather than a simple 
breaking of the law and that the appropriate response should go beyond punishment 
or retribution and encompass putting right the wrong caused to victims and society. 
This positioning of the victim at the centre of the criminal justice system brings two 
differing aspects of the victim’s status to the fore: The victim as a person deserving 
aid, and the victim as participant in the process of determining the penalty imposed 
on the offender, or, expressed differently, the victim as passive injured party and the 
victim as active role player. This thesis has concentrated on the victim as passive 
party, deserving of redress. Much cautionary material has been written regarding the 
dangers of the participatory model of criminal justice allowing the victim to usurp the 
criminal justice process, thus endangering the due-process rights of the accused. 
This threat to the due-process rights of accused persons might be overemphasised, 
as the community – represented by the state – should remain a powerful, impartial 
and decisive participator in the criminal justice process, armed with the authority 
granted by the state – and thus the community – to its office bearers. 
  
Ubuntu displays a marked similarity to the values of restorative justice, emphasising 
the harmonisation of damaged relationships within the community in a way which 
strives to be fair to all parties. The argument that the level of anger in South Africa is 
such that the populace demands crime to be dealt with retributively and is not ready 
for restorative justice programmes is countered by the attainments of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, showing that victims of profoundly evil criminal acts are 
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often prepared to involve themselves in participative processes and extend 
forgiveness to offenders. In fact, South Africa has proved to the world that restorative 
justice has a valuable role to fulfil in the face of the most serious classes of criminal 
action. 
 
Regarding the affordability of a state-funded victim compensation scheme, this thesis 
– being a work of law, not economics – cannot provide a final answer. However, 
pointers regarding affordability are to be found in the fact that the current industrial 
and traffic injury compensation schemes are consuming valuable resources without 
producing satisfactory outcomes. 
 
Comparing developing countries such as South Africa and India, on the one hand, to 
developed countries such as Great Britain and New Zealand, on the other hand, 
shows unequivocally – if unsurprisingly – that developed countries provide a superior 
dispensation of redress for victims of crime, both regarding restitution (recompense 
obtained from the perpetrator), as well as compensation (recompense obtained from 
the state). 
 
While all four countries share the influence of the English legal tradition, they differ 
vastly in their historical development. Nevertheless, the importance of perpetrator-
funded restitution for victims of criminal injury is common to the distinctive tradition of 
each of the countries compared in this work – and this was the case long before 
English influence was felt in the three ex-colonies. All four countries have criminal 
procedure legislation formalising the victim’s restitutionary claim against the 
perpetrator. Restitution in New Zealand differs from the other three countries in that 
its comprehensive victim compensation scheme deprives the victim of crime of a 
tortious claim, except in cases of damage to property. The other three countries all 
grant victims common law, delictual/tortious rights of redress against perpetrators.  
 
South Africa’s highest court has set its face firmly against the granting of punitive 
damages. The courts in the other three countries grant punitive damages in limited, 
precisely prescribed instances. Regarding state liability, constitutional law is 
universally relied on as a basis for granting victims of crime a claim against the state, 
but this development is more vigorous in the countries where acute criminal 
victimisation is coupled with the absence of comprehensive victim compensation 
schemes, namely South Africa and India. While it is debated whether the victim’s 
  
274
claim against the state is a constitutional or a delictual/tortious remedy, once the 
claim has been granted, the rules of law of delict/tort are applied.  
 
Concerning state-funded compensation, the legal systems of the four countries 
targeted in this research share the following similarities: 
 
? There are various examples of legislation in terms of which compensation is 
paid by the state to victims of criminally caused misfortune. In most instances 
the causative act is not per se required to be of a criminal nature, but the 
cause of the harm often amounts to a criminal act in practice.  
? States accept the burden – whether on legal or moral grounds – of 
compensating those suffering certain kinds of misfortune.1 
 
Remaining on the subject of compensation, the four legal systems differ substantially 
in the following respects: 
 
? South Africa has no state-funded victim compensation scheme dedicated to 
the compensation of victims of criminal injuries per se. 
? Great Britain’s Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme provides for the 
compensation of victims of criminal injuries. 
? Great Britain’s social security system offers a variety of benefits to victims of 
misfortune and is criticised because this fragmentation leads to the possibility 
of overcompensation of some victims at the expense of the state. 
? India has no victim compensation scheme dedicated to the compensation of 
victims of criminal injuries per se, with the isolated and limited exception of 
the Tamil Nadu Victim Assistance Fund. 
? New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Commission compensates all victims 
of misfortune – whether criminally caused or not – in terms of the same rules.  
 
Both positive and negative lessons emerge from the experience of other countries: 
                                            
1  Such victims are not always identified as victims of crime and the rationale behind 
compensation often does not arise from the criminality per se of the cause of harm 
though the result is effectively the compensation by the state of victims of crime. 
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 Major Strengths 
 
Weaknesses 
 
G 
B 
 
England has highly sophisticated and 
intricate systems of restitution and 
compensation. By instituting workers’ 
compensation, it initiated the idea of 
state-funded compensation for victims 
of injuries. 
The system’s intricacy leads to the 
proliferation of costly administrative 
machinery and the possibility of over-
compensation at the expense of the 
community. 
I 
N 
D 
I 
A 
The existence of India’s ad hoc victim 
compensation schemes shows a 
growing awareness of the plight of 
victims and illustrates that even poor 
countries can initiate some remedies 
to alleviate the role of victims of crime.
India has little to contribute to improving 
and restructuring restitution and 
compensation in South Africa, as its 
restitutionary legislation is not effective 
and it has no universal victim 
compensation system. 
 
 
 
N 
Z 
New Zealand maximises the benefits 
of Britain’s sophisticated and 
comprehensive system of victim 
redress by substituting Britain’s 
convoluted compensation system with 
a unified scheme of compensation for 
all victims of injury. New Zealand 
capitalizes on the benefits of 
restorative justice measures by 
harnessing the non-homogeneous 
cultural mores of various sectors of 
the populace. 
The New Zealand system which limits 
the amount that can be claimed, has 
led to a proliferation of claims for 
exemplary (punitive) damages which by 
their nature are very costly and time 
consuming. The South African bench 
has shown itself to be dubious of 
granting exemplary damages, thus this 
feature of New Zealand jurisprudence 
will probably not manifest itself in South 
Africa, unless specific legislation 
dealing with the matter is introduced. 
 
 
Following from the above general conclusions, the following points will now be 
considered: 
 
6 1 1 Is South Africa compliant with the requirements of restorative justice? 
 
In the absence of a single universal set of norms, Miers2 has provided a formulation 
of the restitutionary elements which a domestic legal system ought to contain, basing 
his research on internationally accepted norms: 
 
? “The legislation should provide that a compensation (restitution) order can be 
an alternative, an additional or a substitute penal sanction.” In South Africa 
there are no instances where restitution is equated with punishment; on the 
                                            
2  Miers D Compensation for Personal Victimisation in the UK: Meeting European 
Standards Paper read at an ERA Seminar, Protecting Victims of Crime in the 
European Union 5 – 6 November 2001 6. 
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contrary, section 300(3)(b)3 of the Criminal Procedure Act pertinently states 
that a restitution order has the same legal force as a civil judgment 
 
? “Victims should be informed of their opportunities for obtaining restitution and 
compensation, and courts should be provided with relevant information about 
the victim’s loss or injury.” The Victims’ Charter places the obligation on 
police, prosecutors and courts to inform the victim of his or her rights, but it 
has not yet been implemented.4  The draft bill proposed by the South African 
Law Reform Commission also addresses these issues, but has not even 
achieved Bill status yet.5 
 
? “In sentencing the offender, the court is to take into account the victim’s need 
for compensation, and any efforts (successful or otherwise) by the offender to 
compensate the victim.” The main legislation dealing with restitution, section 
300 of the Criminal Procedure Act, is not peremptory and the court is not 
compelled to consider the possibility of a restitution order. A restitution order 
is granted only on application.6  
 
? “The court should be particularly alive to the possibilities of making 
compensation orders where it imposes a probation order or a suspended 
sentence.” Section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act creates the possibility 
of restitution being made a condition of a suspended sentence, but as this 
section is seldom invoked, South African courts cannot be said to be 
“particularly alive” to the matter.7 
 
Turning to state-funded compensation, the United Nations Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power8 raises the expectation 
of state-provided compensation for victims of violent crime9 and the earmarking of 
                                            
3  See Ch 4 Par 4 2 1 2 (supra). 
4  See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 6 (supra). 
5  See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 7 (supra). 
6  See Ch 4 Par 4 2 1 2 (supra). 
7  See Ch 4 Par 4 2 1 1 (supra). 
8  Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985. 
9  Art 12 reads: “When compensation is not fully available from the offender or 
other sources, States should endeavour to provide financial compensation to: 
 (a)  victims who have sustained significant bodily injury or impairment of  
        physical or mental health as a result of serious crimes; 
(b) the family, in particular dependants of persons who have died or become 
physically or mentally incapacitated as a result of such victimization. 
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national funds for this purpose.10 South Africa has examples of legislation where 
victims of crime may be compensated by the state, but no victim compensation 
scheme. 
 
South Africa cannot consider its criminal justice system compliant with the 
requirements of restorative justice. However, closer scrutiny shows that the principles 
of restorative justice are being applied in a community justice system that exists – 
largely unofficially – side by side with the state’s criminal justice system. It is 
submitted that the latter can learn valuable lessons about the practical application of 
restorative justice from the former. It is also necessary that the community justice 
system be legalised and regulated to avoid due-process abuses, the most extreme 
example of which takes the form of vigilante courts. 
 
6 1 2 Specific conclusions 
 
In conclusion, and against the background of a growing perception that victims of 
crime in South Africa do not receive adequate support from the state, 11 the following 
specific conclusions are drawn from the preceding chapters: 
 
? The South African government subscribes to the principles of restorative 
justice;12 
? Restorative justice advocates restitution and compensation for victims of 
crime;13 
? South Africa’s dispensation for victims of crime does not comply with the 
standards required by restorative justice;14 
? The common law of delict/tort in South Africa, England and India all 
present the victim with a notional right of redress against the offender;15 
? In none of these three states do delictual/tortious remedies offer adequate 
recompense to victims of crime;16 
                                            
10  Art 13. See also SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A New Sentencing 
Framework) Project 82 Report (2000) 5 – 6 (2 7 – 2 8). 
Website of the University of the Witwatersrand 
(April 2003) http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/report/project82.pdf 
11  See Ch 1 Par 1 1 (supra). 
12  See Ch 2 Par 2 2 2.  
13  See Ch 1 Par 1 3 1 (supra). 
14  See above. 
15  See Ch 3 Par 3 2 (supra). 
16  See Ch 4 Par 4 4 (supra). 
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? South African legislation creates little scope for the realisation of any 
restitutionary prospects the victim might have;17 
? In New Zealand, the victim’s tortious remedy against the perpetrator has 
de jure been replaced18 by state-funded victim compensation;19 
? In England, the tortious remedy of the victim against the perpetrator has 
de facto been replaced by state-funded victim compensation, though the 
tortious right against the perpetrator can be enforced where feasible;20 
? South African legislation and practice dealing with restitution orders in the 
context of criminal trials are inadequate in material respects;21 
? Nevertheless, South African courts allege a commitment to effecting 
restitution;22 
? Restitution on its own is not an adequate means for redressing harm 
suffered by victims of crime;23 
? State-funded victim compensation schemes exist in Great Britain and New 
Zealand and are seen to function effectively in addressing the needs of 
victims of crime;24 
? In India schemes have been pioneered to grant a limited degree of state-
funded compensation to victims of crime;25 
? South Africa has no scheme dedicated to offering state-funded 
compensation to victims of crime.26 
 
                                            
17  Granted that the poverty of offenders is a universal stumbling block to restitution. See 
Ch 4 Par 4 4 (supra). 
18  With the exception of claims for proprietary damages. See Ch 5 Par 5 5 2 (supra). 
19  See Ch 5 Par 5 5 2 (supra). 
20 See Ch 5 Par 5 5 2 (supra). 
21  See Ch 4 Par 4 4 (supra). 
22  See Ch 4 Par 4 2 1 2 (supra). 
23  Though the poverty of offenders is the greatest stumbling block to restitution [See Ch 
4 Par 4 4 (supra)], according to the 2004/05 Annual Report of the Judicial 
Inspectorate of Prisons “(t)he effect of the minimum sentence legislation has been to 
greatly increase the number of prisoners serving long and life sentences.  It has 
resulted in a major shift in the length of prison terms…”  
Website of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons (January 2006) 
http://judicialinsp.pwv.gov.za/Annualreports/annualreport2005.asp#_Toc105306556 
Offenders are removed from the workplace for longer periods and are thus unable to 
earn the means to effect restitution. 
24  See Ch 5 Par 5 3 2 & 5 5 2 (supra). 
25  See Ch 5 Par 5 4 2 (supra). 
26  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 1 – 5 2 2 (supra). 
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6 2 Recommendations 
 
At the outset27 it was stated that this thesis would have a quantitative nature 
revealing the status quo, but that there would also be a qualitative phase advocating 
the transformation of the current situation; according to Alasuutari, “…the best place 
for grand theoretical models is in the final pages.”28  
 
South Africa can benefit by considering retrospectively the mistakes made by other 
countries and avoid potential pitfalls, while espousing proven advantages. 
Simultaneously, South Africa can improve and adapt principles imbedded in foreign 
systems to address local exigencies. South Africa has social problems similar to 
India. The failure of its workers’ compensation and traffic accident compensation 
dispensations are integral to the recommendations made in this chapter regarding 
victim compensation. 
 
The recommendations below are informed by the conclusions in the previous 
paragraph. This thesis proposes that redress for victims of crime – in the material 
sense – rests on the twin pillars of: 
 
? Restitution, to be addressed by the enactment of:  
o The Child Justice Bill; and 
o  Revised legislation to improve on the Criminal Procedure Act; and 
? Compensation, to be addressed by the institution of a state funded 
compensation scheme. 
 
Restitution and compensation cannot function in isolation; their success depends on 
an effective synergy between them.  
 
Redress should be guided by the principles imbedded in: 
 
? The Constitution; 
? Customary law;  
? Ubuntu; and 
                                            
27  Ch 1 Par 1 3 1 (supra). 
28  Alasuutari P Researching culture: Qualitative method and cultural studies (1995) 
Sage, London 183. See also Silverman D Doing Qualitative Research Second Edition 
(2005) Sage, London 326. 
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? Restorative justice. 
 
The following model illustrates the propositions set out above: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Revised) 
legislation for 
restitution 
 
 
Child Justice 
Bill/Act 
 
State-funded 
Compensation 
Scheme  
 
Compensation 
 
Restitution 
Constitution 
Customary  Law 
Ubuntu 
Restorative  Justice
Redress for 
victims of 
crime 
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6 2 1 Guiding principles: The Constitution, customary law, ubuntu and 
restorative justice 
 
In terms of the Constitution, customary law has the force of law in South Africa;29 it is 
of more than merely historical or background interest. The Law Reform 
Commission’s consideration of indigenous customary law has been limited to an 
espousal of the general principle of restitution, without an analysis of the specific 
rules in terms of which indigenous customary law effects restitution:30 
 
Traditionally African principles are based on reparation and less emphasis is 
placed on the retributive aspect of crime. The victims of crime are therefore 
central in those judicial systems. The question arises whether the so-called 
African principles should also be accommodated in the search for a system 
which will give due recognition to the victims of crime. The search for 
restoring the role of victims of crime may also have far reaching 
consequences for the Government's Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. 
 
The South African Law Reform Commission should be briefed to consider – in a 
detailed and insightful manner – the principles of indigenous customary law when 
giving consideration to the implementation of restorative justice principles in order to 
apply the constitutionally endorsed principles of ubuntu – and thus gain the credibility 
of the majority of the populace for the outcome. The perceived lack of adequate 
provision being made for restitution is viewed as a shortcoming in modern South 
African law as opposed to customary African law where restitution is the touchstone. 
South Africa should follow the example set by the New Zealand Court of Appeal,31 
which has acknowledged that customary practices can be adapted to make the 
criminal justice system compliant with restorative justice principles in a way that 
corresponds with the community’s recognised responses.32 There is evidence 
indicating that many principles of restorative justice are already being applied 
informally in certain South African communities, in the form of community courts. In 
these courts no distinction is drawn between civil and criminal matters; a solution is 
sought for problems that have ruptured the equilibrium of the community.33 The fact 
                                            
29  See Ch 2 Par 2 2 2 (supra). 
30  SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) Project 82 
Report (2000) 5 – 6 (2 7 – 2 8) 1.5. 
31  See the reference to R v Lepupa in Ch 4 Par 4 2 4 3 (supra). 
32  Conferencing and sentencing circles are examples of this synergy. See Restorative 
Justice Briefing Paper 2001 Prison Fellowship International: 
(June 2004) http//:www.restorativejustice.org/.../ 
WhatisRJ/What%20is%20Restorative%20Justice%20--%20revised1.doc -   
33  See Ch 2 Par 2 3 3 (supra). In 1995 the Third Legal Forum (themed Access to 
Justice) convened in Durban by the Ministry of Justice pioneered the giving by the 
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that this tendency has arisen spontaneously and without doctrinaire adherence to the 
precepts of restorative justice, indicates that these practices could give guidance to 
exponents of restorative justice in South Africa and elsewhere; these initiatives 
warrant official recognition in order to preclude lawless vigilante justice.34 
 
 6 2 2 Child Justice Bill  
 
The Child Justice Bill ensconces restorative justice in respect of children accused of 
committing crimes. It provides, inter alia, for preliminary inquiries to be held in respect 
of children before they plead. The object is to decide whether the matter is to be 
conducted in the courts or by way of diversion. The concept of diversion includes 
various kinds of restitution. The bill also provides for instances of restitution taking 
the place of punishment. 
 
The Child Justice Bill has been exhaustively and publicly discussed. It should be 
passed as legislation once the constitutionality problem regarding diversion 
programmes has been resolved. The obvious way to resolve this issue is by 
excluding diversion in cases of serious offences.35 By integrating restorative justice, 
including restitution, into South African law, the hitherto neglected interests of the 
victim will be acknowledged and addressed. Diverting juvenile offenders out of the 
mainstream criminal justice system in the case of less serious offences promotes the 
aims of restorative justice as the victim is allowed to express his or her views on the 
harm caused. Reconciliation between the offender and the victim/community is 
encouraged.36 The main problem surrounding restitution, namely the lack of means 
of the offender, is partially addressed as the Bill provides not only for monetary 
restitution, but also for symbolic restitution to a specified person, group of persons or 
institution and the provision by the child of some service or benefit to a community 
charity or welfare organisation. 
 
                                                                                                                             
legal establishment and the government of more recognition to the paralegal 
movement and community/popular courts. 
34  See generally Schärf W & Nina D The Other Law: Non-state Ordering in South Africa 
(2001) 
35  Concerns have been expressed regarding the constitutionality of diversion 
programmes in cases of serious offences. It is contended that diversion could defeat 
the expectations of the victim in these cases, while removing the safeguards offered 
to the child by a full trial. 
36  See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 5 (supra). 
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6 2 3 Revised legislation for restitution 
 
A common response to the mention of restitution is that restitution cannot alleviate 
the plight of the victim, this being due to the universal lack of means of offenders.37 
This assumption has been challenged in the case of victims of sexual abuse in South 
Africa: Research shows that the majority of abuse offenders are employed and have 
a disposable income.38 Another possibility for enabling offenders to affect restitution 
(despite their incarceration), is the concept of paid labour being rendered by 
offenders, what in the United States of America is referred to as “Prison labor.”39 
Thus restitution is an aspect of victim entitlement that cannot be dismissed summarily 
and should play a substantial role in addressing the plight of victims of crime as it is 
the most valuable form of redress placing the burden where it fairly belongs: On the 
shoulders of offenders; in fact, victims prefer to receive redress from offenders.40 
  
Currently the Criminal Procedure Act has three main sections which deal with 
restitution by perpetrators: 
 
? Section 297, which provides, inter alia, for the postponement or suspension of 
sentence on condition that the perpetrator effect restitution; 
? Section 300, which authorises courts to award damages where an offence 
causes damage to, or loss of, property; and  
? Section 301, which deals with the payment of damages to innocent 
purchasers of unlawfully obtained property.  
 
Section 300 is the main restitutionary provision. However, there are serious 
shortcomings in this legislation: 
 
? The victim has to apply for an order of restitution; 
? An order of restitution is limited to patrimonial loss; 
                                            
37  See Ch 5 (supra). 
38  Rasool S Vermaak K Pharoah R Louw A & Stavrou A Violence Against Women: A 
National Survey (2003) Institute for Security Studies, South Africa 56. According to 
this study 60% of sexual abuse offenders were gainfully employed. 
39  See Sarnoff S K Paying for Crime: The Policies and Possibilities of Crime Victim 
Reimbursement (1996) 21. 
40  See Greenbaum B L Compensation for Victims of Sexual Crime in South Africa: Is 
gender bias obstructing financial redress for victims of sexual violence?  (2005) UCT, 
where it is argued that it is within the means of the state to enhance restitutionary 
legislation in order to alleviate the hardships of victims of sexual offending. See also 
Sarnoff S K Paying for Crime: The Policies and Possibilities of Crime Victim 
Reimbursement (1996) 17; 80. 
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? An order of restitution is enforceable merely as a civil judgment and not as a 
fine; and 
? The victim loses the right to institute a civil claim for the shortfall left by an 
order of restitution. 
 
Appropriate legislation is required to remedy these shortcomings. It is a positive 
aspect that a large part of the groundwork is present in the South African Law 
Reform Commission’s draft bill. Subject to some remediable shortcomings, the draft 
bill forms a sound foundation for restitutionary legislation:41 
 
Strengths 
 
Proposals to rectify weaknesses  
 
The concept of victim is extended to 
cover all persons suffering from the 
consequences of the commission of the 
crime. 
 
The quantum of damages is extended to 
cover all damages (in accordance with 
the criteria of civil delictual law). 
 
The machinery for enforcement of 
payment is extended beyond the force of 
a civil judgment. 
 
Rights of absentee victims are protected. 
 
Courts are compelled to consider 
restitution.  
 
Courts are empowered to order 
restitution suo motu without a request 
from the victim. 
 
The victim is given a role and relevance 
in the sentencing process by the 
introduction of the victim impact 
statement.  
 
The victim impact statement serves as a 
vehicle to bring the degree of the loss 
suffered to the attention of the court.  
 
 
The prosecution is also given the 
 
Courts must be authorised initially to 
impose a period of imprisonment to be 
served if payment is not effected. 
 
The immovable property of the offender 
must not be protected from a sale in 
execution. 
 
                                            
41  It proposes, inter alia, a sentence of reparation that must be considered as part of the 
substantive penalty in every case. See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 7 (supra) for details. 
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responsibility to bring the victim’s loss to 
the attention of the court by means of the 
victim impact statement. 
 
Legal machinery is created to protect the 
interests of the victim even after the 
release of the offender. 
 
 
6 2 4 State-funded victim compensation 
 
Various factors are given in favour of state-funded victim compensation: Victim 
empowerment builds confidence in the criminal justice system, the state 
acknowledges its responsibility for not preventing crime, international law calls for it, 
the criminal justice system benefits as victim compensation schemes require prompt 
reporting and victim cooperation with the police, the impact of crime on the state is 
reduced because possible financial reliance of victims on the state is prevented by 
helping them back to a productive status, victims’ psychological trauma is eased by 
the assurance that society takes their plight seriously, the cycle of violence against 
women is broken by addressing their financial dependence (allowing them to leave 
abusive environments) and the cycle of retributive violence and vigilantism is 
disrupted. 
 
South Africa is plagued by the problem that its population denigrates the criminal 
justice system as being biased in favour of the offender. This has led to a loss of faith 
in the system and could undermine its authority. There is evidence that victims and 
their supporters are taking the law into their own hands, leading to the erosion of the 
rule of law. Having undergone radical political changes, South Africa is a country 
which is in a phase of reconstruction: It is imperative that the population should 
believe that the country’s criminal justice system supports law-abiding citizenry; if not, 
this could lead to a loss of confidence in the general administration of the country. 
Africa provides ample evidence of the dire consequences of such an outcome. 
Compensation is a fundamental component of victim support and restorative justice. 
Expenditure on victim compensation can at least hold its own against competing calls 
on the fiscus.  
 
Furthermore, victim compensation reinforces the rights of victims without 
simultaneously upsetting the delicate balance between their rights and those of the 
accused – concerns have been expressed that some of the victim-orientated 
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modifications brought about to the English criminal justice system have reduced 
some important civil rights safeguards for the accused without delivering any real 
benefit to victims.42 
 
South Africa is a country where a large number of its inhabitants live in crowded, 
insecure surroundings and are thus prone to repeat victimisation; these repeat 
victims who are at the mercy the same offenders are particularly deserving of the 
state’s assistance in fiscal form.43 
 
Restorative justice cannot come of age in South Africa without the introduction of 
state-funded victim compensation. No matter how well-drafted legislation dealing with 
restitution might be, the lack of means of offenders will remain an insuperable 
problem in offender-victim restitution; compounding this, is the fact that the 
prosecution rate of offenders is very low.44 By criminalising certain forms of 
behaviour, the state tacitly acknowledges that society – and consequently the 
individual – deserves to be protected from the vicissitudes caused by such criminal 
acts. Also, delivery of legal aid in South Africa does not realistically guarantee victims 
the means to enforce the restitutionary claims they have. Developed countries, like 
Great Britain and New Zealand, have victim compensation schemes, while 
developing countries, like India and South Africa, have not evolved to this point. The 
major factor against state-funded victim compensation is the burden it places on the 
fiscus. The incremental introduction of victim compensation can partially address this 
concern.45 The value of a victim compensation scheme in the context of restorative 
justice is summarised in the following statement:46 
 
If reparation to victims is to be an overarching goal of restorative justice, 
compensation programs can serve a very valuable purpose: it (sic) can 
supplement restitution in those cases where offenders are unable to fully 
repair the harm done to victims… Moreover, in those cases where it would 
take years for offenders to pay back their victims, compensation funds could 
pay the victim immediately, and offenders would then pay into the fund. 
 
                                            
42  See generally Cape E (ed) Reconcilable Rights: analysing the tension between 
victims and defendants (2004) Legal Action Group. 
43  Van Dijk J “Implications of the International Crime Victims Survey for a Victim 
Perspective” in Crawford A & Goodey J (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective in 
Criminal Justice (2000) 97 118. 
44  S A Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A compensation scheme for victims of 
crime in SA) Project 82 Discussion paper 97 (2001) Ch 2. 
45  For the reasons already stated: See Ch 5 Par 5 2 2 (supra). 
46  Restorative Justice Online: (June 2004) 
http://www.restorativejustice.org/rj3/Introduction-
Definition/Tutorial/Victim_Compensation_Funds.htm 
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The introduction of victim compensation will have the further benefit of rectifying the 
perception that the practice of restorative justice in South Africa is biased in favour of 
the offender while marginalising the victim.47 
 
Turning to the administrative format of victim compensation schemes, there are two 
viable models: 
 
? Schemes dedicated exclusively to the compensation of victims of crime, 
following the example of Britain’s Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Scheme; and  
? Unified schemes compensating all victims of misfortune, following the 
example of New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme. 
 
Most victim compensation schemes fall under the first category. The reason for this 
phenomenon seems to be purely historical: Workers’ compensation was the 
forerunners of traffic accident compensation, victim of crime compensation being a 
more recently innovated form of state-funded compensation. However, this thesis 
advocates adherence to the essential characteristics of a unified scheme in South 
Africa for the following reasons: 
 
? The equality argument which asserts that victims of crime should not be 
treated differently from victims of other kinds of misfortune.48 
? Having separate compensation schemes for various categories of victims 
leads to unnecessary complications when a decision has to be made 
regarding the causation of a particular injury in order to direct the claim to 
the appropriate fund.49 
                                            
47  Setlatjile D Victim Involvement in Restorative Justice Paper submitted for the XIth 
International Symposium on Victimology 13 – 18 July 2003 Stellenbosch 1. 
(June 2004) http://www.victimology.co.za/new%20papers/setlatjile.pdf 
48  The fact that a conviction is not required under most systems supports this – how can 
a person strictu sensu be a victim of crime when no-one is convicted of the 
commission of the crime in question? It is a paradox if “victims of crime” are treated 
differently from victims of other forms of misfortune when there may not be a crime of 
which an offender has been convicted. 
49  See R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Welch  (Unreported)  
Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/3206/99. 
  
288
? The distinction between occupational and other injuries is obsolete as it 
dates from an era when workers’ compensation was the only social 
insurance and welfare programme in operation.50 
? Modern society should have a system of compensation based on the 
financial consequences of an injury rather than its causation. All victims of 
injury have the same financial needs irrespective of the cause of their 
injuries.51 
? A proliferation of benefits available to victims of misfortune leads to the 
danger of the overcompensation of some victims of misfortune at the 
expense of others and the state. 
? A single system allows for a more equitable dispensation than a number 
of systems paying benefits on varying scales from public funds. 
? The previous point does not mean that precise parameters cannot be set 
to qualify for compensation as a victim of crime which differ from those set 
for other victims of misfortune.52 
? In South Africa the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act’s53 Compensation Fund and the Road Accident Fund are not 
functioning optimally in compensating victims of industrial misfortunes and 
road accidents, respectively – both systems are the subject of critical 
investigation. In fact, the parliamentary portfolio committee considering 
the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act was of the opinion that social 
security support systems in South Africa are due for complete overhaul.54  
? A single scheme administered by one bureau of officials will be more cost 
effective to administer than separate systems because a duplication of 
functions is avoided. 
                                            
50  Coverage against employment injuries and diseases  (Second Draft)  (Paper 
prepared for the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social 
Security System by Prof  M P Olivier and Adv E Klinck  July 2001)  Par 16.7. 
51  See previous footnote. 
52  For example, the requirement can be imposed that a victim of crime has to be 
blameless to qualify for compensation, while a victim of an industrial mishap is not 
debarred as a result of his or her own negligence. 
53  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 1 (supra). 
54  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 1 (supra). During September 2006 the Department of Transport 
published Strategy for the Restructuring of the Road Accident Fund as Compulsory 
Social Insurance in relation to the Comprehensive Social Security System (Notice 
1315 of 2006) in which it invited comment on a proposed no-fault scheme to replace 
the Road Accident Fund system. By limiting the levels of benefits available the new 
Scheme envisages protecting the lives and livelihoods of road accident victims across 
a broader spectrum, while leaving cover for risks relating to lifestyle protection to 
discretionary protection in the form of personal insurance. 
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? A unified computer database operated by a single scheme will prevent 
double compensation of a claimant. 
? The existence of a single scheme for the compensation of victims of 
misfortune generally allows for flexibility as categories of victims can be 
added to or omitted from the list of beneficiaries as changing 
circumstances/financial resources dictate. 
? The financial burden of victim compensation could be ameliorated by 
cross-subsidisation and the spreading of risk between the areas of 
compensation currently falling under the aegis of the South African 
Compensation Fund and Road Accident Fund respectively.55 
? As victim compensation does not aspire to grant full compensation to the 
victim in the manner of the law of delict, it is suggested that the method of 
payment followed by the New Zealand system56 be investigated in 
preference to the once-off method of payment favoured by the South 
African Law Reform Commission;57 this pattern is favoured in the recently 
passed Road Accident Fund Amendment Act of 2005.58 In this way the 
victim’s needs may be monitored and the compensation payable can be 
adjusted as his or her needs change. This will ultimately lead to the 
prevention of state funds being paid to persons who no longer require 
assistance. 
 
Regarding the method of compensation employed, there are two fundamental 
options: 
 
? Schemes paying compensation chiefly in the form of a lump sum, 
following the example of Britain’s Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Scheme; and 
? Schemes paying compensation in the form of periodical payments, 
following the example of New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme. 
 
Adoption of a periodical payment system is advocated for the following reasons: 
 
                                            
55  Coverage against employment injuries and diseases (Second Draft) Par 16.16. 
56  See Ch 5 Par 5 5 2 (supra). 
57  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 2 (supra). 
58  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 1 4 (supra). 
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? As affordability is the major stumbling block to the institution of a victim 
compensation scheme in South Africa, it makes sense to pay victims (of 
all kinds of misfortune) amounts they actually need for treatment and 
survival as and when they need them rather than to make lump sum 
payments based simply on a tariff of injuries with no reference to the 
financial consequences suffered by the victim as a result of the injury. 
? A single system will facilitate cross-funding which will ultimately benefit 
victims of injury. The argument that funds obtained from employer 
contributions should be allocated strictly to compensating occupational 
injuries does not hold water, as in modern society these contributions 
have taken on the nature of taxation rather than insurance.59 This applies 
also to the Road Accident Fund which is financed from a levy on fuel sold 
and from loans.60 The citizen is not given the choice as to what his or her 
taxation is to be spent on – why should the situation regarding victim 
compensation be any different? 
? Payments can be reduced or increased as the victim’s needs change. 
? The possibility of the victim squandering – or otherwise being 
dispossessed of61 – a relatively large lump sum payment and ending up 
needy, is reduced. This is particularly relevant bearing in mind that a large 
sector of the local population is unsophisticated and vulnerable to devious 
manipulation. 
? Victims can be protected from inflation on an ongoing basis. While 
inflation might be at relatively low levels at present, the future it is not 
reliably predictable. 
 
The operation of a single system for the compensation of all victims of accidental 
injury does not mean that differing criteria cannot be set for victims of different kinds 
                                            
59  Employee’s compensation is still an instance of statutory insurance in Great Britain. 
In SA, however, the Compensation Fund is administered as a state fund. 
60  The progression from an insurance-based system to a tax-based system is borne out 
by the history of the Road Accident Fund: The (original) Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 
29 of 1942 insured the owner of a motor vehicle. This insurance was undertaken by 
private insurance companies. If the owner failed to reinsure every twelve months the 
cover lapsed. During the 1960s three insurance companies were found not to have 
sufficient income to cover claims and went into liquidation. In 1965, the MVA Fund 
was created as the re-insurer of those companies which undertook third party 
insurance. Today funding is derived from a fuel levy. 
Website of the Department of Transport: 
(May 2004) http://www.transport.gov.za/library/docs/robot/guest.html 
61  Bearing in mind especially one of the premises of this treatise, namely the 
unacceptable extent of crime in SA. See Ch 1 Par 1 1 (supra). 
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of misfortune.62 A victim compensation scheme should adhere to the following 
principles:63  
 
? Only blameless victims who co-operate with the criminal justice system 
should be eligible for compensation. 
? Compensation should be available only in cases of death or serious injury, 
though this could change as and when competing calls on the fiscus 
diminish. 
? A prima facie intentional criminal act should have occurred. This means 
that a successful prosecution need not be required in all cases, for 
example where the perpetrator has died. 
? No claims for property – except personal items – should be entertained. 
? Compensation may be paid in the case of a “Good Samaritan” injured in 
the course of preventing a crime or apprehending a criminal. 
? Only crimes committed in South Africa should attract compensation. 
? Only nationals, permanent residents, lawful aliens and visitors from 
countries with reciprocal agreements should be eligible for compensation. 
? Only victims or dependants of victims should be eligible for benefits. 
? The precise parameters of the concept of “dependant” should be defined 
by the legislature, as the concept of extended family is central to 
customary law.64 
? Retrospective claims should not be accepted. 
? Compensation should be payable even if the offender is not identified. 
? No compensation ought to be paid in respect of injuries where alternative 
sources of reparation are available.65 
                                            
62  See Ch 5 Par 5 5 3 (supra). 
63  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 2 (supra). 
64  For example, in the Memorandum on the Objects of the Welfare Laws Amendment 
Bill (B90-1997), it is stated that the Bill aims to amend s 10 of the Child Care Act 74 of 
1983, in order to exempt members of the extended family of the child from the 
prohibition against receiving and caring for children younger than seven years of age.  
South African Government Website (December 2005) 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/bills/1997.htm 
65  The occasions where this might happen will be reduced if the recommendation of a 
periodical payment system made above is accepted. 
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? The previous point does not however imply that victims should 
automatically be deprived of the delictual right to sue the perpetrator for 
personal injuries.66 In New Zealand this exclusion has led to a proliferation 
of claims for exemplary (punitive) damages. As South African courts have 
hitherto shown their reluctance to grant exemplary damages,67 it seems 
unlikely that this phenomenon will manifest itself in South Africa. It is 
submitted that any redress which the victim manages to obtain from the 
perpetrator can be deducted from the amount he or she would receive 
from the state. By nullifying this common law right of the victim, the 
perpetrator would be protected from the consequences of his or her 
wrongdoing, and that certainly is not the object of victim compensation. 
? The claimant’s own previous criminal activities ought to be taken into 
account when deciding eligibility and/or quantum. 
? In order to qualify for compensation, the claimant must report the crime to 
the police.68 
 
Briefly stated, what is recommended is the consolidation of the Road Accident Fund 
and the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act’s Compensation 
Fund; these two bodies should be amalgamated to create a unified Compensation 
Scheme to compensate victims of crime, as well as victims of traffic and industrial 
injuries. General qualifying criteria will have to be drafted, with specific criteria 
applying in cases of traffic, industrial and crime related injuries, respectively.  
 
Turning to the question of finance – while bearing in mind that this is a work of law 
not governmental finance – it is suggested that funding for the proposed scheme be 
obtained from the following sources: 69 
 
? Funding currently channelled to the Road Accident Fund; 
                                            
66  As is the case in New Zealand; see Ch 5 Par 5 5 1 5 (supra). 
67  Ch 3 Par 3 3 2 (supra). 
68  Currently there is a low rate of crime reporting to the police (except in cases where 
required in terms of insurance policies).  This requirement will have positive 
consequences in this regard. See SA Law Reform Commission Sentencing (A New 
Sentencing Framework) Project 82 Report (2000) 5 – 6 (2 7 – 2 8) Par 2.3 12. 
69  See Ch 5 Par 5 2 2 4 for the recommendations of the SALRC in this regard. See also 
Par 6 3 (infra) regarding suggestions in a Private Member’s Bill creating a victim 
compensation fund: Democratic Alliance website 
 (Jul 2006) http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/News/Article.asp?ID=6654 
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? Funding currently channelled to the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act’s Compensation Fund;  
? Fines imposed as sentences by criminal courts; 
? Bail forfeited to the state; 
? Funds appropriated by Parliament from time to time for the purposes of 
victim compensation;  
? Any donations or bequests made to the fund by local and foreign 
individuals or bodies corporate;  
? Dedicated taxes on goods and services (e g the consumption of alcohol or 
the purchase of firearms or ammunition); 
? Proceeds of crime confiscated in terms of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act;70 and 
? A surcharge on criminal convictions. 
 
 
                                            
70  121 of 1998. See Ch 4 Par 4 3 1 4 (supra). In October 2006 it was announced that 
South Africa would distribute R73,8-million in seized assets of crime to agencies and 
departments involved in combating crime. “Proceeds of crime to combat crime” 
(October 2006) http://www.southafrica.info/what_happening/news/crime-201006.htm 
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The changes and innovations proposed are illustrated by the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 3 Final comments 
 
Research has shown that a pressing need exists for measures aimed at creating an 
environment conducive to the effective enforcement of offender restitution for victims 
of crime. Restitution alone cannot alleviate the plight of the vast majority of crime 
victims, no matter how efficient the enforcement structures created by the state. All 
measures of debt enforcement have to function within the constraints imposed by the 
Constitution. While the main reason for the low viability of restitution in South Africa is 
the poverty of offenders, even affluent countries like Great Britain and New Zealand 
share this problem. It is unlikely that offenders will ever be able to redress fully the 
havoc wrought by their deeds. It is therefore necessary that the state intervene in 
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creating and funding a victim compensation scheme within the parameters 
suggested. 
  
The already parlous predicament of victims of crime is exacerbated when the 
community fails to heed their needs. The South African government has pledged its 
support for restorative justice. Without the necessary resources this notional 
commitment grants victims of crime meagre benefits. Restorative justice is not simply 
an academic catchphrase: If the state continues to pay only lip service thereto, it 
does so at the risk of alienating the growing voice of concern for the suffering of 
victims of crime.  
 
The exigency of the situation has been highlighted in the trial of S v Scott-Crossley,71 
in which the first accused was convicted of murder, executed by placing the 
deceased in a lion enclosure. The direct relevance to this research lies in the first 
accused’s evidence in mitigation. He testified that the ubuntu process had started as 
soon as his family had held meetings with the deceased’s family during the year 
preceding the trial. The accused’s family was willing to support the deceased’s 
family, both financially and emotionally, and thus ameliorate the loss. The defence 
specifically denied that this was a case of the accused attempting to buy his way out 
of prison. The accused indicated that he was prepared to pay R30 000 toward funeral 
costs, to build a house worth R100 000 and to pay R1 000 per month for ten years – 
the deceased’s estimated future earnings – to the family. However, the accused 
would have to be allowed to work in order to meet these commitments. Strict 
correctional supervision was mooted by the defence as being the most appropriate 
sentencing option provided by law.  
 
The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment and quoted in the media as saying, 
“We are sorry that the family didn't accept our offer of financial compensation.”72 The 
restitutionary rights of the family thus took second place to the interests of the 
community in seeing the offender punished. The deceased was a farm labourer and, 
even in the absence of a victim compensation scheme to assist the survivors, it is 
likely that they will become dependent on the state for bare survival, either directly or 
                                            
71 Phalaborwa Circuit Court (Unreported). “Scott-Crossley 'wants to make good'” 12 
August 2005 Independent Online. 
 (August 2005) 
  http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=qw1123847461532B263 
72  “Scott-Crossley expected heavy sentence” 30 September 2005 News24.com 
 (September 2005)  
 http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1809322,00.html 
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indirectly. While the incarceration of the accused was no doubt an appropriate 
sentence, and met with the approval of the family of the deceased and the 
community,73 it is surely inequitable that the public interest has to be served at the 
direct expense of the victims. 
  
As long as South Africa offers no state-funded compensation to victims such as 
those in the Scott-Crossley case, courts will be confronted by the dilemma of having 
to reconcile the interests of victims of crime with those of the community as a whole. 
The interests of justice demand that courts impose sentences of imprisonment in 
cases such as the Scott-Crossley case; on the other hand, imprisoning the 
perpetrator will – in the vast majority of cases – lead to the restitutionary claims of 
victims dwindling to nothing. This dilemma is highlighted by statistics showing South 
Africa to have the highest prison population in Africa – and the fifteenth highest in 
international terms74 – which has the effect of rendering restitution by offenders an 
even more remote possibility. The state has to take a part of the responsibility for 
these high levels of incarceration due to its institution of minimum prison sentences 
and the long periods for which accused persons are kept in prison awaiting trial.75 
State funded victim compensation is the primary instrument to resolve the conflict 
between the interests of the community and those of victims of crime in this instance. 
 
On 20 July 2006, the Democratic Alliance submitted a Private Member’s Bill in 
Parliament seeking to establish a compensation scheme for victims of violent crime.76 
The Bill proposed a fund managed by a group of trustees, appointed by the Minister 
of Safety and Security. The Fund would be financed by fines imposed as sentences 
by the court; bail money forfeited to the state; money appropriated by parliament and 
private donations. The offender would have to have been convicted for the victim to 
qualify for compensation. Compensation would not be paid to persons who have 
                                            
73  See previous footnote: “About 100 people packed in the courtroom cheered and 
ululated after the sentence was read, while (the deceased) Chisale's niece Fetsang 
Jafta declared: ‘I'm satisfied with the outcome.’" 
74  S A has 413 persons imprisoned per 100 000 of the population, while the top country, 
USA, has 714. 58% of countries have rates below 150 per 100 000. UK has 142 per 
100 000. 
Walmsley R World Prison Population List Sixth Edition (2005) International Centre for 
Prison Studies, King's College, London. (January 2006) 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/world-prison-population-list-2005.pdf 
75  See footnote 23 (supra). 
76  The Democratic alliance holds the second largest number of seats in the National 
Assembly: Independent Electoral Commission website: 
 (Jul 2006) http://www.elections.org.za/default.asp 
 Democratic Alliance website:  
 (Jul 2006) http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/News/Article.asp?ID=6654 
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already been awarded damages by a court or who are claiming damages through the 
courts.  How this Bill is received, remains to be seen. 
 
It was pointed out at the beginning of this work77 that every person has the 
constitutional right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right to 
protection against violence from both public and private sources. Giving effect to this 
protection is one of the duties of the state. The courts do not possess sufficient 
means to be effective in redressing the harm done to victims of crime. Restorative 
justice requires state intervention in order to become a reality – 
 
? Legislative intervention is required in order to give substance to the 
victim’s restitutionary rights, and 
? Restitution has to be bolstered by appropriate fiscal support in the form of 
state-funded compensation. 
                                            
77  Ch 1 Par 1 1 (supra). 
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